The USA Fighting Against Al Qaeda in Yemen - Coursework Example

United s Fights against Al-Qaeda in Yemen United s Fights against Al-Qaeda in Yemen Introduction Yemen is based in Middle East and has direct access to major strategic waterways and long porous border with Saudi Arabia. It remains the only non-monarchy within the Arabian Peninsula. The Al-Qaeda revolt in Yemen involved armed conflict involved the government and Al-Qaeda affiliated cells, with United States opting to assist the Yemen. The crackdown of Al-Qaeda by the government started in 2001, with the conditions worsening in 2010 after Yemen declared war on Al-Qaeda. The fighting escalated in 2011 during the Yemeni Revolution when the Jihadists seized the Abyan Governorate and declared it emirate. The main oil pipeline in Yemen was blown up in 2013, and this halted the crude oil flow. Therefore, Yemen has been under pressure to fight Al-Qaeda, especially after the attack of USS Cole and American Embassy in Yemen. The country intensified the attacks against Al-Qaeda in 2009 after the attempt of blowing up the Detroit-bound airliner by US, and this resulted to several deaths. Reports indicate substantial involvement of the Americans in Yemeni operations since 2009 against Al-Qaeda. This includes Intelligence sharing and massive trainings through direct involvement and joint operations command (Boucek & Marina, 2010). Al-Qaeda in Yemen Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula emerged after the leading Islamist group figures started wars in Saudi Arabia. The militants attacked Defense Ministry and left over 50 people dead alongside assassinations of officials and ambushing of the army patrols. This compelled America and other states to close their embassies temporary because of the threats. The government is U.S also promised to fund its allies in the fight against terrorism. Basically, this targeted all the security forces that had gone to Yemen to help in the fight against Al-Qaeda. The government in Yemen tries to contain the armed Shiite-Muslims rebels in the Northern part who caused chaos that forced the president, Ali Saleh, to resign in 2011 (Difo, 2010). The battle resulted to 13 percent contraction of the Yemeni economy with the lost output anticipated to regain by 2015. Deterioration of security in multiple fronts raised the prospects of the collapse of the state. The attack of Al-Qaeda by Yemen is more of a war than a police round up. This is because it has resulted to death of many militants, especially in Abyan and Shabwa provinces. As a result, the U.S targeted the Al-Qaeda enclaves using drone strikes. This is because U.S. believed that Al-Qaeda threatened the citizens and interests of United States in Yemen (Hellmich, 2012). Devil’s Advocate Analysis The devil’s advocacy analysis method involves development of solid argument for the recommended course of action, after which the recommendation is subjected to an extensive formal critique. Good recommendations are normally based on strong assumptions and are independent of effective and forceful criticism. This helps yield sound judgment. This analysis process involves seven major phases. The first phase involves identification of the problem. In the fight of US against Al-Qaeda in Yemen, the main problem is the Al-Qaeda terrorism. US is in the battle against Al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen. The military from U.S is preparing to give over $100 million in their counterterrorism and security aid within the Arabian countries based on newly obtained documents. The aftermath of the resignation by Yemen president, Ali Saleh, resulted to decline in the political crisis. The US administration notified the congress of the intentions to resume their military aid in Yemen which were restricted by the counterterrorism forces in Yemen locked if fight against the Al-Qaeda affiliate that also targeted United States (Herridge, 2011). The second phase involves dividing the group into two and assigning one the play the DA (Devil’s Advocate) subgroup and the other one to develop the affirmative recommendation (AR subgroup). In this case, Al-Qaeda represents the DA subgroup while US the AR subgroup. By June 2010, the lawmakers in Pentagon were notified of $75 million worth small arms, vehicles, ammunitions, hand-launched surveillance drones as well as other equipment to the Ministry of Interior in Yemen. Documents indicated that the military aid was to remain quite extensive making the Pentagon notify the Congress of the additional $37 million for the trained special operational units in U.S. this included a package of the small troop-transport aircraft, five-raiding boats for the commandos, small arms and ammunitions and 100-night vision devices. Additional Yemen aid was reported by the Bloomberg news. According to the news, the military trainers from US went back to Yemen after one-year suspension of the security assistance (Hull, 2011). The intelligence officials from United States described the Al-Qaeda in Yemen as the leading terrorist threat in United States, especially due to the aftermath of Osama bin Laden and the weakening Al-Qaeda major organization in Pakistan. The administration in US said that the intelligence agencies and CIA from Yemen and Saudi Arabia thwarted plots by Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula of bombing the US-bound airliner. This bombing plan was described as an updated version of the previous Al-Qaeda efforts to blow the transatlantic flights, including the failed attempt in 2009 by an operative to detonate a bomb in his underwear. Additionally, US funded Yemen using $84 million as security assistance to counter the terrorists’ attacks. The United States also conducted various military attacks in Yemen against the Al-Qaeda militants. The central government in Yemen is relatively weak with powerful tribal systems which leave large areas lawless, even open for militant operations and trainings. Also, the Al-Qaeda presence in the country is also relatively strong. In an effort to counterterrorism in Yemen, US have been compelled to increase the military aid (Johnsen, 2013). The third phase involves instruction AR subgroup, in this case, US, to develop a set of recommendation as well as build the argument based on major facts, data and assumptions. Meanwhile, the DA group should also be ready to critique the agendas by the AR group. In the current case, the funds supplied by US to counterterrorism were used first in 2002 with approval and cooperation of the government. The predator drone controlled by CIA fired hellfire missile in SUV desert in Yemen. This is because Yemeni suspected that the senior Al-Qaeda lieutenant was the mastermind behind the bombing at the US Cole, which killed 17 Americans. They had put his name among the most wanted criminals by US government. During the attack, the lieutenant was killed alongside other five SUV occupants and Al-Qaeda terrorists, among which one of them was an American, Kamal Derwish (Lippold, 2012). By 2010, US launched an errant drone attack that targeted Al-Qaeda terrorists within the Wadi-Abida region. Five people were killed during the attack, among them Jaber-al-Shamwani, who was the deputy governor in the Maarib province and mediated between militants ad government. The death of the governor angered the Shabwani tribesmen who started a heavy fight with the government security forces, and they attacked the major oil pipeline within the region. In 2010, United States corporate with the officials from Yemen and launched a four-cruise missile attack at the suspected terrorist targets in the country. Reports showed that Yemen requested the US to suspend the missile strikes after a pro-Yemeni tribal leader was killed making the tribe to revolt against the Yemeni government. Also, reports indicated that US remained on the ground together with the Yemeni Army in their hunt for Al-Qaeda operatives (Mardini & Bruce, 2010). In 2011, the American manned drones and jets killed an Al-Qaeda operative, Abu Ali al-Harithi, and other militants in the southern part of Yemen. The CIA operatives and American Special Forces coordinated the strikes. However, four civilians were also killed during the strike. The associated press reports show that the American government started establishing an airbase near Yemen for their operations. For instance, the drone strike by US targeted Anwar al-Awlaki and succeeded in killing him while he was driving to get the breakfast. The drone killed at least 9 militants in 2012, with the first strikes targeting the Abyan and Shabwa provinces that were mostly or partially inhabited by the insurgents (Phillips, 2011). On the other hand, United States is continually facing the threats from the Al-Qaeda militants twelve years down the after they declared war against it. This has been contributed by the failure to understand all complexities involved in terrorist networks after its evolution over the years with no tactical successes. Their strategy of disrupting Al-Qaeda networks through assassinations of their senior leadership is based on poor understanding which overemphasizes the importance of the group and intentions of the affiliates to attack US. The strategy has failed overall dismantling of the militant networks. Despite the Al-Qaeda bearing small resemblance than earlier years of attack, the US strategy to counter them remains unchanged and ineffective (Phillips, 2011). This facilitates movement of the Al-Qaeda network from centrally organized network that existed for years to latticed interconnections between the Al-Qaeda small groups. The most crucial inflection point took place in 2009 when the Yemen-base Al-Qaeda affiliate established a new model the Al-Qaeda role groups within the network. The new model, Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), focused its efforts in fighting against United States and started to establish relationships with the other groups. The Osama bin Ladens death and the Arab spring in 2011 catalyzed for the changes in network. This made other affiliates adapt the AQAP model and established the inter-group connections the spanned the whole region. The connections facilitated broader cooperation and coordination within the network increasing the overall resiliency. The target by the US of specific groups and individuals did not add up as the strategy allowed the Al-Qaeda affiliates from Syria, Iraq and West Africa to virtually expand unchecked. The US also ignored growth of the associated groups in North Africa, particularly in Libya. Al-Qaeda network remains a global business and is operational within the global arena. Most of the Al-Qaeda groups operate at local levels strengthening on broader networks. Therefore, United States requires a comprehensive strategy globally in order to counter the Al-Qaeda tailoring it down to local levels (Boucek & Marina, 2010). The fourth phase involves joining the two subgroups together by instruction the AR group to presents its agendas to the DA group. In this case, AR subgroup; US, had opted to help Yemen and fund the war activities against Al-Qaeda. Also, US strategized on the appropriate way of eliminating the AQAP and other Al-Qaeda affiliated groups through killing their core leaders. On the other hand, DA subgroup; Al-Qaeda countered this through leadership regeneration programs that ensured that the smaller militant groups remained effective. The fifth phase involves separating the group again and enabling them revise their recommendations. The AR group must be prepared for the critiques from the DA group, while the DA group should prepare more critiques. In this fight, Al-Qaeda is planning to recruit more militants while the US also plan for more funding, even for the armies from other countries who have gone to Yemen to aid in the fight against Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda continues to seek for fresh attacks of United States, as well as nurture lateral connections with other groups within the Al-Qaeda networks. The credible threats from Arabian Peninsula have instigated closure of the US diplomatic posts in Middle East and North Africa. The AQAP is devoted at attacking the United States and has succeeded in laying down the model of developing capabilities of conducting attacks against US (Johnsen, 2013). The sixth phase involves repeating then fourth and fifth phases until a consensus is reached. In the case presented, a recommendation, the final phase is yet to be reached. despite the US coming up with more tactics of fighting the Al-Qaeda, more and more Al-Qaeda groups are terrorizing the US diplomatic areas in the world. This has compelled it close most of its offices in North Africa and Middle East. Red Team Analysis A red team analysis involves an independent group challenging another bigger institution to enhance its effectiveness. In this case, the red teams are represented by CIA and Americans from America, and Yemenis, AQAP, Al-Qaeda and other smaller groups from the Middle East. Most direct threat to US today originated from AQAP that attempted to attack the homeland US three times since its formation in 2009. Such affiliate lies behind the threat stream which prompted unprecedented closure of more than twenty diplomatic posts in America in North Africa and Middle East. The prominence of the AQAP within the Al-Qaeda network must not be interpreted to imply that the AQAP will replace core groups in Pakistan. Its interpretation must be within the broader context of Al-Qaeda network. However, it is imperative to note that AQAP is capable terrorist group within the network of other smaller groups that operated in a similar manner. The rapid ascendancy of AQAP in Yemen benefited from the expertise of people who were active within the Al-Qaeda network. The echelon of the AQAP leadership had combined experience for decades. Also, the weak Yemeni government provided an opportunity for the militant groups to grow rapidly. AQAP continued with attacks in Yemen under the Al-Qaeda umbrella (Difo, 2010). As a result, AQAP poses the worst threat to US as it has incorporated lessons learnt from Al-Qaeda in Iraq. It has succeeded in shifting the conditions on ground and appeal to various anti-government groupings in Yemen. The group has been able to design explosive devices and succeeded in penetrating the security defenses in by Americans (Hull, 2011). Most people believe that the strategy put in place by Bush Government in 2001 to counter Al-Qaeda remains consist with the one that is applied by Obama today. The US targeted at killing the senior leadership within the core group with the aim of disrupting the network. Through this strategy, US pursued localized assist and training programs that enabled the local militaries counter growth of the Al-Qaeda-linked groups. Obama’s administration succeeded in grouping AQAP with the Al-Qaeda central group after the attack in 2009 and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) attack (Mardini & Bruce, 2010). It is believed that US has been successful in killing the Al-Qaeda, TTP and AQAP, especially after killing the five most wanted Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, including Osama bin Laden. Also, in Yemen, US have succeeded in killing senior operatives like Mohamed Said al Umdah and Said al Shihri, who was the deputy leader. However, the long-term US impacts have been limited by the regeneration of TTP and AWAP leadership. The Al-Qaeda core was decimated by US. This required dedication of considerable intelligence and military resources and assets. Though Yemenis and Americans have had mixed feelings of success of US against Al-Qaeda, Americans feel that the counter attack of the AQAP depends on the direct action that targets the AQAP leadership as well as on counterterrorism actions by Yemen to combat AQAP on ground. It is noted that the US targeted strikes have resulted to death of various AQAP leaders with the partners in Yemen had limited success. Despite the Yemeni troops partnering with local militias in recapturing the AQAPs territory, the security forces have been unable completely to control the AQAPs local networks. Most of the conditions that resulted to the permissive environment in Yemen remain in place. This includes the grievance against the central government as well as local conflicts on resource accessibility like water. Therefore, people feel that the strategy might not be hundred percent efficient against AQAP (Difo, 2010). The Yemenis and Americans believe that the tactical successes by America against the militants have not been effective in weakening overall network as per their expectations. Rather, Al-Qaeda remains relatively stronger than it was during the initial instances. Strengthening of the affiliates has enhanced development of the overall network. Therefore, targeting a single group or selecting senior leadership does not disrupt the entire network. Failure to understand on proper Al-Qaeda network operations imply the US strategy in counteracting the militants is confused (Phillips, 2011). The Al-Qaeda network has evolved since 2001 making the network become more resilient ad complex over the years. Currently, the network can be perceived as a latticed structure with numerous interconnections among the affiliates, associates and Al-Qaeda core. Their operations have become more global ad US needs comprehensive global strategy to counter the group. The strategy must also be tailored locally to enhance the direct response to local conditions. This way, US will be able to gain effective neutralization of the threats from Al-Qaeda networks (Hellmich, 2012). When the US army ground campaign picked up, the Al-Qaeda militias held a series of attacks against them. This has made US pullback various diplomatic posts and close the diplomatic offices in Yemen. Though the personnel from the embassy were not evacuated, the facility was closed to public meaning a closure to the processing of visas as well as provision of other services. Involvement of the American Commandos in various shooting for the militias continued. Failure by the government to identify those involved in various kidnappings and shootings raised many questions on Yemen’s protection of the American citizens (Hellmich, 2012). Conclusion Basically, the Devil’s advocate and Red Team analyses techniques are best suited in evaluating the fight of the US against Al-Qaeda in Yemen. In devil’s advocate, US acts as AR while Al-Qaeda acts as DA subgroup. US tries to come up with recommendations, to the extent of even funding all the fights in Yemen, while Al-Qaeda remains relatively strong despite all the attacks from US such as killing of their core leaders. The battle undergoes through seven phases as resented in the context but it should be noted that the final recommendation has not yet been reached. On the other hand, in red team analysis, red teams can be perceived from both sides; those who are supporting the fight, and those who are fought. On the side of Americans and Yemenis, Al-Qaeda is the red team while they are blue team. The opposite is true when perceived from the Al-Qaeda’s side. References Boucek, C., & Marina, O. (2010). Yemen on the Brink. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Difo, G. (2010). Yemen and U.S. Security Assessing and Managing the Challenge of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Washington, D.C.: American Security Project. Hellmich, C. (2012). Fighting Al Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35(9) , 618-33. Herridge, C. (2011). The next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaedas American Recruits. New York: Crown Forum. Hull, E. J. (2011). High-value Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen. Washington, D.C.: Potomac. Johnsen, G. D. (2013). The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and Americas War in Arabia. New York: W.W. Norton. Lippold, K. S. (2012). Front Burner: Al Qaedas Attack on the USS Cole. New York: PublicAffairs. Mardini, R., & Bruce, O. (2010). The Battle for Yemen: Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Stability. Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation. Phillips, S. (2011). Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Yemen. Survival 53(1), 95-120. Phillips, S. (2011). Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Yemen Confronting Al-Qaeda, Preventing State Failure: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. (2010, January 20). United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. Read More