Defence Policy of Australia - Assignment Example

Australia’s defense policy focus: Should it be regional or global? Defense is a term inherently interrelated with the term security, because security is defense’s reason for being. To understand this relationship reversely, we could say, without any threat to security there is no reason for defense. Meaning, the more insecure a nation is, the tighter its defense is. We could say then that any nation’s defense reflects the nation’s insecurity. And the more nations fortify their defenses the more they spell out distrust and fear. This becomes very apparent every time crises emerge. And to this date, the issue of defense becomes more volatile after the September 11, 2001 incident. But the root of the matter is the state’s definition of security. How security is characterized consequentially determines its threat. For instance, security for the US is the perpetuation of its hegemony all over the world. That’s why the 9/11-incident, which is a direct assault to this US assertion – a direct threat to US hegemonic arrogance (Beeson and Bellamy n.d.: 1), has created profound insecurity in the US and among its allies as vividly expressed by their highly costly war on terrorism. And Australia – the unfaltering loyal ally of the US in the Asia-Pacific, is no exception. In fact, debate on Australia’s defense policy focus has once again takes center stage due to this unthinkable threat from extremist “non-state actors” (Ungerer 2000: 80; Howard 2007: par. 5). Australians have disagreed for generations about how best to make Australia secure… from the conscription referenda of World War I to the disputes over the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s, the challenge to the American alliance in the 1980s and opposition to the war on Iraq in 2003. Familiar themes in this national debate appear and reappear—whether to rely on allies or self-defense, whether to fight abroad or only at home, whether to define Australia's region broadly or more narrowly, how much to depend upon diplomacy as compared with defense, and so on. The emergence of a new threat in the form of global terrorism has ensured that the debate about defense and security continues. (Firth 2005: 174-175) With these premises, before we could determine Australia’s defense policy focus, it would be logical to determine first the threats to Australia’s security. And for this matter, it would be necessary to establish Australia’s definition of its security, as it would determine what would be considered threat to Australian security. Of which, the best source is the government itself. To quote Prime Minister John Howard, himself: … the core of Australia’s security agenda is quite straightforward. It is to protect and defend our people, and our interest, and our way of life. In practice, Australia has a history of seeing its own security as intertwined with the security of others and with the forces that shape the global system. (2006: par. 2) And to quote Prime Minister Rudd himself: Freedom from attack or the threat of attack; the maintenance of our territorial integrity; the maintenance of our political sovereignty; the preservation of our hard won freedoms; and the maintenance of our fundamental capacity to advance economic prosperity for all Australians…These interests are not only enduring, they are common to most countries that share our values and goals. These interests reflect the fact that nation states continue to protect and promote their sovereignty, but do so in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. (Rudd 2008: 3 & 7) In short, security is the guarantee of territorial right and freedom coupled with political and economic freedom – the fundamentals commonly believed to build a prosperous and humane society. By which economic freedom is defined as the equal opportunity to freely attain one’s self-development and economic progress and political freedom as the freedom to express one’s thought and ideas, to believe without being coerced, and to chose whom to and not to associate with. (Downer & Vaile 2003: vii) Following this, it would be understood that anything that would deny Australia of these rights would be considered threat to Australian security. One more thing, the crux in conceptualizing security is its given context especially so that nations operate and interrelate in a fast changing multi-dimensional world, which usually ushers new concepts, new relationships, new perspectives. Concretely, with the end of the so-called Cold War, due to the “collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991” (Kim & Hyun 2000: 33) re-evaluation and re-conceptualization of security became popular among analysts. Although the ‘Westphalian’ international order is still in effect, we are beginning to witness a major conceptual shift in security thinking — from a focus on national security, with its emphasis on the military defense of the state, to an emphasis on comprehensive security and human security issues, underscoring the need to ensure the tranquility and welfare of individuals who live in the state. (Ibid) Not until a deeper understanding on the complexities of the current international system is integrated into the study and practice of security that nation-states would become competent in dealing with varied possible threats that may challenge even the most powerful. (Beeson & Bellamy n.d.: 3) It is with these considerations that the threats to Australian security are defined. In the second foreign and trade policy White Paper of the Commonwealth of Australia entitled Advancing the National Interest, it was stated that Australia is “dealing forthrightly with security threats, especially from terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and people smuggling” (Downer & Vaile 2003: iv) and that the “threats to Australia’s security come not just from our region, but also from more distant points on the globe” (ix). These are reiterated in the 2005 Defense Update of Australia’s National Security: “Defeating the threat of terrorism, countering the proliferation of WMD and supporting regional states in difficulty remain of the highest priority” (Hill 2005: 15) Describing this current context as “a changed strategic environment” (Hill 2003: 8), defined Australia’s national security threats are described each as follows: a). Global Terrorism has been evaluated as Islamic extremism – “ a perverse interpretation of the Muslim faith” (Downer & Vaile: x) – most prominently represented by Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda group. And in this respect, Australia’s neighboring Southeast Asia – “a geopolitical ‘shatterbelt’, a region marked by great diversity and conflict” (Lyon 2007: 4), a known habitat of Muslim nations, has been immediately identified as a potential breeding area for terrorists and “a potential base for terrorist operations” (Stewart 2001, cited in Beeson 2003: 226+). And without any further explanation, the Australian government told its people that “Australia has been identified as a target” (Hill 2003: 11; Downer 2004: xi) – in fact third following US and Britain. (Beeson 2003: 226+) b). The threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was attributed to the fall of Soviet communism and the development of globalization whereby these two phenomena developed a conducive environment for the fast production of ‘nuclear, chemical and biological weapons’ describing WMD as the ‘ultimate asymmetric threat’ that encourages weak states to flout and capacitates non-state actors to unilateral attack. (Hill 2003: 15) c). People smuggling, perceived effected by the regions troubled characteristic due to its deeply rooted socio-political problems (Hill 2003: 18) drive citizens away from their countries and illegally migrate to seek asylum or refuge in Australia. With the above threats, Australia’s national security policy responses are designed in building lasting capabilities, as laid down by Australian PM Kevin Rudd in his speech in The First National Security Statement to the Parliament on December 4, 2008, which generally are as follows: First, an activist diplomatic strategy that is aimed at keeping our region peaceful and prosperous. Second, making sure that we have an Australian Defence Force that is ready to respond when necessary, in a range of situations from combat operations to disaster relief. Third, building and maintaining national security agencies and capabilities that work effectively together. (sec. 1, sub-sec. 2, par. 1) Concretely, activist diplomatic strategy means maintaining a ‘key strategic partnership’ with the US as the ‘central pillar’ of Australia’s national security policy as this places Australia in a more secured position both regional and global (Rudd 2008, sec. 1, sub-sec. 2, par. 3; strengthening Australia’s “security policy cooperation with a number of regional partners including Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore” (par. 5), and expanding Australia’s “security policy dialogue with China and our security policy cooperation with India” (par. 6). This “creative middle power diplomacy must be reinforced by a robust defense policy” (par. 11) of which as set out in the Australia’s National Security – A Defense Update 2005 has two major elements: “to shape and build a defense capability that is versatile, adaptable, and which links easily with other arms of the Australian government …(and) to build strong security relationships both regionally and globally” (Hill 2005: 18). Australia’s national security policy reiterates the Australian government’s high regard and unswerving loyalty to the US and its prejudice to a more militaristic approach with the Australian Defense Force regarded as “the cornerstone” (Hill 2005: v) of Australia’s security. Also, it fairly recognizes the necessity to foster cooperation among its neighboring countries, as it focuses on potent domestic, regional and global security threats. Australia’s defense policy focus: Creates security or insecurity? Should be regional or global? Security is a much sought after state or condition, because without it, political and economic progress will be hardly achieved (Howard 2007: 3). Understandably, any defense policy will naturally be subjected to scrutiny just like Australia’s. Since, the ultimate aim of defense is security, it is in securing the nation and its people that makes any defense policy sound and effective. Unfortunately, however, this is not always the case. There are defense policies that instead of providing security are causing further insecurity. For example, states particularly great powers like the US and Britain – the main actors – ensure survival by perpetuating their powers (Kim & Hyun 2000: 34). In fact, “they remain committed not only to global deterrence strategies and global military deployments but to the actual application of large-scale force whenever economic or strategic interests are at stake” (Camilleri 2000: 314). Yet, this makes them potent targets of retaliation, as what had been pointed out by Al Qaeda’s bombing of the twin tower in New York. As Beeson and Bellamy emphasized, the US has no one but only itself to reproach as it epitomizes an order perceived indifferent to the improvement of international inequality. (n.d.: 18) Furthermore, “American militarism makes likely targets such as Iraq and North Korea feel insecure prompting them to develop their own defensive military capacities in whatever way they can” (26). What do these tell us? These evidently imply that just like any other policy, defense policy should be based on a just framework. Meaning it should be addressing a real threat, not an amplified one or worse a created one; defense response should commensurate not overkill the perceived threat, because overkill is no longer defense but aggression; and most importantly, one’s security should not be causing insecurity to the other, because this would only create more insecurity on both. In short, an effective defense policy should pave the way towards peace not war. It is in this framework, that we shall assess Australia’s defense policy focus. The first point is the judgment on the well-defined perceived threats to Australia’s security – Are they real or not? Contrary to the Australian government’s pronouncements, “Dibb found Australia to be one of the safest countries in the world. Far from being at risk, Australia faced 'no identifiable direct military threat'…” (Firth 2005: 157) The Australian government’s claim that sending Australian troops to countries like Korea, Malaya, Borneo, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan to assist her great and powerful friends to ensure her own security in the future, reflects Australia’s mentality of forward defense reducing it to a warlike nation. (156) This in fact caused Australia’s neighboring countries in the region to accuse Australia as Washington’s ‘deputy sheriff’ in the region (Holloway 2002, cited in Miller 2003: 9; Cook 1999, Murphy 2002, cited in Snyder 2006: 328) straining Australia’s projection and relationship in her own regional sphere. Not to say that the resources Australia spent and allotted in support of her allies’ wars were already unavailable for Asia’s sake. (Snyder 2006: 327) In this manner, Australia is creating her own threat, her own insecurity. Australia's unique position as a Western political and cultural state and close US ally on the edge of Southeast Asia has made it, from time to time, a convenient focus for Southeast Asian fears of Western and US economic, cultural, and military challenges to the sovereignty and aspirations of these states. (Snyder 2006: 336) The second point is the consistency between the perceived problem and the defined solution. As the Australian government has vocally pledged support to asylum seekers, its “refugee policies… designed to protect Australia's sovereignty and maintain national security” (Beeson 2003: 233) sends contradicting messages, especially so that in the “Tampa Crisis” (Ibid), “a fairly routine humanitarian issue” (229) the government sent back the 460 refugees on the ground that accepting them “would encourage ‘destination shopping’, the trade in people smuggling, and generally encourage other would-be emigrants to head for Australia” (Ibid). In the same manner, Australian policymakers found themselves in the slightly bizarre and unsustainable position of enthusiastically supporting a war against an "evil" and oppressive Taliban regime, while simultaneously refusing to accept or assist those Afghanis who sensibly attempted to flee such oppression. (Beeson 2002: 238) As Wanandi (2001: 13) stated: such ambivalent refugee policy of the Australian government had downgraded Australia in the eyes of prestigious Indonesian observers to a ‘Pacific pariah’. Worse, to justify these policy and practice, the Australian government evidently degrades possible asylum seekers through arbitrary and misleading use of ‘video evidence’ (Garran 2001: 4). This is not only a lowly compromise of Australia’s moral standards, but also jeopardizes the nation’s defense. Furthermore, the big deployment and spending on “better protecting Australia’s borders… against non-citizens” (Smith 2008: 5) were not only demoralizing and costly (ANON 2002 cited in Beeson 2003: 231) but is an over reaction to the actual threat. (Garran 2001: 9) The third point is Australia’s make over of its defense force spending “$26 billion by 2015-16” (Howard 2006: par. 29) and “investing heavily on broader defense capability” (par. 29). Critics wonder why Australia has decided to buy 59 Abrams refurbished heavy battle tanks from the USA at a cost of $550 million, battlefield vehicles with advanced armor that have no conceivable use in a regional conflict such as that in East Timor or Solomon Islands, or in action against regional terrorists, and would be of value only in a distant war where Australia would be fighting alongside the Americans. Similar doubts have been raised about the government's decision to add a US ship design to the list of possible purchases in Australia's $6 billion destroyer project… The history of Australian defense procurement is in any case littered with examples of expensive bungles, like that of the Collins-class submarines, which were initially too noisy and could not carry the right torpedoes. (Firth 2005: 177) Fourth, as to its strategy in confronting the defined threats to Australia and its people, Lyon (2007: 5) emphasized that “… strategic policy must have at its foundation the safety and security of Australia and its people,” but he forgot to add that on the other hand it should not aggress other nation and people, as Australia’s dealing with her Pacific neighbors makes her “more of an interventionist, metropolitan power” (Lyon 2007: 9). Key to this negative imaging is Australia’s well-kept and well-treasured traditional alliance with the US. In fact, Australia’s all-out support to America’s war against terrorism went beyond the ‘field of operations’. (Woolner 2003: 2) The United States is often seen as the primary agent of the challenges that many in Southeast Asia perceive they face, be it an attack on traditional languages and culture from US mass media, challenges to traditional values from Western liberalism, or challenges to their sovereignty from globalization. (Dibb 1993: 59-60) Australia’s strategy of middle power diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region creates contradicting effects, which may be attributed to the region’s rich diverse culture. As General Li Jijun stated, “Culture is the root and foundation of strategy” (cited in Scobell 2002: 1). This implies that for Australia to achieve regional cooperation, knowing that “only regional cooperation can defeat the transnational threats that pose the major security concerns of today and the future” (Blair 2001, cited in Haselden 2002-03: 125) should therefore learn to respect and deal with each culture. As Miller (2003: 6) stressed, “the key to understanding the different security approaches is the recognition of Asia’s unique style of relationships. Analysis of Australia’s defense policy focus leads me more to believe that it is creating disunity within the region, and it is creating more threats to Australia and its people, especially in this turbulent times. The basic flaw of Australia’s defense policy lies in its two fundamentals: its center pillar – the strategic alliance with the US; and its cornerstone – the highly sophisticated defense force. Essentially this only reflects how Australia superficially appreciates the security problems she thinks threaten her. These fail to recognize or may be intentionally evade rooting out that the problems of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and human trafficking were all after effect – directly of indirectly – of America’s hegemonic arrogance and militarism; that unless Australia frees itself from being the loyal mouthpiece of the US in the Asia-Pacific region would it be able to convince the region’s nation-states to work cooperatively; and that if only Australia has no power-ambition would it be able to promote peace – the true basis of security. In fact even Col. Miller(2003: 1), himself a US military officer realized, “It is just this U.S.-centric approach to security that will cause our strategy to eventually fail in Asia.” We suggest that rather than continuing to build security by constructing and defending boundaries between states or ‘us and them’ in an era when ideational and material boundary maintenance is all but impossible, a globalized conception of security depends upon the construction of transnational security communities predicated on more widely accepted norms, values, interests and identities. (Beeson & Bellamy n.d.: 3-4). Today, Australia is increasingly confronted with sets of security issues, matters, problems, which may not necessarily mean threats unless mishandled or unless, just like in the war on terrorism, this would be used to subtlety impose a unilateral regional order. One thing is inevitable, Australia can no longer operate continentally alone, but its defense policy focus should be an interrelation of continental, regional, and global focus as it is facing security problems in the context of “a world characterized by malleable borders and transnational networks.” (Beeson 2003: 237) Conclusion The greatest source of insecurity is fear. The greatest fear to have is the fear of the unknown… the fear of the possible… the fear of an enemy you knew you had created… and its too late to retrace your footsteps because you knew you already have deeply offended that enemy of your creation. Why in the first place should Australia be threatened by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and human trafficking? Why did Australia rank third in the terrorist list? Why should it be a target of attack? Citing the bombing in Bali, Indonesia as the basis of direct terrorist threat – why in the first place was Bali bombed and by whom? Why is the Southeast Asia immediately pinpointed a potent base for terrorist operations? Is it because Muslims commonly inhabit the area? This assumption clearly racialized a security problem that in fact is more politically seated rather than fundamental Islam perversion. Such kind of perception on this matter would only polarize the world that would further disunity and hatred. Knowing your enemy is correct and good for defense, but creating an enemy is another thing and more dangerous. Between the two, where does the problem lie? Even enemies justify there sort of action because they know that mere terrorism is unpalatable to the human race… the question now is why all of a sudden terrorism is gaining its ground, when we say its evil, when man is basically good, and when societies clamor for peace and equality? Many harbor it. Why? Is it because many sympathize with them, on what ground? Let’s not give them more reason to be justified. Denying them the very reason of their existence – that is injustice – will extinct them. But to attack them militarily with black propaganda will just make them great, especially among Asians, who seem to be more sympathetic to underdogs. Has it never occurred to us why now defense is such a sensitive fragile issue? Because with the globalization of the world, people begin to see the disparity of lives and they begin to ask why? They begin to look for answers. They begin to see the root cause. They begin to hate, to act. Furthermore, enemies are given wider opportunities and ways to retaliate against their enemy. Globalization has radically changed the contours of nations and peoples interrelations and even perspective – in this context to debate on the range of Australia’s defense is moot and academic, because whether we like it or not, we are no longer existing in the framework only of our national or regional boundaries. We are living, operating, dealing, and surviving harshly in a globalized world. The issue that we have to deal with our defense policy focus is our standpoint. Australia’s defense policies may be comprehensive, but again, unless Australia’s standpoint remains to be of primary service on the perpetuation of the US hegemonic interest in Asia-Pacific and the whole world, its policies will recreate more security problems not only to Australia, but to Asia-Pacific and the world as a whole. Australia is needed by the US to protect its hegemony in Asia that houses four of US possible contenders for power: China, Japan, India, North Korea in the region by encouraging positive cooperation within the region. But as Palmer (1992: 28) has described, although SEATO has failed in its aim to unite Southeast Asia, it has however, proven that indeed it is very difficult for a nation outside the region to persuade regional country-members to achieve collective security, most especially in a highly-diverse region like Asia-Pacific. This US difficulty however, is wholeheartedly being shouldered by Australia, which as discussed earlier is jeopardizing Australia’s security, regional relations and even its own national integrity. In fact, Gamaut et al. (2001: 15) observed that “Australia’s official relations with the Asia-Pacific region are more fragile and less productive than any time for several decades,” the most complex and fragile of these is with Indonesia. (Beeson 2002: 240) Furthermore, the basic lopsidedness of the distribution of economic power between nations, especially when they are made to believe that it is imperative for Australia to remain loyal to its strategic ally, essentially handcuffed Australian leaders leaving them no choice in trade talks with the US even against the painful reality that US policy has direct adverse effect on Australian producers, specifically in agriculture and manufacturing. (Ravenhill 2001: 249) It is quite surprising that a nation like Australia – a powerful nation, which projects it self a cooperative and friendly-neighbor country, a “good international citizen” (Beeson 2002: 232) would be so adamant to expand and improve its defense forces primarily against terrorism, yet is unwilling to detach from the magnetic heat that makes it a target of terrorism and that is its loyal friendship with the US the creator of terrorists, and in the eyes of Asians is the creator of terrorism. … the US is responsible for the creation of an international order that is associated with major disparities of wealth and power, and which systematically privileges some interests and countries over others, that has created the conditions in which the likes of Osama bin Laden can find support. (Beeson 2002: 238) And the security threats defined by the Australian government: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal migration are, “in their different ways, urgent, unambiguous expressions of profound unhappiness with the prevailing international order” (Beeson 2002: 242). And not unless the root causes of these security problems are addressed, they will remain and possibly would become worse. Therefore, the quest for security is essentially the quest for peace. Thus, defense policy focus should center on striking the balance between social development and military defense towards the alleviation of inequality. Reference List Beeson, Mark, 2003, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy,” The Australian Journal of Politics, vol. 48, no. 2, 226-250. 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Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Teak Hyun, Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security, New York, United Nations University Press, (33-44). Lyon, Rod, 2007, “Australia’s strategic fundamentals,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Special Report), Issue 6, 1-12 June viewed: http://academia-research.com/files/message/1296883_SR6_Australia%27s_strategic_fundamentals.pdf Miller, Frank L. Jr., 2003, “Impact of Strategic Culture on US Policies for East Asia,” November, viewed 14 May 2009 retrieved from: http://www.academia-research.com/files/instr/299581_Strategic%20Cultures%20in%20the%20Asia-Pacific%20Region.pdf Palmer, Norman D., 1992, “SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASPAC,” in K.S. Sandhu, et al. (eds.), The ASEAN Reader (1-30), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Ravenhill, John, 2001, "Allies but not friends: The economic relationship", Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2, 249-259. Rudd, Kevin (Prime Minister), 2008, The First National Statement to the Australian Parliament, 4 December, viewed http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0659.cfm Scobell, Andrew, 2002, China and Strategic Culture, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute. Smith, Ric, 2008, Summary and Conclusions: Report of the Review of Homeland and Border Security presented to the Australian Government, 27 June, viewed 12 May 2009 retrieved from: http://www.academia-research.com/files/instr/299581_20081204_review_homeland_security.pdf Snyder, Craig A., 2006, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of Australia’s Foreign Policy,” Contemporary Souhteast Asia, vol. 28, no. 2, 322-340. Ungerer, Carl J., 2000, “Approaching human security as ‘middle powers’: Australian and Canadian disarmament diplomacy after the Cold War,” in In William T. Tow, Rames Thakur and In-Taek Hyun (eds.) Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security, New York: United Nations University Press. (78-93) Wanandi, Jusuf, 2001, “Great nation reduced to a Pacific Pariah,” The Australian, 11 November, 10. Woolner, Derek, 2003, “The 2003 Defence Statement: The failure to marry politics and policy,” Symposium: Advancing the National Interest? 28 April viewed 12 May 2009 retrieved from: http://www.academia-research.com/files/instr/299581_ARPA_%20The%202003%20Defence%20Stat...pdf Read More