Why Do People Vote - Essay Example

Voting: Why do people vote? Assess the public choice approach to this issue and consider its implications for collective choice. By [Name of University] [Date] This paper intends to investigate the why people value the right to vote and what influences them in voting in certain patterns. The observation that people generally value voting rights is a common phenomenon in political science literature and financial economics. However, no generally accepted explanation of this phenomenon exists. Essentially Muller explains three ways inculcated in the voters paradox. They include redefining a rational or coherent voter’s calculus, relaxing rationality assumption and relaxing self-interest assumption. In addition, the expressive voter hypothesis, ethical and self –interested theories of voting are clearly discussed. It is imperative to note that, Muller evaluates the concepts of the three theories in a rather pragmatic manner, which brings out the aspect of voters turn out in comparison with the D terms (DORUSSEN & TAYLOR, 2002). The D terms signifies the upshot of one’s vote on the welfare of others. Further description of this scenario brings out the aspect of provision of a set of testable proposition by both the expressive and ethical voter. However, it is suggestible that, behavioral psychology can allow the public choice to introduce sociological variables in the model. It is evident that the rational choice and behavioral theories are rather complementary than competing (DORUSSEN & TAYLOR, 2002). It is fundamental to note that, Muller exhibits an implicit moral dominant claim that paying attention to political debates has an immense likelihood of commanding more attention compared to engaging in economic productivity and other areas of sincere intent. In this regard, Muller explains the aspect of rational voter theory and the rationality assumption as a theory, which assumes human behavior and instead guided by instrumental reasoning (FARQUHARSON, 2009). This study establishes that individuals normally chooses what they believe is the best means of attaining specific goals. This aspect considers maximization of utility in everything that is cherished, for instance currency and moral standards. The rational choice theory belongs to the introductory theory of economics. This theory adopts the aspect of methodological individualism, which Muller explains that its conception of the social situations and collective behaviors dictates the exclusive result of individual actions, which include voting patterns. Muller asserts that, a rational voter exhibits a rational preference when voting. It is imperative to note that the aspect of rational preference surpasses all factors when one is making a decision on whom to vote (DORUSSEN & TAYLOR, 2002). In this regard, Muller argues that relaxing the rationality assumption of individual depends on the magnitude of influence exhibited on the individual’s cognitive ability to weigh every choice, awareness of all possible choices and significant of all the precise information about any occurrence under any choice made. These factors at the long run make a voter to vote with a probability of one for a candidate who assumes a position close to the voter’s ideal point. It is significant to note that both assumptions and the behavioral projections of rational choice theory influence the magnitude of the independent axiom and time consistence of a rational voter in making a decision on whom to vote. Considering the expressive voting hypothesis, it is realized that, voters value the right to vote beyond instrumental reasons, which include a means to an end and not attaching a value to the opportunity to vote in itself. Muller argues that voting itself is expressive since voters do not benefit directly from the votes rather indirectly through their ability to affect decisions in their favor (MUELLER, 2003). This study establishes that the broad sense and description of expressive voting captures the meaning of voters voting expressively in tandem with motivation of wanting to influence the outcome of the vote. For instance, the versions considered critical in the expressive voting hypothesis include individuals valuing the right to vote because they enjoy the position of being a voter and being in control of a decision, individuals enjoy being part of a group, which exercises power and individuals enjoy being part of the majority. These aspects explicitly describe the expressive voting (COUGHLIN, 2002). On the other hand, the ethical theory of voting explains the fundamental aspect of an ethical voter as being the consideration of minimal regret. It is fundamental to note that, the moral obligation to vote is resolute endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. Prediction of the voting outcomes depends on the solution concept called consistency links agent preferences with actual behavior in a mode comparable to the Nash equilibrium (COUGHLIN, 2002). The aspects of moral principles when voting remain significant since they determine how individuals vote. Essentially, good and appalling governments are attributable to how individuals vote. It is notable that the voting behavior immensely affects the political outcomes. The ethical aspect of voting requires individuals to vote instead of abstaining, avoid selling or vote trading and ensure that the reasons of voting are morally justified. In essence, the voters should vote for what they justifiably believe promotes universal gain instead of narrow and self-interest. The ethics guiding voting has counterintuitive implications. For instance, some citizens do not find a reason to vote because they do understand the fundamental contribution of their vote towards good or appalling governance. In this context, it is moral since the argument for abstaining is genuine. In addition, when informed class of politicians, businessmen, writers and artists vote believing that they have judged their decision beyond reasonable doubt in bid to have good governance but unluckily the individuals voted in turn to be working for self interests instead of common good (MULLER, 2003). This forms the worst immoral aspect created by the elite group thus pollution of democracy. In essence, a well judged voting decision guided by ethical and moral aspects leads to creation of a liberal and democratic government, which will perform well compared to the feasible alternatives. In addition, every vote counts in a well functioning democracy and it influences the quality of a government to be put in place. Self-interest theory in a voting process exhibits the aspect of personal agendas when making a decision. Self-interest can be defined as the extent to which a matter impinges instantaneously and substantially upon an individual’s clandestine life. For instance, voters vote for some individuals in the hope of fulfilling matters touching on economy, education, corruption and even democracy in an egocentric manner (COUGHLIN, 2002). This trend is purely self-centered since it is derived from personal urge intended to satisfy personal interests. When a voter is guided by self-interest, he/she does not find grounds of evaluating the candidates before voting. This theory is perceived to be the worst since it ends up contributing to election of dreadful governance, however on the contrary, a negligible number of such leaders elected on such platforms perform to the expectations of specific individuals or groups It is imperative to note that, self-interest voting has both positive and negative implication (MUELLER, 2003). For the case of positive implication, it is fundamental to note that, a self-centered voter who makes a decisive move to vote for an issue affecting a group of persons where he/she is inclusive, serves right since the interests of majority are catered for. This contributes to the betterment of a people. However, a vote intended to satisfy strictly personal interest is risky and it is attributable to appalling governance. This is immoral and unethical. Actually rational and selfish individuals should not vote. The rational choice theory has been rescued from the voter turnout paradox by properly decoupling rationality from self-interest. On another hand, it should be noted that rationality does not imply selfishness, however in common phenomenon the two concepts are inseparable (SAARI, 2004). This study establishes that voting and making a vote choice are interesting examples of decision, which remain rational in complex elections only to the extent that the voters are unselfish. The overall implication remains that of the manner in which individuals collect weigh and sieve information before making any decision. On the other hand, the paradox of any voting exercise is that for any rational or self-interested voter, the overheads of voting will usually supersede the expected benefits. This is because of the chances of exercising the vital vote is some how minuscule in comparison with any realistic estimate of the private individual gains from diverse possible outcomes (SAARI, 2004). In essence, the expected gains tend to be less than the overheads incurred. In addition, the fact that people vote, it is a serious problem to the public choice. On the other hand, the paradox appears to disregard guarantee payback, which is associated with voting. This aspect affects the outcome of the vote. In essence, the public choice is good at explaining committee voting. Committee voting means the size of voting population is little but well informed consequently calculating a tangible benefit. List of References COUGHLIN, P. J. (2002). Probabilistic voting theory. Cambridge [England], Cambridge University Press. FARQUHARSON, R. (2009). Theory of voting. New Haven, Yale University Press. DORUSSEN, H., & TAYLOR, M. (2002). Economic voting. London, Routledge. MUELLER, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III / D.C. Mueller. Cambridge, Inglaterra : Cambridge University. SAARI, D. (2004). Geometry of voting. Berlin, Springer-Verlag. Read More