Emerging Piracy Threat off the West African Coast and Somali Piracy - Essay Example

Emerging Piracy Threat off the West African Coast and Somali Piracy With the increased technological innovations emerging around the globe, modes of communication and transport are some of the most significant beneficiaries of these innovations. One of these affected transport modes is the water transport. Water transport is controlled along the relevant coastlines and ports following international standards. However, the success and management of this mode of transport along major ports and coastlines faces one major challenge, piracy (Meijden, 2008, p.10-11). There is no unique definition of piracy. However, there are two internationally recognized definitions of piracy. One definition, which relies on international law, confines piracy to attacks on the high seas and restricts attacks on state territorial waters. The other definition of piracy is more practical and is used by the international maritime bureau that encompasses both high seas and state territorial attacks. Lack of a common definition of piracy makes piracy a threat to almost all ports. This is because there is no known extent of piracy, no accurate and binding statistics on piracy activities hence inadequate allocation of resources to avert this menace (Great Britain: Parliament, 2006, p.10-11). Generally, piracy involves acts of robbery or criminal violence at sea and those who commit piracy are known as pirates. However, the definition of piracy under the 1992 Special Report on Piracy of the International Maritime Bureau as an act of boarding a vessel with an intention to commit robbery or other criminal activities with an ability to use force in attaining this goal. In the West African Coast and Somali coastline, this includes attacks on vessel on passage, in port, at anchor, against the cargo, passengers, and crew of the vessel (Beckman, 1994, p.5). It entails simply attacking a ship or facilitating that attack. For a fact, piracy has adverse effects on the daily running of port operations (Talley, 2009, p.34-37), world security, and international business. Indeed, maritime piracy has direct costs on humanitarian assistance, adversely affects maritime economic activities like fishing, oil production and cost of energy, tourism, insurance and shipping costs (Mbekeani and Ncube, 2011, p. 5). Upon hijacking vessels, the pirates call for ransoms to release the hijacked vessels. In 2011, ransom reached an epitome when Greek owners paid $13.5 million for the release of the Irene, an oil tanker. Many more ransoms have been paid to the West African Coast and Somali coastline pirates to secure hijacked cargo, passengers, or crew. However, the cost of attempting to prevent and protect against piracy is even greater than that of paying ransoms. Actually, vessels spend more fuel while steaming through dangerous waters at faster than usual speeds to avoid the pirates. They equally take longer routes that attract delays on the delivery of consignment, more fuel costs, and danger pay for seafarers. Indeed, ship owners end up paying “war risk” and “kidnap and ransom” and insurance worth $635 million upon hijacking of their vessels. Indeed, it affects the premiums and coverage on insurance costs. According premiums and coverage to a recent report by UNCTAD, insurance premiums for ships traveling through the Gulf have rose from between 0.05% and 0.175% of the value of their cargo, compared to between 0% and 0.05% in May 2008 (Mbekeani and Ncube, 2011, p.6). All these costs are further transmitted to the port management that subsequently raises port prices. However, the most significant undoing of piracy is the changes it cause the economics of sea trade. Where the shipping industry is responsible for around 90% of world trade, the effects of piracy are hence undeniable in the economy. Moreover, maritime piracy in West African Coast and Somali coastline affects the political stability of the reference nations. However, there has been measures to curb this crisis with the signing of international agreements and treaties geared towards this goal. Indeed, the United Nations Security Council observes that the international community must build on the Security Council’s resolution 2018 (2011) to counter the growing menace of piracy in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea region through coordination and logistical support to regional security initiatives (United Nations Security Council, 2012, p.1). Piracy threat off the West African coast has been rampant in the last two years. Indeed, news on piracy off the coast of West Africa has been on the front line for years. Actually, the International Maritime Organization notes that most attacks off Benin are directed at oil and energy tankers with the clear aim of energy theft (Foster, 2011, p.1). It is a fact that in the last two years more and more piracy attacks are happening in the West African coast in the Gulf of Guinea in a more violent, sophisticated and systematic manner (VOANews, 2012, p.1). In light of this, the International Maritime Organization received 45 reports of piracy incidents from seven west and central African nations in 2010 and an additional 64 reports of piracy attacks from nine countries in 2011(Smith, 2011, p.1). Among the reported attacks 19 occurred near Lagos. Most significantly, piracy off the coasts of Benin, Congo, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Nigeria hit a high of 10 piracy incidents in the first two months. Indeed, Nigeria and Benin have already reported 22 piracy incidents in 2012 according to International Maritime Bureau. Therefore, the question as to what motivates the pirates to carry out these criminality and their modes of operation arises. First, the West African pirates may have been motivated by the success of their Somali counterparts in piracy. According to a 2011 report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, West African countries lack adequate legislative framework and enforcement capacities to address piracy (United Nations, 2010, p.16). This weakness has largely motivated piracy in West Africa coast. In addition, Togo Oil and Marine Chairman Monty Jones claim that insider information allows pirates to target cargo ships as corrupt law enforcement allows piracy to thrive. Similarly, the illegal sale of oil in the West African countries creates a culture of lawlessness along the coast hence motivating piracy as security forces work with armed groups in this course. The emergence of new technology significantly reduces the size of the crew as well as a vessels ability to defend it hence becoming more prone to pirate attacks. Moreover, the improved pirates’ weapons speed, surprise firepower and rapid escape, and easier access to information about shipping plans and routes motivate piracy activities along the West African coast. Additionally, the reduced international ocean patrols and ties with former colonies leave the West African countries in a risky position where they cannot afford sea security. At the same time political corruption, political instability, economics of the third world, willingness of shippers to pay the costs of piracy rather than higher insurance premiums motivate the pirates to carry out their mission. More so, political leaders also avoid political risks associated with reporting attacks, the power vacuum, rival warlords, and the failure to develop international protection agency motivate piracy. On the same note, increased maritime commercial traffic in the West African region and the inability of the central government to protect its citizens from pirates is perhaps the greatest motivator to piracy in the West Africa coast. Pirates especially those from Nigeria use violence, beat crewmembers with rifle butts and electric cables, and shoot the crew in course of hijacking the vessels. The modus of operandi include typical attacks against ships at anchor, board ship, threatening the crew with knives/firearms, stealing cargo, cash, and possessions. They equally act as land-based hostage negotiator and ask for huge ransoms from the reference government in exchange with the freedom of the vessel, its passengers, cargo, and crewmembers. They use speedboats and sea maps to track and hijack the vessels. Early pirate groups, former fishing captains and fishermen, rebels, and individual criminals carry out pirate attacks in the West Africa coast (Talas, n.y, p.28). In Somalia acts of piracy are on ever increasing tread and more violent than in the western Africa coast. Indeed, maritime pirate attacks in Africa are generally concentrated mostly in Somalia and Nigeria. However, the concern on Somali piracy is more fundamental subject to the global importance of the Somali coastline. Statistically, more than 10 percent of all seaborne oil passes through the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal for use in other countries. In addition, according to the World Food Programme more than 3.25 million people in Somalia are dependent on food aid where this food aid comes to Somalia via its waters. However, due to the increased acts of piracy in the Somali waters, the WFP reports that the number of ships willing to carry food aid to Somalia has greatly reduced. Actually, in November 2011 al Shabaab rebels banned 16 humanitarian agencies from working in central and southern Somalia, jeopardizing the lives of millions of Somalis, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Foster, 2011, p.4). Additionally, a vessel was captured, leading to a ransom payment of more than US$1million making many ship owners avoid the Indian Ocean. Most significantly, the capture of Sirius Star carrying two million barrels of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to the United States became the largest oil tanker to be seized by pirates in Somali waters (Mbekeani and Ncube, 2011, p. 5). Piracy activities along the Somali coastline equally affect other East African countries like Kenya and Tanzania. According to IMO, Somali pirates operating farther and farther from their territorial waters are responsible for many of the pirate attacks reported in Kenya and Tanzania. Nevertheless, IMO reports that the number of reported pirate attacks in East Africa decreased from 222 in 2009 to 172 in 2010 where 168 attacks were in international waters, 2 were in territorial waters, while 2 were in port area. In addition, according to the latest Oceans Beyond Piracy Study named "The Human Cost of Somali Piracy" of 2010, 4185 Seafarers were attacked with firearms and Rocket Propelled Grenades, 1090 Seafarers were taken hostage, 516 Seafarers were used as human shields, while 342 Survived Incidents in Citadels (One Earth Future Foundation, 2012,p.1). IMB Piracy Reporting Centre figures for 2011 Worldwide Somalia reports the total attacks as 119 83, total hijackings as 15 14, total hostages as 250, total hostages killed as 7, vessels held by pirates as 28, and hostages held by pirates as 587 (Talas, 2011, p.21). Generally, the IMB reports an increase in the number of pirate attacks globally as well as the number of crewmembers taken hostage in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. It records that Vessels reported 445 attacks in 2010 where 1,181crew members were taken hostage signifying a rise from 2009 statistics. However, subject to international intervention, these figures dropped in 2011 where 5 attacks were reported from earlier 35 attacks in 2010 and1 vessel was pirated as compared to 5 in 2010 (Foster, 2011, p.3). However, the fight against Somali piracy has been quite a challenge. Indeed, pirate attacks off Somalia have become more violent since mid-2010, because of the increased difficulty of capturing ship where Somali pirates sail as far as 250-400 nm away from coastlines to launch a pirate attack. For a fact, at least 40 vessels and more than 400 hostages are still being held in or just off Somalia, according to the Ecoterra International group, which monitors piracy in the region (BBC News, 2012, p.1). Hence, the question as to what motivates piracy in Somalia arises. Pirates in Somalia rely on perceived levels of corruption in the country, diverted aid and stolen political power, lawlessness (Eichstaedt, 2010, p.146) and lack of government in Somalia which accords the pirates enough time to keep vessels on the coast as they wait for ransoms (Daniels, 2012, p.33-39). Additionally, inadequate reporting of piracy victims in Somalia hence no follow up on piracy activities. Most significantly, no country is willing to seek justice for the pirate victims and hence more and more of the suspected pirates are being freed and the incentive to hunt reduces to zero. This motivates the pirates to continue with their activities without fear of the law. At the same time pirates in Somalia draws claims against foreign vessels of illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping in Somalia to support their activities. These claims are yet to be addressed and hence motivation to piracy. Pirates in Somalia have largely changed their tactics of operation where they even act as human traffickers between Somalia and Yemen. They consequently use small dhows, grenades, smaller skiffs, old machine guns, and pistols to launch their operations. Indeed, the modus of operandi include typical attacks against ships at anchor, board ship, threatening the crew with knives/firearms, stealing cargo, cash, and possessions. The groups involved in piracy in Somali include early pirate groups based around Hobyo and Harardheere, Former fishing captains, a shore-based Mr. BIG, Former Somali coastguard officers, and Al-Qaeda linked terrorist group Al-Shabaab (Talas, 2011, p.28). Works Cited BBC News 2012, Somali piracy boosts Puntland economy, Viewed 9 May 2012, < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16534293> Beckman, R 1994, Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Strait, IBRU, London. Daniels, C 2012, Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Scarecrow Press, 2012, London Eichstaedt, P 2010, Pirate State: Inside Somalias Terrorism at Sea, Chicago Review Press, 2010, London. Foster, E 2011, Anti-piracy review, The Civil-Military Fusion Centre, London. Great Britain: Parliament 2006, Piracy: Eighth Report of Session 2005-06; Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence, The Stationery Office, London. Mbekeani, K and Ncube, M 2011, Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy, Viewed 9 May 2012, Meijden, L 2008, The Influence of Modern Piracy on Maritime Commercial Transport, Viewed 9 May 2012, One Earth Future Foundation 2012, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, Viewed May 2012, < http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/cost-of-piracy/human-cost-somali-piracy> Smith, D 2011, Piracy off West Africa increases sharply, Viewed 9 May 2012, < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/12/piracy-west-africa-increase-somalia> Talas, R 2011, Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Short History and some Thoughts about the Future, University of Hall, London. Talas, R 2011, The Economic and Human Costs of Somali Piracy, University of Hall, London. Talley, W 2009, Port economics, Taylor & Francis, London United Nations 2010, Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014, Viewed 9 May 2012, < http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/Regional_Programme_for_West_Africa.pdf> VOANews 2012, Piracy a Growing Threat to West Africa, Viewed 9 May 2012, Read More