The Impact of Time Pressure on Pilot Decisions - Literature review Example

The Impact of Time Pressure on Pilot Decisions Student’s name Institution Introduction Following Chappell’s (2001) findings that of approximately 51% of pilot errors leading to accidents were related to errors in judgment in time pressure situations, studies on pilot judgment in time pressure situation have been on the rise in aviation psychology. However most of the studies conducted on pilot judgment and decision making in time pressure situations has in the main been reconstructive and retrieved from incident reports and accident analysis reports from the FAA and also from judgment based pilot training programs founded on intuition development. However scholars are in agreement with regard to what existing literature offers to the industry; faulty pilot decision making is a major factor in the incidence of fatal aviation accidents, empirical data offers valuable insights on how decision making under time pressure ought to be used in the development of program for evaluation and training. Even with such conclusions, scholars in aviation psychology are yet to come up with a theory based approach that takes into account the empirical aspects of information processing in the cockpit. This paper is a critical review of relevant literature as obtained from anecdotal evidence, theoretical experiments, and studies by observation intended to understand how the pilot reacts to time pressure in making judgments in the cockpit. Anecdotal Observations It is a fact of life that in each day a variety of decisions which are complex and critical are made often with inadequate information and under inadequate time leading to pressure. For instance an experienced doctor may not necessarily perform a systematic comparison of every symptom exhibited with the corresponding probability of it being related to a certain ailment but rather the medic may perform a pattern match comparing the exhibited symptoms and the characteristic that is attributed to a certain ailment (Ericsson & Charness, 2004). The characteristic is represented by stored archetype of the ailment which the practitioner has in the long term memory. In the same vein judgments by judicial officers such as sentencing or parole may be determined by long term memory attributes that are applied to a case with similar circumstances. While the inexperienced subject is more likely to exhaustively consider the consequences of all independent facts presented by a certain case so as to reach conclusions and decisions, the expert would make use of their wide knowledge which is normally organized in outlines or schema. Just like in the aforementioned medical example, (Wright, 2004) makes the description of the judicial officers decision as a pattern match of facts presented in a case and the repertoire of knowledge the judge has on the different types of stereotyped profiles. The evocation of a particular schema therefore acts as a guide upon which the person would make future judgments and also acquire new information. While schematic decision making may result in a hastening of the judgment process, it presents some disadvantages. For instance, the stereotyping of situations may result in self fulfilling prophecies and biases which impact the objectivity of the information gathering process. The consequences of reduced objectivity may result in the pilot making a decision that might jeopardize the plane’s safety due to depending on familiar yet unsuitable schema. Edwards (2004) suggested the development of a two stage process for pilot assessment of non routine happenings. According to anecdotal evidence obtained from FAA incident and accident reports, it is hypothesized that when the pilot encounters an event that is non-routine, they will make judgment after m making a diagnosis, and then follow this with an evaluation of the possible effects of the incident. One of the greatest controversies of the two stage theory is the assertion that incidents and accidents are not related to inaccurate diagnostics. It asserts that incidents and accidents are a result of inaccurate assessment of the possible effects of a given incident. Accidents are usually as a result of time pressures which result into either overassessment or underassessment of the gravity of the consequences of action. Time pressure on the pilot is presumed to result to a strong situational stressor for the pilot that may consequently lead to the making of sub optimal decisions and performance deterioration. An example from Payne et al., (2008) makes a good illustration of the aforementioned point. In this instance the pilot overassesd the effects of the failure of a night time alternator resulting to the decision to opt for a dangerous landing in a dimly lit airfield resulting in a fatal accident when he should have landed at another airport a few minutes further ahead. Underassessment may also make a pilot incapable of making appropriate or timely interventions. Instances of underassessment which are all too common include ignoring icing on the wing. In most instances the accuracy of assessments of the impact of an action is colored by a repertoire of experiences which offer scripts that show the likely sequence of events to be expected. The experience of each individual will determine how the individual perceives the script’s effect evaluation. The two stage theory is satisfactory on the intuitive perspective though it lacks any empirical backing. It is important to make an analysis in an empirical and structured manner; how a pilot makes a diagnosis of a situation, and how he makes the determination of the best viable option for a given circumstance. Observational Research Telfer (2007) asserts that defective decision making is inevitable if the relevant options are not explored fully and the most viable option selected for maximum utility. Theoretically this would be an ideal situation but in the real world such a situation is not possible given severe time pressures. As compared to normative decision making decision making models which are meant to maximize the quality of decisions, Chappell offers a Recognition-Primed Decision Model in order to understand decision making under circumstances of time pressure (2001). He asserts that RDPD belongs to the opposite end of the spectrum as compared to multi attribute analysis strategies since Recognition Primed Decision Models are non-optimizing, do not call for conscious deliberation and do not make comparisons between a range of alternatives. The research by Wright offers insights into the critical decision making processes in the cockpit. Ericsson & Charness (2004) make an analysis of the stratagems that proficient decision makers such as speed chess tournament players, fireground command and military commanders make use of during time pressure situations. On this basis Wright (2004) makes the argument that recognitional strategies are dominant in decision making operational paradigms as opposed to analytical strategies. Recognitional strategies are normally known by their attribute of recognition of particular cues that make the decision maker draw from a repertoire of experiences from long term memory. Analytical strategies on the other hand integrate information from the working memory through making of inferences in making predictions of the likely outcomes of a situation. This will include the real time generation of possible range of alternate solutions that will offer the most utility. Studies have shown that in urgent situations, recognitional strategies are made use of by proficient decision makers. Edwards (2004) found that pilots were not as interested in an exhaustive review of what could happen but rather in finding what is cost effective, workable and timely. Edwards approximated that 75% of the complex non routine and high risk decisions were accomplished in less than a minute while many were accomplished in only seconds. In very few instances did pilots take two options into consideration and opt for the one offering the greater utility. The pilots would rely on their ability to recognize aspects similar to previous repertoire which would then guide them in the present situation. Through the use of imagery, the pilots would play the scripts looking for a workable solution which is eventually implemented. If the pilots were to come up with a range of alternatives and make a systematic determination of viability, the plane could have gone into an uncontrollable situation. Payne et al., (2008) asserted that veteran pilots tend to make higher quality decisions in a shorter time as opposed to novice pilots due to a larger repertoire of experiences to draw from. Telfer (2007) compared novice and master chess players that were playing under no time stress and under time stress games. The quality of the moves made by the players was rated by the grandmaster. The study found that the moves of the master players were to a great extent better than those of the novices and were also of the same quality during time pressure situations. Novices on the other hand portrayed a drastic reduction in the quality of their moves when subjected to time pressure of the timed games. Telfer (2007) concluded that the expert players were relying on the recognitional decision making capacities which are lesser affected under time pressure as compared to the analytical strategies relied upon by the rookies. Chappell’s work would suggest that the decision making processes of novices and experts vary (2001). According to normative theory, the proficient pilots would make use of utility based strategies in an examination of a range of options and then opt for the one offering the most utility. Based on the cues a situation provides, expert pilots will immediately recognize the appropriate action to be undertaken by drawing from a repertoire of past experiences regardless of time pressure. Novices will depend on the training received since they lack the past experience and hence will have to integrate cues in a determination of what action to take which will result in decreased quality of decisions in time pressure situations. Experimental Research Definition of Expertise The University of Illinois Aviation Research Laboratory adopted an empirical approach in the study of aviation psychology aspect of pilot behavior under time pressure. The term expert was adopted in describing pilots with high time experience while low time experience pilots are referred to as novices. It however asserted that the term expertise is a concept which cannot be straitjacketed into total time dimensions. Ericsson & Charness’s criterion for expertise was based on a standard of 600 which enables the division into two equal sample groups. The use of a criterion which is purely quantitative will not be objective as it does not take into account the quality of flight experience (2004). For instance a pilot may have flown 200 flight hours yet has an Airline Transport Pilot certificate. Another may have flown 5000 hours total time yet has a private pilot license. As such the quality of the two pilots will vary according to the different experiences as well as the time flown and hence all these aspects ought to be taken into account. According to Ericsson & Charness (2004) experts are defined as high time pilots having flown 1000 hours coupled with significant quality of experience. On the other hand, novices are low time pilots who have flown less than 500 hours. Experimental Research Wright (2004) made a comparison of 38 instrument rated pilots who were classified in two groups according to flight hours. By making use of the pencil and paper tests, they made an analysis of the putative information processing aspects involved in the making of decisions. Wright, (2004) automated the tests into a format commonly referred to as SPARTANS (Simple Portable Aviation-Relevant Test-battery and Answer-scoring System). Edwards (2004) conducted a study intended to assess non domain specific pilot capacities using contextual areas of the general decision making processes. The subjects were analyzed by being made to fly Instrument Flight Rules on Microcomputer-based Inflight Decision Simulators. On the basis of performance the study observed no discernible differences between the experts and the novices. Working memory capacity, declarative knowledge and spatial abilities were moderately predictive of decision making in the rookie pilots but were not good predictors of high time pilot decision making. The results seem to support the perspective that low and high time pilots may use alternative cognitive strategies. The experienced pilots do not have to rely as much on working memory as much as the novices do. The retrieval of scripts from the long term memory is deemed to be relatively easier for the experts as they have a significant range of repertoire to draw from as compared to the novices. For instance a communications problem for a plane after clearance for landing will offer deep insights on the reactions from the pilots. A high time pilot will be quick to find a solution to the problem by drawing from a similar experience. A low time pilot on the other hand will not have a repertoire of experiences to draw from and hence will spend a lot of time evaluating the options of whether to approach or try to solve the communications issue. The novice will spend a lot of time on trying to retrieve the regulations and training he has received rather than drawing from experience and hence decision making will be less effective. A possible explanation for the failure to find a difference in decision performance between low-time and high-time pilot performance is that subjects were asked to choose their decisions from up to six multiple choice alternatives presented to them on screen. Essentially, this design prompted the novices by providing "off the peg" hypotheses. By concentrating only on the output end of decision making, nothing was learned about differences in cue recognition or hypothesis generation. These deficiencies may account for the lack of differences between high-time and low-time groups. Decision Making Under Stress Payne et al., (2008) conducted a study between experts and novices using instrumentation to analyze the use of alternative cognitive strategies employed in time pressure and time pressure free situations. The study established that the two groups of pilots’ performance when under time pressure was approximately the same and on the same cognition capacities for the domain independent measures of information processing. Conversely it was established that the novices portrayed performance quality reductions in the domain specific tasks when under time pressure. The novices had decreased performance quality when they had to pay attention to moving display indicators. As trait anxiety demonstrated equivalent mean scores for both sets of groups, it has to be concluded that the differences in quality of performance on operational proficiency under time pressure is not related to personality variables but rather to an inbuilt resistance to pressure that experts possess. This supports the theory that the performance of novice pilots as compared to experts is dependent to a greater extent on cognitive operations on working memory which tends to depreciate under pressure. The experts have lesser problems in dealing with time pressure since they can draw from the long term memory range of repertoire in diagnosing and reacting to situations. This enables the experts to make actions without resorting to analytical processes in the working memory which are liable to pressures. References Chappell, S.L. (2001). Training and cockpit design to promote expert performance. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, Department of Aviation. Edwards, W. (2004). The theory of decision-making. Psychological Bulletin, 51 (4), 380-417. Ericsson, K.A. & Charness, N. (2004). Expert performance: Its structure and acquisition. American Psychologist 49 (8), 725-747. Payne, J.W., Bettman, J.R. & Johnston, E.J. (2008). Adaptive strategy selection in decision making. Journal of experimental psychology: Learning, memory and cognition 14 (3), 534-552. Telfer, R. (2007). Pilot judgement training: The Australian study. Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, Department of Aviation. Wright, P.L. (2004). The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the use of evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 59 (3), 555-561. Read More