AU Policy on Boko Haram - Essay Example

AU Policy on Boko Haram Introduction In response to the Boko Haram’s more violent and active approach to achieving its political and religious objectives and undertaking frequent civilian attacks, the AU summit in Addis Ababa set up a multi-national joint force to combat Boko Haram (Sengupta & Nossiter, 2015: p1). The force, which consists of 8,700 troops provided by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin, is headquartered in N’Djamena, Chad. Regional governments, under the auspices of the AU, have also been discussing the operational mandate of this military coalition, as well as its budget. This is necessary prior to the AU getting authorization and funding from the UNSC to deploy the force. The AU’s rationale for this strategy was that the Nigerian Army had failed to curb Boko Haram’s activities, even as its neighbours grew increasingly apprehensive about the group’s increasing prosperity and expansionist agenda (Akinleye, 2015: p1). This agreement at the 24th AU Summit is a marked shift in Nigerian policy about the AU’s role in fighting Boko Haram. However, questions remain about Nigeria’s continued willingness to allow foreign troops on its territory, as well as whether this will be enough to contain the group. Analysis of AU’s Policy to Boko Haram Overall, the decision by Nigeria to accept AU help through regional countries in the Lake Chad Basin, especially in stepping up military assaults on villages and towns on Nigeria’s borders, may mark the turning point in how the threat from Boko Haram is handled. The UNSC has also agreed to support advance plans by countries from the Chad Basin to form a multinational joint task force against Boko Haram, of which Chad contributes the bulk of the troops (telegraph.co.uk, 2015: p1). The acceptance by Nigeria of the AU’s recommendation to form the multinational force and deploy it in the North East of the country was the result of pressure by its neighbours leading to the 24th AU Summit, especially as Boko Haram had begun to expand its activities across the border. The AU has seemingly convinced the involved countries to put aside historical border tensions, as well as previous failures by individual governments to tackle the group (bbc.com, 2015: p1). Through the AU resolution, it seems that Nigeria and its neighbours are more determined to confront Boko Haram and its destabilizing mission in the Chad Basin region. However, there are still major obstacles to achieving the results desired by the EU in its resolution during the 24th AU Summit, even if the regional countries do manage to address the issues that have prevented previous efforts from succeeding. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that intensified military action may not be sufficient to solve the problem that is deeply rooted (Dory, 2015: p42). Inequality in the access to basic services, economic opportunity, access to power, and rampant corruption has tended to isolate Nigerians living in the North East, especially the poorest segments of the population. Boko Haram has successfully mobilized young people in the Northern regions, specifically by leveraging the widespread discontent that has resulted from these perceived injustices. Although neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger could play a critical role in weakening Boko Haram’s capacity to evade Nigeria’s military by retreating to forested border areas, Nigeria still has the most important role to play. The institutional weaknesses and socio-economic and political disparities that have plagued the Northern region of Nigeria was mentioned during the AU Summit, during which it was agreed that Boko Haram had thrived because the population felt defenceless against them (Solomon, 2012: p93). While the 24th AU Summit enhanced momentum in the fight against Boko Haram, the multinational military force’s effectiveness and the determination and enthusiasm following the AU resolution could be endangered by several factors. To begin with, the effectiveness of this force’s deployment will be mainly determined by its financial viability, which means that there is need for a UN Trust Fund to ensure the military deployments are sustainable (Waddington, 2015b: p56). The countries currently involved in creating a deployment force have had to use their own funds to fight Boko Haram and, in future, this source of funding is unsustainable as these countries struggle with fluctuating energy prices on which their budgets are dependent. The complications involved in the UNSC’s institutional mechanism for resolutions also raises doubts as to how fast this trust fund can be established and, despite the UN’s support for the multinational force, there is real danger that this enthusiasm could wither as the process drags on (Hall, 2015: p6). Subsequent frustrations over unmet expectations could even revive hostilities in the region. The AU’s resolution may also face obstacles in relation to the situation within Nigeria, where a long, drawn-out election period has left the military in charge of all operational decisions in the fight against Boko Haram (Waddington, 2015a: p15). Indeed, one of the reasons for this drawn-out process was the argument that Boko Haram attacks and logistical issues in the North East would hinder the conduction of a safe election. The internal politics in Nigeria, which have already seen attempts by the former government to sabotage the incoming government by hoarding petrol supplies, could seriously threaten Nigeria’s ability to fully invest in the coalition. Moreover, sectarian violence in Nigeria could threaten the country’s ability to fight Boko Haram because of religious splits. Combined with increasing incidents of suicide bombings prior to and after the elections, the regional force’s effectiveness may be highly compromised by internal strife in Nigeria (Sampson, 2015: p46). Recommendations on the Way Forward The Nigerian and regional countries’ previous strategy, which has also been endorsed by the EU in fighting other groups like Al Shabaab in East Africa, revolved around the removal of key Boko Haram figures. However, this strategy has failed to force the group’s retreat because the dissemination and absorption of Boko Haram’s ideology has been so widespread that it is increasingly less dependent on individuals for its operational capabilities (Okai, 2014: p4). The AU, in its fight against Boko Haram, should seek to include other agencies in its planning, such as ECOWAS, as well as involve an array of international and national agencies across the countries involved in deploying the multinational military force. These include the intelligence services, the law enforcement agencies, the diplomatic services, and the financial sector, rather than only focusing on the military from the countries involved (Akpan & Ekanem, 2014: p153). The key to defeating Boko Haram will be the AU’s ability to foster coordination, cooperation, and organization among different agencies in Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger. The AU should also seek to promote good governance in the medium term for the countries involved, especially as this is central to fighting the Boko Haram narrative of economic gains for the people of the Chad Basin. Therefore, it is important for the AU to foster effective development of state resource administration, development of an effective and efficient civil society, and the rule of law (Jerome, 2015: p94). It is only when the AU is able to foster such a structure in the Chad Basin region that the war on Boko Haram, which has been fuelled over time by ignorance and dissatisfaction, can be won. It is critical to note that most of the countries that have successfully tackled terrorism have good governance. For instance, although terrorism is still a threat in Western Europe, these countries have effectively countered regular threats through interlocking cooperation and measures. The AU needs to facilitate the sharing of intelligence resources among the regional countries, specifically to allow for the thwarting of attacks in major towns at an early stage (Amusan & Oyewole, 2014: p39). The AU should prioritize intelligence cooperation along with military cooperation, especially as this will enable the multinational force to respond effectively and in a timely manner. Finally, the importance of diplomacy cannot be overstated, especially in terms of countries from which Boko Haram continues to receive weapons and supplies, albeit covertly. Although this strategy may be too late for the war on Boko Haram, diplomatic approaches to some of the splinter cells in Boko Haram could yield effective results (Hoffman, 2012: p91). Therefore, any attempt to fight Boko Haram in Nigeria and its Northern border regions must take into consideration diplomatic efforts, both with Boko Haram cells and with neighbouring countries where foreign Boko Haram fighters stream into Nigeria. However, this could prove difficult due to the lack of functional ministries and good governance in some of the involved countries that are emerging from internal strife. Indeed, it cannot be totally dismissed that some countries have actively supported Boko Haram in their operational capacities (Giroux & Gilpin, 2014: p2). As a result, while diplomacy may be difficult, the AU is the only institution with the capabilities to initiate it. References Akinleye, A. (2015, February 8). African nations pledge 8,700 for anti-Boko Haram force. Retrieved June 4, 2015, from Reuters: http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/08/nigeria-violence-cameroon-idINKBN0LC02X20150208 Akpan, F., & Ekanem, O. (2014). Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science, 10(2), 151-155 Amusan, L., & Oyewole, S. (2014). Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: a reflection on the failure of democratic containment. Politeia, 33(1), 35-49 bbc.com. (2015, January 16). Boko Haram crisis: African Union to discuss multinational force. Retrieved June 4, 2015, from BBC NEWS: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30854145 Dory, A. J. (2015). Shaping Africas Peace and Security Partnerships for the 21st Century. Prism: a Journal of the Centre for Complex Operations, 5(2), 42-49 Giroux, J., & Gilpin, R. (2014). The situation in Nigeria is evolving and, perhaps, unravelling. To contain and disrupt Boko Haram a new approach and security paradigm is needed. Left unaddressed, the violence will continue to intensify, with broader implications for Nigeria at a domestic and regional level. Policy Perspectives, 2(1), 2 Hall, J. (2015). Africas conflict crises of 2015: Africa-wide-continental overview. Africa Conflict Monitor, 2(3), 4-11 Hoffman, B. (2012). Combating Terrorism: Adapting Global Strategy to the Evolving Threats of a New Decade. Geo. J. Intl Aff., 13(2), 91 Jerome, A. (2015). Lessons from Colombia for Curtailing the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Prism: a Journal of the Centre for Complex Operations, 5(2), 94 Okai, N. (2014). Terrorism in West Africa: Boko Haram, Adding Some Few Recommendations to the Yamoussoukro Declaration. International Journal of Innovative Research and Development, 3(5), 23-31 Sampson, I. T. (2015). Between Boko Haram and the Joint Task Force: Assessing the Dilemma of Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Northern Nigeria. Journal of African Law, 59(01), 25-63 Sengupta, S., & Nossiter, A. (2015, January 30). African Nations Show Progress in Uniting to Beat Back Militants in Nigeria. Retrieved June 4, 2015, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/world/africa/boko-haram-chad-nigeria.html?_r=0 Solomon, H. (2012). The changing nature of the terrorist threat in Africa and the AUs response: research notes/commentaries. Journal of African Union Studies: Constructing African unity: an ascendant architecture or building on shaky foundations?, 1(1), 89-97 telegraph.co.uk. (2015, January 30). African Union calls for 7,500-strong force to fight Boko Haram. Retrieved June 4, 2015, from The Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11378699/African-Union-calls-for-7500-strong-force-to-fight-Boko-Haram.html Waddington, C. (2015a). Boko Haram and al-Shabaab: comparable threats to African security: Africa-wide-featured analysis. Africa Conflict Monitor, 1(1), 12-19 Waddington, C. (2015b). The fight against Boko Haram is now a regional one: West Africa-issue in focus. Africa Conflict Monitor, 1(1), 54-59 Read More