The Comparison of Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy in Brazil and Argentina - Coursework Example

The Comparison of Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1976). The military state in Argentina and Brazil were a product of discontent and struggles with civilian governments that utilized their popular support to galvanize people around strong socialist ideals. The socialist state at that time did not produce the widely held views because it led to social, economic and political institutional failures that were characterized by hyper inflation, balance of payment problems, communist dictatorial tendencies and ideological tensions. Therefore this paper argues that the military interventions in Brazil and Argentina were a means to solve the ensuing problems within a democratic framework through the establishment solid institutions of governance. It recognizes that there were points of convergence between the separate military interventions as well as tacit divergence between them. 1.0 Introduction The Brazilian military coup was staged in 1964 due to the fact that the then President Joao Goulart regime’s socialist policies led to serious economic problems. Subsequently, there developed a deep resentment by the middle class towards the communist system due to wide wage reductions (Pion-Berlin 3). They therefore resorted to violent military insurgency and labor strikes to air and pursue a lasting solution to the challenges at the time. This was informed by the pro-poor fiscal and economic reforms that the level of economic production could not effectively support (Pion-Berlin 3). This led to the then anti-unionist politicians to co-opt the military intervention as a stop-gap measure to correct the social, economic and political imbalances that existed at the time (Pion-Berlin 4). The Argentinean coup of 1976 followed a similar pattern with Brazil because President Peron capitalized on the established constitutional order to create a potent trade union caucus. In order to maintain its influence and control, the president’s popular movement overran democratic entitlements of his critics and political foes that drew their support from the middle class (Pion-Berlin 4). This paper will therefore explore the differences in the military interventions between Brazil and Argentina as well as their similarities. It will also explore albeit in a limited way on the consequences of the same. The paper is organized into four parts with the first part detailing the nature of the military dictatorships; the next part will focus on the similarities between the two military regimes. The third part will explore the divergent approaches to the introduction of democratic reforms by the two military governments while the last part will be a conclusion of the study. 2.0 The Similarities between the Military Transition in Brazil and Argentina. To begin with, it is important to note that the military coups both countries occurred at the height of the cold war that pitted the United States of America on one hand the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In essence, the former supported capitalist policies that were characterized by political, economic and social freedoms while the latter communist policies that were characterized by government involvement in politics and economics (Nino 135). The populist regimes led by President Juan Peron of Argentina and Joao Goulart were characterized by pro-poor policies while on the other hand it curtailed the economic and social freedoms that were largely espoused by the working classes. Their policies did not favor investments and growth in the business sectors. Consequently, the economies stagnated and were therefore unable to generate economic growth and create employment (Pion-Berlin 3). The governments of Brazil and Argentina introduced nationalist policies that would indigenize industries and introduce tax reforms that would hedge their newly formed industries against importation of goods from developed countries. The subsequent military interventions were therefore influenced by an increasingly frustrated middle class that highly favored economic liberalization (Pion-Berlin 2). The other similar characteristic between the two military interventions was informed by the co-operation between the military and the middle class political and social groups. The discontent arising out of the economic challenges saw the civil society enjoin the military in their quest for championing civil and political freedoms (Falleti 12). Similarity between the transitions from dictatorship to democracy in both countries was that they were relatively short in terms of duration. It has been argued by Pion-Berlin that the average period of the military intervention was nine years (Pion-Berlin 1). This was informed by the fact that their key aim was to midwife constitutional and democratic reforms that would see them emerge as openly democratic regimes as opposed to the single party systems that were in place at the time (Pion-Berlin 2). Both military interventions however, were characterized by repression and the suspension of the existing constitutional and political order. This was informed by the need to develop a new legal regime that would enhance democratic and political freedoms as a panacea to the centrist and populist political system that existed before the coups (Pion-Berlin 3). Both Brazil and Argentinean military interventions were characterized by weakening of the political institutions that existed at the time. The Brazilian military option allowed the continued existence of the Congress as a law making body while the Argentinean option involved complete ban of the political parties which ensured an unfettered control of the military (Falleti 2). In Brazil for instance, the military presided over the election of the care-taker president who was then approved by the congress while in Argentina, the military completely took over the running of the state with administrative powers (Fellipe, 386). Brazil and Argentinean military regimes had highly federalized systems of governments in the periods between 1960’s and 1970’s. However, the military was directly involved in the management of government affairs because they maintained a tight control of all government affairs even in instances where they allowed for civilian participation in governance (Fellipe 385). In this regard therefore, the military developed formal rules of governance that created governance institutions. These rules were created with a view to manage the relations between the military institutions themselves as well as between them and civilian institutions (Fellipe 386). Military interventions in both Brazil and Argentina were as a result of the threats from civilian militarized leftwing movements. The military did not want to be edged out of existence by the radical groups such as Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) in Argentina and the anti-unionist civil society groups in Brazil (Pion-Berlin 2). The Brazilian and the Argentinean military, while recognizing the failures of the popular democratic governments, did not want to be involved in the military coups until they ensured that the unwavering support of the public. The public view then was that they were to preside over the democratic reforms and return to their traditional national security role but this did not happen (Pion-Berlin 2). The military role in the transition to democracy did not go according to the hitherto expected view because they took complete control of the governance structures and remained there in for a substantial period. In Brazil for instance, the military married development and national security which saw them actively engaged in governance issues while in the Argentinean military took complete control of government (Pion-Berlin 2). The management of transition by both militaries was not an exclusive military affair because as need would dictate, civilian bureaucrats were engaged in governance or approval levels (Nino 385). The Brazilian military for instance directly appointed the (General) president before seeking Congressional approval while the Argentinean military retained the minister for education and economy (Falleti 11). The other glaring similarities between them are that they did not tolerate the development of an active opposition once they assumed power. This is because political parties were limited in power and influence as in the case of Brazil while in Argentinean case, the military junta that took over the reins of power banned all political parties (Fellipe 387). It is also important to take note of the fact that the Brazilian military regime allowed for elections in both the municipalities and states for both Mayors and governors respectively. However, under the guise of security certain municipal mayors were directly appointed by the military and approved by the congress (Falleti 14). 3.0 Differences in Military Fashioned Transition between Brazil and Argentina. The military intervention between Brazil and Argentina had certain differences in terms of how they fostered the emergence of new governance structures and institutions. This section is dedicated towards exploring the different approaches that the military regimes facilitated the emergence of new democracies either by design or default or even both. To begin with, the Argentinean military regime completely took control of the midwifery role to the exclusion of the civil society and political groups. When the civilian government of President Peron collapsed in 1976, the military took complete control of the arms government such as the judiciary, legislature and the executive (Nino 387). The military regime ruled by edicts which was not subject to any legislative approval because the political parties had been utterly disbanded (Falleti 11). The authoritarian junta even resorted to constitutionally legalize their rule by crafting a constitution which failed the legitimacy test via a referendum in 1980 (Fellipe 387). In a sharp contrast with the Argentinean model, the Brazilian military junta did not take complete control of all the arms of government. For instance, they allowed the continued existence of the Brazilian Congress albeit with clipped powers (Falleti 13). Political parties were not disbanded in Brazil and this was demonstrated by the periodical elections in both the state and municipalities where political parties were allowed to participate in (Falleti 13). This therefore translates to the fact that while Brazil military regime allowed for people to continue expressing their democratic will through regular elections, Argentinean equivalent maintained a complete control over the political process. When the military authoritarian regime took over, the legislature was replaced by the 9-member legislative council (Falleti 11). To further assert their control over regional political process, the military regime completely closed down the regional assemblies. The military junta further took over the judicial and executive roles replacing them with members from their own ranks (Falleti 11). This conduct goes to demonstrate further that the Argentinean military monopolized the exercise of legislative, judicial and executive power while the Brazilian junta shared power with the people by engaging the Congress in the approval of their selected president. In addition they did not close down the state and municipal governments (Falleti 13). The Brazilian military regime allowed for political parties to thrive and the opposition politics to exist. It has been argued that while it did not permit community participation in governance process, it none the less allowed for regular elections (Dominguez 18). In addition, they allowed for the existence of workers unions and the civil society while the Argentinean case was different in that the military took over the minimal role of citizen representation in elections, workers unions and political parties (Dominguez 18). The Brazilian military junta was effective in managing succession between one leader and the other (Dominguez 7). It successfully witnessed the succession of power four times between 1964 and 1985 unlike Argentina where the military appointed presidents were deposed in coup d’états between 1976 and 1976 (Dominguez 6). The onset of the Argentinean military rule was well received by the civil society and the political groups while the Brazilian case faced a limited amount of resistance from the same groups (Dominguez 6). The Argentinean military coup came after widespread economic failures by the Peron government and this attracted the support of the guerilla movements and the workers groups because it was seen as a legitimate means to end the economic turndown and the civil strife that existed at the time (Dominguez 6). The Brazilian coup of 1964 was also informed by similar concerns but the civil society and workers unions gave a wide berth to the calls for general strikes and when the military took over it sparked protests (Fellipe 384). There was poor separation of the state and the military in the Argentinean military rule because the military did not effectively separate itself from the state institutions namely the judiciary, executive and legislature. On the other hand the Brazilian military authority was successful in institutionalizing its rule by distinguishing between military institutions from state agencies (Fellipe 386). This is attributed to the fact that the Brazilian military junta did not abolish the constitution but worked around it with minimal reforms to anchor its rule within the constitution. On the other hand, the Argentinean military authority disbanded the constitution and resorted to ruling by decrees (Fellipe 387). As a result, the Argentinean military was actively involved in the administrative functions even at the lowest levels of governance and even the civil society interests as well as the workers interests (Fellipe 387). The Brazilian institutionalization model succeeded because the legislative organs remained intact in the period of the authoritarian rule and this enabled them to manage the transition effectively (Dominguez 4). The Argentinean military approach in the management of the government affairs was a disjointed one in the sense that once they assumed the reins of power, each military department namely navy, army and air force was engrossed in protecting its turf. Subsequently, they were unable to present a united front on democratic and political transition (Pion-Berlin 7). The Brazilian junta on the other hand had a very united front in social and political issues and that is why they did not want to intervene militarily in 1964. They were united by one core fact that is to modernize the state’s economic, political and democratic systems (Pion-Berlin 4). 4.0 The Divergent Approaches of Transition from Military Dictatorship to Democracy The transition from dictatorship to democracy took divergent approaches in Brazil and Argentina. This section will explore the different approaches that the transition took in the different countries whether by deliberate design and default. The division within the military was their Achilles heel because they were unable to deliver on the political and particularly the economic front. The military was divided between the moderates and conservatives where the former supported the return to democracy while the conservatives preferred maintenance of the status-quo (Pion-Berlin 18). In effect the junta became a lame duck government resulting in a coup in December 11 1981. The subsequent divisions meant that the military was never united and as such the beginning of the end of military dictatorship and the return of multiparty democracy (Pion-Berlin 18). To begin with the Argentinean transition to democracy was abrupt and was necessitated by the defeat of her military in the Falkland war with Britain. The decision to go to war with Britain over the Falkland Island in 1982 exposed the extent of divisions between the institutions as their divisions meant that they could not present a joint military strategy against a superior adversary (Pion-Berlin 18). When General Reynaldo Bignone finally assumed power, the divisions between the military departments played out as the Navy and Air force refused to be part of his government. The loss of the battle over the Falkland Island led to the loss of the junta’s credibility in the eyes of the public while the democratic opposition gained popularity which forced Reynaldo to succumb to pressure to call for democratic elections (Pion-Berlin 18). The Brazilian case was no different because the military authorities never envisaged a return to democracy neither did they take deliberate steps towards it. This was informed by the impressive economic performance of the Brazilian economy between 1960’s and 70’s (Pion-Berlin 16). Like in Argentina, there were divisions between the intelligence agencies that were dominated by radicals while the military pursued measures to legitimize its stranglehold on power through direct political and democratic concessions to political groups and the civil society (Pion-Berlin 16). The script however changed later when the economic downturn in the 80’s set in which forced the junta to negotiate an exit strategy which involved negotiating for safeguards once they were out of power. They effectively were able to manage the transition to democratic rule by dictating its terms (Fellipe 388). 4.0 Conclusion Transition from military dictatorship in both countries had one common point in that the military regimes intervened as the people’s savior from bad governance perpetuated by democratically elected governments (Pion-Berlin 2). However, once they assumed the reins of power they became reactionary and did all in their power to keep government control in their hands. This ranged from state political and democratic concessions to political groups and the civil society to iron-fist tactics (Falleti 11). However the transition to democracy was a product of economic and military failures which meant that they had no option but to accede to demands for democratic governance (Pion-Berlin 22). Works Cited Agüero, Felipe. "Legacies of transitions: Institutionalization, the military, and democracy in South America." Mershon International Studies Review 42.2 (1998): 383-404. Domínguez, Jorge I. The Perfect Dictatorship? Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile. and Mexico, mimeo (2002): 1-23. Falleti, Tulia G. "Varieties of authoritarianism: the organization of the military state and its effects on federalism in Argentina and Brazil." Studies in Comparative International Development 46.2 (2011): 137-162. Nino, Carlos Santiago. "Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin America." U. Miami L. Rev. 44 (1989): 129. Pion-Berlin, David. "Military Dictatorships of Brazil and the Southern Cone." World Scholar: Latin America & the Caribbean (2011): 1-18. . Read More