Thomas Reids Position on Common Sense - Essay Example

Running Head: THOMAS REID’S POSITION ON COMMON SENSE Thomas Reid’s Position on Common Sense The Common Sense Philosophy emerged back in the 17th and 18th centuries as a response to the challenges that were posed by philosophical scepticism and then science. It focused on assessing the role that the principles of common sense played in human life both on social and intellectual levels. Philosophers that developed the ideas of common sense asserted that people come already equipped with a special ability to perceive specific notions, truths, etc by intuition. This was thought to condition human experience and make possible knowledge of moral, religious, and scientific kind. The first thinkers were Herbert of Cherbury, as well as René Descartes; other British representatives were Henry Lee, Claude Buffier, Henry Home, G. Leibniz, and many more (Redekop, 2009, p.407). Thomas Reid is considered a founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense, whose ideas influenced several generations of philosophers well throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Rejecting the Theory of ideas, he claimed that it was “sensus communis” (the term Reid used to describe the “common sense”) that should be perceived as a solid basis of the philosophical quest. Reid’s main arguments on common sense revolved around his reaction to the ideas by Hume and Berkeley. Hume believed that a person can never comprehend what the world which is external for him/her consists of, since human knowledge is restricted by the ideas that are present in human mind. Berkeley, in his turn, maintained that the external world is just ideas inherent in human mind. Both Berkeley and Hume asserted that a mental phenomenon exists as perceptions of certain mental objects (Yaffe & Nichols, 2009, [online]). Contrary to these philosophers, Reid asserted that the foundations of common sense provide a justification to human belief in the existence of an external world. Reid provided response to the arguments by Hume, both naturalistic and skeptical by devising a set of common sense principles. He saw them as the basis of rational perception of the world and rational thought. To illustrate, any person who commits oneself to a philosophical argument must unconditionally presuppose particular beliefs. The examples are I am speaking to a real person, or the external world does exist under the laws which remain unchanged. Along these claims, more presuppositions can be found, which are all positive, meaningful, and reality-based. In this context, it is worth mentioning that Reid does not see the belief in these principles’ rightness as something rational. Instead, he asserts that it is reason that demands that the aforementioned principles act as prerequisites and that it is human mind that inherently produces them. Thus, the question of sanity arises here, which Reid believes leans back on his understanding of the common sense functioning. In relation to this, Reid writes, “For, before men can reason together, they must agree in first principles; and it is impossible to reason with a man who has no principles in common with you.” (Reid, 1846, p.230). Reid also believed that qualities are to be in “(...) Something that is figured, colored, hard or soft, that moves or resists. It is not to these qualities, but to that which is the subject of them, that we give the name body. If any man should think fit to deny that these things are qualities, or that they require any subject, I leave him to enjoy his opinion as a man who denies first principles, and is not fit to be reasoned with.” (Reid, 1785, p.766) While Reid’s position on common sense can be well understood through analyzing his criticism of Hume, I would like to briefly outline his ideas regarding Hume’s understanding of knowledge. As it has already been mentioned, Hume along with Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley developed the ideal theory of human mind, which Reid refuted by offering the positive idea of mind instead. The grounding argument against the theory by Hume is that it does not work if one takes into account intentionality and, moreover, human capacity to think of things that in reality do not exist. Careful analysis of Reid’s works allows making a conclusion that Reid appeals to the concept of “sensus communis” for two major reasons. In the human mind, original first principles are the foundation on which all belief and conception are based. People’s basic conceptions evolve as a response to certain signs, as an outcome of these principles. These signs are actually sensations or mental states which initiate conceptions. However, it is not always so. Sometimes, the signs are not actually mental states, but physical processes which take place in human organs of sense. All in all, the essential function of a sign is to give rise to a conception, as well as belief, which follows as a result of the human mind’s natural faculties (Lehrer, 1989, p.19). The second reason, according to Lehrer, which guided Reid towards the concept of “sensus communis” is his empiricism (Lehrer, 1989, p.20). While the proponents of the ideal theory made an assumption that mental states exist, they based their proof the existence of the real world on this assumption. Reid thinks this idea is absurd, since he believes we may well make an assumption that the objects of the external world exist and have their qualities. That is why, natural faculties is what people base their convictions on, with consciousness in the leading place, and perception in the second one. Reid based his view on the idea that both of them are elements of natural constitution, and there is now explanation why one should be trusted more than the other (Lehrer, 1989, p.20). All in all, it can be summarized that Reid chooses from three available options: 1) people must trust their faculties initially until they are provided with enough reason to stop trusting; 2) people must distrust their faculties initially (specifically, by scepticism that is thorough and consistent); 3) people must start with wholly arbitrary partiality, which is not justified, toward certain faculties. As it seems, Reid thinks the first option is the sensible choice. Therefore, Reid’s view on how people’s belief can be justified in an external world falls back on Reid’s assertion that people do not have any better reason to either trust or distrust (doubt) those beliefs that have been formed by reason than they do in respect to the beliefs that have been formed by human perception Responding to the argument by Reid, I would like to say that while Reid’s position regarding “the presumptively true beliefs” seems plausible for many of his readers; it is hard for me to agree with his argument of self-evidence which is a result of his common sense argument. While the philosopher asserted that all knowledge starts with the things people cannot help but believe, these “self-evident” truths, (i.e. people’s being aware of what pain or enjoyment is), do not require philosophical justification since “they are virtually forced upon us by the constitution of our own nature in order to function in a world God had created.” (Pearcey, 2004: 312). Reid’s views of the principles that provide the background for the reliability of human faculties seem conditional, as well as general. Therefore, I think it is virtually impossible to find the aspect of self-evidence in the principles that are characterized by such qualities. I agree with Greco that while it is quite easy to perceive the self-evidence of some conditional (“contingent”) truths (we exist), and of some general truths (like, for example, geometrical formulas), it is really difficult to perceive truths which are at once general and conditional as self-evident (Greco, 2008, p.299). Moreover, Reid’s argument seems implausible if to apply it to religious belief. The Reid’s realism based on the primary role of common sense, as well as a related notion of self-evidence contains dangers of turning into intellectually lazy individuals. Indeed, when things appear self-evident and people do not question them and explore them, they are likely to rely too much on these things. In terms of Christian belief, it poses a danger that believers will start accepting these things as dogma. Pearcey points out that this is close to heresy – questioning and mistakenly rely on self-evidence as God’s proof, which may be used against people who do not believe. For example, Pearcey has found this tendency to persist among American evangelicals (Pearcey, 2004). While I have some disagreements with Reid regarding the view of self-evidence and the role of first principles, I find some of his ideas on skepticism quite sound. Reid developed these ideas as a response to the question: “How can truth be justified?”. Contrary to Hume, who expressed the view that human beliefs are not justified, Reid offers his view of the belief’s justifiability in existing external world. First of all, the philosopher distinguishes between the sсeptics who are likely to be concerned about this problem in two groups: the first one is “thorough and consistent sceptic[s]” and the second one is “semi-sceptics” (Reid, 1997, p.71). The sceptics which are called “thorough and consistent” are said to hardly consider anything as knowledge. They only do it when the human faculty which is responsible for the belief formation has been proven in terms of its reliability. “Of course, nothing can be proven or shown until some belief is accepted, so a thorough sceptic . . . will end up not believing anything” (De Rose, 1998, p. 328). Reid hardly displays any interest in such type of sceptic, saying about him, “he must even be left to enjoy his scepticism” (Reid, 1958, p. 447) At the same time, Reid’s view of semi-sceptics appears to be more innovative and solid. In his opinion, semi-sceptics opt for accepting either one or more sources of their belief prior to the proof has been made that they are reliable. They holder all the remaining sources up to the chosen standard. To illustrate, according to the philosopher, “Hume has assumed that the deliverances of consciousness and reasoning are trustworthy” (Lehrer, 1989, p.149). However, Reid observes that it is totally arbitrary for the semi-sceptic to choose what faculty to accept and what to doubt. For example, this is how Reid responds to the sceptic’s position: “Reason, says the sceptic, is the only judge of truth, and you ought to throw off every opinion and every belief that is not grounded on reason. Why, Sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception; they came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another” (Reid, 1997, pp. 168-169). Responding to one of the strongest criticisms of Reid’s argument, I would like to look at that provided by Kant. Kant criticized Reid’s philosophy in two directions. First of all, Kant explicitly maintained that the whole philosophy of common sense is methodologically directed in a wrong direction. Implicitly, Kant refuted Reid’s ideas by denying the accuracy of Reid’s statement that through introspection one can directly access the ontology of human mind in an epistemological manner (Brun-Rovet, 2002, p.495). In response to this criticism, one should mention that Kant’s view is somewhat similar to Reid’s, therefore, his criticisms are directed against his own philosophy as well. Just as Reid, Kant’s asserts that the concept of human mind is pre-systematic, and as Kant is attempting to justify the reason, he fails to do it in epistemological manner (Brun-Rovet, 2002, p. 496). To conclude, while the argument of Thomas Reid is somewhat obscure and contains dangers of religious misinterpretation, his ideas of scepticism are interesting and quite innovative. Kant’s criticism of Reid unveils some methodological fallacies, yet it does not lessen the merit of Reid’s works, especially in the realm of pre-systematic concepts of human mind. Besides, Reid’s philosophy provides an insight into the method and way of writing, as well as scientific discussions that were common in Reid’s lifetime. References Brun-Rovet, E. Reid, Kant, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (209):495-510. DeRose, K. (1989). “Reid’s Anti-sensationalism and His Realism,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 98, No. 3 (July 1989). Lehrer, K. (1989). “Conception without Representation—Justification without Inference: Reid’s Theory,” Nous, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1989. Lehrer, K. (1989) Thomas Reid. Taylor & Francis. Pearcey N (2004). Total Truth. Liberating Christianity from its Cultural Captivity. Wheaton, Illinois, USA: Crossway Books.  Redekop, B. (2009). “Common Sense in Philosophical and Scientific Perspective.” Management Decision. Vol. 47 No. 3, 2009, pp. 399-412. Reid, T. (1785). An inquiry into the human mind: on the principles of common sense. Printed T. Cadell in the Strand, London; and J. Bell and W. Creech, Edinburgh. Reid, T. (1846). The works of Thomas Reid, with selections from his unpublished letters. (Preface, notes and suppl. dissertations by sir W. Hamilton. Prefixed, Stewarts Account of the life and writings of Reid). Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart & Co; Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. Reid, T. (1958). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, reprinted in Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, William Hamilton, ed., 5th Ed. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1958). Reid, T. (1997). An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Derek Brookes (Ed). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Yaffe, Gideon and Nichols, Ryan (2009). "Thomas Reid", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved on February 10, 2012 from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/reid/. Read More