ense to establish agencies that control data centers in the states/cities and who can be of assistance when a state is under duress, whether medical, weather-related or physiological. Such agencies do exist, but have yet to pick up speed as was shown up in the tragic carnage in Virginia Tech. This Paper examines how the national grid has been networked and its command and control set up.
In any data gathering and collating agency, the inputs can be inundating in volume, with a high level of irrelevance. All the same, every bit of information must be considered as actionable intelligence until proved otherwise. ‘Analysis must be objective and independent of political considerations. Since no single Agency has the ability to cater to the variability, pace, activity level and anticipated quantum of demands of information and its analyses, it must utilize distributed expertise, regardless of where in the Intelligence Community (IC) this expertise is. Collaboration must the norm in the IC, overcoming technical, policy and administrative barriers. The analytical process must be transparent, with logical argumentation and evidence-supported analyses. If intelligence gaps cannot be covered within the IC, the IC must tap external expertise to obtain relevant data, even if international agencies are to be involved’ (www.fas.org). As far as practicable, data and analysis sharing must be in real time and all operating agencies and operators data-linked.
In an emergent situation, one of the most critical information systems is the Public Information System. ‘The US National Incident Management System (NIMS) requires that public information be organized around a Joint Information System (JIS) that is overseen by the Public Information Officer (PIO). The Public Information Officer (PIO) represents and advises the Incident Commander on all public information matters relating to the management of the incident. The PIO handles:
The PIO also oversees other functions required