Explaining Grahams Rejection of Anti-Realism - Term Paper Example

Explaining Graham’s Rejection of Anti-Realism Introduction In this paper, anti-realism as presented by George Graham will be discussed. First, realism and anti-realism will be defined. Second, the arguments against anti-realism will be presented. Finally, the arguments that support anti-realism will be presented. Though anti-realism has some acknowledged problems, it is the best model that conforms to psychological study needs. Realism is a psychological concept advanced by George Graham in which he contends that mental disorders are real and that though they can be assigned to an amalgamation of physical and mental somatic sources they should can be differentiated from neurological disorders.For that matter, the implication is that neurological and mental disorders are two distinctly different fields in psychiatry. In this case, this explanation links philosophy of the mind and psychopathology, and determines that philosophy of the mind and psychopathology are co-dependent, in reference of psychiatry. The reason for presenting the realism concept was in response to psychopathology manuals demand that tools and concepts distinctive to a specific field in the science of philosophy be applied in explaining and understanding mental disorders. Additionally, they implied that psychiatry principles and viewpoints were distinct from science in general. Therefore, Graham’s realism concept contributed to a holistic explanation of mental disorders within the field of psychiatry; furthermore introduction of the concept in the field of psychiatry draws on psychopathology to explain the how the mind works (Graham, 2013). Anti-realism is a viewthat is contrary to realism as presented by Graham. In this case, anti-realism is a psychological concept that contends that mental disorders do not exist. For that matter, the amalgamation of physical and mental somatic sources that cause mental disorders qualify the handling of mental disorders as psychological ailments; since they present chemical destabilization of the brain. To elaborate further, an individual who presents mental disorder would typically present chemical imbalances in their brain (Graham, 2013). Moral and metaphysical skepticism There are two skepticisms presented to counter Graham’s concept of mental disorder, and presentation of the anti-realism arguments; moral and metaphysical skepticisms. The two skepticisms have argued that Graham’s concept is flawed and erroneous. In this respect they contend that the concepts must either be rejected or modified to reflect actuality (Graham, 2013). The first argument for anti-realism is the moral skepticism, which claims that Graham’s explanation of mental disorder is morally impractical. In this case, the moral skepticism notes that Graham’s explanation applies physical concepts and evaluative conclusions that cannot be practiced in the physical examination of mentally ill patients. To elaborate further, moral skepticism was first presented by Thomas Szasz and is based on the tenet that scientific studies are not normative; instead they are practical and descriptive, whereas psychiatric studies make extensive use of normative arguments and judgments that have been derived from established standards that are widely practiced in the psychiatry. For instance, a patient who presents with a broken leg does not require normative judgments to make a diagnosis, rather a scan of the broken leg enables a descriptive judgment on how the leg is to be treated. In addition, the skepticism presents the opinion that diagnosing a psychiatric disorder involves an imposition of a subjective value assessment and decision. In this respect, each psychiatrist would apply their personal feelings and opinions in making a psychiatric diagnosis; this is despite the fact that they all apply the same diagnosis guidelines. The implication is that psychiatry is not a science and as such any scientific arguments applied in psychiatry are fundamentally wrong (Graham, 2013). The second argument for anti-realism is the metaphysical skepticism, which claims that Graham’s approach to psychiatry is dualistic –a dualistic approach is self-negating as it argues both ways and offers no definite answers to a problem. In this case, Graham contends that for every mental aspect there is an equal physical aspect. This is true in the sense that for any presenting mental condition there must be a matching physical condition accompanying it. For that matter, Graham argues that a unique mental interpretation of a psychiatric disorder, as opposed to a physical and reductive interpretation of the psychiatric disorder is unreasonably and invalidly dualistic. In contrast, the metaphysical skepticism argues that the notion of physical and mental normativity in psychiatry - as presented by Graham – is unjustified since a smidgen of relationship between physical and mental health does not justify an association of the two in all psychiatric concepts (Graham, 2013). Discussion Arguments for anti-realism present that realism defense of scientific rationality as anchored in reality and truth as false. Rather, they contend that scientific evidence should be handled as experimentally adequate data and not reality and truth. In this case, applying scientific dogmas to explain mental disabilities is erroneous since scientific evidence mirroring the correct prediction of a psychological nature does not imply that it explains the social factors. For that matter, anti-realism accepts scientific rationality on the basis that it makes accurate diagnoses of psychological disorders based on observable features and outcomes. In addition, they assign the adjectives successful and unsuccessful to the non-observable features as opposed to scientific approaches that assign the adjectives true and false to the non-observable features. Thus, arguments for antirealism delink observable features and recordable empirical data from reality and truth since they contend that reality and truth are better explained by experience (Graham, 2013). Additionally, arguments for anti-realism takes issue with realisms’ reticent use of rationality in defining and explaining mental disorders. For that matter, realism presents rationality as a mechanical feature, though Graham later argues – in his defense of realism – that a psychiatric diagnosis on the basis of the immediate causes of mental illness is a purely mechanical approach and detrimental to the advancement of psychiatric studies. In reference to that, realisms’ reticence for allowing the use of mechanical features in psychiatric and mental disorders diagnosis makes it difficult to decide when the mechanical features can be applied to the diagnosis. For instance, Graham applied the mechanical features in defining and explaining schizophrenia as a mental disorder in which the intentional patterns carried out by the patient reinforced and deepened the mental disorder. In contrast, applying the mechanical features to defining and explaining an addictive behavior tends to angle precariously and treacherously towards self-righteousness; since the patient presenting the addictive behavior is characterized as an individual who cannot keep the promise to refrain from engaging in the addictive behavior and is not responsible. In fact, an individual engaging in an addictive behavior is presented as ignorant of the self (Graham, 2013). As earlier stated, applying Graham’s founding parameters to a patient suffering major depressive disorder shows that the patient would typical view themselves as either resentful of their unfair treatment or defenseless, and their environment as demoralizing. In this case, these representation views help in the psychiatric condition diagnosis and identification of the empirical features pertinent to the psychiatric condition diagnosis; such as the identifying the psychiatric condition and its onset. Graham depresses his presentations and arguments on realism and anti-realism by acknowledging that empirical factors introduced by the non-reductive approaches and the founding parameters are of very little or no use in diagnosing some of the mental disorders and psychiatric conditions. For instance, a patient suffering disillusion would be unable to conduct an analysis of their individual self and association with the environment. In such a case, the patient’s delusions of their experiences contribution to their mental state would not aid a psychiatric diagnosis, and would in fact hinder the whole diagnosis process (Graham, 2013). In addition, Graham applies a phenomenological approach to his explanations of realism and anti-realism. For that matter, he argues that a mental disorder is the rational jumbling of rational thought processes. In reference to that, an individual who presents a mental disorder would, on one or more occasions, be unable to apply the rational thought process, even if it is unintentional. In this respect, both the non-mental and mental states of the mind inhibit the typical psychology. For that matter, a mentally sick individual would experience a jumbling up of some of their mental capacities. Not surprisingly, Graham’s listing of the mental capacities encompasses what an individual would require to lead a decent life. In this case, the listings include: emotional capacity; commitment; care; self- and environmental-comprehension; and spatial self-location. To elaborate further, a mentally ill individual would, therefore, have their mental capacities jumbled up to such an extent that their ability to lead a decent life is compromised, and they would require either assistance or psychiatric intervention to allow them lead a decent life. One must accept that Graham’s application of a phenomenological approach to mental disorder and psychiatric diagnosis is a moral presentation of his earlier stated ideas (Graham, 2013). Arguments against moral and metaphysical skepticism I think that the best way to reject the moral skepticism argument, as earlier presented, is by arguing that psychiatry is scientific in nature and can apply appeals to scientific norms thus any normative assumptions that are made in general medicine can be made in psychiatry– which is a branch of medicine.For that matter, general medicine applies physical examination of patients as a routine procedure. In addition, it also applies normative assumptions in diagnosing patients. In reference to that, the fact that mental and psychiatric diagnosis apply normative assumptions does not preclude the application of physical assumptions. As such, diagnosis of psychiatric conditions using both physical and normative assumptions would be in line with general medicine principles. In fact, I am of the opinion that applying physical examination allows the psychiatrist to be thorough and proficient in their diagnosis. I also contend that similar to general medicine, psychiatry is a practical science field and thus justified in applying both normative and physical assumptions in diagnosis. I think that the best way to reject the metaphysical skepticism, which presents Graham’s argument as dualistic, is by arguing that an individual presenting a psychiatric condition may present both physical and mental symptoms for the condition. In reference to my argument, for every mental condition there is a matching physical condition presented. For instance, an individual suffering schizophrenia would present certain parts of their brain as more active than the other parts if they are subjected to a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). While the presence of a physical condition to match the mental condition is true for some of the mental condition, not all mental ailments present this scenario. For instance, an individual suffering addiction may present normal brain patters as a non-addict if they are both subjected to an MRI. We could also argue that the presence of psycho-stimulants in the individual body could be construed as a physical match to the mental addiction. It is my opinion that matching physical conditions to mental disorders is preferable to metaphysical skepticism. Thus a mental disorder can match a physical disorder without necessarily presenting physical symptoms – seen on the case of addiction. Conclusion One must accept that in spite of the skepticisms–moral and metaphysical skepticism Graham’s rejection of the anti-realism arguments is an important contribution to mental and psychiatric diagnosis. In this case, he offers a philosophical perspective to psychiatry’s skeptic diagnosis and a way to integrate psychiatry into science in general and general medicine in particular. In this respect, it is prudent to note that the presented philosophical arguments on the nature of psychiatry point to the fact that there are diverse ontologies of psychiatric and mental diagnosis such that it is difficult to determine arguments that would be presented as knowledge. Regrettably, it is possible to present convincing philosophical arguments that psychiatry can either take or not take a physical perspective yet get the ontology of psychiatry wrong. Advanced succinctly, philosophical arguments do not guarantee knowledge. For that matter, I am of the opinion that the arguments presented for and against anti-realism open up room for conceptual debate on psychiatry, and psychiatric and mental diagnosis ontologies. This does not take away from the fact that Graham’s arguments present a valid option for the analysis of mental disorders and psychiatry. Reference Graham, G. (2013). The disordered mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness, 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Read More