Simone de Beauvoirs Analysis of Womens Existence - Essay Example

Running Head: Simone De Beauvoir's analysis f women's existence Simone De Beauvoir's analysis of women's existence as a phenomenological project [Name of the writer] [Name of the institution] Simone De Beauvoir's analysis of women's existence as a phenomenological project Phenomenological psychology, then, has as its task overcoming the naturalistic presuppositions underlying both f these attempts at formulating psychology as a science: by 1) "bracketing" the naturalistic presupposition that "reality" is physical and 2) by suspending (via the phenomenological epoche) the belief parallel to this presupposition, viz., that external perception provides the privileged mode f access to such reality. In addition, 3) the belief, corresponding to 2), that the "reflective" introspection f the subject matter f the "psyche" is to be secured via "inner perception" formulated in contradistinction to "outer perception" is likewise to be "suspended." Subsequent to these methodical moves, "pure consciousness" is accessed via specifically phenomenological reflections which attend to the "how" f the givenness f both the naturalistically posited external and internal objects. As a result f this bracketing f the naturalistic positing f reality and the epoche f the beliefs that correspond to this positing, the how f the givenness f such outer and inner objects is to be phenomenologically investigated qua their status as the "meanings" (Sinne) f "that which is," meanings that are now given to "pure consciousness." For Husserl, Sinn designates that which is manifest to phenomenological reflection, subsequent to the "bracketing" f the "reality" f both "inner" and "outer" objects (and eventually the horizon f the natural world) and the epoche f the natural attitude's naive belief in the transcendent reality f these objects and world-horizon. As such, Sinn articulates the status f the phenomenologically "reduced" phenomena f these objects and world-horizon and the corresponding natural attitude which is manifested when the phenomenological attitude no longer "goes along with" the natural positing f these objects and world-horizon in terms f the taken-for-granted status f their transcendent reality. Sinn is typically translated as "meaning" or "sense," neither f which is completely satisfactory. In the case f "meaning," there is the suggestion f "conceptuality," which brings along with it misleading connotations f "mental" and/ or "abstract" reality. In the case f "sense," there is the suggestion f "sense perception," which also carries with it "sensible" and/or "physical" connotations. Since the phenomena referred to by Sinn may include the phenomenologically reduced manifestation f both "concepts" and "sense perception" without, however, necessarily being exhausted by either, I will sometimes leave the word untranslated, as a reminder that the scope f its reference may exceed these possibilities. (The reference f Sinn to the phenomena f the nonobjectifiable horizon f the natural world and the attitude that posits its reality, for instance, is one such case f the term's scope exceeding both conceptual and physical phenomena.) The naturalistically posited external and internal objects are therefore not to be investigated in terms f their naturalistically posited statuses as "realities" transcendent to consciousness; rather, they are uncovered, in accord with their phenomenologically psychological "reduced" status as "meanings" manifest to consciousness "purified" f such positing (and belief in this positing) f transcendent reality, in terms f the "immanent" subject matter f the science f phenomenological psychology. And it is precisely the lived-experience f such meaning and its structure that articulates the positive account f the subject matter f psychology provided by Husserl's phenomenological psychology. Insofar as both psychological and transcendental phenomenology are defined in terms f the reflective securing and eidetic unfolding f "pure consciousness," their demarcation must be sought, then, not outside but within the context f this unfolding. This makes not only for the subtlety f their distinction, but for its slipperiness as well. This latter characteristic comes to the fore with the consideration f the phenomenological issues that are involved in this distinction. These issues resolve themselves into two broad yet interrelated themes. On the one hand, there is (a) the issue f the scope and limits f the reflectively accessed "how" f the modes f givenness f "that which presents itself" to experience. On the other hand, there is (b) the issue f the "attitude" with which these modes f givenness are encountered. Regarding (a), the domain f phenomenological psychology is differentiated from transcendental phenomenology in that former, in contrast to the latter, secures and eidetically unfolds "pure consciousness" within the context f the horizon f the world. Indeed, Husserl at times (see Husserl, 1962/1971, pp. 83-86)9 considers the phenomenologically psychological unfolding f pure consciousness as the prerequisite for the initial unfolding f the world-horizon as a phenomenon. As such, by first rendering thematic the "how" f the modes f givenness f the world-horizon's presenting itself to experience, phenomenological psychology assumes the function f a propaedeutic (Husserl, 1962/1977, p. 170) to its eventual bracketing, suspension, and reduction by transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenological psychology fulfils this propaedeutic function inasmuch as the initial bracketing and suspension f the naturalistic positing f the transcendent being f outer and inner objects discloses the horizontal being f the world as the "taken for granted" ground or foundation within which or "wherein" such objectives are always given. That is to say, phenomenologically psychological reflection upon the psychologically reduced "pure phenomena" f such objectivities discloses the "how" f their givenness to pure consciousness in terms f their being "parts" f the natural world. Within the context f the psychological reduction, this world manifests itself not as the totality f such objects but as the non-objectifiable horizon that is always co-given with them, without, however, being given in a mode analogous to their givenness. Hence, its "non-objectifiable" phenomenal status. Once the world-horizon is made manifest by the phenomenologically psychological reduction in this fashion, the issue f "how" it functions as the "ground" f the pure meanings investigated by phenomenological psychology, that is, "how" it functions to unify and make intelligible the immanent phenomena f the psyche and ego and transcendent phenomena f worldly objects, may be investigated by higher-level, "transcendental" reflections. Regarding (b), the issue f the different "attitudes" with which psychological and transcendental phenomenology encounter the modes f givenness f the phenomena investigated by each, the following is noteworthy. Phenomenological psychology is differentiated from transcendental phenomenology in that its "attitude" limits itself to unfolding the "how" f the modes f givenness f "that which presents itself" within the context f the "naive acceptance" f the validity f the world-horizon and its "natural" apperception by mundane subjectivity. This phenomenologically psychological attitude thus stands in contrast to the attitude f transcendental phenomenology, which unfolds the "how" f the modes f givenness f "that which presents itself" by treating both the validity f the worldhorizon and its apperception as "acceptance phenomena" referring back to a genesis in transcendental subjectivity. In Husserl's view, this reference to a trans-mundane subjectivity becomes necessary once the so-called paradox f human subjectivity (Husserl, 1978, pp. 178183) is confronted. At issue in this paradox is the status f the "being" f the subjectivity f the lived-experience f immanent meaning that is investigated by phenomenological psychology. As a result f the "how" f its givenness occurring within the context f the worldhorizon, its "being" is understood by the attitude guiding phenomenological psychology as a part f the world. That is to say, psychological subjectivity is understood as a "being-in-the-world." Insofar, however, as the meaning f the world that is disclosed to this subjectivity is understood to have its constitutive source in this very same worldly or mundane subjectivity, a condition that Husserl refers to as "transcendental psychologism" results (Husserl, 1962/ 1971, pp. 82-83). By this is meant the philosophically illegitimate attempt to account for the source f the meaning f the being f the world on the basis f a being that derives its meaning, in part, from that very same world. In Husserl's view, this attempt involves circular reasoning and is therefore philosophically incoherent. This is the case because mundane subjectivity, encountered as a part f (or being in) the world, presupposes precisely this world and, therefore, cannot be posited as the constitutive source f its meaning. The paradox at issue here is resolved by Husserl on the basis f the so-called transcendental turn. Following this "turn," the subjectivity encountering the "how" f the givenness f the world-horizon and its apperception is formulated, on the basis f the "adoption" f the transcendental attitude, in terms f meaning phenomena that are now, with this shift in attitude, given to a subjectivity that is no longer taken to be a "part" f the world, viz., transcendental subjectivity. Insight into what Husserl considers to be the eidetic necessity for this differentiation between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology (and their consequent different tasks) comes to the fore when the problematic involved in the initial (phenomenologically psychological) securing f access to "pure consciousness" is thematized. As we have seen, this problematic involves the phenomenological demonstration f the inability f both the natural sciences and traditional epistemologies and ontologies to fully account for !) the concepts involved in the intelligibility f their respective subject matters, and 2) the various spheres f meaning that are (either explicitly or tacitly) appealed to in the formulations f the "ground" f experience from which these subject matters are ultimately maintained, by these disciplines, to be derived. The critical unfolding f this double inability to account for presuppositions comprises the first task f phenomenology; as such, it provides the much disputed "motive" for the phenomenological radicalizing (in the guise f the so-called phenomenological and eidetic reductions) f the cognitive intent that it shares with these disciplines. The key methodological moves f this critically motivated, phenomenological radicalization f the cognitive intent underlying both science and philosophy are: 1) the bracketing and epoche f all appeals to intelligibility and meaning that cannot be disclosed, via phenomenological descriptions, in "immanent" lived-experience and the subsequent reduction f the "referent" f these appeals to their Sachen selbst (matters themselves) manifest in the "evidence" or "intuition" that is the basis f these descriptions; and 2) the eidetic reduction which unfolds the invariant structures (the eide) f these phenomenologically reduced "matters themselves." Both f these moves take as their point f departure the concepts employed by science and philosophy to formulate their respective subject matters, along with their formulations f the "composition" f the "reality" f experience, as they present themselves to phenomenological reflection. The "phenomenological" moment f such reflection emerges when, by not "going along" with the literal, which is to say, "natural" significance and meaning f these concepts and putative compositions f "reality," reflection is able to attend to the "how" f their modes f givenness. Subsequent to the phenomenologically reflective securing f access to what is now yielded in terms f the "phenomena" f such significance and meaning, the phenomenological method first uncovers their basic style (faktische Wesen). This is accomplished by treating such phenomena as exemplary models and either comparing them or varying them in phantasy, such that what is common to the individual instances f each comes to thematic prominence (in the guise f "seeing essences") (see Hopkins, 1997, pp. 162ff). Building upon this, the phenomenological method (in the guise f the "eidetic reduction") treats, in turn, the basic styles that have been brought into prominence as exemplary models. Again, either comparatively or in phantasy variation, the method brings to thematic prominence what is common; this time the commortality (viz., the so-called pure eidos) that is at issue is taken to belong to this basic style itself. The eidetic necessity f the distinction between phenomenological and transcendental phenomenology emerges on the basis f the phenomenological insight that the basic style and eidos f concepts and experience that are initially yielded, qua "pure consciousness," are so yielded within the functioning as valid, and therefore uncritically accepted, horizon and apperception f the world. The critical taking into and giving an account f this presupposition, motivated by the now transcendental radicalization f the cognitive intent f phenomenology, becomes, then, the task f a transcendental phenomenology. On the basis f these preliminary considerations, the subtlety and slipperiness, as well as the eidetic necessity, f the demarcation between phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental disciplines should be both apparent and compelling. Likewise, their distinctive tasks should now be clear and compelling. Phenomenological psychology, operating within the so-called natural attitude, is guided by an attitude expressive f mundanely critical cognitive and experiential interests; as such, it has as its task the clarification (insofar as is possible within the context f the natural attitude) f the scientific and philosophical claims f the already existing (i.e., traditional) sciences, epistemologies, and ontologies. Transcendental phenomenology, operating within the so-called transcendental attitude, is guided by an attitude expressive f transcendentally critical cognitive and experiential interests; as such, it has as its task the clarification, which at the transcendental level amounts to a (insofar as is possible) "grounding," not so much f the claims, but f the trans-mundane presuppositions (i.e., the "meta," and in this sense "metaphysical" presuppositions) f the sciences and philosophy. As a result f this critical orientation f both psychological and transcendental phenomenology, the suitability, and, when the cognitive radicality f their critical orientations is considered in contrast with naturalistic biases f the traditional philosophies f science, the superiority, f each f these phenomenological disciplines to undertake "meta-psychological" investigations of' the basic concepts and methodological presuppositions that guide the veritable plethora f existing psychological theories, should be underscored at this juncture. The method f phenomenological psychology lends itself to both identifying and clarifying the hypotheses that are presupposed by the various "schools" f psychology with respect to both psychology's most proper method and its "true" subject matter. The method f transcendental phenomenology, taking as its point f departure the clarifying analyses provided by phenomenological psychology, lends itself to philosophically adjudicating the inevitable disputes and foundational crises that arise when the conflicting presuppositions (regarding psychology's most proper method and "true" subject matter) f the various psychological schools are taken into account. In what follows, the presuppositions regarding the hypothesis f the "unconscious" of' two such psychological schools f thought, Freud's and Jung's, will first be investigated within the rubric f phenomenological psychology. Subsequent to the phenomenologically psychological clarification f their respective hypotheses, the issues involved in the constitution f an "unconscious" per se will then be investigated within the rubric f transcendental phenomenology. References Freud, Sigmund. (1972). A general introduction to psychoanalysis. New York: Pocket Books. (Original work published 1920) Hopkins, Butt. (1997). Phenomenological cognition f the a priori: Husserl's method f "seeing essences." In Husserl in contemporary context (pp. 151-178). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Husserl, Edmund. (1962). Der encyclopedia britannica artikel: Vierte, letzte fassung. In Phanomenologische Psychologie (pp. 277-301). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, Edmund. (May, 1971). Phenomenology (translation f "Der encyclopedia britannica artikel: Vierte, letzte fassung). The Journal f the British Society for Phenomenology, II: 2, 83-86. Husserl, Edmund (1977). Phenomenological psychology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1962) Husserl, Edmund. (1978). The crisis f european sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1954) Husserl, Edmund. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenolog3 and to a phenomenological philosophy, first book. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1913) Jung, C. G. (1918). Studies in word association. London: Routledge & Kegal Paul. Jung, C. G. (1976). Psychological types. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Original work published in 1920) Read More