How PRSPs Increase National Ownership of Programmes - Assignment Example

The adoption by local governments of policies advanced by international donor organisations like the IMF and World Bank often leaves doubt about the amount of relevance that they have for the states represented by these local governments. Yet the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) drafted by nations themselves in order to garner the aid of international financial institutions (IFIs) has also posed doubts about the “ownership” of policies contained within the document. Ownership can be considered as influenced by the extent to which the PRSP reflects policies tailored to fit the needs of the individual country, and this might be seen as indicative of the amount of involvement (at all levels of the society) granted the nation in its compilation. Previous attempts at formulating written strategies for reducing poverty (such as the Policy Framework Paper) had resulted in almost the entire document’s being drafted by the IFI in question (Piron & Evans, 2004). The PRSP differs in that it must be drafted by the country hoping to receive the grant or debt cancellation. Ownership can be called into question on more than one level. First, ownership by the local government can be questioned because of the nature of the document. The fact that grants and debt cancellations are dependent on its completion and approval by the IFI raises doubts as to whether the policies represented will originate with and reflect the needs of the recipient government and not the donor groups. Doubts also arise concerning the extent to which the nation as a whole may be said to own the PRSP, as internal frictions and disjointedness within the levels of government as well as between and among local non-governmental organisations may also prevent the document’s being representative of the different levels and sections of society. The meaning of the term “participation” is also relevant in the consideration of ownership of PRSP’s. Participation can range from cursory and superficial consultation of the local governments on the one hand, to (on the other hand) the empowerment of that government by entrusting it with a decision-making part in the process. The idea is that those affected by the policies should have influence in the PRSP’s creation. According to the definition given by the World Bank, participation should involve a wide cross-section of the interested groups, including the donors, but especially including all levels of the local government, NGO’s, the private sector, trade unions, academia, and the public at large (Stewart & Wang, 2003, p. 8). In addition to such breadth of involvement, these groups should be given as heavy a hand in decision-making to grant them also a great depth of involvement. The level at which participation occurs in drafting of the PRSP, according to this definition, should give an indication into the level of ownership that the nation has of the document. By now, several countries have adopted the task of constructing PRSP’s and have reached one stage or another of completion. Up to the end of 2003, 78 PRSP’s had been produced (Stewart & Wang, 2003, p. 3), and that number has now increased by the completion of several that were then in progress. By taking a look at the dimensions that indicate national ownership of a PRSP and carefully assessing aspects of this process as undertaken by a number of these nations, it is possible to make a judgement about how far extensive participation leads to ownership of PRSP’s in these specific countries. Conditionality has largely been seen as a deterrent to the ownership of programmes by local governments and largely a source of disempowerment to them (Stewart & Wang, 2003, p. 2). Though PRSP’s were designed to minimise the element of conditionality in the drafting of such papers, it is possible that the influence of these IFI’s are still strong enough to cause an unofficial but similar effect. Joint Staff Assessments (JSA), prepared as a combined effort of the staffs of the IMF and World Bank, are designed to appraise the progress of the PRSP’s in order to assess whether they provide a “credible framework within which the Bank and Fund can design their concessional programmes” (ODI, 2004, p. 3). Though they are not to be used as a determiner of the details of the PRSP they are often suggestive of the direction the World Bank or IMF would like PRSP’s to take. As indicated in Piron and Evans (2004), “Instead of the PRSP principles supporting a transformation in what governments do, they risk overriding or derailing domestic political and policymaking processes by imposing international priorities and undermining local level political accountability” (p. 1). It might be argued that the presence of IFI representatives in the recipient nations might even be misleading to the local governments and cause them to consider any hints, suggestions or even gestures made by them as indicative of a condition. In such cases, though the nation may evince extensive participation in the drafting of the PRSP, such participation may be geared at appeasing those who represent the donor organisations and thereby defeat national ownership of the document. Such has been the case in Madagascar, whose ability to claim and feel ownership of the PRSP was in effect removed from the government as a result of the JSA. The donors produced an extensive commentary on the drafts of Madagascar’s PRSP. This commentary contained a detailed list of concerns and recommendations, which the local Madagascar government considered to be conditions for the approval of the PRSP. The result was that the nation’s truest interests were left hanging for several months while the country’s government prepared a report on the current and future implementations of the items recommended by the JSA. This effectively decreased the ownership of the PRSP by Madagascar, as it felt itself obliged to devise policies in ways that aligned with the desires of the donors (ODI, 2004, p. 6). Other ways exist in which the will or interests of the IFI’s have been imposed upon recipient governments, threatening its involvement in and ownership of the PRSPs. In many cases the PRSP’s have been dependent upon the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility which provides “credits to support monetary policy and fiscal reform” (Stewart & Wang, 2003, p. 21). The effect of this other lending instrument has often been to reinforce the desires of the IFI’s while only nominally reducing the conditionality of the PRSP. Kenya saw the negotiation of a very stringent PRGF just before the completion of its PRSP. In such a case, despite the extent of participation, ownership of the PRSP by the Kenyans was likely to be heavily reduced as the government was bound to adopt donor policies in order to facilitate the passing of the adjacent document. In fact, such action might even have precluded active participation by many Kenyan governmental and non-governmental organisations. Other countries such as Bolivia and Nicaragua have seen the PRSP disregarded in favour of the policies of other more donor-driven documents. Such actions, though they might allow for wide participation in the drafting of a representative PRSP, serve to cripple the government’s psychological ownership of the document as it becomes aware that much of its work might very well be denied implementation (2003, p. 21). In Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, civil society groups were compelled to reject the country’s PRSP. The Sri Lankan’s specifically defended rejection with claims that the PRSP had been drafted without seeking any consultation with these groups. One such group, The Alliance for the Protection of Natural Resources and Human Rights, represents more that one hundred groups, including trade unions, fisheries, peasants, displaced persons, and religious groups. This group claims also that the policies of the new PRSP are hardly any different from the previous recommendations made by IMF (Bretton Woods, 2003). This lack of consultation with a breadth of societal groups has led to the idea that national ownership of a PRSP does depend on extensive participation. Yet this example is also reminiscent of the idea of many critics that the PRSP might become just like the previous IFI documents that are reflective only of the donor communities’ plans and desires for the recipient nations (2003). The advantages of the involvement of the donor community are however not to be overlooked, largely because of its ability to keep the government actively pursuing the planning process when internal problems might impede its progress. Such internal problems are also indicative of the level of participation and national ownership that can be granted the PRSP. It has been mentioned before that breadth of participation is defined by the involvement a wide cross-section of local interest groups. Here it can be seen that extensive participation largely fosters national ownership of the PRSP. When governments are driven to discuss plans with the different groups that consist the nation, it is likely to become more cognisant of their needs and draft a representative document as a result. The Ugandan’s are a good example as they adopted a consensual procedure for policy-making that was able to effect a revision of the PEAP (Uganda’s special version of the PRSP). The document demonstrated increased ownership by the nation because of the attempts by the government to use a Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) to ensure that participation occurred on a wide scale (Piron and Evans, 2004, p. 20). Ownership of the PRSP in Rwanda occurred largely as a result of the broad participation through the PPA as well. This was interwoven with indigenous methods of participation to create a document that probed the opinions of even the poorest members of society. The result of this was widespread endorsement of the policies and even aided in “the post-conflict reconciliation and peace-building process” (Stewart and Wang, 2003, p. 9). The extent to which some groups are included or excluded aligns with the extent to which ownership of the PRSP takes place. In some cases it has happened that while a broad cross-section of societal groups is allowed to participate, the neglect of just one group has represented such a large part of the society that national ownership has been compromised. In such countries as Senegal, Mali, Benin, and Malawi, parliamentary involvement has been minimal (Stewart and Wang, 2003, p. 11). Though the country involved other non-governmental groups in the process, it was mainly concerned with the involvement of the executive body of the government. In Uganda, parliamentarians removed themselves from the PEAP process because “very little electoral political capital is derived from such participation [and] despite the importance of poverty reduction to the Movement’s political agenda in Uganda, MPs will not gain a greater chance of being re-elected should they engage in a PEAP discussion (closely associated with the executive) and may risk loosing Movement support if they assert themselves too much” (Piron and Evans, 2004). Similarly, the Albanians encountered parliamentary problems as, according to their PRSP, “The consultations with the parliament were not adequately intensive, because the parliament was dissolved at the moment when the strategy’s drafting process had just gone underway” (Albanian Government, 2001). The first two countries suffered a lack of ownership of the programmes, though Albania fared better. The PRSP process has been reported as one that helped improve the confidence in government that had been undermined during this crisis. It, in effect, forced the different branches of government to work together, and this promoted participation. The PRSP created a challenge for the government to work together, and consequently increased solidarity through extensive parliamentary participation. It was this that led to increased ownership within the government (World Bank and IMF, 2005, p. 21). Governments’ attempts at securing parliamentary participation demonstrate a belief in the importance of that governmental body. Parliamentary exclusion might be said to reduce the amount of ownership that can be granted the country, considering the fact that Members of Parliament are elected by and therefore representatives of the citizens. In these countries’ cases the lack of participation that extends to parliament meant a lack of complete national ownership of the PRSP. It has been reported that in Bosnia and Herzegovina while some 40 NGO’s were active participants in the PRSP, another 100 participated only minimally (OSCE, 2005). In Mauritania too, the World Bank and IMF report that NGO participation was structured by the government, and that “meetings tend to be highly structured, with little opportunity to depart from the agenda developed by the authorities or to question the basic approach to some issues” (2005, p. 45). The result was that the ownership of the PRSP can be said only to be largely felt by the Mauritanian government (as the private sector encountered similar problems). Although ownership of the programme by the government is essential, non-governmental organisations are very important as well. These types of organisations have been credited with having the ability to create pressure and call authorities “into account” (OSCE, 2005), and are therefore able to voice and cause the inclusion of their interests in any given debate on the country’s economic and social welfare. Since their interests reflect those of the citizens, exclusion of this group in both these countries led to a smaller degree of citizen representation in the PRSP and therefore a smaller degree of national ownership of the programmes contained in the document. One major division of NGO’s can be found in trade unions. The exclusion of trade unions has occurred on a large scale in the construction of the PRSP. Though in many cases each trade union might represent the interests of only a narrow section of society (Stewart and Wang, 2003, p. 11) the exclusion of one or several might pose a problem as they represent the interests of the workers of the society. Tanzania and Uganda represent countries whose trade unions were allowed participation only after the completion and endorsement of the PRSP (2003, p. 11). The Ugandan trade unions that were too closely connected with the opposition were left out (Piron and Evans, 2004, p. 16). This fact leads to the assessment that though representation might occur on a wide scale, it is possible that ownership in its purest sense might prove elusive if full participation is not sought. According to the ODI, some countries that carry the legacy of the Soviet Union have shown a remarkable capacity to include trade unions as their relations with the government has been good. One such country is Albania in which trade unions were successfully included in the PRSP drafting process because of its inclusion in the National Civil Society Advisory Group. In other countries such as Ghana and Zambia, trade unions were allowed to sit on advisory boards for the creation of PRSP’s (Egulu, 2003, pp. 10-11). This gives the impression that the alignment of organisations interests leads to a greater chance of extensive participation. It might be argued that such alignment on policies is an indicator that the groups already support or have been convinced of the wisdom and benefits of the policies about to be created. They have come to “own” them. Therefore, agreement on the PRSP’s further indicates a deeper level of ownership. It is again possible that a country evince a wide scope of participation by its several groups, but still create PRSP’s that are not owned by the nation because a large proportion of its citizens remain unrepresented. Several countries have demonstrated a reluctance to include women in the PRSP process, yet this group represents approximately 50% of any country’s population. In Senegal women were ignored during the PRSP process. Tanzania, Bolivia, and Malawi saw very few women groups being consulted. However, some countries such as Kenya and Lesotho made efforts to include women. It can be argued that though these countries might all have represented extensive participation with regard to number and type of organisations included, only Kenya and Lesotho constructed a PRSP that was truly owned by the nation as a whole and not just by the groups with suffrage (Stewart and Wang, 2003, p. 11). Other groups that saw little participation include peasants and the indigenous peoples. Their general marginalisation renders their exclusion from the PRSP process insignificant when considering breadth of participation, yet they are citizens of the nation and their lack of ownership undermines national ownership. Bolivia reported the failure of representatives for such poor groups to attend the deliberations for the PRSP (Stewart and Wang, 2003, p. 12). The neglect of their interests that almost inevitably resulted from their exclusion leads to the conclusion that such PRSP’s were not representative of a considerable depth of ownership by the nation. Even when representation does occur, however, it is possible that some groups cannot be considered as having really participated. Studies done Ghana, Vietnam and Zambia led to the conclusion that the poorer communities would like to and ought to have a chance to participate more directly, rather than only through NGO’s. What is desired here is even more breadth of participation—on an individual level. This suggests that the more extensive the participation, the greater the degree of ownership of the PRSP that will be felt by the nation (Bretton Woods Project, 2001). Related to this is the narrowing of participation that comes with the government’s making little effort to surmount language barriers that exist in the country. In Lao PDR and Cambodia, civil groups complained that only “prominent” NGO’s were contacted in the drafting process. Some groups argued that “failure to translate the papers into either Khmer or Lao marginalised the majority of civil society actors” (Bretton Woods, 2002). This led to the belief by many that eradication of poverty was not an element on the agenda of such a document whose goal is ostensibly to seek out ways to remove poverty. The groups revealed that they felt no ownership of that particular PRSP. Bangladesh groups expressed similar sentiments, posing a very similar criticism of the transparency of the PRSP and suggesting that the extent to which groups are allowed to participate in its drafting has a significant bearing on the nation’s ownership of the document (2002). The term ownership, as it has been applied to the drafting of the PRSP’s and the implementation of the policies contained in it, does appear to require that a high level of participation be granted the different groups that have an interest in the policies. The countries considered have experienced participation at different levels, but most have demonstrated a greater tendency toward collective acceptance of the PRSP when a wide variety of societal groups have been involved in the process of drafting the document. It has been seen that ownership can take place on different levels, but that governmental ownership does not necessarily mean national ownership. On the one hand, though donors play an important part in the process, it is good when a nation’s government has a chance to branch away from their dictates to locate and create programmes in the areas that it considers its country to have the greatest need. On the other hand, problems of ownership arise when some tiers of the government and/or civil organisations are excluded. Similar problems arise when sectors of the country such as the private and academic sectors are not considered in the process or when indigenous groups are marginalised or the poor granted participation only through NGO’s. The successful ownership of PRSP’s therefore has the greatest chance of being achieved only in the presence of extensive participation by all departments of society. References Albanian Government. (2001). “Medium term program of the Albanian Government ‘Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy.’” National strategy for socio-economic development. Tirana. http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/Albania_PRSP.pdf Bretton Woods Project. (2001). “PRSP case studies report.” Bretton Woods Project: critical voices on the World Bank and IMF. Available: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=i-126- a1c725a8a41a78c7d69cfc95ab24da9b Bretton Woods Project. (2003). “PRSP dangers exposed again.” Bretton Woods Project: critical voices on the World Bank and IMF. Available: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=i-126- faec65d7032f8a5ea26783a3506958a6 Egulu, L. (2003). “The role of social dialogue and advocacy in PRSP processes.” The World Bank Group. Turin. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). (2004). “PRSP annual progress reports and joint staff assessments.” PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project. ODI: London. Piron, L & A. Evans. (2004). Politics and the PRSP approach: synthesis paper. ODI: London. Stewart, F. and Wang, M. (2003). “Do PRSPs empower poor countries and disempower the World Bank, or is it the other way round?” Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper. University of Oxford. http://www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk/research/qehwp.html World Bank, The and IMF. (2005). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative: findings from 10 country case studies of World Bank and IMF support. Washington DC. Read More