Should We Regard Political Obligation as a Natural Duty - Assignment Example

Should we regard political obligation as a natural duty? The concept of political obligation and related notions of fairness, justice and natural duty is a fascinating field of inquiry that lends itself to new and ever more complex perspectives on the world of politics. It is now studied under political science, but was previously dealt with by institutions and academies of law, ethics and philosophy. In this regard, it is fair to say that the ideas of Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Waldron and John Rawls comprise the origins of this field of inquiry. The growing stature and relevance of the subject to the present times is reflected in the rapidly growing body of literature pertaining to it (Buchanan, 2004). Coming to the topic question, the ideas of the aforementioned intellectuals as well as contemporary thinkers on the subject are drawn upon in answering it. The group of contemporary thinkers on the subject include Christopher Wellman, David Lefkowitz, Craig Carr, George Klosko and Allen Buchanan. To begin with, let us now consider John Rawls principle of fairness. At the time of his writing, the nation-state as we now understand it was not established as the dominant political entity. As a result, Rawls principle of fairness is applicable to any group of persons, irrespective of the political jurisdictions that they fall under. Rawls articulates the principle as follows: “When a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture [or scheme] according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share”. (Rawls, as quoted in Lefkowitz, 2004) Political thinkers of our time, including Carr and Lefkowitz have critiqued Rawls principle of fairness by pointing out its inadequacy to offer solutions for global warming, climate change, etc. Lefkowitz, in particular, claims that “mere receipt of benefit from a cooperative scheme does not entail an obligation to contribute to its operation” (2004). For example, one of the stark realities of our times is pollution due to auto-mobile emissions. The industrialized nations of the world, that includes the United States, United Kingdom and other western democracies, are major contributors to this pollution. It is fair to expect citizens of these nations to do something about the situation by adopting stringent pollution control standards for their auto-mobiles. Upon its implementation, the air will get cleaner, the benefits of which will be enjoyed by Americans, British and people in the Third World alike. It then raises the question, Are auto-mobile owners of the Third World countries, who contribute to pollution to a lesser extent, but qualify as unintended beneficiaries of clean air, required to adopt similar pollution control standards for their auto-mobiles on grounds of fairness? As a way of responding to this question, Lefkowitz asserts that it is “irrelevant exactly whom those who institute a cooperative scheme intend to benefit; in this case, whether citizens of the industrialized nations intend to benefit the Third World people. What matters is the nature of the good provided by the cooperative scheme; if the good is one that the latter have a moral duty to secure for themselves or others, be it a natural duty or an acquired one, then they are required to contribute to a scheme that serves this purpose, and in all other cases, they are not so required”. (Lefkowitz, 2004) As we delve further into the question of political obligation as a natural duty, it is important to consider the role of nature in human affairs. Firstly, we as a species are still related to the other classes of organisms on planet earth. The creationist view of life has been quelled by the validity of gradual evolutionary processes that govern all life. There is sufficient evidence (including DNA testing) to confirm the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection. This natural process continues to work within the artificial confines erected by modern civil societies. The largest of these confinements is the nation-state, which has added new dimension to the concept of group selection. The relevance of theories of biology to that of political science lies in the fact that phenomena such as kin-ship bonds, out-group hostility, group selection, etc. are plausible explanations for acts of racial discrimination, ethnic cleansing and xenophobia that weve witnessed in recent history. On the positive side, studies of different primate species have underlined the virtues of altruism among social groups. Hence, it is fair to state that the inherent nature of human beings continues to work and adjust to artificial political constraints such as national borders. This understanding is essential to solve problems such as environmental pollution that was discussed above, as it suggests that national boundaries and the rights and duties conferred on citizens within them, stand secondary to the welfare of broader humanity. Going back to the issue of environmental pollution, the obligation for signing nations to abide by the Kyoto Protocol is a political obligation which is also a natural duty. The member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on the other hand, do not have the imperative to adhere to the treaty, as it has lost relevance since the end of the Cold War. What we learn from this example is that political obligation does not always originate from ethical and moral considerations, whereas natural duties do. In this context, it is useful to introduce the view of Christopher Wellman, who attempts to support political obligations on the basis of a principle of samaritanism. In the words of George Klosko, “Wellman appeals to the familiar idea that people have strong moral requirements to come to the aid of others who are in peril or dire need. As Wellman sees things, the dangers in question are those of a Hobbesian state of nature, which people would generally confront, if not for benefits provided by the state, especially the rule of law. Wellman believes that the dangers can be alleviated only by state coordination, supported by coercion, and so citizens can justifiably be forced to obey the law. Like theories based on gratitude and fairness, samaritanism grounds political obligations on state benefits. But unlike these other theories, Wellmans turns on benefits provided to other people: the perils that others would experience in a state of nature can justify impinging on moral rights people would otherwise have”. (Klosko, 2005) George Klosko, who has written an important book title Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice, endorses Christopher Wellmans principle on grounds of its advantages over competing theories. He explains that while samaritanism is theoretically similar to natural duty of justice, the general framework of its application is very broad. This is in sharp contrast with John Rawlss natural political duty, which is open to varied interpretation and is usually applied to problems of political obligation. There is a strong affinity between Wellmans samaritanism and theories based on the principle of fairness. With complex co-operation required for availing the benefits provided by the state, it is the obligation of every citizen to abide by the law as his/her contribution to the overall samaritan task. It must be admitted, however, that Wellmans theory is not a panacea by any means. It provides satisfactory solutions to certain cases of moral conundrums but fails in others (Klosko, 2005). In conclusion, it is reasonable to state that there is no overarching principle that would govern the issue of political obligation. Not every instance of political obligation qualifies as a natural duty. Contrariwise, natural duties do not fall within the jurisdiction of geo-political entities. Sam Duncan concisely expresses these complexities thus: “Beyond the practical consequences it has, I doubt whether theories based on the natural duy of justice can ever justify political obligation as it is usually conceived. Such theories rely on a natural duty that is universal in its demands, but must explain why it gives us obligations to one particular state over the others. I am not so sure this is possible; at best there will be tension in any natural duy account of the traditional notion of political obligation, and I think the particularity requirement with the attendant idea of special ties is incoherent with Kantian thought on the subject.” (Duncan, 2007) Furthermore, modern nation-states are no more agents of morality as a business corporation is, as the pursuit of power and wealth is what drives them. It makes more sense to peruse theories and principles of evolutionary biology and psychology to determine which categories of political obligations can be regarded as natural duties. As of now, no comprehensive synthesis of these two seemingly disparate fields of inquiry have been carried out. Until such a time comes, people in power should bank upon empirical statistics and the distilled wisdom of yesteryear philosophers in arriving at political decisions. When these people in power find themselves in a dilemma, it is intuitively more prudent to fulfil natural duties before considering political obligations. Works Cited: Buchanan, Allen. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Carr, Craig L. "Fairness and Political Obligation." Social Theory and Practice 28.1 (2002): 1+. Duncan, Sam. "The Borders of Justice: Kant and Waldron on Political Obligation and Range Limitation." Social Theory and Practice 33.1 (2007): 27+. Klosko, George. Political Obligations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2005. Lefkowitz, David. "The Nature of Fairness and Political Obligation: A Response to Carr." Social Theory and Practice 30.1 (2004): 1+. Read More