Conflict in Fragile States Policy - Coursework Example

Policy Brief Conflict in Fragile s Policy: How to achieve uniformity in the tackling conflict in affected nations Executive Summary The Conflict in fragile states policy was first published as a UK foreign policy on 12 December 2012, with the major aim of this policy being to provide for a framework for the UK to engage in preventing and addressing regional and international conflicts (gov.uk, 2012:n.p.). The policy specifically sought to have the UK engage in helping the fragile and conflict affected states regain their stability (gov.uk, 2012:n.p.). However, the current Russia-Ukraine crisis has put the UK on the spot, as an international partner that is conspicuously absent in the Ukraine peace efforts (Wesel, 2015:n.p.). Britain is a member of the UN security council, in addition to being a member of NATO and also a member of the European Union, which means that it is expected to be involved in the Ukraine crisis fully, as a concerned partner of these international treaties (Bennett, 2015:n.p.). Nevertheless, the UK has been observed to have taken a back seat in this issue. France and Germany are leading in the way of establishing peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, while the USA is highly involved in strategizing military support if a need for the same arises, but the UK is conspicuously absent. If uniformity in tackling conflict in the affected nations has to be achieved, then the UK should be involved directly and actively in the process of seeking solution to end the Ukraine crisis. The Issue The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has committed to support fragile states embroiled in conflicts through spending 30% of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to tackle crisis in the affected nations and help them regain stability for the year 2014-2015 (gov.uk, 2012:n.p.). This is an increment from the amount that was dedicated for this objective, which was set at 22% in 2010 (ICAI, 2014:1). Such increase in spending is targeted at increasing the swiftness, appropriateness and effectiveness of responding to international crises and restoring stability. The Ukraine crisis is one major crisis currently posing the danger of erupting into a full-blown conflict. However, the UK is conspicuously absent in the process of seeking solution to this crisis (Watt, 2015:n.p.). The UK and the British Prime Minister himself have defended the perceived absence of the UK in the Ukraine Crisis, through arguing that the UK has been actively been involved in seeking solution to the crisis under the larger European Union umbrella, where stern sanctions have been issued against Russia. David Cameron, in response to the question of whether the UK was trying to distance itself from the crisis, said that the UK has played a supportive role, through leading the other European Nations in issuing strict economic sanctions against Russia, which are proving to be very effective, when the current state of the Russian economy is considered. While this argument might be true, the UK is known for its active role in trying to resolve any major crisis and security conflict that arises in the world. The UK was an active participant in the Syrian crisis, and it has also been involved in the Libyan crisis, despite the fact that such countries are in the Middle East. Thus, it would be highly expected that the UK would also play an active role in helping resolve the Ukraine crisis, owing to the fact that this is a conflict that is affecting Europe directly, by pitching two European countries against each other. In this respect, the UK seems to be applying double standards in responding to international crises, by being directly and actively involved in resolving some of the conflicts, while taking a back seat in addressing others. Background information The UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states recognizes that once conflict breaks, its impact to the countries involved and to the international community can be enormous (Fragile States Team, 2012:2). Thus, the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states offers that it is the responsibility of the UK to help the fragile nations and other states that are involved in conflict to tackle the causes of the conflict and stop it from accelerating, rather than waiting until the conflict has already worsened, and then pay the heavy price or trying to contain the conflict (gov.uk, 2012:n.p.). However, the response that the UK has shown towards the Ukraine crisis is short of this commitment by the policy, owing to the fact that the UK has not actively engaged in trying to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and thus prevent this conflict from running out of hand, and then costing the two countries and the international community dearly. Further, the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states offers that to be able to address the threats of conflicts effectively, the UK must always be prepared to take fast, appropriate and effective action towards quelling a conflict that arises, by trying to prevent and stop the conflict form accelerating (Below, A. & Belzile, 2013:7). This provision of the policy does not seem to have been implemented in the Ukraine crisis, owing to the fact that the UK, as an individual nation, a member of the UN Security Council and also a member of the EU and the NATO has not played any active role in trying to stop the Ukraine crisis from escalating (Bennett, 2015:n.p.). The argument that the UK has acted as a member of the EU in ensuring the issuance of stern economic sanctions towards Russia does not reflect any element of fast, appropriate or effective action towards stopping a crisis as provided under the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states. The other major provision of the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states is that it is the responsibility of the UK to offer the necessary form of support to fragile countries, to enable such countries stabilize and become capable of managing tension and conflict that is potentially explosive (Edmunds, Gaskarth & Porter, 2014:36). The policy seeks to achieve the stabilization of the fragile nations through pursuing international engagements that can combine efforts to assist the fragile and other vulnerable countries towards gaining the capabilities to stop a conflict (Letouze & Catheu, 2013:27). The issue of the Ukraine crisis however does not seem to reflect this provision of the policy. The UK has neither engaged individually nor sought the collaboration of the international community towards assisting Ukraine, the vulnerable nation in this case, to gain the capability it requires to stop the conflict. Despite the fact that the imposition of economic sanctions can help in affecting the economic situation of Russia such that it can shape up to the demands of the international community, economic sanctions are not fast, effective and appropriate actions that can help address the Ukraine Crisis as required under the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states (Brock, 2011:12). Thus, the UK needs to take a decisive action towards active and direct involvement in the crisis, while at the same time combining efforts with the other partners in the international community to establishing a lasting solution to the problem. Policy options Direct and Active involvement The UK should get involved directly involved in resolving international crises, through engaging in peace talks. The UK Prime Minister has received criticism from different quarters for failing to join the French president and German Chancellor in the visit to Moscow for the Ukraine crisis peace talks, which has been regarded as an important step towards helping address the conflict and establish a solution that does not entail military power use (White, 2015:n.p.). The weight which the British Prime Minister would have brought to the talks is big, and it has been considered so unfortunate that the Prime Minister decided to skip the visit. This action has meant that the UK Prime Minister is weakening the influence of the UK abroad, when such influence is highly needed (Cordon & Woodcock, 2015:n.p.). The response by the UK to the Ukraine crisis has been seen as a way of the UK trying to avoid direct confrontations with its other European counterparts, and thus has opted to apply the sanction card as the strategy for addressing the conflict, under the umbrella of the European Union. This is a lenient strategy that is not likely to antagonize the UK against either Ukraine or Russia, in the face of the existing crisis, since the UK would not be seen to be playing any direct role in supporting either of the parties to the conflict (White, 2015:n.p.). This strategy can be suitable for addressing an international conflict that entails two European countries, which the UK may require to engage in other matters of the European prosperity in the future, thus opting to remain neutral. Apply a Neutral Approach The UK can adapt a neutral approach to all international crises, by avoiding getting involved either directly or indirectly in any crisis (CommGAP, 2014:2). Another argument that has been given in support of the neutral approach of the UK to the Ukraine crisis is that the UK has been an active player in the resolution of major international crises such as the Syrian and the Libyan crises, and thus it is time that the UK takes a break (Bennett, 2015:n.p.). It has also been argued that by the UK taking a seemingly inactive role in responding to the Ukraine crisis, other European Nations, for Example France and Germany have taken the responsibility to address the crisis directly. Therefore, the argument holds that taking of the back seat by the UK in addressing the Ukraine crisis is a suitable strategy of prompting other European Nations to take responsibility in working towards the resolution of the crisis that concerns Europe. The argument is that the other European nations will stop depending on the UK which has always been relied upon to take action towards resolving international conflicts (Watt, 2015:n.p.). The British Prime Minister held that the UK had played its role in trying to sustain a strong coalition of European Nations that have issued strong and serious sanctions on Russia, which are effective to make Russia change its course of action against Ukraine. This strategy is argued to be effective, most especially coupled with the fall in the fuel prices, which has seen the Russian economy stumble down and most likely headed towards a recession that the country cannot take. Such an action is seen as effective in making Russia rethink its course, and honor the demands of the international community. However, this action does not entirely deter Russia from striking Ukraine militarily. Recommendations There is no doubt that the UK is part and parcel of the international community and it cannot run away from this fact. The UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states created a resource Conflict Pool as a pool of resources that are to be used towards helping in managing and preventing international conflict (CommGAP, 2014:2). The conflict pool was established as an emergency funding source for the UK to address international conflicts that seem to threaten the welfare of the UK and that of the international community. Most especially, this funding program was established to enable the UK respond to crises rapidly and resolve conflicts swiftly. However, the Ukraine crisis has dragged on for long now, but the UK has shown no sign of engaging in the effort to help resolve the conflict. This wait and see attitude is clearly contrary to the provisions of the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states, which requires the UK to respond to crises and conflicts swiftly, and thus help to abate them before they can accelerate (Great Britain, 2014:5). The major problem associated with the wait-and-see approach that has been adopted by the UK as the response to the Ukraine crisis is that the crisis can break up into an explosive and enormous military power confrontation between the two nations aided by their allies, which in the end will become a major disaster for the international community, just like the Libyan and the Syrian crises. The intention and the motive of the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states policy is that such far-reaching international security crises are abated early enough, before they can become too costly for the international community to respond (Brock, 2011:21). The UK has been rapid in responding to some international crisis, for example the Syria and the Libyan crisis, while being perceived to be very slow in responding to other crisis, such as the Ukraine crisis. However, there should be a uniform application and implementation of the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states, which requires that the UK has the responsibility to respond fast, appropriately and effectively to international conflicts and crises. This is a way of ensuring the stability of the nations in crisis and preventing the crisis from escalating into a major disaster for the conflicting nations and for the international community (Great Britain, 2006:154). The manner in which the UK is responding to the Ukraine crisis can be seen as discriminative application of the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states, since the UK responds to certain international crises decisively, directly and swiftly, yet taking a back seat in other crisis, and opting to adapt a wait-and-see approach. There is no doubt that the economic sanction imposed on Russia by the European Union is effective in affecting the economic growth and performance of the Russian economy. However, such a measure cannot deter Russia from attacking Ukraine militarily, and thus cause the two countries as well as the international community a costly intervention. Thus, the UK needs to apply the provisions of the UK Policy on Conflict in fragile states uniformly, by engaging directly in resolving the Ukraine crisis. References Below, A. & Belzile, A. (May 2013). Comparing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States. Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security (BIGS) Policy Paper 3, 1-44. Bennett, O. (6 February 2015). Where is David Cameron? Top military general blasts "irrelevant" Tory leader cut out of Ukraine peace deal. Retrieved from http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/david-cameron-top-military-general-5115495 Brock, L. (2011). Fragile states. Cambridge: Polity. 2-56. Communication for Governance & Accountability Program (CommGAP) . (2014). Towards A New Policy Model for Media and Communication in Post-Conflict and Fragile States. The World Bank. 1-6. Cordon, G. & Woodcock, A. (February 7, 2015). Britain is Absent from Ukraine Peace Efforts. The Journal. Retrieved from https://www.questia.com/newspaper/1G1-400512092/britain-is-absent-from-ukraine-peace-efforts Edmunds, T., Gaskarth, J. & Porter, R. (2014). British foreign policy and the national interest: Identity, strategy and security. 34-79. Fragile States Team. (28 February 2012). Managing results in conflict‐affected and fragile states: A stock‐take of lessons, experience and practice, 1-52. gov.uk. Policy: Conflict in fragile states. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/preventing-conflict-in-fragile-states--2 Great Britain. (2006). Conflict and development: Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. London: The Stationery Office. 154-160. Great Britain. (2014). Ukraine and Russia: EU restrictive measures : eleventh report of session 2014-15 : documents considered by the committee on 3 September 2014, and recommended for debate : report, together with formal minutes. 5-7. LDCs Independent Commission for Aid Impact. (ICAI). (2014). DFID’s scale-up in fragile states, 1-11. Letouze, E. & Catheu, J. (2013). Fragile states: Resource flows and trends. 25-38. Watt, N. (5 February 2015). Foreign policy: David Cameron plays down UK absence from Ukraine talks. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/feb/05/david-cameron-uk-absence-ukraine-talks Wesel, B. (February 9, 2015). Ukraine crisis: Are the British backing down? Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.de/ukraine-crisis-are-the-british-backing-down/a-18246810 White, M. (9 February 2015). Bit player Britain risks being stuck on foreign policy sidelines. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2015/feb/09/bit-player-britain-risks-being-stuck-on-foreign-policy-sidelines Read More