The Falkland War between Great Britain and Argentina - Case Study Example

The Falkland War Name: Tutor: Institution: Date: The Falkland War Introduction The Falkland war was a conflict between the Great Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty of Falkland Islands1. Collier argues that the conflict between the two states generated into a major war among two Western nations since the Second World War and was characterized by failure of preventive diplomacy and management of crisis. The war was somewhat unexpected since it not only involved a great power state, Great Britain with a minor player, Argentina but also it occurred in a period when there were sufficient past lessons to learn from such as the Falkland crisis of 1770 and there were new tools and systems designed to safeguard against interstate and international conflict and prevention of any breach of global peace and coexistence such as the United Nations Security Council2. An interesting fact in the Falkland War was the role of the United States, a major player initially as a mediator and later on as an ally to one of the warring parties3. According to Wallace4, the two states went to war for different reasons, for Great Britain, the war provided a means for the great power to reassert its imperial claims and defend its dependent territories while for Argentina, the war was a means to safeguard its honor and sovereignty for which it deeply believed in, to avenge the act of aggression against them by the British Naval Force in 1833 which led to eviction of Argentineans, to uphold its patriotic intentions and national interests and more significantly to divert the attention away from the violations of human rights and economic hardships in Argentina under the Argentina’s ruling military junta. Collier5 indicates that the war was a means for Argentina to bolster its national pride and show of commitment in fighting for what it believed to be its own, sovereignty of Falkland Islands. This forms the basis of the research report that seeks to explicitly analyze the Falkland war and apply crisis management theory to explain why the crisis did escalate into war. The history of the Falkland War The size of the Falklands islands is such that, one would not expect it to be a place that would warrant a war since the islands comprises of a group of islands at the South Atlantic which are approximately four hundred miles off the mainland of South America with the two main islands, Soledad and Gran Malvina having similar areas as Wales6. According to Lauricia, at the time the Falklands war began, the population in Falkland Islands stood at 1820 with four hundred thousand sheep and by1996 territorial census, the population had increased only slightly to stand at 2221 people. Prior to the start of the war, Great Britain and Argentina had been engaged in seventeen year process of numerous resolutions and bilateral concessions7. Previously in 1833, the Great Britain had successfully inhabited the islands and had in fact, shown aggression to protect the Falklands island territories as its own8. In 1965, Argentina presented the dispute over sovereignty to the United Nations under the background of decolonization9. Under the UN charter, small countries such as the Falkland Islands had the right of National self determination to decide which rule they wanted to operate under and apparently, the islanders opted for a British rule rather than the dictatorial governance of the military junta10. Argentina had tried unsuccessfully to woo the islanders with economic incentives with the view of convincing them to join Argentina but the islanders were unwilling to do so11. With the rising pressure for the military junta to get a victory prior to the 150th anniversary of British rule, the Argentine General, Galteri invaded the islands with the view of re-occupying its territory which the British interpreted as an attack to its dependent territory12. In addition, the Argentineans had stable relationship with a major player, a great power state, the United States, which they believed could either remain neutral or support them in the impending war, unfortunately, this was a misconception on Argentinean’s part13. The war officially began in April Second 1982. The Argentinean side required a causus beli to justify their going into war with Great Britain to occupy Falkland Islands, which the Argentineans did have14. Dugdale-Pointon15 highlights that a scrap trader from Argentina was contracted to get rid of a discarded whaling station in South George, an island under British rule in the East of Falklands that Argentina laid claims. The trader landed on the island without authorization and was instructed to leave or get permits and more than twenty British marines were directed to enforce the order16. In retaliation, Argentinean troops were sent to occupy the island and safeguard the scrap dealer, while an attack was made on Falklands simultaneously, taking Great Britain in utter surprise. The British had to act fast to retake the islands by undertaking massive mobilization despite the long distance separating the islands and the UK. The vast distances compelled the British to rely on naval operations17. Although the United States tried to prevent the war using diplomatic systems, both parties to the disputes were in bellicose mood and the US had no options but to take sides, thus, supporting the UK with intelligence and military capabilities18. The war lasted seventy four days and concluded with the Argentinean surrendering and the British retaking the control of the islands19. More than two hundred British military guards, three Falkland islanders, more than six hundred Argentinean military staff lost their lives20. Following the defeat of Argentina by the British, the Argentinean public participated in massive protests against the military junta resulting in the fall of the ruling military rule21. In 1989, the two warring sides restored their relations under the umbrella formula that indicates that the disputes of sovereignty of islands remain aside22. On the other hand , the Great Britain reaffirmed its position as a major player and a great power internationally, and the win offered it the much desired boost of its national confidence and more importantly, ascertained political success of the Thatcher government in the upcoming 1983 General elections23. The Falklands islands as earlier mentioned by 1982 were not new to conflicts as evidenced in 1770 crisis between Spain and Great Britain over the sovereignty of the same islands. The war was effectively averted through a 1771 declaration reinstating the status quo ante24. The use of bilateral diplomacy laden with non-negotiable aspects and multifaceted by the existence of a third party in the conflict, which was the Falkland islanders who had the right to determine under which rule they wanted and chose the UK, made the Falkland war inevitable. The lack of a third party to consistently exert an efficient and sufficient leverage on decision makers for both sides led to a virtual stalemate which was not effectively handed leading to war25. Prior to the war, the conditions for crisis escalation were clearly existent since Argentinean decision makers felt there lacked conflict-limiting norms and systems and that no organizations put in place were apprehensive of their issues and no effective mediation processes were being done and therefore, Argentina was left with little choice but to go to war to safeguard its sovereignty, uphold its patriotism and safeguard its national interests26 (Beck, 1988). Crisis management in the Falkland War Lebow27 indicates that wars are inspired by crises where states perceive that an action by another major player as a threat to its national interests, bargaining power and its ability to remain in power. According to Vasquez28 crises have the ability to stimulate hostile interactions and escalate to war. As evidenced in the Falkland War, Argentina perceived that UK’s possession of the islands, which is a major global player, as a threat to Argentinean national interests, which in this case was sovereignty. Moreover, the push and pull between UK and Argentina on who owned the islands generated hostile interactions between the two, resulting in a major war29. According to Pearson & Rochester30 the decisions for states to go to war or not to go to war is determined by if the conditions offer the state leaders the opportunities to achieve gains through war and more significantly their perceptions and their willingness to respond to the perceived opportunities. In the Falkland war, despite desperate attempts by the United States, the United Nations among other stakeholders to avert the crisis, the prevalent conditions offered the state leaders in Argentina and UK chances to attain gains in terms of averting focus from internal turmoil and national pride respectively and leaders in both states were willing to respond to these perceived opportunities31. According to scientific approach to understanding the causes of war32, failure to effectively manage crisis and repeat of crises enhances the probability of war. Vasquez suggests that based on his scientific approach, once crises results in wars, there are six factors that can expand war among them alliances with non-belligerents, territorial contiguity, continuing crises, bandwagon impacts linked to deteriorating norms of prohibiting violence, weakening political order and economic dependence33. The attempts to avert the crisis and to effectively and efficiently manage the crises were uneventful owing to the element of misperceptions34. There were varied misperceptions on the Argentinean side that informed their decisions to go to war of which, they believed they could win the war against the British although it was not to be. By seeing the islands as a seemingly insignificant piece of territory with a significantly low population, the Argentinean thought that the British could not go on physical offensive over it, taking into considerations the vast distances involved between the UK and the islands and the high number of British expatriates located in the Mainland of Argentina35. Majority of Argentineans have been instilled in them the notions and beliefs that the Falkland Islands were under their sovereignty and that the British and stolen them and in the spirit of entrenched patriotism and national cause, Argentinean did pay a heavy price for these beliefs although unfounded36. Another form of misperceptions were the beliefs by the Argentineans that owing to the mutual relationship they had with the United States in President Reagan’s administration, the US would naturally remain neutral in case of war between itself and UK and when worse came to worst, Argentina believed that they could rely on the backing of US militarily37. Wallace indicates that this was a miscalculation since not only did the US side with the UK, but also offered massive backing in terms of ammunition, military support and intelligence services. In addition, Argentina had received the cutbacks projected in the UK 1981 White paper as a pointer that Great Britain could not fight for the islands and for this, Argentineans were seriously mistaken since the British perceived it as a indication of honor and were enraged at the actions of what they deemed as a Tin-pot despotism38. On the other hand, the British could not foresee a minor player going into war with a major such as her and therefore, they were caught unawares following the 2nd April 1982 invasion39. Why did the crisis management efforts such as negotiations failed during the crisis prior to the Falkland war? One may ask. This was because at the latter stages of conflict, mediation and negotiations are usually gravely constrained since it becomes difficult to keep the negotiations confidential, evaluation of power is usually highly biased, the political costs often increase significantly and aspects beyond manipulation like pride, nationalism and honor ruin any logical efforts to restore the crisis back to its fundamentals40. In general, perceptual process is often gravely filtered by defensive actions and conduct hence; there is no room for any plan other than the urgent desire to cease fire, which is more often than not, the last thing any of the belligerents wants to do41. This is what exactly occurred in the Falkland crisis. In regards to the significance of perceptions, it is important to analyze what the Falkland War was not. The war was not a war of colonialism as the Argentineans believed although it was the starting point of the whole saga, since the islanders collectively desired to remain part of the UK42. The war was not as a result of the cold war since apparently, the lack of proper scrutiny and disregard by the international community was in fact because the crisis was not connected to the cold war43. In addition, Argentina was regarded an ally by the US, that is, an anti communist administration and international community were not ready for another intra-system war in the Western sphere44. Laucirica suggests that the war was not an ethnic or a religious one since both Catholic and non-catholic religious outfits had coexisted peacefully in the islands and in the mainland. Primarily, the war was not as a result of continued enmity between Argentina and UK other than two previous altercations in the beginning of 19th Century, antipathy feelings by the Argentineans against the British only generated in relation to the islands; until the 1930s, the political development and national economy of Argentina were robustly UK-based45. What ignited belligerency were the deeply-rooted grievances entrenched in the culture of Argentineans since they were all brought up knowing the islands, were, are and will always belong to Argentina. Upon manipulation by the military Junta, this was a strong force backing national mobilization46. This is because, in a country with no ethnic core shaping national conscience such as Falkland Islands, national artifacts are the very cement of patriotism47. As described by Shaw & Wong, state leaders learn to appease to matters sacred, to the cognitive and emotional processes in the identification systems48. Just like religion, patriotism can act as the catalyst for and the tool for political maneuver, which informed Argentinean government in going to war49. The perceptions of the military Junta on the tolerance of international environment and the possible reactions of the US that it would be neutral were ill advised and it cost Argentina a lot. Failure to effectively manage the Falkland crisis can be linked to the inability of security systems and security organizations in organizations to fully commit in dissolving the crises which results in one side of the party taking the matters in their own hands to defend their causes50. In addition, failure to observe and identify warning signs in regards to the Falklands war, there was sufficient time, that is, 17 years and ample opportunities to avert the crises, but the warning signs were not read and when they were they were not deemed serious and when they finally were deemed serious, it was too late51. According to Evans52 there was failure in capitalizing on majority of opportunities to encourage preventive diplomacy and restore peace owing to lack of awareness on the explosive nature of the crisis, lack of commitment and convincing enforcement capacity of international community. Conclusion Peacemaking and preventive diplomacy in the Falkland war seemed to either of the warring party as the least option since war meant, in their perceptions, added advantages for the military ruler and for the Thatcher administration. For the military ruler, war meant regaining control and confidence of the Argentineans and a chance to distract the attention from the ongoing internal turmoil linked to human rights violations and economic malfunctions while for the Thatcher government, war meant accessing the much needed political reprieve to continue its unpopular economic changes and there was a great need by the UK to flex its military power in a bid to recover portion of its declining claim as great world power. The war was characterized by misperceptions, self interests and opportunities and willingness among the state leaders to go to war in a bid to regain honor on UK‘s part and uphold patriotism on Argentinean side. Despite having access to experiences from past crisis such as the Falkland crisis of 1770 and existence of international security systems and organizations developed by the international community to pursue settlement of disputes and safeguard and eradicate threats to peace, and last minute mediation efforts, the crisis in Falkland escalated to a major war. Bibliography Beck, P. 1988. The Falkland Islands as an International Problem. Rutledge: Chapman and Hall Inc. Collier, S. 1983. The First Falklands War? Argentinean attitudes. International Affairs, Vol. 59 (3), 459-464. Dugdale-Pointon, T. 2006. The Falklands War 1982. History of War, Accessible from http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_falklands.html Dunnett, D. 1983. Self-determination and the Falklands. International Affairs, Vol. 59 (3), p 415- 428. Evans, G. 1993. Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. Victoria, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S. 1982. The Battle for the Falklands. New York: WW Norton & Company.  Laucirica, J.O. 2000. Lessons from Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, p 79- 95 Lebow, R.N. 1984. Between peace and War: the nature of international crisis. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1984. Lebow, R.N. 2010. Why Nations Fight: Past and future motives for war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pearson, F.S. & Rochester, J.M. 1998. International Relations: The global condition in the twenty first century. New Jersey: McGraw-Hill. R. P. Shaw & Y. Wong. 1989. Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism. London: Unwin Hyman. Vasquez, J. A. 1996. The causes of the second world war in Europe: a new scientific explanation. International political science review, Vol 17, No.2 pp1616-171. Wallace, W. 1983. Miscalculation, crisis management and Falklands Conflict. World Today, 39, No. 1 Read More