As a result f this bracketing f the naturalistic positing f reality and the epoche f the beliefs that correspond to this positing, the how f the givenness f such outer and inner objects is to be phenomenologically investigated qua their status as the "meanings" (Sinne) f "that which is," meanings that are now given to "pure consciousness."
For Husserl, Sinn designates that which is manifest to phenomenological reflection, subsequent to the "bracketing" f the "reality" f both "inner" and "outer" objects (and eventually the horizon f the natural world) and the epoche f the natural attitude's naive belief in the transcendent reality f these objects and world-horizon. As such, Sinn articulates the status f the phenomenologically "reduced" phenomena f these objects and world-horizon and the corresponding natural attitude which is manifested when the phenomenological attitude no longer "goes along with" the natural positing f these objects and world-horizon in terms f the taken-for-granted status f their transcendent reality. ...
In the case f "meaning," there is the suggestion f "conceptuality," which brings along with it misleading connotations f "mental" and/ or "abstract" reality. In the case f "sense," there is the suggestion f "sense perception," which also carries with it "sensible" and/or "physical" connotations. Since the phenomena referred to by Sinn may include the phenomenologically reduced manifestation f both "concepts" and "sense perception" without, however, necessarily being exhausted by either, I will sometimes leave the word untranslated, as a reminder that the scope f its reference may exceed these possibilities. (The reference f Sinn to the phenomena f the nonobjectifiable horizon f the natural world and the attitude that posits its reality, for instance, is one such case f the term's scope exceeding both conceptual and physical phenomena.) The naturalistically posited external and internal objects are therefore not to be investigated in terms f their naturalistically posited statuses as "realities" transcendent to consciousness; rather, they are uncovered, in accord with their phenomenologically psychological "reduced" status as "meanings" manifest to consciousness "purified" f such positing (and belief in this positing) f transcendent reality, in terms f the "immanent" subject matter f the science f phenomenological psychology. And it is precisely the lived-experience f such meaning and its structure that articulates the positive account f the subject matter f psychology provided by Husserl's phenomenological psychology.
Insofar as both psychological and transcendental phenomenology are defined in terms f the reflective securing and eidetic unfolding f "pure consciousness," their demarcation must be sought, then, not