Finlandization: Against Ukrainian Sovereignty - Report Example

In the context of contemporary events, the question of Ukrainian in general and Crimean in particular sovereignty is one among the most crucial in international relations. In fact, conflict with Russia questions current sustainability of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the circumstances when it is a brand-new country appeared after the Soviet Union collapse. In this situation, the probability of ‘Finlandization’ as exchanging sovereignty for independence in favor to the more powerful neighbor is at its highest level since Ukraine has achieved its independence. Currently, Western opinion makers do not have unite opinion on this subject; thus, there appear both arguments in support and opposing the ability of Ukraine in general and Crimea in particular to keep there sovereignty. In this essay, it is evident that Crimea is incapable to sustain its sovereignty and cannot survive in an independent manner; on the contrary, Ukraine as a country that had been fighting for its sovereignty for years proves that ‘Finlandization’ is not its future. On the one hand, the situation in Crimea reminds the fact of Finland’s western Karelia region victim to Soviet Union for its own ‘Finlandization’ (Garry). Nevertheless, the internal situation in Crimea does not fit the very idea of ‘Finlandization’ in the way West understands it. In this context, the term ‘Finlandization’ as the act of sovereignty limitation in order to save independence (Kirchick) does not refer to Crimea since this area never was independent. In particular, throughout its history this region was under influence of different states, from Ottoman Empire to Russian Empire, and from Soviet Union to Ukraine (Associated Press and Reuters). Although, under Russian rule this region was dependent to the highest extent, since it had its own Khanate in Ottoman times and autonomy status in independent Ukraine (Associated Press and Reuters). Consequently, current falling under Russian rule has nothing to do with both sovereignty and independence. In addition, previous Crimean governments had been pushing this region to instability and further relying on foreign actors. As an illustration for this thesis, Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurance appeared in 1994 after certain actions from Crimean government ir order to guarantee not only Crimean but also overall Ukrainian independence and sovereignty; in fact, Russia, USA, UK, China and France signed it (Mackay). Thus, the question of sovereignty and independence is not relevant in the given case, since Crimea never had independence to sacrifice its sovereignty for. Furthermore, the act of transferring Crimea back to Russia complicates the very possibility of ‘Finlandization’ for both this region and Ukraine. In this context, appearance of armed people in this region increases the level of suspicion to Russia in international environment and makes it impossible to predict its behavior in the near future (Mackay). Moreover, Ukraine had itself comprehended in the context of recent events the manipulation with its non-sovereign territories that in fact had easily believed in Russian propaganda. In particular, Russian military base in Sevastopol was a “city of special status” in independent Ukraine and the starting point for Crimea annexation (Mackay). In the context of this violent annexation, the case of Crimean non-sovereignty is similar rather to sadly known poor Dagestan situation than to internal conditions of prosperous international Hong Kong. In particular, they are similar in geography, agricultural economy, lack of drinking water, dependence on subsidies, and claims of Muslim community (Goble). Consequently, it is reasonable to state that it is impossible to build independence in the case when non-sovereign region is incapable to sustain its own economy by itself. In this context, current lack of independent experts in both Crimea and Dagestan (Goble) illustrates that with falling under the influence of Putin’s Russia it is impossible to maintain neither sovereignty nor independence nor matter what is written in international official papers. On another hand, it is irrelevant to create the precedent of ‘Finlandization’ in Ukraine due to its current internal situation and its political preferences for future. In general, it is common to believe that the strategic geopolitical position of Ukraine (right between West and Russia) enables an application of ‘Finlandization’ in order to guarantee its neutrality and non-conflict orientation in the future. Nevertheless, Lagon and Moreland warn that Putin is ignorant to domestic priorities in Ukraine; consequently, the model will never work in the same manner as it used to operate in Finland. In particular, the fact of shared history, language, and customs brings doubt in possible neutrality of Ukraine under Russian influence (Lagon and Moreland). Moreover, this country is too weak and poor comparing to Finland; thus, it does not have enough resources to be strong enough and guarantee internal develop in the circumstances of ‘Finlandization’ (Gaddy). In other words, Ukraine is incapable to play the role as “prosperous, free, and democratic country with a market economy and elected parliament, all the while maintaining good relations with both the Moscow and the West” (Kirchick). In the given circumstances, Russia had started its invasion right after Ukrainian people had openly articulated their willingness to achieve above-mentioned freedoms and prosperity. In this context, question of Ukrainian threat to authoritarian Putin regime is crucial (Lagon and Moreland); in fact, it simply will not allow it to develop when Russian people suffer by themselves. Finally, post-revolutionary Ukraine does not deserve ‘Finlandization’, as ordinary people in this country had been fighting for European ideals of democracy and personal prosperity less than one year ago. In fact, the Western reaction should not be as flexible as it is now. In this context, the similar movements Russia had already demonstrated in Georgia, when U.S. administration was preoccupied with Afghanistan and Iran (Asmus). In fact, case of Georgia is illustrative in the circumstances of hidden war between Russia and Ukraine currently. In this case, The Economist believes that current crisis took its beginning in a five-day open conflict between Russia and Georgia, as in those times precedent of South Ossetia and Abkhazia annexation had emerged (“Dreams Deferred”). In other words, Putin already has a successful scenario of getting what he wants in an aggressive manner. On the contrary, Western strategy on both Ukraine and Georgia reveals its failure. As for Ukrainian domestic situation, even with the victory of Yanukovych on presidential elections it had already proved its European choice during Orange revolution (Asmus). Thus, it is time for the West to respond or not respond (Lagon and Moreland). To put it in Asmus’s words, “it is time for the West to openly debate what its strategy is – and what is not.” Hence, it is relevant to state that the stakes are higher than it may seem, since researchers take Ukraine as a battlefield for Western values. In order to sum up, the essay discussed two cases of non-sovereign territories (Crimea and Dagestan) and two examples of sovereign countries (Ukraine and Georgia) in the context of possible ‘Finlandization’ in contemporary times. In fact, it is evident that this process worked only in the case of Finland, since it had enough political will and resources to maintain the independence it took in exchange to its sovereignty. In particular, Crimea and Dagestan proved that non-sovereign subsidized region is incapable to maintain its independence even if it achieves the chance to get it. As for Ukraine and Georgia, the main reason of inability of ‘Finlandization’ for them is not only their economic distresses but also their clear appeal to EU that they want to join Western cultural environment and break with their Soviet past. Hence, it is evident that both sovereign and non-sovereign territories cannot take ‘Finladization’ as the best option for them, even though they have different internal situations. Works Cited: Asmus, R. “Finlandization of Georgia and Ukraine” The Moscow Times. 3 Mar. 2010. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. Associated Press and Reuters. “Everything you need to know about Crimea.” Haaretz. 11 March 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. “Dreams Deferred: Georgia is frittering away the gains of liberal reforms.” The Economist. 6 Dec. 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. Garry, C. “Finlandization for Ukraine: Realistic or Utopian?” Brookings. 6 March 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. Goble, P. “Crimea More Likely to Become ‘Second Dagestan’ Rather Than ‘Second Tatarstan,’ Expects Say.” The Interpreter. 5 May 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. Kirchick, J. “Finlandization Is Not a Solution for Ukraine” The American Interest. 27 July 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. Lagon, M. and Moreland, W. “’Finlandization’ Abandons Ukraine.” Foreign Policy. 3 Nov. 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2014. Mackay, G. “Ukraine, Russia and the Crimea: A History.” International Business Times. 2 Apr. 2014. Web. 30 Jan. 2014. Read More