Aspects of Visual Imagery - Coursework Example

Visual Imagery of the al Affiliation Visual Imagery For majority of us, mental imagery is a common phenomenon. We often recall past events, and even imagine of possible ones by forming mental images of them. Our dreams also seem largely to be composed of mental imagery. Indeed, psychologist and philosophers have argued out that together with the immediate perceptual experience, mental imagery makes the sum of the consciousness. If we are to understand the consciousness, we certainly have to understand the mental imagery (Berman & Lyons, 2007). Philosophers have studies visual imagery for centuries, experimental psychologist has also studied it for a number of years. Most recently, it has attracted the attention of the neuroscientist and cognitive scientists. Nevertheless, most of the mystery remains unresolved. There exists a controversy not only on the role of neural and cognitive mechanism during imagery but also over the function it plays in cognition if any (Richardson, 2009). Some of the researchers regards mental imagery as the platform for all thoughts; some regards it as necessary for given cognitive task such as judgment on spatial relationships and yet other scientist regard it as functionally unimportant of the unconscious cognitive process that constitute how we think. Just like an object which is perceived, mental images bear intentionality. In concept, it means there is always a real image of the perceived imaginary object by the brain. Some of the philosophers argue that consciousness and intentionality to be somewhat related. Nevertheless, unlike in the object perceived by the mind, mental images occur in absence of their object (Morris & Hampson, 2003). To emphasize on the point, it is hard to perceive a cat when no cat exist but one can imagine of a cat or other perceptible thing at any given time. Furthermore, one cannot perceive the image of a cat other than how it actually look like but whenever one wants it; it is possible to imagine that image of a cat anywhere or in any given condition (Richardson, 2009). Hence, images seem well suited to work as mental representations enabling us to think of things they way they are currently not and thus plan for the future, recall the past, reflect on about the unknown and fantasies about the unreal world. The ability to see things using the “mind eye” having been from ancient times known to be part of cognitive function. Most scholars refer Visual imagery as form of experience, experience that subjectively resembles the experience one have when actually perceived something. What this means is that, unless we understand perceptual consciousness, we cannot understand imaginal consciousness and vice-versa. Unfortunately, scientists have never come to an agreement on the issue. It nevertheless implies that visual imagery is necessarily and always conscious; if something has not been consciously experienced, it can never be mental imagery(Morris & Hampson, 2003). If we argue that mental imagery to be mental representation, as some cognitive theorist argues, the close conceptual linkage between consciousness and imagery is broken and arguably becomes conceivable that images plays a role in our cognitive without us being consciously aware about it. There is part of the evidence that shows this does indeed happen. Give it an example, experimental studies involving verbal memory have established that nouns that are easy to imagine and think of the corresponding image such as lion are better remembered compared to the nouns associated with images that are not easy to remember such as abstract nouns such as truth (Morris & Hampson, 2003). However, the mnemonic issue of imagability does occur regardless of whether any pertinent images are consciously experienced. One explanation about this is that image representation may impulsively get evoked by real words and is likely to play a role in making the words memorable even though they do not rise to consciousness. Much unlike the experimental conception imagery, the representational conception shows that it is possible to understand the function and nature of imagery without giving much attention to the fact that it is consciously experienced; in fact most theoretical and empirical cognitive science research on visual imagery in the last few decades have been based on this premise. The problem is that, imaginal consciousness have been largely been ignored while the controversies and questions about its representational function have received much attentions. Additionally, little attention has been given to the issue of what can differentiate between those cognitively active images that enter consciousness from those that fails to enter consciousness. But in either of the case, imagery cannot be satisfactory typified purely on the basis of its representational function. It is impossible though to differentiate it from other form of possible or actual mental representation without asking some controversial questions regarding its nature; or on the other hand, fascinating about the experimental conception of the imagery. We can arguably say that, mental images are those mental representations whose when on mind have the potential to give perceptual experience. If that is the case, representational conception of visual imagery is done theoretically dependent upon the experiential perception, and it’s hard to even to understand visual imagery unless one considers its conscious nature into consideration. Modern scientific controversies regarding visual imagery is by no means turn wholly on matters of empirical or theoretical fact (Berman & Lyons, 2007). Major disagreements revolve mainly upon conceptual matters and upon conflicting ideas regarding what issues a theory tackling visual imagery most needs to respond to. For instance, is it critical to consider the intentional nature and conscious of visual imagery when we try to know its cognitive functions. An overview of the historical contexts from which the range of existing research programs transpired is essential in discernment and judging between such contrary perspectives. Scientist across the globe differs on whether early thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato whose research involve the initial discussions of cognition, had anything close to the modern concept of consciousness. However, one thing is clear in that, Aristotle and Plato had the concept of visual imagery. Plato hesitantly proposed that human memory might be similar to a mass of wax into which our thoughts and perceptions imprint impressions; he also suggests, figuratively, by giving an example of an inner artist who mentally paints “images” pictures in the soul, and continue to propose that imagery may be implicated in the method through which the balanced mind apply control over the living thing appetites (Ellis, 2005). However, we can trace the concept of visual imagery from Platos successor Aristotle who gives the first logical account of the purpose of imagery in cognition. According to Aristotle, images have the same role just like the broader notion of visual mental representation has in current cognitive science. He postulated that mental images participate in critical role in thought and memory: memory recall is the component to mind of images of past situations and events, and "It is literally impracticable to think without seeing the image first"(Ellis, 2005). He also suggested that images strengthen the importance of language, and take part in motivation. If we did not have mental images, our speech would probably be empty noise like coughing, he argues, since something can only motivate our actions when something has been actually perceived from the brains. However, a mental visual image of a liked or disliked thing allows humans think about it in its nonappearance, and hence keep up our motivation. Aristotle also put forward that imagination that is closely related to common faculty of sense perception is centrally accountable for creating our mental images. Some scientists argue that this ability can be equated to conception of consciousness. Historically, however, the outcome of the stalemate about imageless thought was discrediting introspective methodologies in used in psychology, and even of the fact that consciousness could be studied scientifically (Pylyshyn, 2002). One of the earliest authors, John B. Watson, posited that consciousness was naturally unscientific notion, and, as a key member of this argument, cast doubt on the existence of visual imagery. He postulated that psychology should be perceived as the study engaged in nature of behavior rather than the study involving consciousness. Most of the cohorts belonging to Waston group treated consciousness beyond reach of science. At the same period, the inception and growth of analytical philosophy movement and specifically the influence of Wittgenstein Ludwig, also added to the cloud of doubts and made many philosophers to discredit the importance of imagery, or in most cases ignore it. However, with time, scientist started to appreciate the fact about consciousness and they laid experiments that showed the presence of visual imagery and how it was attached to memory recall (Pylyshyn, 2002). Picture theory In this theory, just as the name suggest, visual images can be identified with representations in the brain that are in some important way like pictures or do represent things much the same way the picture does. Although it is believed that picture represent through semblance, it does not conclusively points that this can be the basis of mental representation. Resemblance is an essentially subjective connection that is documented when a conscious mind centers upon definite similarities involving things at the same time ignoring or discounting other, equally neutrally real dissimilarities. In order to achieve this, the mind should be able to stand for the things, and their applicable aspects. Picture theory is certainly the oldest and most applied concept on theory of imagery. Indeed, since primeval time’s humans have applied pictures, “images” as a way of creating visual experiences of objects and things that are not really there presently, and the comparison with visual imagery is also easily brought out (Pylyshyn, 2002). The theory dates back to the ancient scientists such as Plato and its concept seem to be deeply entrenched in many arguments on how the mind works. Indeed, many of the expressions such as “the mind’s eye”, and” mental picture” seem to be derived from the picture theory (Ellis, 2005). It is evident that, visual imagery enhances our ability to recall. Those who are visually impaired may not have much potential in their brain recall capacity compared to those who visual sight is normal. The brain tends to recall from what that have been perceived, hence the visual memory. References Berman, D. and Lyons, W. (2007). The first modern battle for consciousness: J. B. Watsons rejection of mental images. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14 (#11), 5-26. Dean, G. M. & Morris, P. E. (2003). The relationship between self-reports of imagery and spatial ability. British Journal of Psychology, 94, 245–273. Ellis, R. D. (2005). Questioning consciousness: the interplay of imagery, cognition, and emotion in the human brain. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L. and Ganis, G. (2006). The case for mental imagery. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marks, D. F. (2007). Consciousness, mental imagery and action. British Journal of Psychology, 90, 567-585. Morris, P. E. and Hampson, P. J. (2003). Imagery and consciousness. London: Academic Press. ORegan, J. K. and Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 939-1031. Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2002). Mental imagery: in search of a theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 157-237. Richardson, J. T. E. (2009). Mental imagery. Hove, U.K.: Psychology Press. Read More