Being an Atheist by H J McCloskey - Essay Example

In his article, On Being an Atheist, the Australian philosopher H.J. McCloskey (1968) takes the position that atheism represents a more reasonable and comfortable belief than that forwarded by belief systems associated with Christianity.  McCloskey argues his point by countering the three theistic proofs: the cosmological argument, the teleological argument and the argument from design. As stated in our class response instructions, in the article, McCloskey is both critical of the classical arguments for God’s existence and offers the problem of evil as a reason why one should not believe in God, since in a world supposedly made by the all-loving God evil should not and would not exist. While to some this position on face value may seem to have credibility, a careful analysis of the theories from a Christian perspective shows his arguments lacking. The first thing that strikes is McCloskey’s choice of beginning his discourse with a usual and chronically pleading argument that would appear to make sense and put the entire onus of “believing” or of “faith” on a human need to want to believe, rather than a spiritual analysis of why we do. McCloskey puts forth that many theists take the position that “atheism is a cold, comfortless position,”1, and quotes one Christian as saying, “It’s harder if you don’t believe in God.” 2 McCloskey’s argument, which he extracts totally from this position, is a tired one at best, tied to a humanistic era [the 1960s] that overly promoted, at the exclusion of the spiritual founded in the intellectual, the concept of science, be it the science of human psychology or otherwise. “Proof” is the buzzword, a strange choice since proof of this overriding human need to feel comfortable in an uncomfortable world has never been proven, but is itself founded on the “discoveries” suggested by psychologists and sociologists and hardly based in solid scientific irrefutable fact. Much of McCloskey’s so called scientific approach falls far short of anything resembling proof. Consider McCloskey’s cosmological argument as examined by Privette (2009). “McCloskey argued that the cosmological argument was an argument from the existence of the world, as we know it.   He stated that believing in an uncaused first cause of the universe is a problem because nothing about our universe forces us to that conclusion.”3 I agree with Privette and would use the following argument, as she has, with a few of my own thoughts added on the concept of contingencies. If everything in the universe is contingent [even big bang theories acknowledge contingencies], it does not seem reasonable from any viewpoint possible that first line contingency does not rest with and require intelligence. To ignore prime contingency is to forward a “belief” that chemicals and substances have within themselves intelligence sufficient to force such action. Privette writes, “...everything in the universe is contingent and that if contingent things exist, they require a necessary being as their ultimate cause.”4 While Privette courageously takes a “position,” the irony of the McCloskey position is that it does preclude contingencies. As might be McCloskey’s view of both Privette and myself as “benighted defenders of superstition,”5 my [our] position on cosmological theory in regard to the contingency position, if anything, absolves us of that charge. It is reasonable from every perspective. In addition to countering McCloskey’s arguments, which often focus on God as prime mover, Evans (1982) leaves room for two arguments, those that pre-suppose that the universe had a beginning, and those which do not—temporal and nontemporal arguments respectively. 6 Arguments in Evans’ view do not depend upon whether there is or is not a beginning to the universe. Whatever the “truth” may be, which we are unlikely to ascertain through religion or science, the argument of prime mover remains even more relevant since science insists on the validity of the big bang theory and, therefore, a set beginning, which it can not prove though it relies heavily on proofs. So the stance is hypocritical. Using the scientific insistence on reason, as Evans writes, “There seems to be no evident reason why the objects of our universe exist, or even why there should be a universe at all.” 7 Responding to McCloskey and his insistence that the cosmological argument does not prove God’s existence or his hand in design, Evans suggests that indeed the argument does not prove anything, but should simply lead us to want to learn more about God, the universe and God’s role in the creation, if indeed creation is an appropriate word. Evans intelligent and reasonable stance on the subject in my view provides a continuum for further discussion rather than a hard and fast argument that supports rather than challenges the role of science in its ongoing quest for a truth, even if it does exclude religion. Ironically, McCloskey does not do Evans or the religious view the same favor. The theories of McCloskey regarding teleological arguments and their failure to provide indisputable proofs regarding design and the purpose thereof are particularly shortsighted and fallible and in my opinion. “Indisputable” is a very concrete term, one that should not and indeed can not be applied to philosophical or, for that, scientific concepts, particularly when it comes to the design and purpose of the unknowable universe. McCloskey himself makes this very point. ‘So many things which were, before the theory of evolution, construed as evidence of design and purpose, are now seen to be nothing of the sort.” 8 The key word here is “seen,” perceived based upon the Darwinian “perception” of the animal kingdom from a scientific viewpoint which has become “indisputable” over the decades, may well prove very much “disputable” when closely examined or, as Evans suggests, with further information. Assuming evolution is “true” and occurred exactly the way Darwin says it did, the argument itself may be combined with other teleological arguments that leave room for both science and religious perspective. Evans writes, [conceding] the validity of Darwinian theories...[Evans] “questions whether more ultimate explanation is still not required.”9 But perhaps the most significant argument and the one that strikes most theists as particularly unsettling rests in Evans analysis of scientific evolutionary theory presented as the last word, or, as he puts it, “brute facts”10 not subject to further inquiry and interpretation. A natural response here is, why don’t scientists, as men and women seeking truth, ponder this as limiting the quest for knowledge that might open new doors to understanding the creation, evolution and design of the universe? Good question. As science proposes: the laws of nature simply exist, and that in terms of design it is not relevant why they exist. The position in itself is an incomplete explanation that should be rejected out hand by scientists based on man’s natural instinct toward intellectual curiosity. Referring to McCloskey argument for “indisputable” evidence, he must also challenge science to provide the same. He does not. The most common arguments often center upon God, in perfect state, as creator of an obviously imperfect world. “How can there be so much evil in the world if there is a God? How can God allow it?” We often hear these questions posed both by those seeking to deny the existence of a creator [McCloskey] and those simply perplexed by the evil they see about them. McCloskey falls into the former category, claiming that the imperfection and presence of evil in the world [clearly] argues against divine design and divine perfection in the [evil] world. The problem here lies in the definition of perfection, one McCloskey neither acknowledges nor addresses. He describes his “reality” of God [if there is such a thing] as one full of foibles, hardly perfect given the imperfection and evil of a world designed with so-called divine purpose. Providing “real” choices for the nature of God, he insists God is either “malevolent”or a “bungler” 11 at best. McCloskey argument however is made mute by Evans’ free admission regarding the limitations of the cosmological argument. Evans found that the argument only shows the existence of a necessary being as cause for the universe. “While this does include key elements of the theistic conception of God, it leaves out...quite few important ones. The conclusion is compatible with many views of God.” 12 The idea here is that the concept of God as perfect is one concept and one concept alone. For McCloskey to use this as an argument against the existence of a prime mover, then, is out of line, misleading and inadequate. The attribute of perfection, then, is questionable when applied to God and the universe and world, since it is not known whether the attribute actually exists or not. Yet McCloskey relies heavily on the aspect of perfection in his argument. ‘“No being who was perfect could have created a world in which there was unavoidable suffering or in which his creatures would...engage in morally evil acts, acts which very often result in injury to innocent persons.”13 As stated in the response paper document, “The language of this claim seems to imply that it is an example of the logical form of the problem.” But is it? Evans states the problem quite clearly regarding McCloskey’s inference that theists, in claiming logical form, are being self contradictory. “To rebut this charge it is not necessary to know God’s actual reasons for allowing evil...It is sufficient to know there are possible reasons...to show that the occurrence of evil and existence of God are not logically contradictory” 14, coinciding with Evans’ admission of cosmological arguments as incomplete, which appear to conflict if not somewhat diverge from Lipe’s authoritative Christian fundamentalist conclusions. “...there is no human suffering, or any other type suffering, which does not result in some condition necessary in the accomplishment of God’s eternal purpose. The existence of evil is compatible with the existence of the infinite God of the Bible.” 15 The most bonding concept between atheists and theists, at least at the outset of arguments, is that of the existence of free-will within the context of human behavior. The conclusion is obvious. If free will exists, then, as Evans contends, it is illogical to assume that God or any ultimate being has the intention of redirecting it for the purpose of eliminating evil. As example, a person good and spiritual may reflect a nearly perfect spiritual persona, however, he or she does not have the power [nor perhaps the inclination or responsibility] to instill perfect good in others, thus forcing their rejection of evil. Evans writes, “a person who doubts God because of the occurrence of evil [McCloskey] needs...to know God in a fuller way.”16 The question of which is more “comforting” to humans—atheism or theism—seems obvious even to those who deny God’s existence. In his article The Absurdity of Life Without God Craig makes several salient points that whether Christian or not make perfect sense based on life experience. It flies in the fact of reason that one can be comforted by the atheistic notion that death is the end, and that in killing [denying] God we kill ourselves. About the only solution the atheist can offer is that we face the absurdity of life without God and live bravely [as best we can], a perspective sadly drawn in the modernist existentialist novels of Jean Paul Sartre, who himself an atheist admitted life lived on such a desperate plane equals nausea. Of the same humanistic era, philosopher Bertrand Russell, an atheist, predicted man without God was doomed to a life of “unyielding despair.” Craig writes, “Christianity true or not, the alternatives are dire [in terms of feeling comfortable and comforted as we move along life’s path].”17 All things being equal, and failing elusive proofs of arguments, to reject arguments supporting the Christian view of God’s existence and the ultimate continuum of life beyond death seems to sentence oneself to a life of self-serving, amoral despair—hardly a comforting thought. Endnotes 1. H.J. McCloskey. “On Being an Atheist,” Question 1 (1968): 51, 51-54 2. Ibid, 51 3. Cassandra Privette, “Response to: ‘On Being an Atheist,” OpPapers.com, http://www.oppapers.com/essays/Response-To-On-Being-An-Atheist/253461 (2009): para. 2. 4. Ibid para. 3 5. Stephen C. Evans, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith, (Leicester, England: Intervarsity Press, 1982),18: 18-137. 6. Ibid, Evans, 51 7. Ibid 52 8. McCloskey, “On Being an Atheist” 51 9. Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 65 10. Ibid 66 11. McCloskey, “On Being an Atheist” 52 12. Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 59 13. McCloskey, “On Being an Atheist” 52 14. Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 137 15. David L. Lipe, “The Problem of Evil, Pain and Suffering, Alabama: Apologetics Press, Inc.: 1-6, 6. http://www.apologeticspress.org/pdfs/research_pdf/Problem-of-Evil-Pain-and-Suffer.pdf 16. Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 140 17. William Lane Craig, “The Absurdity of Life Without God” Bibliography Craig, William Lane. “The Absurdity of Life Without God.” Evans, Stephen C. Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith. Leicester, England: Intervarsity Press, 1982. Lipe, David L. “The Problem of Evil, Pain and Suffering.” Alabama: Apologetics Press, Inc. www.ApologeticsPress.org. Retrieved from: http://www.apologeticspress.org/pdfs/research_pdf/Problem-of-Evil-Pain-and-Suffer.pdf McCloskey, H.J. “On Being an Atheist.” Question 1 (1968): 51-54 Privette, Cassandra. “Response to: ‘On Being an Atheist,” OpPapers.com, http://www.oppapers.com/essays/Response-To-On-Being-An-Atheist/253461 (2009). In Response to McCloskey: “On Being an Atheist” Your Name Department Course Title and Number Date of Submission Endnotes 18. H.J. McCloskey. “On Being an Atheist,” Question 1 (1968): 51, 51-54 19. Ibid, 51 20. Cassandra Privette, “Response to: ‘On Being an Atheist,” OpPapers.com, http://www.oppapers.com/essays/Response-To-On-Being-An-Atheist/253461 (2009): para. 2. 21. Stephen C. Evans, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith, (Leicester, England: Intervarsity Press, 1982),18: 18-137. 22. Ibid Evans, 51 Bibliography McCloskey, H.J. “On Being an Atheist.” Question 1 (1968): 51-54 Privette, Cassandra. “Response to: ‘On Being an Atheist,” OpPapers.com, http://www.oppapers.com/essays/Response-To-On-Being-An-Atheist/253461 (2009). Evans, Stephen C. Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith. Leicester, England: Intervarsity Press, 1982. 1 Read More