Application of OSINIT on Irans Nuclear Threat - Literature review Example

Position Paper -- Application of OSINIT on Iran’s Nuclear Threat It was the U.S., way back in 1967, which delivered the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), a 5 MW pool-design light water research reactor and the weapon-grade uranium fuel for the reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had inspected this reactor. Later things at the political stage changed with the revolution of 1979 in Iran as the U.S. denied the delivery of fuel (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 7-8). The AEOI entered into a $5.5 million contract in 1987 with Argentina to convert the reactor’s fuel from 93 percent enriched uranium to little below the 20 percent enriched uranium, a little less than the red mark for highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Teheran reactor has been functioning with LEU fuel since 1993 (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 9-10). Iran has been secretively using this reactor to organize such functions that likely connected Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons.  It is clear that without informing the IAEA Iran irradiated uranium oxide (UO2) limits in the TRR and shifted plutonium in glove boxes at Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) laboratories.  Iran had also agreed that it developed minor quantity of polonium-210 in the TRR in the early 1990s via the irradiation of bismuth limits.  Polonium 210 is a popular radioactive stuff employed in a beryllium-polonium neutron initiator, which begins a series of reaction in a nuclear weapon (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 7-8). Although Iran asserted that the polonium was developed as component of a research for the production of neutron sources to be used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators, and not for employing in a nuclear weapons neutron initiator, the plant was kept under routine security at the time of testing.  It indicates that the low security was maintained so that actual experiments could not be detected or doubted (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 9-10). An analysis into the fuel needs of the Teheran Research Reactor confirms its yearly LEU needs on the basis of assumptions over the reactor’s working power, its yearly working strength, and the fuel burn-up before spent fuel run (Nuclear Iran par. 1). As per estimates: 1. The annual uranium 235 consumption was: 5 MW-th x 365 days/year x (0.4 to 0.8) x 1.25 grams/MW-th-days = 0.91 to 1.82 kg per year. 2. The quantity of uranium-235 in the fresh fuel needed in a year was the quantity exhausted split by the fuel’s burn-up, or 1.82 to 3.64 kg of uranium 235 per year. 3. Since the fuel is 19.75 percent enriched, the measured yearly fuel need is 9.2 to 18.4 kg LEU (uranium mass) in a year. If the reactor worked only at 3 MW, it would need just 5.5 to 11 kg of LEU (uranium mass) in a year.  At this reduced power charge, the Argentine-delivered fuel would be sufficient for 10-20 years. Iran had been operating the reactor at a reduced capacity of 3 MH and at a reduced functioning limit factor of 40 percent since 1993 out of compulsion as the Argentine fuel was expected to run out during the next few years 4. If Iran arranged 1,200 kg of LEU (3.5 %) hexafluoride, as published in the media, an enrichment plant could generate nearly 120 kilograms of 19.75 LEU (uranium mass) from it, agreeing a tails check of 0.71 percent (natural uranium). This amount of 19.75% LEU would match approximately 6-13 year value of fuel at a functioning power of 5 MW and a limit factor between 40 and 80 percent, granting some minimal losses in fuel assembly. If the TRR keeps at 3 MW, then enough fuel remains for 11 to 21 years of function (Nuclear Iran par. 1-3). Iran has been on the road to progression for attaining nuclear capabilities, which seem to be beyond the genuine peaceful needs of using it for producing fuel from the enriched uranium. Off late negotiations of P5+1 with the Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, on Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow have been inconclusive as Jalili rejected one by one all the points raised by the P5+1 proposal, focused to reduce 20% stockpile of Iran’s enriched uranium output. Had the Iranian negotiator agreed to the proposal, it would have showed Iran’s inclination not to produce weapon-grade fuel. Iran’s non-committal has once again aired the wider risk of its nuclear program (Zarif par. 3). Iran has been successful in stockpiling enough enriched uranium from the Natanz and Fordow facilities that it can be used as a fuel after converting it to the weapon-grade fuel for making five nuclear weapons. Although time for converting the fuel from enriched uranium into weapon-grade fuel is decreasing, the possibility of secret locations of uranium enrichment can not be erased, given the past doubtful behavior and lack of transparency on the part of the Iranian government to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Further, Iran has not hidden its intention to walk on the new inroads for attaining nuclear weapon fuel through its heavy water reactor Arak. The Arak facility can produce weapons-grade plutonium enough for two nuclear weapons in a year if it starts functioning (Zarif par. 1). Without going into the timeline of the nuclear warheads’ fuel generating capacity of Iran, it seems to be adamant on its demand of “comprehensive sanctions relief” without attending to the problems due to which sanctions were imposed, and showing total disregard to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This indicates Iran’s stubbornness on getting nuclear weapons capability irrespective of the imposition of latest economic sanctions (Zarif par. 3). According to BBC News, western countries do not have faith in the intentions of Iran on declaring the location and output of its enriched uranium producing capacities and peaceful initiatives (“Q&A: Uranium Enrichment” par. 3). Iran joined the “nuclear club” in April 2006, but throughout pressure has been mounting on Iran to suspend production of enriched uranium as it can be used for making a nuclear bomb. According to Jeffrey Lewis, executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University, Tehran’s past doubtful record is responsible for not believing in its promises of peaceful uses of enriched uranium. Iran had been hiding its nuclear initiatives for the last 18 years, thus violating the trust of the NPT (“Q&A: Uranium Enrichment” par. 14-22). Iran has been confusing the stakeholder powers with its “further enrichment” declaration although a contrary intention of running such a plant outside the country was made not quite earlier by President Ahmadinejad. Intentions of Iran are far from being clear on what it wants to accomplish through its nuclear capacities; whether it wants to attain the expertise to develop a nuclear bomb some day or the purpose is peaceful as it states, just using its right under the NPT, although the Security Council and the UN’s nuclear body, the IAEA, has asked Iran to put a full-stop on the enrichment functions, or it wants to bring the powerful elements of the country under the single agenda to create global impact. Whatever the intentions of the Iranian government, it has become clear that it is way behind the critical red mark of enriching to weapons-grade standard (Reynolds par. 1). The big question still remains unanswered because Iran is not adhering to the UN imposition of total hold on enrichment of uranium and is not keen on participating in a discussion on sustainable surety of its peaceful nuclear initiatives. Another loose thread is the 20% conversion of enriched uranium into fuel rods for the Tehran reactor although it lacks this capacity right now (Reynolds par. 2). As far as it is a matter of American interests, it wants to add on the sanctions. It can create a situation, according to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, of instability emerging not only from the capacity of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons but the instability out of an attack on Iran as well (Reynolds par. 3). Works Cited Nuclear Iran. 1999. “Tehran Research Reactor Fuel Requirements.” Web. 28 September 2012. . “Q&A: Uranium enrichment.” BBC News. 1 September 2006. Web. 28 September 2012. . Reynolds, Paul. “Iran confuses again with further enrichment.” BBC News. 16 April 2010. Web. 28 September 2012. . Tehran Nuclear Research Center. “Nuclear Sites – Nuclear Iran.” 1999. Web. 28 September 2012. . Zarif, Maseh. “Iran Nuclear Threat Overshadows Talks.” Iran Tracker. 19 June 2012. 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