Battle of Little Round Top: Intelligence Preparation of Battle Field Analysis - Report Example

Battle of Little Round Top: Intelligence Preparation of Battle Field Analysis Battle of Little Round Top: Intelligence Preparation of Battle Field Analysis Overview The position of Little Round Top was useful for the North and the South when it is considered as an artillery position. In Gettysburg, the Confederate attacks were causing considerable damage to the Union line, and the Union troops were on the verge of a retreat. Admittedly, the Confederate General made a mistake by not launching a quick attack on Cemetery Hill, and in the mean time, Meade quickly moved his people to the high grounds. This gave the Union line a chance to hold on using the higher elevation advantage. According to Brann (1863), this place had a lot of features making it a perfect decisive force in battle field. The Battle in Little Round Top The Union defensive position as on the second day of the battle was like an inverted ‘J’ that extended from Culp’s Hill on the north, around Cemetery Hill and south along Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top. Thus, Little Round Top was the left end of the Union Line. However, the day of July 2 saw many dramatic moments. Little Round Top was occupied by a division of the XII Corps commanded by Brig. General John W. Geary. Meade ordered Geary’s to rejoin the rest of the XII Corps at Culp’s Hill. He also directed Maj. General Daniel E. Sickle’s III Corps to take over Geary’s position. However, as a result of confusion, III Corps failed to arrive at the top as Geary pulled his men out. This left the Little Round Top unmanned and vulnerable. Seeing the unmanned and geographically important Little Round Top, General Lee decided to attack the southern end of the Union Line. If it could crush that area of the defense line, it could reach the Little Round Top; a position that would give them indisputable advantage over the Union line below. However, it took some time for them to assemble the troops, and by 4.30 pm, Major Hood’s division headed towards the southern end of the Union line. However, as General Warren understood the importance of Little Round Top, he moved there to assess the situation. As he found the place unoccupied and undefended, he understood the danger involved. As Wright (1990) points out, on Warren’s request, Colonel Strong Vincent sent the men of his brigade to the Little Round Top. However, Colonel William C. Oates advanced towards the top as he was directed to pass up between the Round Tops and to find the Union left. By turning the Union left, it could capture the Little Round. However, there he made the terrible mistake of sending his men down the northern slope. Immediately, his men came under heavy fire by the men of Chamberlain’s 20th Regiment. As there was battle, the Chamberlain’s men were at advantage as they got cover of rocks. According to Norton (1863), the men of Oates were tired by a 28 kilometer walk. As a result, Chamberlain’s men managed to defeat them in a fierce battle. Analysis of the Military Movements The first stage of Intelligence preparation is defining the battle field environment. Admittedly, the Little Round Top was nearly 50 feet above the nearby areas, and it provided a clear view of the surrounding areas. The war at the Little Round Top is a perfect example of how terrain could be used to make military advantages in the battle field and how it can function as a decisive force. In the case of Little Round Top, most of the people in the field including General Robert E. Lee, George G. Meade, James Longstreet, Jubal A. Early, John Bell Hood, and Colonel William C. Oates all understood the strategic importance of the Little Round Top. However, General Daniel Sickles failed to recognize the importance of the place and hence there was a lot of destruction in his III Corps. Evidently, his failure was that he did not think seriously about the strength of the threat, their equipments, and their possible doctrine (Field manual, 1994). Evidently, if he had thought about the fact that the force of Confederates was much stronger and the intention of them would be to capture the strategically important Little Round Top, he would not have taken such an independent decision that put the entire Union troops into danger. A look into the geography of Little Round Top proves that its features fit the components of a decisive terrain. It had a combination of geographical advantages that could be made use of by either side. The very first point is the view from Little Round Top. From the top, view was only hindered by the Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, and its western slop was cleared by chance a year before the battle, thus providing a clear view of the countryside south of Gettysburg. The area from Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Ridge was cultivated, but was open up to the foot of the hills. So, any movement from that side was easily visible. As the area was open to the western side, it was possible to draw up artillery on the slopes to cover the area by fire. The second advantage of Little Round Top as a decisive terrain was its elevation. Admittedly, it was the most predominant area in the vicinity of Gettysburg. It stood nearly 50 feet above the cemetery ridge, and thus, it provided a clear view of several miles covering both Seminary Ridge and Southern parts of Gettysburg. Evidently, if someone wanted to get hold of Little Round Top, it required to climb the steep slope of the Hill where any deployment was impossible. In addition, as the area was wide open, the attacker could get little chance for concealment. Admittedly, when the Confederates tried to capture Little Round Top, they failed to take these facts into consideration. As a result, as they moved up the hill in the open, there was hot sun from above making their every move highly visible (Field manual, 1994). Obviously, the tactics adopted by the Confederates went completely wrong in their effort to capture the Little Round Top. If they wanted to capture it, what they had to do was to attack the flank of army of the Potomac, thus cutting off communication, thus forcing the troops to withdraw from Cemetery Ridge. According to Scott (1994), once the Union withdrew from the top to the low open terrain, the Confederates could take control of the Taneytown Road. Control of the Taneytown Road meant the seizure of General Meade’s entire supply system and artillery reserves. By blocking one of the two vital roads, they could prevent a retrograde operation. However, when Hood tried to take his men uphill in broad daylight through the open slopes, his men were exhausted as a result of very long walk. So, when Chamberlain’s men attacked them, they could not effectively manage to go ahead despite their fierce power. However, had he decided to take over Cemetery Ridge and up to Taneytown Road in the daylight, and then a move to the Little Round Top at night, the Union would have lost the advantage of clear open slopes. In addition, his men would not have been so tired. Admittedly, Confederates tried to go uphill not taking into account some weather conditions. For example, they selected the time when there was no fog and wind. However, if they did the operation in the morning when there was fog and breeze, or at night, that could considerably conceal their movements (The battle of Gettysburg, 1863). However, it is rather wise from the part of Chamberlain’s men to attack the Confederates when they were totally tired. The Confederates were much more powerful and highly experienced. However, they were tired and were totally ignorant about the possibility of an attack from the slopes from where their movements were clearly visible. Thus, the Confederates’ failure to capture the Little Round Top that would have totally altered the picture was the result of ignoring the importance of geographical terrain. What they had to do, especially when it was found that the slopes were occupied by the Union army, was to take control of the roads that allowed supply and communication to the Union men uphill. In the view of Inners and Fleeger (n.d), this would have forced them to retreat from the Little Round Top, and the Confederates could take control of the place. However, though the Union people generally realized the importance of Little Round Top, it is seen that General Sickle made a lot of mistakes in his preparation. First of all, he did not care to go uphill and take control of Little Round Top, This kept all the Union people highly vulnerable. In addition, he did not show any intention to extend his line further to the south. In addition, one can see that he brought his men directly under fire by the Confederates as he made a line of his men to face the attack by Confederates. He made a thin line with no reserve or physical features to back up. Thus, he faced considerable destruction as the Confederates moved ahead. Admittedly, before taking that decision, he had to communicate. That could make sure that either he could go uphill and join the men of Warren to have a better position to face the Confederates as they try to move uphill. Otherwise, he could have got help from Chamberlain’s men to face the Confederates. In all these cases, one can see that what Sickle had done was not according to the rule of intelligence preparation. McGrath (2004) points out that as Sickle made his men confront Lee’s men without the support from Meade, the entire plan went astray and Sickle’s III Corps received great shock. Also, one can see considerable deviation from the standard norms in the movement of Confederates too. First of all, they only considered the presence of enemies on the top of the hill, and seeing only few of them, they thought it would be easy to capture the place. However, one can see that if they had tried to capture the important roads to the Little Round Top in the daylight, blocking communication and arms reserve, they could have forced the Union military to retreat to the planes. Then, they could go to the top at night. References Brann, J. (02 July, 1863). Defense of little round top. Civil War Trust. Retrieved from http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/gettysburg-history-articles/defense-of-little-round-top.html The battle of Gettysburg. (02 July, 1863). The American Civil War. Retrieved from http://www.brotherswar.com/Gettysburg_Day_2.htm Field manual: Department of army. (08 July, 1994). Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. 1.1-B-38. Inners, J. D & Fleeger, G. M. (n.d). Little Round Top: Day 2 action and the York haven Diabase, 60-76. McGrath, J. J. (June 2004). The brigade: A history, It’s organization and employement in the US army. Combat Studies Institute Press, 1-44. Norton, O. W. (02 July, 1863). The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top. New York: The Neale Publishing Company. Scott, H. D. (04 January, 1994). Identification of decisive terrain: Useful concept or historical label?. School of Advanced Military Studies: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1-47. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA274441 Wright, J. R. (01 January, 1990). Time on little round top. GETTYSBURG: Historical Articles of Lasting Interest, (2). Retrieved from http://www.mahoningvalleycwrt.com/Member%20research/Jim%20Wright%20-%20Time%20on%20LRT.pdf Read More