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Pages 8 (2008 words)
Phenomenological psychology, then, has as its task overcoming the naturalistic presuppositions underlying both f these attempts at formulating psychology as a science: by 1) "bracketing" the naturalistic presupposition that "reality" is physical and 2) by suspending (via the phenomenological epoche) the belief parallel to this presupposition, viz., that external perception provides the privileged mode f access to such reality…
As a result f this bracketing f the naturalistic positing f reality and the epoche f the beliefs that correspond to this positing, the how f the givenness f such outer and inner objects is to be phenomenologically investigated qua their status as the "meanings" (Sinne) f "that which is," meanings that are now given to "pure consciousness."
For Husserl, Sinn designates that which is manifest to phenomenological reflection, subsequent to the "bracketing" f the "reality" f both "inner" and "outer" objects (and eventually the horizon f the natural world) and the epoche f the natural attitude's naive belief in the transcendent reality f these objects and world-horizon. As such, Sinn articulates the status f the phenomenologically "reduced" phenomena f these objects and world-horizon and the corresponding natural attitude which is manifested when the phenomenological attitude no longer "goes along with" the natural positing f these objects and world-horizon in terms f the taken-for-granted status f their transcendent reality. ...
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