Repressed Memories - Research Paper Example

Repressed Memories Alyssa Stephenson PGS 468 Psychology and Law November 11, INTRODUCTION Individuals have thoughts regarding all aspects of life, and typically have control over those thoughts. For example, a person can change his or her mind, think in new ways, formulate new ideas, and shift attention from one thought to the next. It seems as though humans have control over thoughts; however, it is impossible to not think about something. This task is impossible for most because of the seeming permanence of the unwanted thought. Interestingly, people who are motivated to forget can apparently sometimes do so. Many reasons arise as to why a person wishes to forget. For example, an undesirable thought may interfere with day-today work, causes anxiety, loss of sleep, or simply it is annoying. In the extreme cases, potential suppressors are the victims of physical, verbal, or sexual abuse, or have visions of a loved one dying, that may cause impairments in all aspects of the experiencer’s life. This motivated forgetting comes in two forms: unconscious, as in the controversial and contentious repressed memory literature, and conscious, as in the attempted suppression of undesirable thoughts (Bjork, Bjork, & Anderson, 1998). Controversy surrounding the concept of repression and the recovery of repressed memories has been brought to the forefront of recent literature. Jurors are being faced with the difficult task of evaluating testimony from alleged victims claiming to have recovered previously forgotten memories of childhood sexual abuse. The role of jury members is to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused - a task which is particularly difficult given that the events in question have typically taken place many years previously. Unfortunately, such cases are also characterized by a lack of evidence, aside from the testimonial accounts of the alleged victim and the accused. FORGETTING AS PHENOMENON A recovered memory is one which is suppressed or forgotten for a period of time and then later recalled. In order to further our understanding of recovered memories, a review of why individuals forget is warranted. There are currently four prominent explanations behind why people might seem to forget and then later recall traumatic events: 1) ordinary forgetting, 2) false memories, 3) dissociation, and 4) repression. Ordinary Forgetting Loftus, Gary, and Feldman (1994) suggest that memory of traumatic events may be no different from memory of regular events. Therefore, one would expect the process of forgetting to be the same, resulting from normal processes such as interference and decay. As noted by Brewin and Andrews (1998), ordinary forgetting may be more relevant to single instances of trauma or abuse, and less relevant to ongoing trauma. These authors assert that memory of similar events repeated over time is more likely to be strengthened than forgotten. As a result, recovered memories of ongoing childhood trauma are unlikely to result from the process of ordinary forgetting. False Memories An additional explanation for recovered memories has been offered by such groups as the False Memory Syndrome Foundation in the United States, and its counterparts across the globe, such as the British False Memory Society. Just as their respective names suggest, these organizations refute recovered memory claims and assert that such memories are completely unfounded, and therefore false. Prominent researchers, such as Elizabeth Loftus (2003), have since joined the crusade to evaluate recovered memories empirically. Porter, Yuille, and Lehman (1999) suggest that recovered memories may actually be false memories that have arisen as a result of police questioning or psychotherapy. Memory retrieval techniques used in clinical settings in particular have been criticized for resulting in false recovery of events that never occurred. As Heaps and Nash (2001) discuss, one such technique is the use of imagination for forgotten events. Individuals are encouraged to use prior knowledge and experience in an attempt to reconstruct a forgotten event. Perceptual elaboration, combined with event-specific information, is used to reconstruct a memory for an event. Throughout this process, the distinction between imagination and reality may become blurred, resulting in the individual becoming increasingly confident that the imagined event did indeed occur. Dissociation Human beings may also forget events, particularly ones that are traumatic in nature, as a result of defense mechanisms. For instance, according to this theory, survivors of sexual abuse frequently develop defense mechanisms to help them cope with the ongoing trauma. More specifically, dissociation or disconnection from reality has been offered as an additional explanation for forgetting. Children or individuals experiencing ongoing abuse or trauma may mentally separate themselves from the situation as a form of coping. Brewin and Andrews (1998) describe dissociative states as altered states of consciousness. Ordinary perceptual, cognitive, and motor functioning becomes impaired and the individual, therefore, lacks a full awareness of the surrounding environment. Notably, there has been little validation of dissociation as a mechanism of forgetting. Repression Repression of memories is a concept originally formulated by Sigmund Freud in the early 1900s. Freud theorized that repression was a defense mechanism by which individuals attempted to relieve their extreme anxiety by pushing thoughts and memories into the unconscious recesses of the mind (Liebert & Liebert, 1998). More recently, repression as an explanation for forgetting has come to focus on memory process failures involving encoding, storage, and/or retrieval. As Brewin and Andrews (1998) point out, repression can occur either as a conscious or unconscious act. In primary repression, preconscious or unconscious mechanisms block mental processing of experiences related to traumatic events. Therefore, the experience is never formed into memory and repression occurs. A second form of repression, after-expulsion, occurs when information has already been received and processed through the memory system; however, the individual is incapable of retrieving (i.e., remembering) the information. Although theorists have extended Freud’s idea of repression beyond its initial conception, repression continues to revolve around the concept of forgetting events which are often traumatic in nature. Assuming that repression allows individuals to suppress memories of events in order to preserve their well-being, questions arise on how such repressed memories are recalled. Literature discusses several psychotherapy techniques that have been used by therapists to access the memories of their clients (Liebert and Liebert, 1998). Perhaps the most controversial technique used in recovering repressed memories is hypnosis. Clinicians employing hypnosis as a memory recovery technique typically ask clients to regress to an earlier time in their lives, such as childhood. Clients are encouraged by the clinician to view their childhood as if on television. In doing so, the intention is that previously forgotten memories will be brought to the forefront of conscious experience, where the individual can then access the memory. While hypnosis has been generally accepted for a variety of disorders, its use during memory recall is particularly controversial. This controversy is partly due to the fact that hypnotized individuals become highly susceptible to suggestion. Nevertheless, hypnosis is the primary technique implicated in the retrieval of previously forgotten memories. MECHANISMS OF MEMORY REPRESSION AND SUPRESSION Anderson (2003) examined many of the main points from the above theories to develop a research paradigm to test repression and suppression of memories. Recent research with neurologically normal college students found suppression of unwanted memories; where as recall of suppressed items worsens with increased suppression trials (Anderson, 2003). This resulted in evidence for suppression when a participant encountered a cue to forget an unwanted memory and continually rejected that unwanted memory upon the cue. As the number of the rejection of the unwanted memory increased, the more difficult it became to later recall that unwanted memory. More specifically, Anderson (2003) used a four phase (i.e., learn, recall, think-no-think, test) procedure to examine suppression. Learning the pairs consisted of viewing the two words simultaneously on the computer screen, each pair appeared alone in the center of the screen for a specific amount of time. The researchers used a recall task to test the participant’s memory of the pairs; the participant had to recall at least 50 percent of the pairs. Next, was the think/no-think phase in which the researchers used color to cue participants to either suppress (i.e., red font) or recall (i.e., green font), and manipulated the number of repetitions each participant suppressed or recalled (Anderson, 2003). If the left-hand member word was in green, the participant was to recall and say the right-hand member word that goes with the pair. If the word was in red, the participant was to suppress and not say the matching word. At repetition levels, zero and one, researchers found no difference; however, at levels, one and eight, researchers found a statistically significant difference, and at levels eight and 16, researchers found no difference (Anderson & Green, 2001). Anderson and Green’s (2001) experiment utilized two different testing methods, same or independent probe, to determine if the participant actually suppressed or recalled. In the same probe method, the participant saw all the left-hand member words individually and was to recall and say the correct right-hand member. With the independent probe method, participants saw a clue to the left-hand member, and the first letter of the right-hand member, and were to recall and say the correct right-hand member. The researchers deemed successful suppression if the participant could not recall one of the pairs that was a suppression pair. This was true for both testing methods. The authors equally supported both ways of testing, but did not suggest why use of both methods and did not make a distinction or preference for use of one method over the other. Anderson and Green (2001) proposed that a deliberate effortful process plays a role in targeting recall of some memories, and forgetting of others. This suggested that when presentation of a stimulus triggered an unwanted memory in the victim, recruiting the process prevented awareness of the memory. Clinical studies of psychogenic amnesia suggested that the more encounters with stimuli that reminded one of an unwanted memory should make that memory less accessible (Wood, 2005). These findings supported Freud’s suggestion of a suppression mechanism that forced unwanted memories out of awareness. Anderson and Green (2001) proposed evidence for a viable model for repression as well as the potential to move from an unintentional to an intentional process of forgetting. Anderson et al. (2004) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the neural systems involved in keeping unwanted memories out of consciousness. The experiment replicated the experiment by Anderson and Green (2001) published in Nature in that it used the same procedure and both methods (i.e., same and independent probe) for testing. The researchers scanned each participant with the fMRI when both suppressing and recalling the words. The participant knew to suppress or recall depending on the color of the word (i.e., green for recall or red for suppress). To identify the neural systems involved in suppression, the researchers contrasted activation during suppression and recall trials. Researchers pinpointed the prefrontal cortical and right hippocampal activations as predictors for the extent of forgetting the unwanted memory (Anderson et al., 2004). These results confirmed the existence of an active forgetting process and established a neurobiological model for guiding inquiry into motivated forgetting (Anderson et al., 2004). Currently, researchers incorporated autobiographical events into directed forgetting paradigms and got results that support the findings of Anderson (2003) as well as others who conducted suppression research. Joslyn and Oakes (2005) instructed participants to intentionally forget material previously written in a journal. The researchers suggested that participants had the ability to suppress memories of autobiographical events similarly to the way participants forget words on a memory list. These findings were true regardless of whether the events were positive or negative in mood and emotional intensity did not matter (Joslyn & Oakes, 2005). The effect was seen even after a full week after issuing the forget cue. With these findings in place, there was little doubt of the possibility that intentional forgetting of autobiographical events occurs. Joslyn and Oakes (2005) contended this allows a therapist to instruct patients to keep a journal of events or to write down if possible the traumatic event that is causing so much pain. The psychologist can implement this coping mechanism by giving the client a cue to forget and instructing the patient to forget the unwanted memory. JUDISICAL PERSPECTIVE ON REPRESSED AND RECOVERED MEMORIES Various civil and criminal proceedings have established the admissibility of recovered memory testimony in courts of law. Freckelton (1997) discusses the case of a six year old man accused of indecent assault and false imprisonment occurring 13 years previously. The complainant, who was approximately nine years of age at the time, testified that her memory of the sexual assault had been revived through the course of therapy ten years following the alleged incident (Freckelton, 1997). She described the recovery of her memory as a series of flashbacks that became increasingly vivid. Kelly, Kristiansen, and Haslip (1998) conclude from their review of the Quick Law database in Canada that approximately 170 sexual assault judgements involved some form of recovered memory. Moreover, since judgements are submitted to the database at the discretion of the judges, the authors estimate that this number represents only a small portion of all cases involving recovered memories and sexual assault. Notably, Kelly et al.’s (1998) findings are relatively outdated; however, the implication remains that recovered memories play a role in courts of law. Recently, the literature has come to reflect the increasing prevalence of recovered memories within legal contexts. The result has been the inception of controversy and debate. As MacMartin and Yarmey (1999) point out, psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists alike have engaged in debate over the accuracy of recovered memories. The debate is not intended in any way to minimize the seriousness of childhood sexual abuse; rather, researchers recognize that child abuse is a serious social problem that requires attention. The core of the debate focuses on the accuracy of recovered memories in general. There has been little empirical evidence supporting the accuracy of repressed and recovered memories. This void has primarily risen from a combination of logistical problems. Typically, in order to verify the accuracy of accounts based on memory, researchers must rely on corroboration from other sources, such as family members. Finding others to confirm or disconfirm information can sometimes be difficult. Moreover, researchers have no way to verify that collaborated accounts are themselves accurate. As a result, most of the research to date has been focused on demonstrating the inaccuracy and susceptibility of memory in general (e.g., Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Porter et al., 1999). At the core of the false memory debate is whether recovered memories are indeed factual. Paris (1996) contends that the empirical research offers little evidence supporting the notion that normal memories can be repressed. The author further asserts that there is no empirical evidence indicating that trauma makes suppression of memories more likely. On the contrary, current research indicates that survivors of severe trauma actually experience repeated, unwanted thoughts and memories as opposed to repression. Holmes, Grey, and Young (2005) examined outpatients who met criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and found that patients frequently experienced vivid and intrusive memories, causing them to re-experience the trauma. Similarly, a study conducted by Alexander, Quas, and Goodman (2005) determined that adult survivors of sexual abuse who reported their victimization as the most traumatic event in their lifetime had the most accurate memory recollections. The authors also found that severity of PTSD symptoms was related to increased memory accuracy. Peace and Porter’s (2004) findings lend further support to the notion that traumatic events do not necessarily result in repression. The authors examined both positive and negative memory reports of participants who recently experienced a traumatic event and found that traumatic, negative memory tended to be more accurate and less influenced by distortion compared to non-traumatic, positive memories. REPRESSED MEMORY AND JUROR BIAS Despite courtroom practices (e.g., juror instructions) intended to eliminate juror biases, there remains a multitude of ways in which jurors can be biased in their decision making, particularly during the court trial involving repressed and recovered memories. Wegener, Kerr, Fleming, and Petty (2000) point out that jurors may fail to rely completely on jury instructions and may instead choose to rely on information gained from other sources (e.g., pretrial publicity). Jurors may also rely on specific defendant and plaintiff characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age) or irrelevant trial information (e.g., testimony ruled inadmissible). Similarly, jurors may also misuse information provided to them. For example, jurors may consider a defendants criminal history as evidence that he or she is guilty of the current offence, rather than using the information to evaluate the defendants credibility. Unfortunately, as Wegener et al (2000) report, jury instructions intended to compensate for biases are often misunderstood or ignored. In addition, Lieberman and Sales’ (1997) research suggests that such instructions are often ineffective in eliminating juror bias. Wegener et al.(2000) further suggest that instructions are unable to eliminate biases completely because jurors are often left to decide for themselves what constitutes a personal bias and how to overcome it. Realizing that jurors are likely influenced by various biases, some researchers have proposed theories to explain how these biases might impact juror decisions. One such theory, the Flexible Correction Model (FCM) proposed by Wegener et al. (2000), postulates that the direction and strength of juror biases vary across both jurors and trials. For instance, while the defendant’s gender may cause one juror to render a guilty verdict, another juror may render a not-guilty verdict based on that same characteristic. Essentially, not only is there variability among jurors in the amount and type of bias, but jurors also vary in their motivations; while one juror’s bias may lead him or her to provide a pro-plaintiff verdict, the same bias in another juror may result in an opposing decision. An additional component to FCM that is particularly relevant within the current study describes how jurors may in some cases over-compensate for their personal biases. For instance, if a juror believes that a plaintiff may be partially to blame for the abuse due to his or her perceptions of adolescent sexuality, then the juror may attempt to overcome this bias by adjusting his or her judgment. Specifically, the juror may render a more pro-plaintiff verdict, view the plaintiff as more truthful, the defendant as less truthful, and provide more compensation. REFERENCES Alexander, K. W., Quas, J. A., & Goodman, G. S. (2005). Traumatic impact predicts long term memory for documented child sexual abuse. Psychological Science, 16(1), 33-40 Anderson, M. C. (2003). Rethinking interference theory: Executive control and the Mechanisms of forgetting. Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 415-445. Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive control. Nature, 410 (6826), 366-369. Anderson, M. C., Ochsner, K. N., Kuhl, B., Cooper, J., Robertson, E., Gabrieli, S. W., et al. (2004). Neural systems underlying the suppression of unwanted memories. Science, 303, 232-235. Bjork, E. L., Bjork R. A., & Anderson, M. C. (1998). Varieties of goal-directed forgetting. Intentional forgetting. In J. M. Golding, & C. M. 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