inners of World War II, in which the United States therefore bore the burden of leadership in the free world and was obligated to defend both democracy and freedom. It was a reality in which the US was threatened -- psychologically, politically and militarily -- by the expansion of and aggression from, among others, a totalitarian Soviet Union and the international Communist movement it sponsored (Weldes 1996: 283).
4. Crucial to the following analysis is that the institutional feature which distinguishes democracies from autocracies is the existence of a popularly elected legislature with the capacity to constrain a countrys chief executive. We assume that legislatures are more protectionist than executives in democracies and show that, even so, pairs of democracies are more likely than mixed pairs to liberalize commerce.
We claim that this institutional difference contributes to a greater tendency for pairs of democratic countries to agree upon lower trade barriers than pairs comprised of a democracy and an autocracy (i.e., mixed pairs) (Mansfield, et al. 2000: 304-305).
5. ... Economic polarization is related to the alientation that groups of people feel against each other, and this alienation is enforced by notion of within-group cohesion and identity. ... What matters for conflict ... is rather economic polarization. ... [A] society that is split into two well-defined groups with [differences] in incomes is particularly likely to experience social unrest (Ostby 2008: 146).
6. A fundamental assertion of balance-of-power thought is that large-scale conflict between nations will be avoided when their power is approximately equal, and, conversely, will be more likely between nations that diverge in their power. This assertion is based on the assumption, frequently hidden, that in a conflict between any two nations there is a direct relationship between power and victory, and, other considerations aside, the more powerful nation will prevail (Siverson and