The Vietnam Conflict and the Philippine Insurrection - Essay Example

The Vietnam Conflict and the Philippine Insurrection Douglas M. Lundblad xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx SGM William Evans 6 May The purpose of this paper is to compare the counterinsurgency operations in the Philippine insurrection with the Vietnam conflict. It will identify the root causes of success or failure in each conflict and will identify three critical factors that contributed to the success or failure on the battlefield. We have witnessed, on many occasions, conflicts in which history seemed to have repeated itself. If we do not take time to learn from our successes as well as our mistakes, we will continue to suffer many losses on the battlefield. By reviewing tactics and techniques implemented in prior conflicts, we will save lives and billions of dollars. Although the United States military has proven repeatedly that it can learn and adapt to any situation that our country may face, due to lack of cultural awareness the army entered many conflicts with expectations that were not realistic. Through proper training and by applying the strategy used from prior conflicts, we will be able to better prepare our soldiers to confront and defeat the enemy on the battlefields in future combat operations. The Vietnam Conflict and the Philippine Insurrection Introduction On May 1, 1950, the US military assistance to South Vietnam was authorized by President Truman for repulsing North Vietnamese irregular force attacks and sending American military forces into a distant foreign land. Twenty-five years later, on April 30, 1975, American military forces withdrew from South Vietnam without achieving the objective of neutralizing the threat from North Vietnam, leaving South Vietnam to be overrun by North Vietnamese forces. However, this was not the first American experience of fighting modern insurgency in countries located far from America. The first such experience for the American military forces was in the Philippine insurrection from 1889 to 1892. The burden of the Philippine insurrection on the US military came from defeating the Spanish and taking control of the Philippines. Philippine insurgents, who were fighting the Spanish for freedom from their rule, turned their ire against the American forces. This first experience of the American military in fighting insurgency was a success in terms of containing the insurgency, which unfortunately was not the case in the fight to contain the spread of the North Vietnam inspired insurgency from overrunning South Vietnam. Root Causes of the Failure in the Vietnam Conflict The American failure in the Vietnam conflict led to several critical evaluations of the reasons for the failure. The themes that quite often came across are the conflict between the political and military leadership regarding objectives of the American intervention in Vietnam, and the use of the traditional military doctrine for achieving these objectives. However, from a military strategic perspective, failure in the Vietnam conflict is grounded on the conduct of conventional warfare to overcome an unconventional enemy, and the conduct of limited war campaign against an enemy that was fighting an all out war (Drew, 1986). Evaluation of these reasons for the failure in the Vietnam conflict brings out three root causes of failure; they are: underestimation of the enemy and their tactics; over-reliance on technological superiority; and the inexperienced and under-motivated young officers that led the men in actual combat with the enemy. Underestimation of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong Guerrillas The enemy force that the American and South Vietnamese armed forces had to contend with in the Vietnam conflict consisted of two components. These were the Vietcong guerrilla forces and the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA). During the initial period of the conflict, it was the Vietcong insurgents in South Vietnam, mainly consisting of South Vietnamese born insurgents that had fought against the French for freedom from colonial rule who bore the brunt of the direct conflict with the American and South Vietnamese forces, using the weapons, ammunition, and other supplies received from the NVA. To start with, the Vietcong numbered around just 5,000, and this made containing them easy. However, the threat of their growth and the potential danger from that was ignored at the ground level – containment was the ground level strategy. This, combined with the lack of due consideration for the political and social dimensions involved in the conflict, allowed the Vietcong to grow and develop in the local populations, raising the threat that they posed. Greater control of the Vietcong over the local South Vietnamese population in combination with the infiltration into South Vietnam by larger numbers of Vietcong from the North contributed to their growth in size to a fighting force of more than 80,000 in number by 1964 (Demma, 1989). The successes, though limited, provided confidence to the NVA army to directly involve themselves in the conflict in the South, changing the dimension of the conflict, through the arrival of a more regular armed force, which was demonstrated by the Tet offensive in 1968, a major operational campaign of the NVA in the Vietnam conflict. The Tet offensive may not have been a successful battlefield strategy, but it did convey an operational blow to the Americans and the South Vietnamese forces; it also showed the real strength of the enemy. From an operational perspective, the Tet offensive achieved the strategic objective expected of it. The long drawn conflict had eroded popular support for the Vietnam War in America. Having brought the realization of the full potential of the NVA and the Vietcong, the Tet offensive removed whatever little support for the war the government had,. American withdrawal from Vietnam was not long in coming, with the expected consequence of North Vietnam quickly overrunning any resistance in the South (Swaykos, 1996). Over-reliance on Technological Superiority Wars are won by the superior combination of the quantitative and qualitative components of the competing armed forces. It is easy to assess the quantitative elements, for they deal with numbers of the various elements used by each of the contending forces. The qualitative material and non-material aspects are, however, more difficult, though it may not appear to be so. It is, therefore, not surprising that when technological advantages are present to a competing force, there is a likelihood of over-emphasis on this advantage and the over-reliance on technological performance to achieve strategic objectives in the conflict (Handel, 1981). American forces were guilty of this over-emphasis on technology in Vietnam, probably in keeping with the focus on minimizing American casualties in the conflict. Time was an element that was in favor of the Vietcong. Their aim was not for immediate territorial gain, but to control the minds of the South Vietnamese, and the more time it took and the harsher the methods used by the Americans and the South Vietnamese forces, the more the advantage to the Vietcong. In a non-conventional war, technological superiority of conventional arms does not always deliver the intended objectives. The American forces believed that the use of superior firepower and mobility to neutralize enemy bases and supply routes would be sufficient to quickly win the war. Air support by tactical fighters, helicopters, and armored formations was the key element in this search and destroy strategy. Success hinged on reducing the Vietcong strength faster than replacements from the North or replacements from recruitment in the South began to act. The growing strength of the Vietcong, over time, belied the success of this tactic of superior fire power and mobility to contain the enemy. A key requirement in successfully engaging the Vietcong guerillas meant bringing them out into the open, reducing the effect of their asymmetric tactical strategy. To this end, superior infrared photography, communication systems, and defoliants were used. Analysis of what this tactic achieved has demonstrated that a very large proportion of these operations did not have any contact with the enemy, and in three-fourths of the enemy engagements, the time and place was chosen by the Vietcong and not the American forces. In contrast, the asymmetric tactics in use of tunnels, moving supplies by bicycles, and human intelligence network for gathering information was far superior to the technological inputs used by the American forces. Furthermore, the use of some of the technological inputs was more counter-productive than useful. For example, the excessive use of fire power increased civilian South Vietnamese casualties, and the use of defoliants resulted in damage to the farmlands. American air power was expected to turn the tide through the use of air superiority for strategic bombing of the enemy. Against the enemies using guerilla tactics as their main ground strategy, the strategic targets found were few in number, and the rest elusive, reducing the effectiveness of air superiority. The supply routes were not effectively blocked; the strategically important targets were not removed in adequate numbers by the use of air power, so this tactics did not have any strong influence on the result of the conflict (Drew, 1986). Unmotivated and Inexperienced Young Officers This is the observation of Colonel Hal Moore from the early days of the Vietnam conflict on the combat role required of junior officers: “There was considerable hand-to-hand fighting. For example, the first platoon leader was found later KIA (killed in action) and five dead PAVN lie around him and near his CP (command post) foxhole.” (Milam, 2009, p.8). The war in Vietnam was far different from the war experiences during the Second World War and later in Korea, as they were conventional wars, while the Vietnam conflict was more a counter insurgency operation. In the entire span of the war, it was the junior officers who led men into intense battles in the fields and jungles of Vietnam and who died at almost twice the anticipated rate. Hollywood may have exaggerated the brief span of life of an infantry lieutenant in the Vietnam conflict as that of fifteen minutes, but it emanates from the high attrition rate of these brave yet inexperienced men that took on a determined and experienced enemy. The high attrition rate meant that young officers passing out of the ROTC route and the more renowned West Point were rushed into war fronts without any experience. Besides the inexperience of these young officers, there was also the lack of motivation. There is a convention in the army that leaders have not only to be trained but also to be willing to do what they ask of their men; or, in other words, to be willing to muddy their boots by active participation in the conflict action. However, higher field and general grade officers preferred to remain in safe places in the rear or in the seat of a high flying helicopter. This meant that the inexperienced young officers leading the actual battle formations on the ground had no one to motivate them. Self-motivation for self-survival and survival of the men they commanded was what they were left to depend on (Milam, 2009). Root Causes of the Success in Overcoming the Philippines Insurrection The Philippine insurrection or the Philippine-American War occurred from 1899-1902. The initial phase of the insurrection was fought on a conventional war basis. The defeat of the Filipino Revolutionary Government (FPRG) by the American forces witnessed the transformation of the war into a guerilla campaign in the countryside of Northern Philippines. The insurrection ended in July 1902, when the important leaders of the insurrection were either killed or captured, and the rest surrendered to the American forces, resulting in the handing over of the remaining elements of the insurrection to the police force of the America-run Philippine civilian government. There were three crucial elements: appropriate intelligence gathering, good strategies, and proper planning; the policy of rewarding support against the insurrection and punishing opposition; and the reliance on native scouts in achieving this success. Proper Intelligence Gathering, Good Strategies, and Proper Planning Military intelligence gathering was still in its infancy during the Philippine Insurrection. In an effort to reduce this deficiency, an American Commander in the Philippines, Major General Otis, put in place the Bureau of Insurgent Records (BIR), which translated records that were captured from the enemy. Subsequently, Brigadier General MacArthur reorganized this intelligence gathering initiative into the Division of Military Information (DMI), which coordinated the flow of information from the field commanders up and back to the field commanders, so as to provide a full understanding of the overall picture and conditions (Tucker, 2009). It was recognized at the outset that positive incentives could only assist the Filipinos in accepting American rule, but it would require the use of military force to defeat and nullify the insurrection. Thus military power was given priority and support. More troops were sent and more garrisons created; Filipino supportive troops were developed; and effective use of naval strength was employed. Augmenting the military efforts was the planning that was the outcome of the understanding of the social and political dimensions involved, which allowed the use of social and political divides to reduce the grip of the insurrection over the people, gradually isolating them. The isolated elements of the insurrection were then taken care of by the military garrisons (Deady, 2005). The Policy of Rewarding Support and Punishing Opposition The American military forces followed a policy of rewarding support and punishing opposition during the course of the military operations in the Philippine Insurrection. This policy of rewarding support and punishing opposition was called “attraction and chastisement.” This was an extremely useful and an operational strategy that assisted in overcoming resistance from the insurgents and reaching military objectives. This strategy forced the local population to take sides in the conflict. Aiding the reward and deterrent strategy was the understanding of the social divide in the diverse nation, with the insurgency essentially led and supported by the Tagalog ethnic group. Island populations that were believed to be supportive of the insurrection were converted into concentration camps, and the population segregated from the insurgents, who were hunted down and killed. On the other side, cooperating communities were encouraged to become associated with the governance of their region. This carrot and stick policy contributed in a large way to the isolation of the insurgents, leading to their capture, their death, or their surrender (Deady, 2005). The Reliance on Native Scouts Filipino scouts, police and auxiliary forces were recruited from ethnic groups that were hostile to the Tagalog ethnic group, which was the driving force behind the insurrection. The use of these native elements provided the American forces with better understanding of the geography of this land of many islands, the lay of the land, and useful intelligence. With the growing realization that these native elements presented a formidable asset in fighting the insurrection, their numbers were increased. By the time the military operations were believed to have been completed, the Filipino scouts, police, and auxiliary forces supporting American operations in the Philippines had grown to 15,000 (Deady, 2005). Conclusion In the Philippine Insurrection, the strategy of the insurgents was to use the national will of the population to deprive the Americans from achieving their objectives. The American strategy was achieving the end state of a stable, democratic and independent Philippines. To this end the full power of the nation was used. Military strength was build up to adequate levels to initially contain the insurrection and then destroy it. In comparison, the full power of the nation was never used in Vietnam to achieve the end state of a stable, democratic and independent South Vietnam. Troop strength and military might were not committed in full, nor did the military go all out to wipe out the insurgents. In the Philippine Insurrection, adequate military measures were coupled with the policy of “attraction and chastisement” to drive a wedge between the local population and the insurgents. Such a strategy was not used in the Vietnam conflict. On the contrary, as the war progressed, the South Vietnamese government, the South Vietnamese armed forces, and the American forces were gradually alienated from the local population, allowing the Vietcong to exploit this situation to gain in strength and operational efficacy. In the Philippine Insurrection, the American forces used intelligence to bring together a force of the local population to exploit the ethnic divide that was present in the social fabric of the country. The local force developed by the Americans in Vietnam was not reliable. One of the key American strategies in the Vietnam conflict was the use of its technological superiority. In a conventional war, technological superiority is useful. However, in a conflict situation dealing with an enemy using asymmetric strategies, technological superiority did not provide the desired impact, and in fact worked as a detriment in aiding the isolation of the American forces from the local Vietnam population. The lessons learnt from the successful anti-insurgency operations during the Philippine Insurrection were not put to use in the Vietnam War. This comparison provides lessons to be heeded in training soldiers to effectively plan tactics and effectively take on their combat role in possible encounters with the enemy, with particular emphasis on the global war on terrorism. In unconventional warfare, particularly with an enemy employing an asymmetric strategy, isolation of the enemy from the local population is essential. This will prevent the enemy from growing in strength over time. Achieving this is possible through the understanding of the social and political divides in the country and employing them against the enemy, by providing incentives to inimical groups within the social and political fabric for opposition to the enemy and by strict actions against supporters of the enemy. Use of superior technology for battlefield advantage is a strategy that does not work when the warfare is conducted in an unconventional manner. Full power of the nation should be employed against the enemy to destroy, not merely contain, the enemy. Isolation of the enemies from the local population assists in this drive, and, once they are isolated, the full power of the nation can be used to destroy them. Literary References Deady, T. K. (2005). Lessons from a successful counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902. Retrieved from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/05spring/deady.pdf. Demma, V. H. (1989). The U.S. army in Vietnam. Center of Military History. United States Army, Washington D.C. Retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/vietnam/short.history/chap_28.txt Drew, D. M. (1986). Rolling thunder 1965: Anatomy of failure. Cadre Paper Issue 86, Part 3 of Report (Air University of (U.S.). Airpower Research Institute. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press. Handel, M. (1981). Numbers do count: The question of quality versus quantity. Journal of Strategic Studies 4(3), 225-260. Milam, R. (2009). Not a gentleman’s war: An inside view of junior officers in the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. Swaykos, J. W. (1996). Operational art in the Tet Offensive: A North Vietnamese perspective. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a312931.pdf. Tucker, S. (ed.). (2009). The Encyclopedia of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars: A political, social, and military history (p.403). Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO LLC. Read More