Rejection of Grahams Anti-Realism about Mental Disorders - Essay Example

Rejection of Graham’s Anti-Realism about Mental Disorders In this essay, an explanation will be presented for rejection of Graham’s anti-realism about mental disorders. The essay entails an explanation of the meaning of anti-realism and the two arguments that are raised by Graham on its behalf. This is then followed by discussion of the responses that try to reject these arguments. Anti-realism about mental disorders is the denial that mental disorders exist. Anti-realists do not believe in the existence of mental disorders and attribute psychological states of mind that are seen by realists as ‘mental disorders’ to brain disorders, which are physical in nature like somatic diseases. Anti-realists take two main approaches in defending their view; the first is referred to as metaphysical skepticism. The metaphysical skepticism argument points out that there are no mental disorders at all and that what is alleged to be mental disorders consist of brain disorders that neuroscience will progressively prove to be. The second approach is that moral skepticism which asserts that labeling agents as being mentally disordered has negative effects on them due to violation of their dignity. While the first approach appears to me to be sound in denying existence of mental disorders, moral skepticism comes through as being considerably sentimental as it approaches the subject in terms of moral values without attempting to explain it. Realism on the other hand is regarded as the affirmation that mental disorders do exist. According to realism with regard to mental disorders, they are real qua mental and cannot be treated merely as neurological illnesses. Their argument is that even though they result from a combination of mental and somatic causes, mental disorders are an entity on their own and those are just causative conditions. Graham presents two arguments for not accepting anti-realism about mental disorders. The first one addresses metaphysical skepticism; according to metaphysical skepticism, there is nothing like mental disorders, instead what are referred to as mental disorders are in fact brain disorders. Graham argues that this is wrong because it is based on physicalism, which is a flawed concept with regard to its explanation of mental disorders. Graham points out that the explanation by physicalism that the body and mind are similar because both of them consist of physical matter is wrong. I tend to agree with this assertion by Graham; it does not make sense that the mind consists of physical matter like the body and they can interact physically, the brain may be physical but the brain is not the mind. Graham’s second argument is also about physicalism, he indicates that even in the unlikely case that it would be true, it would still make sense to view mental disorders as being both mental and real at the same time. Accordingly, there is no dichotomy between mental and physical distinction of the mind thus by being physical the mind cannot thus be ruled out from being mental at the same time. Graham’s first argument is that dualism should be accepted over physicalism. Dualism is based on the affirmation of two distinct kinds of things in the world, physical stuff and mental stuff. As a result, dualists find it difficult to make the distinction between body and mind because the belief that they are two distinct entities makes it impossible to explain their interaction. However, Graham still makes the point that it is much more plausible to accept dualism in explanation of the realism of mental disorders than physicalism. In accepting dualism, Graham argues that physical science has it limits in explaining the mental state and this leads to an explanatory gap. This position can be understood to mean that no level of scientific explanation about the functioning of the brain can enable us understand thoughts and experiences of the mind. It acknowledges that although humans are physical beings and the brain is physical, we are not blank because we have a conscience. This conscience represents what dualism recognizes as the mind. Viewed from that perspective, Graham is arguing that dualism is right in recognizing that humans have both a physical presence that may be represented by the body and brain, and a mental presence which is represented by the conscience. In elaborating the explanatory gap, Graham further asserts that it is impossible to have a purely physical description of a mental state or experience as physicalism tries to assert, this is termed as the physically descriptive elusiveness of subjectivity. The assertion indicates that feelings cannot be explained physically or entirely attributed to physical phenomena. For example feelings such as smell and taste cannot be entirely explained physically, this may be exemplified by the fact that two different people cannot be able to taste the same food exactly the same although our physical constitution is basically the same. The Second argument by Graham is that viewed in a different perspective, physicalism is compatible with the mind and mental states. As has been pointed out before, Graham asserts that there is not dichotomous distinction between the physical/mental states. Both states can co-exist side by side at the same time. This is the main point of view that provides Graham with the window to make the second argument that accommodates physicalism even though he had rejected its propositions in the first place. Graham argues that there is metaphysical cohabitation between the physical and mental states. This argument asserts that there must be a mental explanation to phenomena which cannot be explained by physical principles. Thus, many features or events that the language of physics cannot be able to describe can on the other hand be explained though mental language. For example while it is possible to use physical principles in explaining the desire to leave the house and go for a walk, it is not possible to physically explain the reasons why a person would choose to do it at exactly a particular time, put on particular attire or use a certain route in going for the walk. All these events are attributable to the mind according to Graham and therefore this is can be considered metaphysical cohabitation. The second argument by Graham also considers the perspective of moral skepticism. This perspective can be understood on the basis of metaphysical cohabitation, this is the belief that the physical and mental human states cohabit side by side or rather the mind and brain work together. Moral skepticism, labeled by Graham as the respect for person’s argument, clearly considers both the physical and the mental state. Graham argues that labeling an individual as being mentally disordered has severe negative effects on that person and therefore violates the dignity of that person. He further points out that by labeling a person as being mentally disordered, that person is being treated as not being responsible for their own conduct in some areas of life. This clearly demonstrates that making claims on a person’s mental state, which is a purely mental exercise, is likely to have effects on the physical behavior of the person. The physical behavior is then manifested as lack of responsibility in the person’s ‘conduct’ in some areas of life. This is a process that can only explained on the basis of both mental and physical principles because otherwise it is not possible to physically explain why mental actions should lead to reactions that can be manifested physically. I think that the best way to reject Graham’s first argument that dualism should be accepted over physicalism is to point out that dualism is not a realistic explanation of the relationship between the mental state and the physical state. Dualism is based on the affirmation of two distinct kinds of things in the world, physical stuff and mental stuff. As a result, dualists find it difficult to make the distinction between body and mind because the belief that they are two distinct entities makes it impossible to explain their interaction. I believe that this is where the flaw of dualism lies because while it is recognized that both the mental state and the physical state exist, it cannot be said that the two states have no direct or indirect relationship. Graham’s argument that dualism can be adopted to explain realism is not very realistic because it is known that physical human actions are directed by their mental states. The physical body cannot be expected to act on its own accord without mental input and therefore dualism fails to support realism unless it can strive to make a connection between the two. In other words without a connection between the mental and the physical human states, human beings would not be much different from robots. Only that in this case the robots would have a mind but it would not be participating in any way in influencing the actions of the robot for reasons that cannot be explained. Graham also argues that the reason dualism is preferable over physicalism is that physical science has it limits in explaining the mental state which leads to an explanatory gap. The position is understood to mean that no level of scientific explanation about the functioning of the brain can enable us understand things concerning the mind like thoughts and experiences. There is acknowledgment that although humans are physical beings with a physical brain, they are not blank because they have a conscience. This line of argument can also be rejected by further examining the concept of the brain. It can be argued that although scientific explanation leaves a gap in explaining some human actions, this does not mean that they cannot be attributed to the functions of the brain. Similarly, this observation does not also mean that realists have succeeded in giving a convincing explanation of how the mind controls physical actions. My main point is that it is more realistic to reject both dualism and physicalism because the same weaknesses of physicalism that makes Graham reject it in favor of dualism can be identified in the latter. Dualism by combining mental/physical principles and failing to show the link between them also leaves an explanation gap in describing some human actions. Thus, it does not earn credibility over physicalism just by virtue of putting together the mental and the physical aspects without coherently relating them. I think that the best way to reject the second argument is that although it finally justifies physicalism by combining the physical and mental states as two ‘physical’ states with influence on each other, it fails to explain how. This leads again to an explanation gap which is important enough to reject Graham’s second argument. According to Graham, there is no dichotomous distinction between the physical/mental states. Both states can co-exist side by side at the same time and thus there is metaphysical cohabitation between the physical and mental states. This assertion is based on the observation that some physical phenomena must be explained mentally while some mental actions can be explained by physical principles. For example a person may scream because of pain after knocking their toe on an object, while the whole process consists of physical actions (Knocking the toe, pain, and screaming), Graham does not explain how the mental aspect is incorporated into the process leading up to the person screaming. So even though according to his argument the screaming may be explained by combination of both physical and mental aspects, he does not attempt to explain how. Similarly, the gap in a ‘how’ explanation becomes evident when attempting to describe how a person’s mental decision leads to a physical action. In the example given previously, apparently according to Graham, the combination between the mental and physical aspects makes a person to leave the house and go for a walk in a particular way. Even though it may be acknowledged that the combination is important for that decision and the ensuing actions, the physicalism perspective does not become credible in explaining it because it makes no attempt to tell us how. The basis for rejection of Graham’s second argument becomes much clearer when he incorporates the moral skepticism perspective. Moral skepticism, labeled by Graham as the respect for persons argument, clearly considers both the physical and the mental state. Graham argues that labeling an individual as being mentally disordered has severe negative effects on that person and therefore violates the dignity of that person. It is quite clear from this argument that Graham combines both physical and mental aspects in a disjointed manner without making any attempt to explain how they combine with each other. While labeling a person as being mentally disordered is a distinctly a physical action that results from mental comparisons, he does not explain exactly how the process takes place. On the other hand the labeling results to mental effects on the victim, which may then manifest as mental conditions like loss of dignity or poor attitude. While it can be acknowledged that this process is incorporates mental and physical principles, Graham’s argument should be rejected on the basis that it does not make the attempt to rationally explain how the two combine to produce the results they do. Read More