Aviation Safety: The Human Factors in the System Safety Discipline - Term Paper Example

Aviation Safety – The Human Factors in the System Safety Discipline Introduction and Thesis Human faults have empirically been proved to be one of the major causes of accidents in commercial aviation industry worldwide. While automated systems such as autopilots and state-of-the-art radars can virtually guide an airliner’s course to safety in cases of emergency landing or other types of failures, questions are still being asked about the standards of safety in the US aviation industry. Overt dependence on computerized systems has proved fatal in the past as systems are prone to malfunction and mislead. Air traffic control and pilots form the core of human elements during the entire span of flight for an airliner. Both factors play the all-important role of maneuvering a jet effectively during severe climatic turbulences, fuel exhaustions, electrical failures and so on. Frequent occurrences of such incidents in the airspace of America highlight the risk involved with depending solely on technology. Technology, notwithstanding its efficiency and promptness, can sometimes be a hazard. This is supported by tons of empirical evidences pointing out to the fact that under dire circumstances, in-flight personnel rely more on their instincts than on referring to safety checkbooks. System In-flight operators and those coordinating with them from outside collectively build a human system which is less reliable in terms of theoretical competence, but more astute when it comes to implementing a mix of technical knowledge. However, in many cases, the technology that we have is outdated and equipments worn to the nub. This contributes to the problems of reliable monitoring and safe maneuvering of commercial airliners. So human staffs work in a dubious situation, where they must have to remain alert all the time to any possibility that might be overlooked by system tools. In the light of this statement, this paper is going to assess the role of human determinants in aviation safety – both in-flight and on the ground. Aviation Safety: An Overview Transportation safety management systems have become more integrated and target-oriented in the last few decades. This is particularly valid for high-speed networks that require a high level of coordination across all operational offshoots. When it comes to commercial aviation business, ground safety management issues are just as important as the in-flight ones, for the former lays down the thumb rules for the latter to be functional. The overall safety assessment metrics involve human as well as system-generated measures. In order to arrive at a standardized mode of safety procedures, it is imperative to have a foundational approach that will integrate all the pertinent aspects of aircraft maintenance, crew management and training, simulation, air traffic control management, airport staff management and last but by no means the least, systematic governance of the airliner in contention. But this type of organic approach is rather theoretical than practical. In majority of cases, a particular airliner faces innumerable challenges ranging from jurisdictional limitations to lack of funds or expertise. However, challenges need to be overcome for ensuring a well-knit system of air transportation that will simultaneously cater to passengers’ requirements as well as economic gain for operators. The Human Factor: Key Concepts Conceptualizing a holistic approach solves bulk of the problems related to transportation safety. To achieve this, it is very important to gain insight into the human factors involved in aviation security. The most pertinent question that might occur to us is to what extent humans are involved in routine flights? Where does this involvement differ from other high-speed commercial networks? To find an answer to this all-important question, it is worth mentioning that aviation is the only industry that literally dissociates itself from all affairs on the ground. Once a flight goes airborne, it can only be traced on radars and radio communication becomes the sole medium of data exchange between the flight crew and the ground crew. Since there is no physical contact between humans, the operation depends largely on technical guidance provided by machines. But system vulnerability is a common factor in any automated domain and aircrafts are no exception to this either. Taking this into consideration, most airliners around the world evaluate the reliability and competence index affixed with human involvement (Redmill & Anderson, 2008, p.139). As regards human factors, aviation industries have long espoused human resource as the most dependable set of operational mechanisms. But at the same time, experts never lost sight of the fact that the aviation sector is a composite one, asking for seamless coordination between the man and the machine. Subsequently, the related academic fields have expanded far beyond the mainstream disciplines of physics and mechanics. Interdisciplinary branches like aerodynamics and biotechnology have emerged out of exhaustive research undertakings by various scientific organizations working in collaboration with safety providers. In line with the documented directives, testing staff endurance under trying circumstances and issuing certified tools and apparatus for implementation in airliner industries became mandatory ever since the WWII. But lapses still continued to prevail in many countries, resulting in major aviation disasters. Gradually in the late twentieth century, engineering and management were merged, thus creating a hierarchy of systems. Each component of this hierarchy is attributed a specific prototype of input-output limit that adds to its following level. Since quality assurance is a major cause for concern for many airline authorities, equal emphasis has been given on improving human reliability in system design. Studies have been made to assess numerous factors that lead to degraded performance. Understanding human psychology and its impact on reflexes form the most critical area of research. Integration of system-related knowledge and psychology is what the authorities have typically focused on to mitigate human errors as much as possible (Stephans, 2004, p. 139). Role of the NTSB The National Transportation Safety Board, the autonomous regulatory body in the US, probes into aviation accidents and a few other transportation mishaps. Its legal clauses are quite at par with all the technical requirements of accident investigations. In other words, the Committee allows for legal leniency whenever asked for by the country’s jurisdiction, without talking away its technical expertise. When it comes to investigating human factors, NTSB’s modus operandi is quite direct. The appointed group of investigators first of all attempts to recover the black box or cockpit voice recorder to trace any clues left by the cabin crews. Then its technical wing tries to decode the transcription to find probable reason(s) of the accident. However, ensuring system safety was the prime consideration during the germinating phases of NTSB. It has only been in recent years that the organization has revamped its operational strategies to probe more into human-system interaction and human performance assessment (Wiener & Nagel, 1989, p.74). Explaining Human Factors: Classes and Subclasses Human errors can be of four types: 1) Unsafe acts of aircrews, 2) Preconditions for unsafe acts, 3) Unsafe supervision, and 4) Organizational influences Needless to mention, any one or more of these factors can trigger a chain of events leading to air disasters. Unsafe acts of crews can be broadly categorized into two scenarios – errors and willful violation of rules and regulations that are mandated by the concerned aircraft authorities. Errors typically refer to human failure to perform the required tasks. On the other hand, violations of rules are treated to be more serious offence by most airliners. There are three types of errors: 1) Decision, 2) Skill-based, and 3) Perceptual Decision errors occur most frequently under pressing circumstances, especially when a person faces challenges that ask of readiness and promptitude. The intention is not dishonest, only the application is. Ineptly executed procedures and making the wrong choice can be cited as common examples of decision errors. Errors made by flight deck personnel due to lack of skill or expertise result from insufficient exposure to actual flying experiences. Flying an airliner requires basic level of competence in maneuvering a number of tools, including stick, rudder, switches, checklists and more. Moreover, the psychological aspects of attention and retention are also part of acquired sets of skills. Temporary memory lapses, oblivious intentions and inadvertent behavioral prompts can cause major problems for the airliner (Transport Canada, 2010). Perceptual errors are relatively less common among commercial airline industry. The blind spot between expectation and reality induces erroneous perceptions on the part of flight deck operators. Quite commonly, one expects what one wants to expect. This implies that once this apparent law is violated due to some rare events, the system which is embedded at the heart of human capacity to perform routine actions with minimal efforts is put astray. Excessive work pressure during busy hours often leads to perception problems. Failure to hear in an engaging and attentive manner on the part of either the air traffic controllers or the pilots causes improper execution of actions, only to be culminated into fatal consequences (Wickens, 1997, p.99). This type of errors may also be caused by sensory blockages (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.52). As far as violations are concerned, there are two identified types: routine violations and exceptional violations. Routine violations are permitted by the operating agency until its extent goes beyond tolerant limits. But the more gruesome kind is the latter one, i.e., exceptional violations which is neither allowed nor customary to the individual’s nature (Transport Canada, 2010). Attempting an outraging turn or unauthorized takeoff are tantamount to exceptional violations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.52). Preconditions of unsafe acts, as the term suggests, is a smoke screen in the figurative sense. Too often it has been noticed that aircraft crews, when facing any unusual situation, worry about the situation itself instead of searching for its cause. This makes for a perfect recipe for disaster in 80% cases (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.56), as other informative giveaways to the likely root of the problem are overlooked by the crews. Figure 1: Categories of preconditions of unsafe acts (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.56) The above diagram shows that preconditions of unsafe acts are largely based on a dichotomy of parametric coefficients: situational and individual. Our responses to external stimuli vary according to the immediate environment we find ourselves in. Similarly, personality also affects our methodologies – the way we go about a series of procedures to perform a specific task. In the context of aviation safety, proper psychological grooming is a must to keep the senses alert all the time. Moreover, a healthy mental state is required to remain physically flexible and instinctive. On the other hand, impaired mental states are proved to have a reduced, often detrimental, effect on successfully completing ordinary tasks in day-to-day lives, let alone maneuvering a complex machine such as an aircraft. Such mental states affect performance directly by causing loss of positional cognizance, overdoing or under doing the required task, misdirected concentration and fatigue. Insidious approaches to critical situations often turn out to be fatal as well, compelling the individual to act in a manner which is not condoned by the regulations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.57). A classic case of insidious attitude may be spotted in the tragic event at Tenerife in 1977, when the KLM 4805 and Pan Am 1736 collided with each other on the runway, killing 583 passengers. Although poor visibility, lack of proper judgment shown by the crews of both airplanes, and miscommunications with the Air Traffic Controller at the Tenerife Airport are considered to be the main causes of the accident, it may be noted that the KLM captain van Zanten flouted the most basics of takeoff procedures in a profoundly disdainful manner, which was, until then, unparalleled in the history of civil aviation. Flight control methodologies demand steady and firm focus on meeting the physical requirements of operation. What this means is that the pilot at the cockpit must be able to perform brisk physical tasks with accuracy. The margin for error is very slim at the wake of an emergency situation. Normally in such a situation, the pilot does not have time to think or consider all the available options. He has to make a decision and implement it to the best possible effect within the least possible time. Hence, chances of committing an error multiply as the reaction time is reduced. Studies on system safety discipline have typically revealed that a person’s inborn aptitude to fly an aircraft is generally overlooked as an important human factor. But this factor alone can set a good pilot apart from a not-so-good one. In other words, the task of piloting an aircraft belongs to certain instinctive and smart individuals who can take quick decisions on the basis of moderate information and who do not always have the luxury of pondering over making the perfect decision. During in-flight emergencies, a pilot needs to assess quickly all the available choices before making the best decision relative to the given circumstance (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.59). CRM & MRM Sometimes crew members create situations that fuel unsafe acts. Crew Resource Management (CRM) endorses that the fundamental idea of aviation safety rests on coordination. Effective communication and constant coordination with ATC and ground staffs resolve many outstanding issues that sometimes occur without anybody’s knowledge. Communication may be channeled into three directions forming a cycle of input-output sharing: within the aircraft, between aircraft and the ground crews, and among the ground crews. Here it may be noted that just as CRM, Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) is equally important for commissioning a healthy and safe working environment on the ground. In order to avoid any causal chain of events sparking a major catastrophe, the CRM system needs to be made as contemporary as possible. The analysis of air traffic safety management strategies brings out how human factors are central to recognizing the constant interaction between technology and human intelligence. A Collaborative Approach to Safety Moreover, setting priorities to execute mutually agreed upon tasks is very important in this regard as emergencies do not always give the scope to follow what ought to be done instead of what needs to be done. For commercial Boeing airliners, instances of stalling or other similar hazards actuate integrated actions on the part of all aircrews to render effective navigability options. While situations such as hull-loss, forced landing, and descent can be avoided with proper installation of state-of-the-art devices, the onus of operating those devices ultimately lies on the crew members. Again, designing the flight deck according to the latest innovations in aerodynamics has proved to be a futuristic step for many commercial carriers, including Boeing. Similarly, a lot of research has gone into the structuring of aircrafts, positioning of engines, wing designs and easier maneuverability of landing gears. Technologists have focused more on making the entire system human-centric, within an automated diagram. Ergonomics Ergonomics emerges out to be one of the recent blessings of biophysical research. Application of ergonomics is widespread in maintenance procedures. Despite the fact that testing and other acute processes are carried out by system automation, primary maintenance drills are still monitored by human agents. The Fault Information Team (FIT), which was utilized by the Boeing to facilitate documentation and reporting of maintenance issues, testifies to the changing paradigms of aviation security from the perspective of human-system consolidation (The Boeing Company, n.d). Introduction of ergonomics has clearly opened up ways to make future systems work faster and better, on an increased level of artificial awareness about human limitations. A Comparative Study Soekkha (1997) makes a comparative study of hull-loss incidents in four generations of aircrafts. The author gives a standard frame of reference depicting how Airbus, Being and McDonnell Douglas score over their competitors in terms of providing enhanced and tested system security for their respective fleets. The statistical report drafted by Soekkha shows how the hull-loss rate per million departures gradually subsided with the advent of automated technologies embedded in the aforementioned carriers (p.170). Conclusion In essence, the thesis question covers a wide range of issues other than just the safety related concerns. Considering the interconnectivity among all tenets of human-machine interactions, it is worth concluding that the human interface and commercial aviation industries across the world serves as an auxiliary tool. It fortifies the entire system by contributing to its enormous scope and extent of execution. Albeit the technology wins the race in terms of reliability, it is the human interference that controls the technology and makes full use of its huge potential. Moreover, the cognitive and psychological aspects of behavior justify how decisions are taken and tasks are executed at critical hours. Besides, sound judgments need to be made to run the machines smoothly. This can be only be done by members and not by automated voice or other channels. References Redmill, F., & Anderson, T. (2008). Improvements in System Safety. London: Springer. Soekkha, H. M. (1997). Aviation safety: human factors, system engineering, flight operations, economics, strategies, and management. AH Zeist. The Netherlands: VSP. Stephans, R. A. (2004). System safety for the 21st century: the updated and revised edition of System safety 2000. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-IEEE. The Boeing Company. (n.d). Human Factors. Retrieved February 26, 2010, from http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_08/human_textonly.html Transport Canada. (2010, February 9). Module 4 – Human Error. Retrieved February 26, 2010, from http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/SystemSafety/pubs/pdm/module4.htm#tphp Wickens, C. D., Mavor, A. S., McGee, J., and National Research Council (U.S.). Panel on Human Factors in Air Traffic Control Automation. (1997). Flight to the future: human factors in air traffic control. Washington D. C.: National Academy Press. Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2003). A human error approach to aviation accident analysis: the human factors analysis and classification system. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Wiener, E. L., & Nagel, D. C. (1989). Human factors in aviation. San Diego, California: Gulf Professional Publishing. Read More