Preservation of Justice as the Power to Rightness - Essay Example

Preservation of Justice as the Power to Rightness The concept of will is a central theme in Anselm of Canterbury’s entire philosophical context. The freedom to choose in Anselm’s philosophy is central in determining the rightness of such will. Anselm positions God at the center of being, without whom anything exists. Freedom and will are much connected in Anselm’s argument. Anselm portrays freedom as the power to act in the right reason, which may be construed to mean having the right intention in committing any act. In the fall off the devil, Anselm says the angels that did not fall are free, and yet cannot sin. This proves that to Anselm, freedom construes the right, and ability to act in the right reason, or meaning having the right intention that cannot lead to sin. In this paper I will review the validity of Anselm’s argument in the statement that “after Satan fell, the angels that did not fall are free and yet cannot sin.” First I will evaluate Anselm’s view relating to the nature of God, secondly, I will review Anselm’s argument concerning, being and the essence of being. This will then lead to the relation between ‘being,’ and preservation of good and evil, evaluating how a being is regarded to be good or evil as related to act and intention of such a being. Finally I will evaluate the dilemma concerning freedom of choice, which will be essential in proving the hypothesis above. In Anselm's argument on free will, God, angels and humans are considered as rational beings able make viable decisions. Anselm view justice as the ability to will what one ought to will, meaning they possessed justice in willing what they ought to will, and sine they were rational beings, the good angles had the potential to sin, but refrained form it by choice. The essence of any being is to obtained justice by wiling what they ought to will; just as the good angels refrained from sin. This will help to prove that though after the fall of Satan the good angels had the ability to do evil, they refrained from this by choice; seeking justice as the essence of any rational being. First, Anselm says all existence is through God, devoid of whom none can exist by itself. “Therefore only the creator has from himself whatever He has, and all other things have something only from him, and just as they have from themselves only nothing, so they have from him only something” (Anselm, 216). Anselm argues that everything has its essence through God, and nothing exists devoid of his power and will. This affirms the importance of ‘will’ in any action. God having been the first being to will implies that any subsequent rational beings have to share this quality. God being the absolute rational being, could only have created other rational beings in his own image, meaning that as God has freedom to will, only so could other rational beings be created. God has imparted the freedom to choose in all rational beings. Secondly, Anselm elaborates on the will and freedom of God to create and preserve any being. God is responsible for being, and what ‘is’ as He conserves in existence what’ is’. Every being is, because it was created by God, and He conserves it in existence. The theme of conservation in this case is responsible for the state of everything which is, without which a being cannot be. “But if you consider existing things: when they pass to not being, God does not cause them not to be………. But also being cannot remain how it was made except by his conserving” (Anselm, 217). It is through conservation that a being is, without which the being would return to not being. Ekenberg (17) further elaborates this notion by arguing that God is only a cause of what is, not of ‘what is not.’ God according to Anselm cannot make something not to be, but by removing his conserving over the being, such a being automatically returns where it belonged to; in not being. Therefore, God’s will is positive and not meant to destroy; though God has freedom to preserve that which He wills. Consequently, all rational beings have a duty to will and choose that which will promote justice. Having argued from this perspective, it would be prudent to relate the above argument on being and preservation to the case of the good angels and the devil. Anselm argues that “… just as the angel who stood in the truth was preserved because he had perseverance, so he has perseverance because he received it, and he received it because God gave it” (Anselm, 218). God’s act to give is preceded by a will to preserve a certain quality in any being, in order to receive the same quality, a being has to have a will, and the integration of these two wills results to preservation of the said quality in a particular being. “ it follows that then , just as the angel who did not stand in the truth did not preserve because he did not have perseverance, ……… he did not preserve because God did not give, without which giving the angel was able to have nothing” (Anselm, 218). Perseverance in this case relates to the ability of a being to have a certain value or quality, of which has been rewarded from God. Anselm by stressing on the importance of receiving portrays a being has freedom to choose either to receive or reject perseverance from God. It is the freedom of such being to choose either to receive or not, but God gives this perseverance to all beings. It’s upon the beings to exercise their freedoms in choosing to receive or reject perseverance from God. Will and freedom are therefore important aspects in understanding Anselm’s argument. Analysis To understand the problem of evil, it would be better to understand the relation between the truth discussed above, and free will. According to Anselm, truth means either an action or will. Whenever a person has a will of what he ought to, such a will is right and true, because that will fulfills its right of function. From the meaning of will, one thing is clear from Anselm’s argument; any action related to the truth, or the rightness of an action is measured against some specified moral settings, related to a statement concerning the function in which it signifies. Through this statement, the problem of evil and good then reappear in Anselm’s arguments. Anselm to answer this dilemma delves in differentiating an action, which comes from free will versus an action that is natural (Ekenberg, 28). To Anselm, A spontaneous action has to be willed. For example, a horse not only acts when it grazes, it may also will to graze, and graze willingly as Ekenberg elaborates. By applying the example of a horse in portraying the action of willing Ekenberg says the following, “a horse is ignorant of rightness, and therefore it is not able to will rightness, and willing rightness is a necessary condition to preserve justice” (p39). Therefore, only rational beings can know rightness, meaning only rational beings have a will to conserve justice. This implies only a rational being deserves a blame for their actions, as they can be described to be either just or unjust. However, in determining the rightness of any action, the will and not the act is more important, as this is comprehended through the immortal part of a being. Ekenberg argues that there is a will for happiness is different from the will for justice. The horse by choosing any of the above has a will for happiness or to satisfy its own needs. Similarly, a being may intend to satisfy temporal needs, which amount to one type of will. The urge to act rightly and in accordance to truth is another type of will that Ekenberg elaborates. This argument takes us to the premise concerning spirit of an act. Is it an act or an intention that makes us right? Therefore, an action by itself does not qualify to be unjust or just, but the will is qualifiedly just. Applying the scope of freedom and will in understanding the actions of any being, St. Augustine’s philosophy is based on the concept of freedom of choice as the key power related to do good or evil. The aspect of freedom to choose is a prerequisite in all rational beings, which includes human beings, God, and angels. If freedom of choice in this case means choosing everything in all cases, having the freedom to choose cannot entail having the power to sin, which may be empathized by the Augustinian argument on free will and sin. Considering the issue of perseverance discussed above, a being possesses something because the being wills to keep or receive it, and because God wills to preserve that thing in the being. Consider the case of a miser and bread. Whenever a miser wills to keep money, but prefers to have bread, which he cannot obtain unless the miser spends the money at hand; he first wills to spend the money before not willing to keep it. In this case, willing to spend the money by buying bread has to be before the miser wills to save the money by not buying the bread. Freedom comes out as the power or an ability to do something. God being Holy, and the absolute good, could not have created evil, and cannot be related to that which is evil. As earlier argued, God preserves what he wills, for a being to be what is. Why then did the devil have no perseverance in willing to do what he ought to will? Considering that the angels were the same before the fall of the devil, this implies that for the devil to fall, he must have willed what he ought not to have willed; noting that will and not act is what makes a being evil or good. God in his right as supreme and with the right to give must have treated the angels the same. This implies that God must have given perseverance to all angels, the devil included. Considering that evil is only related to the will, this assertion implies that for the devil to be evil he must have rejected this perseverance unlike the good angels, and willed contrary to what he ought to have willed. Therefore, if the devil could have received and kept this justice or truth perseveringly, he could not have sinned. The freedom of power and freedom from sin becomes a dilemma that needs to be clarified. Sin, in Augustine’s philosophy represents a case of lacking, rather than having. In this case, having the ability to sin does not portray power, but it is in itself lacking the power. The dilemma created therefore is whether one may have a free will that includes having power to choose that which is sin. Do some people sin by free choice as a matter of necessity, or as an action done in sponte (Meaning by intention or willingly)? (Ekenberg, 28) Angels being rational beings must have a free will either to receive or not to receive what God gives to them. Therefore, noting that the good angels received perseverance as argued above, it implies that the evil angel had no perseverance not because God had not given it, but because, the evil angel did not receive it. This proves the fact angels had a free will either to receive or not to receive the perseverance, as rational beings. This brings the discussion concerning whether good angels were likewise able to sin before the evil angels fell. All rational beings have the power to keep rightness, and at least all created rational beings stand under obligation to do so at all time. The contrary of this would imply that those men who are upright and just by not sinning, by themselves having a nature prone to sin may be greater than angels. This assertion cannot hold any truth. Therefore, all angels; both good and the bad angels were at the same platform; the good angels could also have sinned before or after the fall, just like the bad angels. However, in preceding discussions it is clear; everything comes from God, without whom nothing is. Did God give an evil will to the devil and a good will to the good angels? The evil angel by refusing to receive perseverance from God exercised their freedom to choose, just as the good angles chose to receive the perseverance. Anselm may be construed to mean that the good angels refrained from sinning as an avoidance of punishment. However, from a broader argument, I have demonstrated that follows God preserved justice to all the angels, but the evil angel out of his free will chose not to receive it, contrary to the premise God did not give it. Therefore, justice did not depart from the evil angel, but the evil angel out of his own free will, and freedom to choose deserted justice by willing what he ought not to have willed, making his intention evil; willing by itself is not evil. Consequently, after the Fall of Satan, the angels that did not fall were free and yet could not sin; because they chose to receive justice, which is power to do that which is right and just. Therefore, good angels refrained from sinning because it was just and useful, and not to avoid punishment. This means, There are two inducements that may be related to refraining to sin. Either the good angels refrained from sinning because it was just and useful, or good angels had justice, which is power to will that which they ought to have willed, though they still had a free will not to receive justice, and will what they ought not to have willed, just like the evil angel. Anselm statement is therefore accurate and true, concerning the freedom of the good angels to will and choose that which is just. In this paper, I have shown that the angels left after the fall of the devil are free, and yet cannot sin. This is because; the angels chose to receive justice from God, while the devil chose not to receive this justice. Justice in this case is the power to do thatch which is right, and to will that which they ought to have willed, in contrast to willing that which they ought not to have willed, as is the case with the devil. In addition, I have shown that freedom of choice was Instrumental in the above case; denying the freedom of choice would negate the fact that the angels are rational beings. Therefore this assertion by Anselm is varied and correct, considering angels have justice and the freedom to choose. Works Cited Anselm of Canterbury. “The fall of the devil,” Complete philosophical and theological treatises,. Translated by Hopkins Jasper and Richardson Herbert. MN: Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000. Ekenberg Tomas. “Falling Freely: Anselm of Canterbury on the will.” PhD. Diss. Uppsala University, Sweden, 2005. Print. Read More