How Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau, and John Mearsheimer Could be Called Realists - Literature review Example

Realism and International Politics: How Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau, and John Mearsheimer Could be Called Realists Introduction Some scholars point out that the realist tradition has displayed “a fundamental unity of thought” spanning over nearly two millennia, being primarily concerned – judging on the writings of Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Carl von Clausewitz, etc. – with questions of justice, order and change at the domestic, and international levels (Lebow 53). The precursors of modern realist school of thought, according to Wilkinson, are Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, who assumed that human beings are “fundamentally motivated” by self-interest, and that the wider world of international politics is a scene where this self-interest manifests itself in a constant struggle for power (2). Jackson and Sorensen summarize the basic realist assumptions as follows – a pessimistic view of human nature, a conviction that international relations are “necessarily conflictual” and conflicts are ultimately resolved by war, a high regard for national security and state survival, and basic skepticism about the possibility of progress in international politics, comparable to that at the domestic level (60). Having accepted these assumptions – either explicitly or implicitly – modern realists widely agree that the state is a key political actor, which not only strives to be the most powerful actor in the international system, but also to make certain that no other state will endanger or achieve that status (Wilkinson 3; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 9). This paper examines the views and concepts of Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau, and John Mearsheimer in regard to international relations, as presented in some of their major works, like Aron’s Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. The paper argues that despite the apparent, even substantial differences between them – especially between Raymond Aron on the one side and Morgenthau and Mearsheimer on the other – they generally adhere to the bedrock assumptions of realism about international politics. 2. Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism Hans Morgenthau describes the world as “the result of forces inherent in human nature”, which is by definition reduced to opposing interests and conflict between them (3-4). Thus, politics is seen as a struggle for power over men, where power is the “immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action” (Morgenthau, cited in Jackson and Sorensen 67). Morgenthau has singled out six fundamental principles, which, in his view, envelope the philosophy of political realism (4). The first principle states that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 4). This principle in fact underlines the continuity and rationality in the theory of politics; while the second principle exhibits “the concept of interest defined in terms of power”, which provides the link between reason and facts in international politics and reinforces the first principle, i.e. “infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics”, making “the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (Morgenthau 5). Thus, politics is set as “an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres”, most notably ethics; which, as related to foreign policy, prevents “two popular fallacies” – the concerns with motives and ideological preferences (Morgenthau 5). The third principle states that, although the key concept of interest defined as power is a universally valid, objective category, its content, i.e. changing states’ interests, and the manner of its use are “determined by the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (Morgenthau 13). The “moral significance of political action”, or the tension between morality and successful political action, is addressed by the fourth fundamental principle, stating that universal moral principles in their abstract formulation could not be applied to states’ actions (Morgenthau 14). Thus, while an individual is allowed, or has the moral right, to “sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle”, that’s not the case when the state is concerned; hence political morality, i.e. national survival, differs from individual, or private morality (Morgenthau 14). Therefore, according to Morgenthau, there is “no political morality without prudence”, namely without “consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (Morgenthau 14). In a nutshell, Morgenthau follows the tradition of the precursors of realist school of thought, namely Thucydides and Machiavelli, as well as Hobbes, having arrived at what is considered the central normative doctrine of realism – the difference between private, or individual morality and the political morality (Jackson and Sorensen 67-68). The issue of morality is advanced in the fifth principle stating that the moral aspirations of a particular nation should not be identified with the moral laws, which govern the world (Morgenthau 14); in other words, no nation – even the great democracies – can impose its ideology on other nations (Jackson and Sorensen 70). Insofar as all nations tend to “clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe” (Morgenthau 14-15), it’s “politically pernicious” to employ their power in a crusade for that because it threatens international security (Jackson and Sorensen 70). Finally, the sixth principle reiterates the autonomy of the political sphere, being primarily concerned with interest defined as power and based upon a “pluralistic conception of human nature (Morgenthau 17). Morgenthau also argues that the balance of power and its preservation are “not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations” (179). 3. John Mearsheimer on the International System Mearsheimer depicts the international system as a “brutal arena” where states seek to take advantage over each other, hence have “considerable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively” (54), as well as “little reason to trust each other” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 9). Being based on five assumptions, which he considers accurate representations of important aspects of life in the international system, Mearsheimer asserts that the system encourages states to “look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states” (54). In a nutshell, these assumptions perceive the international system to be an anarchic environment, where the principal actors – great powers – possess some offensive military capability, hence the means of mutual destruction, and are not only potentially dangerous to each other, but also not certain about the intentions of other states; thus, being driven by their most basic motive, i.e. survival, great powers think strategically “about how to survive” in the international system (Mearsheimer 55). In this way, states are viewed as rational actors, greatly concerned with how the behavior of other states “is likely to affect their own strategy for survival”, as well as with the long-term and immediate consequences of their actions (Mearsheimer 55). From these assumptions, Mearsheimer derives three general patterns of state’s behavior, as follows – fear, self-help and power maximization (55). Insofar as in non-hierarchic political environment, i.e. lacking a higher authority, order arises from the interactions between formally equal partners, fear and self-help appear important motivating forces in world politics; hence states “almost always act according to their own self-interest” (Mearsheimer 56; Donnelly 17). The anarchic international system – which doesn’t mean chaotic or riven by disorder – compels states “to pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power” (Mearsheimer 56). Thus, states employ a variety of means, including diplomatic, economic, and military, to shift the balance of power to their advantage, even if that could make other states suspicious, if not hostile; and this pursuit of power ends only when a great power achieves hegemony (Mearsheimer 56). Mearsheimer defines hegemony as domination of the international system, which, as applied to different parts of the world, could be divided into global and regional hegemony; the former, according to Mearsheimer, is virtually impossible to be achieved (60). 4. Raymond Aron’s Diplomatic-Strategic Game As Griffiths points out, Raymond Aron shares – to certain extent however – shared the realist view on the fundamental difference between domestic and international relation, and regarded foreign policy as “constituted by diplomatic-strategic behavior” (1933). In regard to foreign policy, Aron distinguishes between eternal objectives – states’ survival according to Hobbes (security and force), as well as glory, which three objectives are rather difficult to separate, and historical objectives such as the possession of territory (75-78). According to Mahoney, having admitted the international environment being anarchical, Aron asserts that the form of each regime, along with the view of statesmen about international relations, affects the way statesmen operate within the international system (96). Thus, the political principles, political cultures and constitutional forms actually affect the international system; which would explain how the interaction between international anarchy and certain ideologies or doctrines, like Bolshevism and Nazism, shaped much of the twentieth century (Mahoney 96-97). Aron defines the international system as “the ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular relations with each other and that are all capable of being implicated in a generalized war” (94). 5. Conclusion Insofar as Morgenthau and Mearsheimer are concerned, there are certain differences between their concepts of international relations; thus, Mearsheimer considers states’ behavior being determined by the anarchical structure of the international system, whereas Morgenthau regards it as predominantly shaped by the human nature, as well as the “prudential ethics” of statesmen “seeking security and survival in an anarchical world” (Jackson and Sorensen 86). Nevertheless, both Morgenthau and Mearsheimer view international relations as constituted by rational actors, i.e. states, whose foreign policy goals are determined by their interests defined as power, and regulated by the balance of power; which actually defines them as realists. Raymond Aron, in turn, disagrees with Mearsheimer, stating that the structure of international system is “oligopolistic”, i.e. the principal actors determined the system, rather than being determined by it (96). On the other hand, he includes the political principles, political culture and constitutional forms as factors that affect the international system, which appear the major difference between him and the other two. Despite the exaggeration of environmental factors and motives, Raymond Aron is much closer to realist tradition, insofar as admits some of bedrock assumptions about the international system, like its anarchical character, the difference between domestic and international levels, the probability of war, etc. Therefore, he, along with Mearsheimer and Morgenthau, could be considered realist in terms of international politics. Works Cited Aron, R. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003. Print Donnelly, J. Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print Griffiths, M. Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, London: Routledge, 1999. Print Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 3rd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Print Lebow, R. N. “Classical realism”. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Eds. T. Dunne, M. Kurki and St. Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print Mahoney, Daniel J. The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992. Print Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001. Print ---. “The False Promise of International Institutions”. International Security, Winter 1994/1995 Vol.19 (3), pp. 5 – 49, 1994. Web. 23 February 2014. Morgenthau, Hans J., Thompson, K. W. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. Print Wilkinson, P. International Relations: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007. Print Read More