International Doctrines - Essay Example

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN CASE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS International doctrines gain impetus when they are widely accepted and implemented by countries. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is one such doctrine. One nation did not pass the test of properly recognising and implementing it, thereby laying itself open to intervention by the International Community on humanitarian grounds – that nation is Sudan and the internal area where it is guilty of crimes against humanity is Darfur. I) BACKGROUND OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION When the UN was formed, the founding countries endorsed the doctrine of state sovereignty in its Charter, namely “Nothing shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Although this international norm was challenged by the 1948 Convention on Genocide that claimed sovereignty was not protection for crimes against humanity, the Cold War and birth of freshly decolonised states made certain that the original UN charter remained unchanged until 1990. When the Cold War ended in 1991, the growth of multilateralism spawned international calls for global humanitarian intervention to tackle crimes against humanity. Riding on these calls, the United States and UN intervened in Somalia in 1992. However, the forced and undignified withdrawal of their forces in 1994 dealt a body blow to global interest in humanitarian intervention. As a result, there was woefully inadequate international reaction to genocide perpetrated in Rwanda and the Balkans (especially Srebrenica). The dearth of an accepted doctrine was well expressed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during the 2000 General Assembly meeting: “If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights?”1 Kofi Annan’s plea found a favourable respondent in the Canadian government which formed an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Commission’s report in December 2001 entitled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) avoided the controversial ‘Human rights v. Sovereignty’ issue, instead declaring that the greatest obligation of sovereign countries was to safeguard its citizens from internal conflict, rebellion, repression, or state inadequacies. The obvious deduction from it was the responsibility of the International Community to intervene if a country failed (either because of unwillingness or lack of resources) to safeguard its own people.2 II) RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) DOCTRINE The most significant achievement of the 2005 World Summit of the UN General Assembly was the adoption of the R2P doctrine that declared that every country was obliged to safeguard its people from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 1: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group. 2: Ibid. against humanity” through proper measures; and that the International Community was also responsible to adopt proper diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful measures to assist in safeguarding populations from the crimes named above. The Summit’s doctrine was subsequently formally approved by the Security Council in April 2006, thereby establishing it as a newly developed international standard.3 III) THE DARFUR CONFLICT The Darfur conflict began in 2003 between two rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) - a self-defense force representing secular non-Arab people in Darfur – and the Islamist Justice & Equality Movement (JEM).4 The main reason for the conflict was economic marginalisation and disputed land rights. The Sudanese government reacted to the outbreak of hostilities by dispatching troops and hiring the Janjaweed (a shadowy Arab militia) to ruthlessly attack civilians in Darfur.5 The aim of the attack was to ‘drain the swamp,’ namely, force the civilian population to evacuate their villages thus preventing the rebels from getting shelter in most parts of Darfur. It led to the expulsion of around 2 million people from their homes, and death to more than 200,000 of them mainly from disease and malnutrition.6 Although a ceasefire (monitored by the African Union Mission [AMIS] and the United Nations Mission in Sudan [UNMIS]) came into existence in April 2004, peace talks that followed for over a year were desultory and reached no conclusion.7 The Sudanese government continued its willful and flagrant disregard of its responsibility to protect its citizens by blatantly refusing to disarm the Janjaweed, instead proceeding with its program to recruit and give 3: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group. 4: DALY, M.V. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction & Genocide. Page 281 5: January 2006 - Sudan/Darfur: Security Council Report. 6: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group. 7: January 2006 - Sudan/Darfur: Security Council Report. supply arms to the them.8 The government forces and the Janjaweed not only ‘ethnically cleansed’ areas in Darfur, but also created the very recruits to the rebel cause they claim to suppress.9 They indulged in an orgy of killings, burning of villages10 and rape, the last being a very frequent occurrence in Darfur.11 IV) RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY The African Union (AU) first took the initiative to intervene {albeit only as an observer) in Darfur in mid-2004. It set up a small supervisory mission comprising 60 supervisors and 300 troops to safeguard the observers.12 The AU was later instrumental in getting the Sudanese government and a faction of the rebel SLA headed by Minni Arkou Minawi (SLA/MM) to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May 2006. However, the effect of the DPA was largely eroded since the other SLA faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW) as well as the JEM refused the sign it.13 In 2004, the UN enforced an arms embargo against all non-state groups to the Darfur conflict in 2004,14 and gave Sudan a 30-day ultimatum to disarm the Janjaweed, arrest its leaders and allow relief agencies full access to the displaced people in Darfur.15 The response of the Sudanese government was more ‘smoke and mirrors’ rather than constructive efforts to curb the marauding Janjaweed.16 In March 2005, the UN stretched the arms embargo to encompass all groups, also enforcing a penalty of travel restrictions and freezing of assets against those who disregarded the embargo, banned military flights 8: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group. 9: DALY, M.V. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction & Genocide. Page 284 10: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 20 11: Ibid. Page 154 12: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group 13: Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement: The Crisis Group. 14: January 2006 - Sudan/Darfur: Security Council Report. 15: DALY, M.V. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction & Genocide. Page 296 16: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 20 over Darfur, and set up a Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts to supervise conformity.17 Realising that the steps taken so far did not make much difference in Darfur, the UN set up a High Level Mission in December 2006. Consisting of 5 persons led by 1997 Nobel Prize Laureate Professor Judy Williams, its job was to analyse the position in Darfur and give recommendations. The Mission operated for 30 days (between 5 February and 5 March 2007) by arranging meetings with AU representatives in Geneva, Addis Ababa as well as in the Chad refugee camps housing some of the displaced Darfurians. Despite several requests to the Sudanese government, the Mission was not provided visas to officially enter Sudan and visit Darfur. In its report (which marked the first UN human rights study based on the R2P doctrine), the Mission declared there was a large amount of destruction in Darfur, many people were killed, millions of people were forced to leave their homes, and those that managed to reach Chad as refugees had put that nation in danger of being dragged into the conflict. The report also blamed the Sudanese government for being responsible for the situation in Darfur, including its unwillingness to disarm or demobilise the Janjaweed.18 The UN responded to the High Level Mission’s report by passing a resolution via its Human Rights Council on March 29, 2007 that “expressed deep concern about the seriousness of ongoing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur.” The Resolution also “expressed regret” that the High Level Commission “could not visit Darfur.” But on both counts, the resolution failed to blame Sudan for its primary 17: January 2006 - Sudan/Darfur: Security Council Report. 18: WADLOW, R. Darfur –The Responsibility to Protect: Newropeans Magazine. role in the whole matter.19 The Security Council next passed Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007 that declared the position in Darfur was endangering peace, and empowered the deployment of a joint United Nations-African Union mission (UNAMID) as a peacekeeping force in Darfur.20 V) UNAMID UNAMID became the biggest ever UN peacekeeping force deployed anywhere in the world. It initially consisted of 31,000 personnel comprising troops, police and civilians at a cost of $ 2.5 billion annually. Its short term mission in Darfur is to safeguard civilians, reestablish security to facilitate continued humanitarian help, supervise the ceasefire agreements entered into since 2004, assist in enforcing the DPA and check/report on the existence of illegal arms in contravention of the Darfur arms embargo. Its long term mission is to make available a secure surrounding for rebuilding/development/replacement of internally and externally displaced individuals, support and encourage human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law, and supervise the security state of affairs at the nation’s boundaries with Chad and the Central African Republic.21 UNAMID took over authority from AMIS and reached full operational capacity in December 2007 by which time its composition had expanded to 19,555 military personnel and 3,772 police personnel mostly drawn from African nations.22 VI) THE PRESENT SITUATION IN DARFUR While approximately 200,000 Darfurians are living in tents and improvised shelters in 19: SCHLEIN, L. UN Human Rights Council Adopts Resolution on Darfur: Voice of America. 20: UN Security Council Resolution 1769 – Fact Sheet: Savedarfur.org. 21: Ibid. 22: Ibid. camps in Chad, they represent only about 10% of the total number of people displaced.23 The vast majority live in squalid ‘camps’ in Darfur without clean water or proper sanitation, surrounded by Sudanese soldiers and the Janjaweed, 24(many of whom have been recruited into the army).25 A UN official reported that he had never encountered displaced populations as traumatised as the people he met in Darfur.26 During the course of his official monthly statement to the Security Council on 12 May 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed his deep disappointment that the main players persisted in indulging in violence, thereby keeping the conflict simmering in Darfur; in addition, despite a status-of-forces agreement with the Sudanese government, the activities of UNAMID were significantly compromised by bandit attacks on convoys and other crucial logistics challenges and insecurity. Ban Ki-moon added that since the conflict began in 2003 around 2.5 million Darfurians were so far forced to flee from their homes. He concluded his statement by calling for urgent political talks to resolve the conflict.27 VII) THE UN’S ACHILLES HEEL ON PROPER HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN DARFUR The International Community has not reacted forcefully against Sudan. The UN, after all, is an organisation run by its members.28 The main problem is the self-interest of several UN Security Council members.29 The U.S. has an intimate intelligence alliance going on with Sudan in its war on terror. China is not only Sudan’s biggest oil customer, 23: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 87 24: DALY, M.V. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction & Genocide. Page 292 25: Ibid. Page 297 26: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 34 27: Secretary General Ban ‘Deeply Disappointed’ At Continuing Violence in Darfur: UNAMID. 28: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group 29: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 106 but is hesitant to provoke stronger UN intervention for fear it may boomerang in future on Tibet or Xinjiang. Russia too fears a same fate in future in Chechnya. As a result, the UN is concentrating only on supplying humanitarian help - thereby being guilty of tackling the consequences instead of the causes of the conflict.30 VIII) THE SOLUTION The International Community should work to precipitate 3 crucial changes. Firstly, there should be an immediate stop of armed conflict. The International Community should exert maximum influence on all players to honour global humanitarian law, stop attacks on civilians and humanitarians, and make a safe surrounding for aid work to progress. Secondly, the Security Council should strengthen the UNAMID force considerably. Thirdly, the political process should go ahead strongly. Talks held so far have either been boycotted by some players, or eroded by the non-inclusion of Darfur civil society. There should be more forceful attempts to bring about full and inclusive political talks in which the International Community must supply coordinated and prolonged leadership.31 IX) CONCLUSION A senior UN official bitterly remarked: “The International Community is keeping people alive with our humanitarian assistance until they are massacred.”32 Theoretically, the 2005 Summit resolution made it a UN ‘obligation’ to conduct humanitarian intervention.33 In practice however, the world body is being prevented from conducting its obligation due to the vested interests of Security Council members, whose influence 30: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group 31: The Current Situation in Darfur – January 2008: Oxfam America. 32: GRONO, D. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group 33: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 138 is so great that even the EU, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the UN Secretary General himself still avoid calling the crimes in Darfur by their proper name.34 It is a shame upon each of them and the United Nations system as a whole.35 It is high time the Security Council stops the rot within itself, as only that will save the Darfurians. 34: TOTTEN ET AL. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Page 187 35: Ibid. Page 106 X) REFERENCES USED ANON. 2006. January 2006 - Sudan/Darfur: Security Council Report. [Online]. Available: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1313295/k.F9DE/January_2006BRSudanDarfur.htm [23 May 2008] ANON. 2008. The Current Situation in Darfur – January 2008: Oxfam America. [Online]. Available: http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/emergencies/sudan/current_situation [23 May 2008] ANON. 2006. Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement: The Crisis Group. [Online]. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4179 [23 May 2008] ANON. 2008. Secretary General Ban ‘Deeply Disappointed’ At Continuing Violence in Darfur: UNAMID. [Online]. Available: http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=36&ctl=Details&mid=376&ItemID=129 [23 May 2008] ANON. 2007. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 – Fact Sheet: Savedarfur.org. [Online]. http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/policypapers/fact_sheet_un_security_council_resolution_1769/ [23 May 2008] DALY, M.V. 2007. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction & Genocide. Cambridge University Press: New York. GRONO, D. 2006. The International Community’s Failure to Protect: International Crisis Group. [Online]. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4417 [23 May 2008] SCHLEIN, L. 2007. UN Human Rights Council Adopts Resolution on Darfur: Voice of America. [Online]. Available: http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-03/2007-03-30-voa18.cfm [23 May 2008] TOTTEN S. & MARKUSEN E. 2006. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan. Routledge: New York. WADLOW, R. 2007. Darfur –The Responsibility to Protect: Newropeans Magazine. [Online]. Available: http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?Itemid=85&id=5525&option=com_content&task=view [23 May 2008] Read More