Crisis in Ukraine, a New US and Russia Cold War - Research Paper Example

Crisis in Ukraine: A New US-Russia Cold War? al Affiliation Crisis in Ukraine: A New US-Russia Cold War? ‘Ukraine Crisis’ is currently at the core of the major global politics and international relations, threatening the global stability and peace. As the aggressive nationalist and mainly pro-EU (European Union) movement intensified in the capital city, Kiev, the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych collapsed overnight on 22nd February, 2014 and it was replaced by the Ukrainian Pro-EU nationalist government (Nelson, 2014). It led to the Russian military intervention in the Crimean Peninsula and the annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, the annexation of Crimea triggered separation movements in Donetsk and Luhansk, beginning the ongoing war between the pro-Russian radical militia and the Ukrainian army in the Eastern Ukraine (Nelson, 2014). The Ukrainian crisis opened a gate for blame game between the Western powers, particularly, the United States and Russia as both the powers began to accuse one another for the crisis. The US and its European allies condemned Russia’s Crimean annexation and imposed numerous political and economic sanctions on Russia. On the other hand, Russia blamed the west for promoting fascism and imperialism and it continued to provide military and financial aid to pro-Russian rebels in the Eastern Ukraine (Nelson, 2014). In the absolutely unpredictable chain of episodes, domestic clashes between Ukraine’s new pro-western regime and pro-Russian separatists coiled into an intense conflict that provokes a new era of global rivalry between Russia and the West. But, majority of political experts and researches argue that current clashes between Russia and the US can be traced long back in NATO’s policies of expanding in the Eastern Europe, 2008 Georgia war, and Putin’s policies of reestablishing Russian dominance among the post-Soviet countries (Budjeryn, 2015). In other words, it is asserted that the Ukraine crisis simply provide an excuse to the great powers, the US and Russia, to openly defy each other and Ukraine has become a mere victim of great powers’ rivalry (Budjeryn, 2015). The thesis is supported by means of state level theory on international relations and foreign policies. The Ukrainian crisis, which erupted in the late 2013, has practically ended the cooperative phase of Russian-Western relationships that gradually developed with the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s. With the growing confrontation and increased rivalry between the United States and Russia, both the former Cold War opponents are standing on the verge of new era of the Cold War II (Trenin, 2014, p. 3-4). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relations between the US and Russia in context of the Ukrainian crisis. The paper analyzes root causes of the crisis and policies of both the groups. Also, the critical evaluation in the paper investigates provocative culprit group on the basis of available research findings, available data and facts. The thesis of the paper is further strengthened by means of system level theories. Furthermore, the paper highlights the likely outcome of the conflict and potential remedies to it. Background History of the Ukrainian Crisis The autumn of 2013 marked the beginning of a serious political crisis in Ukraine. The ex-president of the country, Victor Yanukovych, had to deal with growing problems in the economics which was on the verge of collapse. He faced a difficult dilemma while deciding the future of the state. Basically, the ex-president had two options: to choose an enduring and at first problematic arrangement with the European Union in order to encourage integration and trade, or to accept a $15 billion credit from the Russian Federation and associate with the Eurasian Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (Woehrel, 2014, p. 1-2). After a long and careful consideration of both variants, V. Yanukovych eventually preferred a deal which was more profitable for him with Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, with whom he had rather friendly relations. This choice was crucial for the whole country since it led to far-reaching consequences. It sparked off strong public protests that were concentrated on the Maidan, Independence Square in Kiev (Woehrel, 2014, p. 1-3). The government was not satisfied with such an unexpected development of the events and made a serious attempt to forcefully clear the protesters away from the Square. Such actions to suppress the demonstration provoked radical prevalent movements against the acting government. The protesters’ struggle against the regime lasted for about 4 months and involved thousands of people throughout the country. When the conflict between the protesters and the forces of government worsened and became really fierce, the demonstrators got a new aim which was to overthrow the Yanukovych ruling and form a pro-European government which would be free of corruption. Nearly 600 people were killed or got severe injuries being beaten by the special armed police called Berkut. At the same time, Yanukovych ran away from the country and the parliament was dissolved. Such political parties as Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda created a coalition and established a new government. The elections were planned to be held on 25 May, 2014 (Woehrel, 2014, p. 1-4). Meanwhile, Russian-ethnic residents of the Crimea who did not support the protests in the Maidan became completely estranged from the country. They considered themselves to be a part of Russia and saw a serious threat for their culture and language in the rise of nationalism in Kiev, the newly-established government which was rather pro-western, and an increasing political power of Tatars (Yuhas, 2014). That is why they requested assistance and social protection from the Russian president. Vladimir Putin, in return, commanded the military forces of the Russian Federation to gather close to the Russia-Ukraine border and the naval base on the peninsula. At the same time, the major official buildings and Crimean airports were captured by militaries in the uniform without any identification marks. The Ukrainian government claimed those unrecognized armed forces to belong to the Russian Federation. The latter denied the involvement of Russian troops in the conflicts in the Crimea (Yuhas, 2014). On 16 March, 2014, the Russian authorities held a referendum on the peninsula which later Ukraine, the USA and the European countries considered to be illegal. According to the results of this referendum, most of the citizens of the Autonomous Republic (i.e. nearly 96%) decided to become a part of the Russian Federation. Afterwards, Russian president signed an agreement for official joining of the Crimea to the country (Yuhas, 2014). Russian or American Provocation? The western powers and Russia have consistently blamed each other for provoking the crisis in Ukraine. However, while analyzing the crisis from the unbiased perspective, one could trace the provocative culprit in the root causes of the crisis. The roots of the Ukrainian crisis can be traced in the long term competition between Russia and the EU (European Union) for the geopolitical and economic integration of Ukraine and other Eastern European states in their own institutions. In the early 1990s, during the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders were against the NATO’s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) further expansion in the Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 2-4). But, the Clinton administration aggressively stressed on the growth of NATO further in the east. Under the policy of expansion, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999 and Slovakia, Latvia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Estonia were associated with the NATO in 2004. Putin administration strongly condemned such western policy from the very beginning. However, Russia was too weak during that period to prevent the NATO’s growth in the Eastern regions of Europe. In 2008, NATO offered membership to Ukraine and Georgia, which didn’t go well with Russian Federation as the Putin administration considered it as a direct threat to Russian dominance in the Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 2-4). In 2008, Russia’s military intervention in Georgia under the justification of R2P (responsibility to protect) policy was seen as Putin’s strong intentions to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining the NATO (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 3-5). Russia and the EU made different judgments from the Russia’s military intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 and the global financial crisis in the same year. The EU launched the Eastern Partnership program to associate Ukraine, and other former Soviet states namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, and Moldova politically and economically with the EU and intentionally ignored clear warnings of Russia. The primary motto of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program was considered as an attempt to establish a “comfort zone” to the eastern borders of the EU and increase Western interaction of these countries (Trenin, 2014, p. 4-9). Not surprisingly, Russia considered it as a threat to its sphere of influence and danger of spreading western ideologies further in Russia, diminishing the Putin’s Russian imperialism ideology in the country. In response to growing western interference in Eastern Europe politics, Moscow energized its Custom Union project to bound former Soviet states under Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union that would give Russian Federation undoubting economic and political advantages (Trenin, 2014, p. 4-7). In a way, Putin’s Crimean annexation can be easily comprehended as a Russian response to western policies towards Eastern Europe and eliminate any possibility of the western advancement in the Russia’s sphere of influence. The Aftermath of the Crisis: A New Era of the Cold War II The Crimean Crisis of 2014 has significantly affected the political, social, and economic stability in Ukraine. Also, due to severe economic and political sanction of the western powers, Russia’s economic growth has drastically declined. According to many experts, the Crimean Crisis could lead to the Cold War II. Russia and the United States are stuck in their mutual mistrust and blame game with both states desperately attempting to nullify each other (Koshkin, 2014). Through the military intervention in Crimea, the Russian government has openly challenged the basic principles of the European order. Therefore, the US and the EU quickly responded with the weapon of financial and political sanctions on Russia. Since the early 2014, the western powers have constantly elevated sanctions against Russian federation, targeting its crucial industries, businesses, and energy, economic, and military sectors (Dworkin et al., 2014). The financial sanctions have significantly damaged economic and social stability in Russia. The prices of wheat and other basic food products have rapidly increased by 60 to 72 %. Russian currency, ruble, is currently trading around 65.10 to the US dollar, which is record low compared to its 82.30 against the US dollar in the early 2015 (Boghani, 2015). Due to rapidly dropping exchange rates, consumer panic is to its high in the country. Moreover, the oil politics of the US and its close ally Saudi Arabia that is not to lower the oil production regardless of excessive global oil supply and comparably low global oil demand has caused the global oil prices to drop to the 11-year low of $45 per barrel from $119 per barrel in June 2014. The logic is obvious. Russia’s more than 70% of exports come from the petroleum sector. With the constantly dropping oil prices, the Russian economy, which is highly relied on the oil and natural gas revenues, has come under immense pressure (Boghani, 2015). In response to the financial and political sanctions of the western powers, Russian government has used its energy weapon against the EU. Ukraine and majority of European states are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. In 2012-13, Ukraine imported about 51 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia on a delivery contract of 2009-11, which was too biased to Ukraine due to dramatically high costs. But, in the late 2013, Putin administration proposed cost reduction in return for the extension of lease for Crimean naval base and declination of EU’s membership offer. However, after the political turnovers in Ukraine, Russia changed its stance and started to demand for settling the debt of $2.1 billion and higher price ($415 instead $275 per thousand cubic meters) for the natural gas (Westphal, 2014, p. 2-4). The EU is heavily relied on Russia for natural gas supplies too as around 56% of its total gas imports come from Russia. The majority of transport pipelines for Russian natural gas to European countries go via Ukraine. With ongoing disputes between Ukraine-Russia and increasing political and economic pressures from the West, Russian government has responded with serious threats of cutting the gas supplies to Europe (Westphal, 2014, p. 2-3). Even though the EU countries are seeking alternative to Russian natural gas, it is practically impossible to become a reality at least in the next few years. Therefore, in the clashes between Russia and the West over the Ukrainian crisis, Europe is highly vulnerable to potential 3rd energy crisis in a same decade (Westphal, 2014, p. 2-5). In a way, the western powers, especially the US, and Russia are trying every possible means to overpower each other, triggering the beginning of the Cold War II. System Level Theories Political experts and scholars in global politics emphasize various levels of analysis through which the Ukrainian crisis and behaviors of states can be inspected. Primarily, the combination of system level theory, individual level theory, and classical realism can be applied to analyze the crisis. State level theory on global politics examines state behavior in context of the global political system. According to the theory, global political system is the cause and its consequence is the state behavior (Newmann, n.d.). In contrary, individual level theory concentrates on individuals. According to this theory, individual or group of individuals make decisions that influence the course of state behavior and associated effects on global politics (Newmann, n.d.). Classical realism is a type of state level theory that emphasizes that all nations involved in global politics chase power. In quest of power, states do everything possible to enhance their power and at the same time, they attempt to lower the power of their enemies. Consequently, their actions in the game of power influence the overall international relations, global security, and foreign policies of states (Newmann, n.d.). The United States and Russia have a long history of rivalry. Even since the end of the Cold War in 1989, both the states have regularly tried to nullify each other through various policies and actions. For instance, as the global power status gradually began to shift from uni-polar system to multi-polar system with the emergence of a number of developing economies such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, global dominance of the US has been threatened (Trenin, 2014, p. 13-14). Most of these countries avoided direct standoff with the US, but majority of them also seek to balance the global power structure by moving away from the Western powers. Especially, number of G20 countries, including Pakistan, Middle-Eastern states, and Latin American nations are readily willing to hold their hope on someone with the capability and courage to meet the power of the US and here, Russia comes to play a crucial role (Trenin, 2014, p. 13-15). The glimpse of hidden confrontation between the US and Russia became more visible in recent years. Especially, Putin’s move to support Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime during the Syrian civil war in 2012 caused a great stir in the Western camp as the US and the NATO were supporting anti-government groups to overthrow the Assad’s ruling in Syria. In order to keep the Syrian arms market and protect own economic interests, Putin opted to support the Assad regime and directly challenged the NATO’s policies in the Syrian civil war which certainly didn’t go well with the US (Trenin, 2014, p. 14-15). The rivalry between the US and Russia became more intense with the confrontation between Russia and the West over the NATO’ Eastern Partnership program. The Western expansion in the Eastern Europe was considered as direct threat to Russia’s dominance in the region. Besides, Ukraine’s crucial geographical position plays a vital role in global geopolitics. For instance, Ukraine is a major hub of Russia’s energy trade with the EU as almost 82% of the Russia’s natural gas’s pipelines to the Western countries go from Ukraine (McMahon, 2014). Also, Ukraine itself is a long-term market for Russia’s natural gas. Besides, Ukraine acts as a buffer state for Russia, providing safe gap for Russia from its Western rivals (McMahon, 2014). Moreover, Crimea’s location is essential for Russia in terms of global trade and security. Crimean Peninsula provides Russia direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. Pro-western ruling in Ukraine and its possible NATO and EU membership would have brought the Western powers within a striking distance to Moscow (Walker & Berkeley, 2015). Crimean annexation allows Russia to have a direct access to its naval base in Sevastopol and doesn’t need to depend on Ukraine for its access. Prior to the crisis, the naval base in Sevastopol was leased to Russia till the end of 2042; however, ongoing political turmoil in Ukraine made Russia more insecure about the future access to the base. The Crimean annexation has significantly enhanced the strategic defense power of Russia and has allowed it to regain its control over the Eastern European regions (BBC Monitoring, 2014). In short, geopolitics and long-term rivalry between the US and Russia, which are supported on the basis of classic realism and system level theory, triggered the crisis. Besides classical realism and system level theory, the Crimean crisis can be analyzed with the help of individual level theory. While examining the global politics responsible for the crisis, a series of domestic political turmoil, a long term cultural, political, religious, and historical links between Russia and Crimea, and contested identity issues in the Ukrainian society can’t be ignored. Crimea was the Russian state until the mid-1950s, when it was given to Ukraine under the regime of Nikita Khrushchev (BBC Monitoring, 2014). According to the 2001 census, ethnic Russian constitute over 62% of the total Crimean population and almost 95% of its population speaks Russian (Smith & Harari, 2014, p. 9-10).Therefore, Crimea has always inclined towards Russia rather than Ukraine which is proved from the regular efforts of the local Crimean political entities to preserve unique autonomous status of Crimea and enhance relations with Russia through a number of actions that are accused to be unconstitutional by the Ukrainian central government. Basically, Ukrainians are deeply divided over ongoing national politics, and historical and linguistic backgrounds. According to the reports of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission and an International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Ukraine is culturally and politically divided between Eastern and Western regions based on the historic and linguistic backgrounds. The country’s Western parts, where over 92% people speak Ukrainian, tend to support pro-EU and Western ideologies and consequently, emphasize (over 75% population) on joining the EU. In contrast, Southern and Eastern regions, where over 76% population’s native language is Russian and are more keen (almost 66% population) to associate with the Eurasian Customs Union and strengthen relations with Russia (Smith & Harari, 2014, p. 9-12). For Western Ukrainians, there is a clear boundary between Ukrainians and Russian, but, most of the Crimean population classifies Russians as “we”, showing strong bonds between Russia and Crimea (Olesker, 2014, p. 10-13). A majority of Crimean Russians are migrated from Russia and are highly loyal to the Moscow Patriarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church (Olesker, 2014, p. 11-14). In such circumstances, the new pro-western government’s decision of enforcing Ukrainian language as the only official language all over the country contradicts with the extreme political, cultural, and pro-Russian ideologies of Crimean and most of the Eastern Ukrainian population. The extreme nationalism of pro-EU political leaders in Ukraine provoked the notion of high insecurity and isolation from the country among the ethnic Russians in Crimea. In other words, the specific actions of certain political leaders triggered domestic turmoil and allowed Russia to capture Crimean under the justification of “R2P” policy, i.e., responsibility to protect Russian ethnic groups all over the world (Olesker, 2014, p. 9-16). The Impact of the Crisis on Ukraine and Current Roles of the US-Russia in the Crisis The Crimean crisis caused significant social, political, and economic collapse in Ukraine. Soon after the crisis, the “People’s Republic of Luhansk” and the “People’s Republic of Donetsk”, the self-proclaimed regimes in the eastern Ukrainian states namely, Luhansk and Donetsk declared themselves independent from Ukraine in May 2014, beginning violent clashes between the Ukrainian army and the separatists. The ongoing armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine has cost the damage over $650 million till today (Shemetov, 2014). The US has constantly blamed Russia for supporting the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. As the Ukrainian crisis further escalated in its Eastern regions, regular reinforcements of armed supplies and men have been sent across the Russian-Ukrainian border. On 17 July, 2014, the bulk anti-aircraft missile that shot down Malaysian Airlines’ commercial flight MH 17, killing all 298 on board passengers, was proved to be one of the Russian-supplied weapons, strengthening the claim of Russian military support to rebel groups in the Eastern Ukraine (Wilson, 2014, p. 262). Since then the Western camp and Ukrainian government have openly accused Russia for abusing a humanitarian aid and secretly helping the separatists (Wilson, 2014, p. 260-263). Despite continuous accusation from the opposite side, Russia has strongly denied any involvement in the Eastern Ukrainian conflict; instead Putin has blamed the West for provoking the civil war in Ukraine. As both the groups are aggressively blaming each other and involved in spreading propaganda against each other, the United Nations argued to give a priority to counter against propaganda, hatred speeches, and rumors (Carter et al., 2014). In response, the US has increased its budget for anti-propaganda programs and decided to spend over $24 million on Russian language programs in 2015 which is remarkably 100% higher than that in 2013. Furthermore, the US and its western allies have spent over $120 million on security aid to Ukraine till now and are considering increasing it further more in the nearest future (RT Group, 2015). In brief, in context of the Ukrainian crisis, the relations between the US and Russia have hit the low since the end of the Cold War. By supporting opposite groups in the crisis, both the powers are trying to nullify each other and protect own interests. Critical Evaluation and Potential Solutions Ukraine is strategically vital state for Russia as it acts as a buffer state for the massive territory of Russia. Logically, Russian government couldn’t afford its long-term rivals, i.e., the Western powers, enter Ukraine. Even though the US opposed Russia’s policies towards Crimea, it is necessary to comprehend logic behind it. According to the classical realism theory and the principles of geopolitics, great powers are always concern with potential security threats surrounding their boundaries. After all, the United States itself won’t tolerate if some other great powers such as, China or Russia, deploy their military bases anywhere near its borders. Similarly, the growing expansion of the NATO and the EU in the Eastern Europe has been considered as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty and its sphere of influence (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 3-7). Besides, Ukraine has strong cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious ties with Russian Federation rather the West. Its majority of population in the Eastern states and Crimea closely associates itself with Russian culture. Also, Ukraine is heavily relied on Russia for energy supplies and financial stability as its most of the industries, trades, and businesses are directly depended on Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 3-8). When the pro-EU Ukrainian government intentionally ignored these basic facts and imposed extreme nationalism, it wasn’t surprising that Russian ethnic groups in Ukraine felt insecure and allowed Russia to conduct military intervention in Crimea under the justification of R2P (responsibility to protect) policy. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea is officially Ukrainian state with historical connections with Russia. A majority of Crimean population speaks Russian and holds close ties with Russia. Many political leaders and experts emphasize for the excessive sanctions on Russia in order to deter its aggressive policies towards Crimea and overall Ukrainian crisis. However, excessive economic sanction or application of force may further worsen the crisis. In case of the Ukrainian crisis, the Canadian proposal seems to be more suitable and appropriate. Legally and officially, Quebec is only a state similar to other states in Canada. However, in actual, it has gained special status. Similar is the case of Catalonia in Spain and Scotland in the UK (Gwyn, 2014). In Crimea, similar kind of decentralization would be needed. Also, by providing more legislative powers to the Crimean autonomous government, legal and political rights and interests of Crimean citizens, particularly ethnic Russians, could be protected. Overall, rather than pushing the world towards great instability and letting the relations between the US and Russia hit further low, it is necessary for the global powers and affected governments to find diplomatic solutions to the crisis with collective efforts and initiatives. Conclusion The Crimean crisis has significantly affected the global peace and security. The crisis has led to drastic social, financial, and political turmoil in Ukraine. Besides, the crisis has brought 2 old rivals, i.e. the US and Russia, on the verge of the Cold War II. The crisis has been effectively analyzed with the help of classical realism, system level and individual level theories on global politics and international relations. It is important for the global leaders to come up with diplomatic solutions like, increased political powers to Crimean government and elevated autonomous status to the region and solve the disputes without any forceful means or violence. With the help of collective efforts of the Russian and Ukrainian governments, international organizations, and the western powers, it is possible to hit the golden mean that would satisfy both the parties and encourage peace and stability in the region. References BBC Monitoring. (2014). Crimea profile. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/-world-europe-18287223 Boghani, P. (2015). 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