by using experience and common sense, professional witness give conclusions on the basis of the knowledge and practices beyond the average judge’s comprehension (Suzanne, 1996). Consequently, statement by unpoliced professional witness can possibly have a biased effect on the judge, who might tend to be more inclined to believing that that the statement is exclusively based on the expert status of the witness. How can the trial jury be in a position of determining whether the professional is just speculating, or even whether the proof on which the professional is basing their statement is adequate to support the ruling? Certainly, the lay witness is prevented from speculation by the jury and can direct rulings when there is adequate evidence in support of a finding. Then is the screening of professional witness by a judge different from this practice? This is a question that poses weighty issues regarding the nature of the role of the judges. In order to be in a position of making an informed judgment concerning whether to admit a professional, the jury would appear to require at least a modicum of professionalism in the field of witness.
In Robinson, which involved a professional testimony regarding whether a DuPont fertilizer harmed the pecan trees of Robinsons, we find that the Supreme Court of Texas maintained that the Texas’ Civil Evidence Laws not only need a professional witness to be qualified, but also to offer statement that is relevant and also on the basis of a credible foundation. Nevertheless, in so doing, Robinson sufficiently adopted the standard of Daubert. The main difference in the case of Robinson was the fact that the Supreme Court of Texas had never adopted the ‘general acceptance’ standard of Frye that was particularly dismissed in Daubert, but instead had used an examination of whether the professional testimony ‘helped the fact’s trier’ under the 702 Rule. However, the Supreme Court of Texas perceived the credibility and