United Nations Emergency Force - Case Study Example

United Nations Emergency Force Introduction Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has continued to confront various issues on global level, and is still playing an influential role in resolving a number of issues on global level. During late 1950s, it confronted severe predicament that resulted in radical alterations and establishments. In specific, Egypt witnessed collapse of Armistice Agreement of 1949 due to dwellings by Israel on its territory (Lipson, 2007). At this time, it was very crucial for the United Nations to respond immediately to the crisis to avoid any warfare in the region, and it did reacted firmly and quickly by planning to establish its emergency force for the objective of peacekeeping globally, but mainly for the conflict of Egypt and Israel (United Nations, 2009). Although many members of the United Nations contributed in the establishment of the first United Nations Emergency Force; however, Lester Pearson of Canada and Dag Hammarskjold, the then Secretary-General played leading roles in carrying out this historical process in an efficient manner. Analysis of the literature indicated that both Egypt and Israel began to deteriorate their conditions that became a major concern for the United Nations, particularly after October 1955. During this period, the Secretary General put enormous efforts to resolve the issues; however, failed to do so that resulted in Egyptian attacks on Israeli territory from Gaza strips (Armstrong, 1957). In response, Israel responded with strong counter-attacks that turned the region into a warfare zone. One of the basic issues of this conflict between Israel and Egypt was utilization of Suez Canal for Israeli shipping purposes, not allowed by the Egyptian government, and thus, this Egyptian restriction for Israel was the decisive factor to encourage Israel in bringing its forces in the Egyptian territory. One of the major factors for the need of an emergency force of the United Nations was the pandemic characteristic of this Egypt-Israel conflict that had the ability to involve major powers like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc (Hudson, 1960). Thus, it became essential to take radical steps to discourage further military engagement of the two countries: Egypt and Israel that were busy in acquiring arms from their Eastern and Western allies specifically. Due to this heightened tension, the United States showed its support with Israel by announcing its financial withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project in Egypt in July 1956. In response, the Egyptian government carried out nationalization process of the Suez Canal in the same week, and began to utilize revenues of the Canal for the same dam project. During the month of September 1956, French and the UK government felt the need of calling meeting of the Security Council as it had now become essential to address this conflict on global platform due to one-sided decisions of Egypt that changed international status of the Suez Canal into a domestic/national one (Barton, 2008). In specific, these governments argued that such actions by the Egyptian government were rupture of “the Suez Canal Convention of the year 1888” (Barton, 2008). In response, Egyptian government filed a complained in the Security Council regarding biased attitude of the United Nations towards Egypt due to interference of some powers in the decisions that was a violation of the United Nations regulations. Thus, gradually, this conflict began to pull various countries under its web. In the month of October 1956, Egyptian locations faced Israeli attacks along with collaboration of French and UK forces. Consequently, Israeli army violated border regulations of Egypt during the last week of October 1956 that enforced the United Nations to intervene in the process immediately, and thus, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization sent the request of ceasefire to Israel, and suggested it to call its forces back in the Israeli territory (United Nations, 2009). After intervention of the UNTSO, UK & French governments gave 12-hour ultimatum of ceasefire to both countries, and asked them to arrange extraction of their armed forces from the border linking the Suez Canal. Moreover, both governments further appealed Egyptian government to permit French forces to establish their temporary bases near the Suez Canal to ensure security of the shipping. In return, the Israeli government acknowledged the ultimatum and brought its forces back from the Suez Canal; however, the Egyptian government showed arrogance while keeping its forces at the canal (Lipson, 2007). Within few days, Anglo-French air forces raided Egyptian locations that enforced Egypt to allow their forces to establish their camps. Although French and the British governments were able to enforce Israel and Egypt to ceasefire; however, leaders of the UN Security Council, especially Lester Pearson emphasized the need of the United Nations force, essential for resolving political and regional issues on global level (Barak, 2006). In specific, Mr. Lester Pearson proposed a model of the first United Nations Emergency Force that would work internationally to ensure peace and safety regionally, as well as globally. The General Assembly of the United Nations accepted the proposal and passed the resolutions on November 04, 1956. Subsequently, the Secretary-General of the UN ordered for immediate planning of the phases of UNEF that will work only in areas with the permission of host governments. In addition, he emphasized the role of UNEF as a cessation tool to stop aggression among different countries (Hudson, 1960). In particular, the General Assembly planned different phases of UNEF’s establishment, as well as deployment during the first week of November 1956, and during that period, they termed it as the first United Nations peacekeeping force that later changed into the first United Nations emergency force. One of the major objectives of the UNEF was to arrange and monitor ceasefire between two countries. In particular, it was the responsibility of UNEF to ensure withdrawal of Israeli, French, and British forces from the Egyptian territory (Nelson, 1985). In addition, the UNEF played the role of shock absorber during risks of warfare, as well as the role of supervisor to guarantee monitoring of ceasefire in an unbiased manner. As UNEF was a unique and new concept, thus, it took longer time for someone to appreciate above-mentioned efforts and mandate of the UNEF, and thus, British, French, and other armed personnel in the Egyptian territory had to withdraw its forces during the summer of 1967. However, during its initial period, the Secretary-General of the United Nations put huge efforts to launch an international force constituting armed personnel from different participating countries and send it in the Egyptian territory. However, this task was not a simple process and thus, the UN leaders confronted many complexities during the process. A crucial issue during the assembling of international force was absence of a sample or model unlike other notions, and therefore, experts had to create everything from a scratch (Barton, 2008). Still, members of the UN Security Council decided to benefit from structure of the UNTSO due to some of the similar objectives of both UN bodies: peacekeeping. As soon as the UN leaders agreed on the development of international force, few members of the UNTSO acted as supervisors in the formation process of the emergency force. The United Nations communicated with various governments on international level to participate in the formation of UNEF through provision of their armed personnel (Browne, 2007). Moreover, supervisors of UNEF began their conciliation sessions with Egyptian leaders to discuss deployment of UN emergency forces on the Egyptian soil that was an essential step for ensuring success of the United Nations Emergency Force. A fundamental characteristic of the first UNEF was its foremost principle that emphasizes permission of the host country as a basic requirement for any actions by the force. Experts have specified that all the later forces that put efforts for peacekeeping or other matters have been following this principle of UNEF I until now (Barak, 2006). Due to this principle of UNEF I, it was essential for UN leaders to acquire consent of Egyptian government, and for such purpose, General Burns was the first leader to meet Egyptian leaders in their capital city for immediate resolution on this principle. Interestingly, UNEF leaders did not had to make extraordinary efforts to acquire Egyptian consent as Egypt had already agreed on the principles of a UN Command that was itself a mode of consent (United Nations, 2009). Still, UNEF leaders played an influential role in acquiring trust of Egyptian government by ensuring collaboration with the UN, as well as ensuring continuation of sovereignty of the host country (Nelson, 1985). Moreover, UNEF ensured autonomous power of Egypt as usual regarding the issue of Suez Canal; however, was able to negotiate with the government by coming up to a faithful agreement that requires Egypt to keep UNEF informed of its future decisions. In this manner, besides its functions of demilitarization, UNEF was an influential factor in the negotiations process that made a big difference in reducing the pandemic factors of the conflict (Ishay, 2008). Thus, after few negotiations, Egyptian government finally gave the permission during second week of November 1956 that began the entrances of the first United Nations Emergency Force in the Egyptian territory. This first troop included soldiers from Canada, Norway, Denmark, Brazil, India, and few other countries as well that sent its forces on the terms of Egyptian consent. To facilitate international troops, the UNEF launched its air base near Ismailia region after the approval of Egyptian government that later became the central headquarters of the UNEF (Ramcharan, 2008). In specific, the first UNEF acted as a supplementary component of the UN General Assembly under the UN Charter’s Article 22 (Hudson, 1960). The Secretary-General was the director of the United Nations Emergency Force and he had the major authority to make decisions regarding establishment, deployment, and withdrawal of international forces during a peacekeeping movement. In other words, the Secretary-General was the administrative authority of the UNEF, whereas, the Force Commander or the Chief of Command was the only authority in the field that worked under the Secretary-General’s instructions (Barak, 2006). Although the Secretary-General was the sole decision maker, however, the Chief of Command had the operational responsibility of success or failure of UNEF I’s operations, especially during its tenure in the Egypt (Browne, 2007). Moreover, it was the responsibility of the Force Commander to plan and arrange distribution of facilities, arm supplies, and other supplementary facilities to the international troops on the borders. Thus, the basic structure of the UNEF was headed by the Secretary-General, followed by the Chief of Command/the Force Commander, and subsequently, junior commanding officers for each deployment. During the second week of November 1956, the first United Nations Emergency Force initiated its operations officially on the Egyptian soil, particularly in the Egyptian capital, Cairo that remained provisional headquarters of the UNEF. As earlier mentioned, ten years later, Egyptian government requested the United Nations to withdraw its international forces from its territory and despite of several negotiations and attempts by the UN Secretary-General, the UNEF withdrew its forces during the third week of May 1967 due to the principle of consent of host country (Ramcharan, 2008). During this period of ten years, UNEF played a major role in lessening tension between Israel and Egypt, and put many efforts to demilitarize the region in an efficient manner. In specific, categorization of this period into different phases will allow a comprehensive understanding of its role in peacekeeping process in the region. The first step taken by the UNEF was the withdrawal of Anglo-French armed forces from the Egyptian area of Port Said, done after air raids by the British and French air forces, discussed earlier in the paper. This action took a period of approximately a month from third week of November to last week of December 1956, and this withdrawal enabled the UNEF leaders to acquire and strengthen trust of Egyptian government (United Nations, 2009). However, from late December 1956 to first week of March 1957, the UNEF changed its focus from Anglo-French forces to Israeli forces, and put efforts to arrange extraction of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula (Lipson, 2007). This was another imperative and crucial step towards a deeper relationship with the Egyptian government, and the major factor of more than ten years of collaboration of Egypt and the United Nations. However, during this second phase, the UNEF did not attempt to arrange withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and thus, the Israeli forces remained there during the second phase. However, during the third phase, UNEF along with negotiations of the Secretary-General requested Israeli forces to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip, as well as the region of Sharam al-Sheikh, and the international troops of the UNEF were successfully in carrying out their missions effectively (Ramcharan, 2008). As soon as the UNEF completed withdrawal of Israeli forces from the mentioned areas, one can witness beginning of the last phase of UNEF’s functions in the Egypt that included positioning of UNEF troops in the international border zone existing between Israel and Egypt. Since then, the UNEF played a significant role in sustaining peace between the two countries for more than a decade as the Egyptian government requested the withdrawal in May 1967 that ended the role of UNEF in the Middle-East region. Facts Following are some of the basic facts and specifics about the first United Nations Emergency Force (United Nations, 2009): Region Egypt The Suez Canal The Sinai Peninsula The Armistice Demarcation Line Command Center Cairo on temporary basis Gaza as permanent headquarter Period & Phases November 1956 – June 1967 November 1956 – December 1956: Withdrawal of Anglo-French forces December 1956 – March 1957: Withdrawal of Israeli forces March 1957 – May 1957: Withdrawal of Israeli forces May 1957 – May 1967: Deployment of UNEF forces May 1967 – June 1967: Withdrawal of UNEF forces Force Commanders/Chief of Command E.L.M. Burns from Canada 1956 - 1959 P. S. Gyani from India 1959 - 1964 Carlos F. Chaves from Brazil 1964 - 1964 Lazar Musicki from Yugoslavia 1964 - 1965 Syseno Sarmento from Brazil 1965 - 1966 Indar J. Rikhye from India 1966 - 1967 Quantity of Troops At maximum (during deployment) More than 6,000 military recruits excluding civilian staff At minimum (during withdrawal) Approximately 3,400 military recruits excluding civilian staff Participating Countries Canada, India, Denmark, Norway, India, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Indonesia, Finland, and Colombia Losses 109 armed workforce 1 domestic employee Expenses 214.2 million dollars Conclusion In conclusion, the first United Nations Emergency Force played a significant and crucial role in maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel for more than a decade. Although it was not able to bring radical changes in the region, however, the experiment was not a failure as well. Actions taken by the UNEF did bring some positive changes in the region that is itself an indication of its success. A major factor of UNEF’s success was the emphasis on negotiations rather than military actions that gave fruitful outcomes. Assembling and deployment of civilian staff along with military personnel was another crucial decision that strengthened trust of Egyptian authorities in this movement. Experts (Ishay, 2008) have clarified that UNEF I played an efficient role in its efforts, however, Egyptian interference after ten years was a surprising and unfavorable act that did not allow the United Nations to settle down and eliminate factors of tension between the two countries. Another indication of UNEF’s success in Egypt is its contemporary role as a blueprint for peacemaking efforts of many countries, especially the United States, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. In current scenario, the United States entered the country with the consent of government authorities and it has been trying to remain by offering financial aids to the governments to sustain peace in the region. Although international media and stakeholders (Ishay, 2008) were hoping extraordinary results of the UNEF’s efforts; however, it is an observation that after the withdrawal, the UNEF faded away somewhere while commanders retired and civil employees went unnoticed. In this perspective, the UNEF experiment of the United Nations was a malfunction, but by default and not with intention. Besides, the UNEF was able to acquire trust of both Egyptian and Israeli authorities with its negotiations and defending military roles in the region. In this regard, presence of UNEF’s international troops in sensitive regions was a positive thing that facilitated the United Nations in demilitarizing the region. Conclusively, the first United Nations Emergency Force is a significant illustration of the efforts of the United Nations for maintaining peace in the region despite its limitations and complexities. Finally, the paper has discussed some of the significant aspects of the first United Nations Emergency Force. It is an expectation that the paper will be beneficial for students, teachers, and professionals in better understanding of the topic. References Armstrong, H. F. (1957). “The U.N. Experience in Gaza.” Foreign Affairs. Council of Foreign Relations. Barak, E. (2006). “Caught in the Middle.” Diplomacy and Statecraft. Volume 17, pp. 393-414. Barton, G. P. (2008). United Nations Force. The Lawbook Exchange Limited. Browne, M. A. (2007). Peacekeeping and Stability Issues. Nova Publishers. Hudson, G. F. (1960). “The United Nations Emergency Force.” Current History. Volume 38, pp. 326-331. Ishay, M. (2008). The History of Human Rights. University of California Press. Lipson, M. (2007). “Peacekeeping.” European Journal of International Relations. Volume 13, Issue 1, pp. 5-34. Nelson, R. W. (1985). “Multinational peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model.” International Affairs. Volume 61, Issue 1, pp. 67-89. Ramcharan, B. G. (2008). Preventive Diplomacy at the UN. Indiana University Press. United Nations. (2009). United Nations Emergency Force. Retrieved on November 21, 2009: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefi.htm Read More