Standard View of Responsibility - Essay Example

Introduction Moral luck involves the question of responsibility for that which one cannot control. Is it just to hold a person morally responsible for actions taken in response to a situation he/she did not bring about According to Thomas Nagel (1993), "where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck" (59). In other words, holding someone responsible for his/her actions even though those actions were taken in circumstances that were foisted upon him/her is considered moral luck. This definition suggests that moral luck and moral responsibility bear a close relationship. Concepcion (2002) describes the "standard view of responsibility" whereby "it is unjust to hold a person morally responsible for that which she did not control. Agents deserve to be morally appraised or held liable only for that which they controlled" (455). The problem this poses is that at some level it can always be argued that a situation was outside of a person's control. There will invariably be some uncontrollable factor that, when joining the confluence of other factors over which a person did have control, it can be argued was the cause of any given scenario. For example, if a person driving a vehicle strikes a child who suddenly runs into the road, it might be argued that the person could have been paying closer attention and thereby braked sooner, or should have been driving more slowly. On the other hand it could be argued that a reasonable person under the circumstances could not have predicted the child running into the road, and therefore this was just bad luck and the driver should not be held responsible. This epitomizes the concept of moral luck. To what extend does a random, uncontrollable occurrence relieve a person of moral responsibility for a harm done Concepcion goes on to argue that accepting the standard view of responsibility "is tantamount to claiming that people are never justly morally appraised or held liable since luck appears to be omnipresent." He describes the shortcomings of the standard view: "If we want to see justice done with regard to responsibility, then we must either allow that people are never morally responsible, show that luck is not ubiquitous or at least that ubiquitous luck is not moral, or show that ascriptions of responsibility can retain justice despite the omnipresence of luck" (455). The implication is that it does not make sense to avoid assigning responsibility simply because luck played a role in the moral dilemma, since luck will virtually always be a factor to some degree. This would logically mean that nobody is ever morally responsible for anything. Paradox of Moral Luck and Moral Responsibility The paradox, as Thomas Nagel (1979) describes it, is that individual moral responsibility is possible even though luck is ubiquitous. We hold a person responsible for actions taken within a scenario he/she did not bring about. It is possible for a person to be morally blameworthy even though the bulk of the circumstances bringing about a scenario were entirely outside of that person's control. Degrees of control are virtually irrelevant, as proximate causation of uncontrollable variables fails to offer any relief from a person's moral responsibility for actions taken within any given situation. Consider the case of a soldier who voluntarily enlists in the U.S. Marine Corps in the hopes of being deployed in Iraq to fight in the war on terror. This person, after months of grueling patrols in Baghdad watching his fellow marines get killed by improvised explosive devices, decides to take revenge by entering the nearest civilian residence and shooting up the women and children inside. Then consider the kid who had his sights set on college but was instead drafted into the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War and becomes so worn down by the war and numbed to killing that he partakes in a massacre of civilians at Mai Lai. The former soldier chose to become involved in Iraq, volunteered for the deployment and subsequently committed an immoral act. The latter soldier had the war thrust upon him, was sent into combat by luck of the draw, and took committed a similar immoral act. Does the fact that luck played a role in the latter soldier's circumstances make him any less morally responsible than the former soldier who chose to be in that situation Arguably it does not. Moral luck and moral responsibility are not mutually exclusive. A person can and should be held responsible for his/her actions even though there was no control over the circumstances surrounding them. To some extent we all find ourselves in every situation in our lives because of luck. Our upbringing, environment, and interrelations with others all contribute potentially uncontrollable variables that bear a causal relationship to our every day circumstances. Nevertheless, we are responsible for the way in which we behave, react, and conduct ourselves within these scenarios. Moreover, as much as luck plays a role in all of our everyday circumstances, our own decisions and actions are often equally influential. Scenarios that are brought about purely by luck or purely by design are exceedingly rare, if they even exist at all. Therefore, while luck influences how we come to find ourselves in a situation, certainly our own control played no small role either. For those ethicists who need something to hang their hats on to assign individual responsibility in the presence of moral luck, this reality is key. Take that case of the drafted Vietnam soldier. Was his situation truly brought about by pure luck It was probably not. Although he was unlucky enough to have his draft number called, there are any number of subsequent decisions he would have consciously and affirmatively made that contributed to his presence at the sight of a massacre of civilians. He may have had some options in terms of what he expressed as preferences for military service. He might have decided to join the part of the platoon that went to scout the village rather than the part that went to retrieve supplies. Even the driver who struck the child, described earlier, arguably made some affirmative decisions that gave him some degree of control over whether or not he would be exposed to that situation. For example, the driver might have chosen to take the bus or train that day, or to ride his bike or walk, instead of driving to his destination. He might have decided that he would wait until he got his paycheck to get his brakes repaired rather than putting it on his credit card. These are examples of how we all make affirmative decisions every day that lead to us being in the circumstances we are in. This then raises the question of whether luck can mitigate the extent of moral responsibility even though it does not eliminate such responsibility. According to Concepcion, the standard view of responsibility should be modified in light of the notion that we all face circumstances that are influenced by some control and some luck. "We may say that agents deserve moral appraisal only for that over which they have restricted control" (459). This implies that the extent of moral responsibility increases and decreases proportionately with the extent to which a person exercises "restricted control" in a situation. Assuming restricted control means that a person's own affirmative and voluntary actions and decisions played some part in why the circumstances are the way they are, it would seem there is always some level of restricted control, or there is never a complete absence of it. Consequently, when luck contributes to a circumstance more than control then a person is less morally responsible, although not entirely relieved of it. On the other hand, when a person's restricted control outweighs luck in terms of influencing the circumstances of the moral dilemma, then a person is morally responsible to a greater degree. Thus, we are never entirely free from moral duty and responsibility in any situation. Conclusion Moral luck and moral responsibility are closely intertwined. The very definition of moral luck implies assignment of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, some thinkers have considered it a paradox that moral responsibility could be assigned to someone in circumstances that were beyond that person's control. We can do this because there is never a complete absence of control, nor is there a complete absence of luck, contributing to any given set of circumstances. There is always some affirmative decision or action to which circumstances can be traced back that bares a causal connection to the moral dilemma. The extent to which moral responsibility should be assigned depends upon the weight of restricted control versus luck in bringing about the circumstances. A person bears greater moral responsibility when his/her affirmative decisions played a greater role than luck; and less responsibility when luck played a greater role than affirmative decisions. Because there is never a complete absence of restricted control, we always bear some moral duty and responsibility within any given situation, even when it seemingly came about at random. In the end, morality is essential in everything we do, whether we are under duress, surprised by random occurrences, or affirmatively brought about a situation by force of will. Works Cited Concepcion, D. "Moral Luck, Control, and the Bases of Desert." Journal of Value Inquiry 36(2002): 455-461. Nagel, T. "Moral Luck." Mortal Questions Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Nagel, T. "Moral Luck" SUNY: 1993. Read More