Materialism and Idealism - Essay Example

? Epicurus’ Materialism and Berkeley’s Idealism It has always been a wonder whether what we can see, hear, feel, smell and touch is real or not. Sometimes, the sensations that we feel are so real, but that thing where one derives his sensations may be existent – or may not. Comparing the principles of Epicurus and George Berkeley on the acquisition of knowledge, it seems that it is more plausible, logical and practical to adopt a materialist view of knowing things. The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus was a proponent of materialism. According to Epicurus, “The first principle is that nothing can be created from the nonexistent” (Author 108). This is rather a common sense view of things, for how can one thing arise from something that does not exist. However, this basic principle of materialism rejects the idea of creation, or making something out of nothing. It therefore rejects the possibility that there is a God who creates something out of nothing, and thus it rejects the possibility that something may actually exist from nothing. This possibility, however, is unscientific and more religious in nature, and thus it is but sensible for many people, including Epicurus, to reject it. The universe, according to Epicurus, “consists of material bodies and void” because the latter is the place where matter is to exist (109). Therefore, the existence of the “void” is considered necessary as it is the one that should contain the matter or the material substance. Epicurus also believes that “the universe as a whole is infinite,” although this may purely have been concluded based on the fact that Epicurus could not possibly comprehend a particular finiteness of the universe (109). It therefore also follows that the number of atoms is infinite, and since the number of atoms is infinite, then the void that holds them must also be infinite. Epicurus is very logical in making this distinction between material substance and “void” since he considers matter to occupy space just like the science of Democritus has established matter to be so, and so he assigns “void” as this space where matter exists (109). The idea of infinity, however, may only be the subjective part of Epicurus’ principles. There may actually be limits to the universe unknown to Epicurus or to any other human being, but perhaps Epicurus or any other human being simply will not be able to know whether such a limit exists. Such idea of infinity, however, translates as infinity even in terms of the “number of worlds, some like ours and some unlike” (110). The reason for this is that the number of atoms is infinite and that they move through great distances. Thus, these atoms which have not been utilized yet in the formation of a single world or many worlds can do the same thing. Moreover, as atoms create materials that create worlds, it is very much true that atoms somewhere may also create earthlike worlds in other parts of the universe. Apart from the idea of infinity, Epicurus has also mentioned something about the formation of images known as “idols” (110). Idols form from air and solid bodies. They possess a very fine texture and they are created as swiftly as thought, and that they flow from the surface of the body of any solid object “in a constant stream” (110). These “idols” are actually the basis of the existence of things as a human being perceives them. How then do we perceive things based on Epicurus’ point of view? It is these idols, specifically their continuous impact or an impression one of them leaves, that actually give the mind a mental picture of an object or an object’s shape (111). Thus, the pure object perceived by the mind is actually not a mental perception but the material impression of the idol or what is created by its continuous impact or stream. Moreover, according to Epicurus, the physical impression made by the idols or the continuous stream of idols on the senses is pure truth, but “whatever is false and erroneous is due to what opinion adds” (111). Thus, Epicurus may be implying that the reason why the stream of idols is perceived differently is that people add their opinion to it. Nevertheless, Epicurus may therefore be implying here that there is indeed non-material substance, i.e. opinion, which can affect the way the material idol is perceived. Moreover, somehow Epicurus subscribes to idealism when he says that “the mental pictures that we receive in the images that either come to our minds in sleep or are formed by the purposeful use of the mind or of the other instruments of judgment” would be different from those things that we know to be true or those that exist. However, perhaps, it is not really a non-material substance that Epicurus refers to as something that determines the variation in human perception, but perhaps the difference lies in the idea that different people naturally perceive one idol differently. Moreover, the idols exist in different positions and locations from which different people may perceive them, and so this may also account for the variations in perception. Moreover, according to Epicurus, atoms do not change by themselves and compounds do not change either based on their positions. The purpose, or rather the outcome, of this is for the atoms to display stability, for “it is necessary that something survive and be not utterly destroyed” (112). This means that the reason or the permanent form of things is that their atoms do not change by themselves and that atoms have an inherent stability. This accounts for the fact that things remain to appear so. Specifically, this is the reason why one’s face last night does not readily change overnight. This principle of permanence actually makes a lot of sense. Furthermore, according to Epicurus, since sensations and feelings are “the most certain foundation for belief” because of the stability of the atomic structure, “the soul is a finely divided, material thing, scattered through the whole aggregation of atoms that make up the body” (112). Epicurus does not deny the existence of the soul, which makes him more like an idealist since the soul is not perceived by the senses. Moreover, Epicurus believes that the soul is material, which makes him sound more ridiculous. Nevertheless, in the Epicurean context, the soul may be an example of an idol or an aggregate of idols, which are materials perceived by the human senses. Furthermore, for Epicurus, the soul is responsible for the sensation part of the body but only as long as the body lives (112). Moreover, for Epicurus, reason exists but it is basically “instinct to do many things of many kinds” (114). It is only later that reason elaborated on these things and then introduced new inventions. This is actually very similar to what Berkeley has postulated, as discussed in the latter half of this paper. For Epicurus, therefore, instinct always comes first for it is based on material existence, while reason only follows from whatever instinct has somehow established itself as a reasonable need or want. This is very logical in the sense that reason, which is something non-material, must have some material basis before it can possibly be understood. After all, in real, practical life, the basis of reason is scientific data or data from observation. In the same way that Epicurus viewed reason, he also viewed words as basically meaningless. For Epicurus, words at first did not have any meaning and that celestial phenomena happen by themselves (114). This is very logical because the vocabulary and the language of every particular group of people are basically only a matter of convention. On the other hand, Irish philosopher George Berkeley believes that “only minds and their thoughts and feelings are real” (118). Based on the principles laid out by George Berkeley, “When we see a tomato, which is a physical object, we are only having sensations of redness, roundness, and so forth” (119). We therefore see the idea existing, as ideas necessarily exist in the mind. This is therefore totally opposite to the view of Epicurus that something must exist first as a material object before the mind can perceive it. For Berkeley, the sensation that one has of something does not prove its existence but rather only makes a conclusion that such sensations are real. There is therefore no guarantee that the thing from which the perceiver supposes the sensations come actually exists. In fact, based on the conversation between Hylas and Philonous, in Berkeley’s greatest work of the same title and where the Irish philosopher seems to play the role of Philonous, the sensations or sensory data that one perceives may only actually be mere sensations that may not be necessarily indicative of the existence of something (112). Therefore, what a person hears is the auditory information but not the auditory source, hence his act of hearing something does not necessarily mean that the source of the sound must also exist, although instinct may tells us that the source of this sound must necessarily exist. Instinct is not to be followed here. Moreover, according to Berkeley, in the words of Philonous, “It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible,” and that “sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combinations of these qualities” (122). This means that “in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound, and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience” (128). This idea, which is similar to those presented above, actually considers as reality only those perceived. The problem, however, is that not everything that is known in practical life is directly perceived by the senses. Some are mere imagination, and images from one’s imagination can definitely elicit the same physiological changes as one would if the imagination were a real thing. Epicurus’ view of reality, perception and the acquisition of knowledge is still more logical than Berkeley’s, although both have flaws in them. For Epicurus, what is real is the material thing that can be perceived by the senses. Epicurus also argues that everything has a material existence in the form of idols or an aggregate of idols. The non-material cannot be perceived simply because it does not exist. This is actually a fairly logical stance compared to Berkeley’s. The problem with Epicurus’ view is that it discounts the possibility of the role of creation or the possibility that something may arise out of nothing. Moreover, another problem with Epicurus is that he assumes that the universe is infinite simply because he has no way of measuring its finiteness and perhaps he cannot comprehend this finiteness. These problems, however, are nothing compared to the problem of perception and opinion, which Epicurus suggests may be of a non-material process. On the other hand, Berkeley believes only one thing – that our sensations and perceptions of one thing cannot possibly guarantee the existence of that thing or person. The only thing that is real is the sensation being perceived, which are actually only ideas. The assumption that something exists because one or two of its qualities are perceived is merely based on experience, and cannot therefore guarantee the existence of such. However, the biggest problem with Berkeley is that he neglects the concept of imagination. Imagination can perceive objects in a slightly different way from sensation but nevertheless, imagination is non-material and therefore it is a possible basis of existence. In this case, Epicurus may come to the rescue and say that the only basis of existence is the reality of the thing being perceived. If one perceives a real thing, then it must be real; but if one merely imagines it, it may not be real at all. However, if Berkeley is confronted by this question, he may simply be speechless. Top of Form Bottom of Form Works Cited Stromberg, Joseph R. “Chapter 10: Materialism.” Reassessing the Presidency. New York: Prentice Hall, 2008. Print. Stromberg, Joseph R. “Chapter 11: Idealism.” Reassessing the Presidency. New York: Prentice Hall, 2008. Print. Read More