Hume's Argument against Induction - Literature review Example

Name: xxxxxx Tutor: xxxxxx Title: Hume’s Argument Against Induction Institution: xxxxxx Date due: xxxxxx Introduction Induction or inductive reasoning refers to a form of reasoning process whereby a conclusion is drawn from a certain case. It is reasoning from a precise case and obtaining a general rule. It draws conclusion from observations so as to make generalizations. Induction is normally contrasted with deduction, the process of reasoning whereby conclusion rationally follows from premises, and in which the conclusion should be correct if the premises are correct. On the contrary, in inductive reasoning there is no any logical movement from the premises to conclusion. The premises form good reasons for acknowledging the conclusion. In inductive reasoning, premises are generally based upon observations or facts. There is usually a probability that the premises might be true whilst the conclusion is false because there isn’t essentially a logical association between conclusion and premises. Induction is utilized when formulating theories, generating hypothesis and determining relationships, and is important for scientific discovery (Weintraub, 1995). Hume’s argument against induction The problem of induction According to Hume, induction refers to the act of drawing universal conclusion based on certain experiences. Even though this scheme is fundamental to the scientific method and empiricism, there is usually something intrinsically tentative about it, since people might attain new data that are diverse and that invalidate their previous conclusions. Basically, the principle of induction teaches people that they can forecast the future based on what has taken place in the past, which they can’t. Hume disputes that in the nonexistence of the actual knowledge of nature of the link between incidents, we can’t sufficiently justify inductive presumptions. Hume proposes that two probable justifications and rebuffs them both. Weintraub (1995) argues that the initial justification is functional implying that it is solely logical that the future must looks like. Hume points out that we might just envisage a world of turmoil, and therefore logic can’t warrant our inductions. The other validation is that we can presume that some event will continue to take place because it has usually occurred before. To Hume, this form of reasoning is spherical and does not have a foundation in reason. Hume feels that n spite the attempts of John Stuart and other philosophers; some people might claim that the dilemma of induction has never been sufficiently resolved. Hume points out that people can still utilize induction, like causation to function on everyday basis provided that we identify the constraints of our knowledge (Stove, 2001). The Uncertainty of Causation Hume views that whilst people might perceive two incidents that seem to take place in coincidence, there in no way for them to recognize the nature of their association. Based upon this observation, Hume disputes against the notion of causation or the cause and effect. People usually assume that one thing causes another thing, but it is probable that one thing doesn’t cause the other. Hume argues that causation is the tendency of connection, a belief which is meaningless and unfounded. He also argues that people constantly observe one incident following another and our presumption and we witness cause and result appears logical to us. Hume believes that people possess an inherent belief in causality, which is rooted in their individual biological practices, and that they can neither discount nor prove this belief. Nevertheless, if people accept their limitataions, they can still work without abandoning their presumptions on cause and effect. Religion proposes that the globe functions on cause and effect therefore there must be a first cause called God. In the worldview of Hume, causation is presumed but eventually not knowable. People don’t know there is a First Cause or a position for God (Fogelin, 1993). Moral Utility versus Religious Morality Hume suggests that the notion that moral values are rooted in their usefulness or their utility, other than in the will of God. This version of Hume theory is distinctive. Unlike his successors like John Stuart, Hume don’t consider that moral realities could be attained scientifically, as people can add up units of utility and contrast the comparative utility of a range of actions. Rather, Hume is a moral sentimentalist who deemed that moral principles can’t be rationally validated as scientific solutions to social difficulties. Hume claims that some principles merely appeal to human beings and other don’t and that moral principles apply to us since they support our interests and the interests of our colleagues, with whom we logically empathize. This means that human beings are biologically inclined to support and approve whatever assists the society, because they all subsist in a society and stand to gain. Cause and effect Logically, reasoning is typically divided into deductive and inductive. Inductive reasoning is usually a large portion of scientific theories and is reasoning from a particular event or idea to general event or idea. Inductive reasoning is similar to a prediction because some incident in the past was certain in a way and thus other similar incidents in the future will be certain. Hume pointed a setback with induction, with presuming that one thing will follow another merely because it has previously followed it. Scientists contemplated that there was an essential association between cause and effect, but Hume argues that there isn’t essential association at all. People only think that something is the cause of another thing because it has been the cause of something else in the past. Hume asserts that it is solely out of habit that we presume something causes another. However, this is a habit or strong belief of mind taught trough experience. No one can prove that there is casual links among impressions. Hume believes that all knowledge comes from experience and that experiences only exist within the mind as individual units of experience. Anything that an individual directly experienced was nothing more than contents of his personal mind or consciousness. If the anticipation that anticipation that a second incident occurs after the initial one is a habit strong conviction that is taught by experience and therefore the empirical evidence or the non-impressionary evidence is required to offer the cause of the effect. There is no self Hume has an interesting argument that self is nonexistent. Because all ideas allegedly is able to be traced to an impression, Hume looked for an impression of self and he could not a solid entity. Hume asks people to consider which impression offers them their concept of self. People tend to think of themselves as selves; stable entities that subsist over time. However, no matter we closely examine our individual experiences we never view anything beyond a sequence of transient sensations, impressions and feelings. People can’t study themselves or what they are, in a unified manner. There is not impression of self that ties their certain impressions together. This means that we can not be directly conscious of ourselves only through what we are experiencing at any particular moment (Kenyon, 1985). Even though the relations between our feelings and ideas might be traced via time by memory, there doesn’t exist an actual proof of any core that links them. Hume proposes that the self is merely a bundle of perceptions, which are similar to connections in a chain. To search for a unifying self past these perceptions is like searching for a chain separately from links that form it. Hume disputes that our concept of self is as a consequence of our innate routine of attributing unified subsistence to any set of connected parts. This belief is innate, but there is not any logical support for it. How have philosophers attempted to refute his argument? David Stove refutes Hume’s argument against induction because is presuming deductive. According to Stove Hume argued that we do not have a priori knowledge and that it can’t be entailed from essential truths and nor can it be inferred from our observations. Hume’s argument against induction depends upon the allegation that all inductive references assume the uniformity principle and that this principle can’t be obtained from reason, but solely from observation. Stove claims that the question that is supposed to be asked is whether every inductive reasoning really depends on Uniformity Principle (Hume, 1740). Stove claims that inductive arguments depend on uniformity principle since the addition makes the inductive argument valid. If stove is correct, then all inductive arguments are really deductive arguments having a hidden premise. A characteristic disparity between deductive and inductive arguments is that, if premises are right, the result of the deductive argument will generally be right as well but this isn’t the case inductive reasoning or induction as Hume claims. If the addition of uniformity principle would make an inductive argument deductively justified, then uniformity principle must be untrue, because this principle will be proved to be untrue by each inductive failure. Therefore, David Stove lines of reasonings present Hume’s uniformity principle as being false. Karl popper Karl Popper have sought to refute and resolve Hume’s argument against induction by arguing that science doesn’t utilize induction, and induction is in reality a myth. Popper argues that knowledge is created by criticism and conjecture and the major role of experiments and observations in science are in an effort to refute and citizen existing theories. Karl’s philosophy of science is, nevertheless, not a type of irrationalism, but critical rationalism. Popper claims that each theory must be subjected to a thorough vital testing regime, intended at trying to falsify the theory. Critical rationalism is very closely linked to Karl’s view on problem of induction. His resolution to the problem of induction is that science in point of fact doesn’t use induction as a way of attaining new knowledge. Because scientific theories are based upon conjectures or inferences, scientists can simply make deductions from conjectured theories and test if the predictions are justified through looking for potential refutations. Poppers deem that Hume’s refutation of inductive conclusion from a logical view point is conclusive and clear, but he is not satisfied with Hume’s psychological elucidation of induction in terms of habit and custom. Hume deems in psychological control of induction; not as a logically justified process, but as a process which people and animals utilize. The answers offered by Hume to psychological and logical problems of induction result to the conclusion that all inductive conjectures are irrational. In Humean view, all knowledge is simple irrational custom or habit and is rationally completely indefensible. Popper reformulates Hume’s psychological problem by broadening the scope occurrences to laws and through including refutations or counterinstances (Popper & Karl 1989). The answer of Popper to the induction problem is that we aren’t justified in reasoning from an occurrence to the reality of the equivalent law. However we are validated in reasoning from counterinstance to falsity of the equivalent universal law. Induction might be logically unjustified, but falsification or refutation is a logically justified means of arguing from one counterinstance to refutation of the corresponding law (Kenyon, 1985). Do you think any reply is satisfactory? I don’t think that both Stove’s and Popper’s reply to Hume’s argument against induction are satisfactory. This is because Popper’s brave attempt to develop a theory of science whilst consenting to skeptical disputes against induction, still holds that pragmatically and rational enterprise. Popper tried to replace induction by his view that science is an extremely rational activity and by naturally attempting to bridge the gaps generated by induction. Popper undertook complex contortions in attempting t offer an answer that didn’t involve induction. He proposed, that a theory through enduring a stringent test intended at falsifying it turned out to be corroborated but not confirmed. This passing doesn’t lead us to thinking that the theory in question is indeed true because Popper presents the possibility of any theory as being true nil because past performance cannot be regarded as indicative of future results. Therefore Popper seeks to acknowledge the skepticism of Hume about induction without acknowledging skepticism about science. In the viewpoint of Popper, scientists are never validated in believing that the observation statements they acknowledge are true (Popper, 1998). Stove’s reply to Hume’s argument against induction is not satisfactory because though he claims that inductive arguments depend on the uniformity principle, he doesn’t present a clear mark of induction. According to Hume (1975) Inductive assumptions are contingent and thus deductive inferences are essential. In the real sense contingent power of induction carries with it the risk of error. Even the superior inductive processes applied to all accessible evidence might get it wrong, implying that excellent deductions might lead to correct premises to untrue conclusions. Therefore, induction can’t be justified because it is a contingent scheme and good inductions might lead us from truths to falsehoods and this means that there can not be a deductive validation for induction (Skyrms, 1992). Conclusion Hume’s argument against induction tries to answer the question whether inductive reasoning results to knowledge. Hume argued that all our experiences and observations give us completely no logical basis for deducing anything that is not observed. Additionaly, Hume believes that even though one incident or set of impressions usually preceded another, this doesn’t prove that the initial incident caused the second incident. He notes that the constant concurrence of two incidents builds up the anticipation that the second incident would occur after the initial one. Bibliography Popper, Karl R., 1989, Conjectures and refutations, 5th edition, Routledge, London. Skyrms, B, 1992, Choice and Chance: an introduction to inductive logic, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, California. Popper, Karl R., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, New York. Popper, Karl, 1998, The problem of induction’, in: Curd, M. and Covers, J.A., editors, Philosophy of science: the central issues, (New York: W.W. Norton,), Weintraub, R., 1995, What was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction? The Philosophical Quarterly 45(181):460-470pp. 426–432. Kenyon, J. D., 1985, Doubts about the Concept of Reason', in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 59, p. 254. Stove, D.C., 2001, The Rationality of Induction, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York. Hume, D, 1975, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. P. N. Nidditch (ed.). 3rd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hume, 1740, A Treatise of Human Nature. 1967 edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Fogelin, R. J., 1993, Hume’s Scepticism, Cambridge University Press, Norton. Read More