Approach towards International Security during the Cold War Period - Essay Example

Approach towards international security during the Cold War period Although the Cold war period different approaches to international security were developed to help handle the increased aggression between the ‘West’ and ‘East’. The main concern in this debate was the existence of nuclear weapons that negatively impacted international relations and security, fundamentally, owing to its destructive force. During this period weapons that had never existed before were created and they carried the capability to destroy the entire world. It is insinuated that the sheer destructiveness of nuclear war invalidated any distinction between winning and losing. Thus, it rendered meaningless the very idea of military strategy as the efficient employment of force to achieve a states objectives. Consequently, strategies fabricated by strategists of that time went as far as realizing that the use of nuclear weapon even in small-scale conflicts was practically impossible. Such is the case that the tremendous impact of these weapons surpassed the goals pursued by the initiating states. To help solve this dilemma, the collective security strategy was suggested. Collective security a major security approach used during cold war refers to a plan that sought to maintain peace on the platform of an organization of sovereign states. Here, the members pledge to secure each other from attack. Collective security idea emerged in 1914 and was extensively reviewed during the First World War only to later take shape, though imperfectly, in the 1940s during the cold war. This term has found its application in less idealistic and narrower strategies for joint defense like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.1 World War II was undoubtedly a catastrophe that had gone so far to discredit existing international order. Taking a global view, the victors of the war supposed that the enforcement of collective security within their hands would be carried by United Nations Security Council. This happened as they hoped that post-war peace would require continuation of the concert experience throughout the war period. However, having weakened and divided the previous ienemy (Germany), soviet-American co-operation became sour following their conflicting ideologies and security interests. The resulting bi polar bloc system damaged the entire mechanism. The formation of United Nations worsened the situations further as the rise of rival groups late in 1940s, virtually four years following the UN charter signing, made this new organization another forum for sectional struggle. The bitter rivalry between the United States and USS, and their individual ability to veto Security Council decisions, made UN irrelevant when it comes to crucial decisions. 2 This period was basically founded on two profound issues that came up at the end of the war: how to stop Germany’s recovery as a war machine learning from the experiences that followed World war; secondly was how to contain soviet threat and expansion. In this case, the Western Europeans had to deal with two serious challenges to security. The two challenges came handy in the integration plan among western Europeans, a factor that had not been witnessed in the continent history. The newly found integration process realized different versions of integration theories. International Ruhr Authority which was established in 1948 became an important toll that exerted control over Germans limiting their control over their coal and steel mines, materials considered the most needed in the war effort. In the same spirit, France, Britain and the Benelux nations in the same year, signed the Brussels Treaty thus establishing a joint defense system among them. One year later, this treaty served as a bridging in the formation of a full- fledged alliance that now included USA and Canada. This alliance was named NATO and it realized US pledge to defend the democratic West from Soviet expansion. Even with these renewed hope, the west still faced the pressure of security concern following the threats posed by Germany. To help solve this, Europeans created another institution in 1950 which they named European Defense Community (EDC) to help bring on board former enemies like Italy and Germany. This proposal came along with other far reaching aspects both with regard to the general European Integration and collective security effort. This institution envisaged a supranational organ that governed the defense policies of countries affiliated to the Brussels Treaty alongside Italy, Germany and a European army. Sadly, EDC never went far due to its federalist feature. Such is the case that it touched the central aspect of the concerned nation’s sovereignty, a factor that no country was willing to surrender, not even France that proposed it. Such is the case that it required concerned nations to give up their security power and defense, factors that were considered vital for preservation of national sovereignty, at least at that time, to a supranational nature organization, merely to put their long time enemies under total control. The collapse of EDC brought out a solution on integration of Italy and Germany in western security system as the Brussels treaty was extended to the two countries forming a new union called western European Union (WEU).3 EDC failure in a way served as blessing in disguise with regard to pursuit of collective security. It is this failure that pushed the European integration process further to include the economic areas that posed less threat to the sovereignty of nations. This process began with the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) replacing International Ruhr Authority. On the other hand issues of security for the western Europeans were left in the hands of NATO. It became clear that Western Europeans undertook a collective security away from the European integration, since NATO offered a better choice for that moment, having incorporated strong and committed superpower, the USA. This strategy did not work well for the otherwise. Many international crises took place sporadically in the East-West relations raising an alarm of escalating the impacts of the cold war. A good evidence of this crises include the attack of Hungary in 1956, building of Berlin wall in 1961, Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the Czech crisis. In all these incidences the west only alternative was to look up to NATO for their defense and security. Based on this development it is clear that other than the general fear, EC members concern over their national security, in which they visualized security and defense as their national obligation, in addition to different foreign policy agendas among themselves played an important role in shaping the collective security effort in the process of European integration.4 Western Europeans strongly supported the process of integrating European communities in areas termed as politically low. Enjoying the privileges of the US nuclear guarantee under the NATO security, members of the EC comfortably focused on widening and deepening their integration in filed far from military issues. Such is the case that even France that had quitted the NATO Military structure to avoid being targeted by soviet nuclear retaliation continued to benefit from the alliance collective security guarantee.5 The period marking the I970s was the Chilliest period even as the cold war came to an end following the détente military policy of the two conflicting blocs. During this period, the peaceful coexistence principle overshadowed the balance of terror experienced in the East-West relations. CSCE (conference on security and co-operation in Europe) was established to act as the only European body mandated to coordinate contact soft security issues between the concern blocs. The rapprochement experienced at some stage between the two blocs also impacted EC. Such is the case that it paved way to the formation of European Political Co-operation (EPC), while attempting to harmonize and coordinate EC’s foreign policy views, and may be as the third force, with regard to world affairs. However, this co-operation was to remain outside EC and obviously outside the process of European Integration despite being co-operation between EC members. 6 Like it had been witnessed previously, the EPC involvement in security issues realized problems. Here, the initial process witnessed a strict exclusion of security and defense matters. It is even suggested that despite the absence of a formal security and defense affair exclusion in the EC agenda, there was still no political will to bring it forth before the members.7 Civilian power stance embraced by members of EC worked against the inclusion of security matters to the EPC during the détente period. However, the later culmination of détente following the super power confrontation made clear the EC vulnerability and necessitated co-operation on security issues. Following these, EPC progressively became involved in the security area. As this happened, fears of US de-coupling and isolation from Europe mounted even as president Reagan came up with policies like SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). This policy implied that the strategic missile theatre of the US would be limited the American territory only, a factor greatly affected the EC members, chiefly Germany. This required them to act as members of EC while co-coordinating their approach on such abrupt security concern. However, EPC did not offer the correct avenue owing to the aforementioned state reservations. The best solution for the moment was to reactivate the long inactive WEU. In this case, it served as an avenue for EC members to deliberate on their security issues. Additionally, it gave the EC members, which were NATO affiliates, the ground to collectively negotiate with U. S. This era seemed to have pioneered a shift in the attitude of EC states with regard to their security making them more concerned of collective security efforts. Under NATO, they felt comfortable with US guarantee, although it was never –long-lasting. As a matter of fact the relations between EC members who are members of NATO and Us experienced many problems. The US had for a long time condemned Europeans for not committing themselves to their own defense and security with regard to manpower and money. This criticism grew further even as the EC continued to develop as world power in the economic standing. On the other side, members of EC alliance faulted the US administration for dominating the alliance threatening them with de-coupling when questioned.8 This idea of abandonment escalated in the mid 1980’s pushing for the first major amendment of community treaties which was signed by SEA (Single European Act). This act served as a great breakthrough for EC members in various aspects. SEA gave the EPC a say in the economic and political aspects of security. However, EPC remained outside the EC, being taken as a separate international instrument through linked to EC. Additionally, the Military features of security were left out me the EPC mandate. 9 Based on the above deliberations, the cold war period realized the reappearance of the Western Europe as strong political and economic actor. This followed the fast political and economic and related integrations that came followed the SEA. The post war European is thought to have used this process to have emerged as a result of many other related factors including the US policies creating fears of abandonment awhile offering a common security environment. The Decline of Collective Security In 1961, the United Nations advanced into Congo (recently liberated from Belgium) which was at that time in strife and Chao. The reason for this invasion was “putting out a brush fire” before it turns out to be a major conflagration, that is according to the leaders. While in this nation, the UN forces suffered serious divisions ensuing from the divided counsel, a factor that clearly pointed out the divergent aims expressed by the involved groups; West, East and third world. The mediation failed and resulted in a new disillusionment following the use of UN as a military force. Following this unfolding, “crisis management” involved direct negotiations of the concerned powers, or special convention, with the UN typically playing a marginal role as supplier of truce-observing parties.10 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) opened the way for thinking of regional opposition to communist growth as “collective security.” This organization was established in 1949 by noncommunist Europe states with United States and Canada as a response to the Soviet threat on Europe. According to American ideologists, “NATO reflected something that was more than just an old fashioned military alliance based as of yore on the realities of power in a world of hostile blocs.” In the 1950s, it serves to persuade the Americans that they might, without considering their ancestral instincts, engage in the twisted and violent affairs characterizing the world without ruining their innocence. Such is the case that they were convinced they would be joined by many other allies and in togetherness fight evil forces. Here, the Cold war, transformed the term into a dedication to check, “Contain,” if not repress the Soviet Union. This newly founded version of “collective security” was rather hard to square with the UN Charter through an appeal to the 51 and 52 articles. These articles addressed the validity of “collective self-defense” through “regional arrangement.” In this case it was said that the incapacitation of the UN, following the soviet noncooperation, necessitated such arrangements. On account of NATO’s apparent achievement in “containing” USSR expansion in Europe, the American policy went ahead, though with little success, to establish similar regional groupings, including Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).11 Another anti –collective fallout followed the 1960s Vietnam War, which is considered one of the most traumatic international conflicts. In this war, it was said that America entry into the Indochina had been primarily influenced by various reasons most evidently the feeling derived from the collective security complex of ideas. According these ideas, aggression was being checked with regard to the UN Charter. Behind the move made by North Vietnam to Bring together a war-torn country under its leadership, majority of the parties involved pictured the growth of a monolithic Asiatic communism founded in China, causing them to invoke the lessons learned during Hitler years: “ Draw the line and fight rather than allow ‘appeasement’ to erode your position.” Collective security as an aspect in the decisive actions taken during cold war is frequently under stressed if not overlooked. People easily forget that in Korea, then in Vietnam, the battle was not merely to check communism but instead it sought to defend world order through punishing “aggression.” Popular leaders such as Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy might not have chosen the painful decision of sending U.S. troops to far regions without the reassuring cause of war deterrence; the bare reason of simple American egotism was not enough.12 The initial partial U.S interest in south Asia, later supported by a forces from the SEATO members , grew to become a nightmare of major war since the conflict escalated resulting in strong reaction on the public opinion in opposition to war in the US and elsewhere. Here, some of the sensitive themes of collective security were damaged severely following the revolution of opinion from the 1957 – 1975 Vietnam War. During this period, the Nixon doctrine declared an American pulling out from unlimited commitments to act as policeman in remote regions. It is worth adding that the UN was more or less excluded from crucial negotiations during the Vietnam War. Such is the case that each side had come before the Security Council presenting their complaints of aggression at various times only to realize no action, a factor that suggested their employment for mere propaganda. Examples of these cases are Laos in 1959 against Hanoi, Cambodia in 1964 against the United States and South Vietnam, the United States later the same year against Hanoi. The later 1954 Geneva Accords and the 1973 Paris conference settlement went ahead to completely overlook the United Nations. There is no doubt that these events presented a big blow to the United Nations.13 The supposition of the general collective doctrine that “aggressors” were typically evil, rogue nations that deserved resistance and punishment came under strong contradiction following the notable Israel-Palestinian Arabs case. Despite its justification on account of ancient ownership, redress of latest injustices elsewhere, or advanced civilization, Jewish invasion of Palestine following the 1948 takeover represented an aggression that has no equal in the present history. However in the Israeli- Arab conflict the United States and the better part of its European partners sided with the former, making the Jewish nation almost an ally and the beneficiary of lavish support. In 1956 president Eisenhower amazed the soviet leader when he showed little knowledge on the planned attack against Egypt of Britain and France along with Israeli, a factor that caused a temporal rift in the NATO. Following this, the United States changed to almost uncritical siding with Israel, time and gain voting in the UN with small minority against any criticism of the Jewish nation.14 Failures of Collective Security During the cold war era, the world seemed to take the form of an international anarchy where power alone mattered, a factor that was expected to be solved by collective security. In this case, collective security failed to strike a compromise between world and national sovereignty since sovereignty is inherently indivisible. This strategy was made ineffective basing on the fact that sovereign states could not be fully bound by promise to act in some theoretical future incidence, particularly where such promises entail the possibility of war. Here, the plans for collective security require such ironclad pledges, or else the system is watered down to become just another tool of national policy like the United States has become. In this case it is worth noting that UN actions do not surpass the politics among nations; such actions only form part of these politics. UN has been said to only mirror the prevailing international society. Such is the case that national sovereignties forms the basis of global politics and such sovereignties will only agree to cooperate as far as their interests are met. 15 Another failure of collective security relates to the idea that aggression became much harder to identify and define as it was initially thought. In such aggressions as those between North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam Israel and the Arab states, India and Pakistan and conceivably most others, great difficulty is experienced when trying to ascertain who initiated the aggression. Does aggression taken in indirect attacks like propaganda and subversion? How far should one back date when determining how one carries the feud? Additionally, there collective security failure is closely linked to an argument made with regard to redundancy. Here, workable collective security order requires that the majority of the powers be in harmony, and also show strong unity to settle on similar basic definitions, for instance, of aggression and justice. This issue proved hard for the involved states, especially when considering the major warring states. Such is the case that collective security was virtually based on firm defense of existing borders, a factor that opened its functionality to criticism on account of freezing the status quo. Following this the problem of justice arose as many states depicted uneasiness with regard to accepting the justice of the existing boundaries. Such justice that frequently depicted the outcome of recent war showed a high probability harboring arrangements that losers consider unacceptable. For this reason, collective security was almost considered a selfish policy of victor states. The only way to solve this issue was to device some technique to revise existent boundaries or condemn a dynamic globe to immobility, a factor which is out rightly impossible. Having said this it is obvious that the collective security strategy could only fit in the traditional European state system as opposed to the rest of the world where boundaries are poorly defined or in some cases nonexistent. Additionally, the constant civil wars, succession wars, and even those fought for liberation, sometimes with assistance from outside interfered with this strategy.16 Finally, collective security strategy failed on account of its efficacy termed as “waging war to prevent war.” Any kind of war, irrespective of the name given to it, carries negative implications to the concerned parties, especially the victims. It is no doubt that proponents of collective security anticipated that well founded international police approach would stop potential war what is popularly known as “stumping out bush fire before it becomes a raging inferno.” However, experiences such as that of Vietnam clearly pointed out that even well intentioned interventions could potentially intensify wars instead of diminishing it. Here, intervention by foreign powers, even if serving in the capacity of an international organization, is generally bound to fail in diminishing conflict. Conclusion Following the end of World War II, there was a growing optimism of better security approach from a revised league of nations, having benefited from the happenings of the 1930s. With such changes, the world expected a new international order that will ensure stability. Such is the case that the league of nation had been discredited, particularly by the Soviet Union, following its expulsion from the organization for attacking Finland in 1940. These events necessitated the establishment of a new world organization hence the United Nations was created in 1945 following extensive discussions and conferences. These new organization differed from the League of Nations in many ways although it maintained the very philosophy of collective security. As a way to boost its effectiveness, the United Nation Charter gave more power to five major states. This was accomplished by granting them permanent representation and veto powers in the upper chamber (Security Council) that maintained exclusive jurisdiction in matters of security. Originally, the Security Council maintained six nonpermanent members, later increased to ten. The United Nations charged the Security Council with the “primary responsibility for maintenance of international security,” requiring each member to take up the duty to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." This was according to the charter’s “principle of sovereign equality of all its members,” in which all the members pledged themselves to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."17 Under this arrangement, seven out of the eleven votes were declared vital when making decisions on substantive matters, including the votes of the United States, China, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France (the permanent members). The Security Council was charged with the responsibility “to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and decide what to do, including taking "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." These era realized the development of the “four policemen” (the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and the United States) idea, in which each of these states was required to maintain peace in its area of globe. These integrations between states of the world pushed by the need to establish better security and defense became the basis of the collective security strategy. 18 Work Cited Bassett, Reginald. Democracy and Foreign Policy: A Case History, the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931–1933. London and New York, 1968. Bloomfield, Lincoln Palmer. The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boston, 1960. ——. The U.N. and Vietnam. New York, 1968. Bowie, Robert R., and Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York, 1998. Claude, Inis L. The United Nations and the Use of Force. New York, 1961. Current, Richard N. "The United States and Collective Security: Notes on the History of an Idea." In Alexander DeConde, ed. Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy. Durham, N.C., 1957. Semantically helpful. Finkelstein, Marina S., and Lawrence S. Finkel-stein, comps. and eds. Collective Security. San Francisco, 1966. A handy collection of readings. Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York and Oxford, 1982. Goldstein, Avery. Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-first Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution. Stanford, Calif., 2000. Haas, Ernst B. Collective Security and the Future International System. Denver, Colo., 1968. Hatton, Ragnhild, and J. S. Bromley, eds. William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680–1720, by and for Mark A. Thomson. Toronto and Liverpool, 1968. A useful case study. Hemleben, Sylvester John. Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries. Chicago, 1943. Early history of the idea of collective security. Howard, Michael Eliot. The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order. New Haven, Conn., 2001. James, Alan. The Politics of Peace-keeping. London and New York, 1969. Kaplan, Lawrence S. The United States and NATO: The Formative Years. Lexington, Ky., 1984. Kuehl, Warren F. Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920. Nashville, Tenn., 1969. A history of the American approach to international organizations to 1920. Lefever, Ernest W. Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation. Baltimore, 1967. McNamara, Robert S., et al. Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy. New York, 1999. Rappard, William E. Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948. London, 1948. A case study of interest. Schmidt, Christopher. Into the heart of darkness cosmopolitanism vs. realism and the Democratic Republic of Congo. New York: John Willy and Sons, 2010. Stromberg, Roland N. Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO. New York, 1963. ——. "Uncertainties and Obscurities about the League of Nations." Journal of the History of Ideas. 23 (January–March 1972): 139–154. Mixes analysis with history. Williams, Bruce Stockton. State Security and the League of Nations. Baltimore, 1927. Read More