Big Dig - an Unprecedented Massive Engineering Project of Boston - Term Paper Example

MASSACHUSETTS BIG DIG (A case perspective analysis) Introduction (description and statement of facts) The Massachusetts Big Dig is an unprecedented massive engineering project for an urban renewal initiative by the city of Boston. The main aim of this project is to put underground or to “bury” an existing major and very busy interstate highway through downtown Boston by the use of a tunnel. This project can be considered a success from the viewpoint of improving quality of life and the urban environment by spurring economic development of nearby areas adjacent to its former Central Artery (I-93) which were previously already showing signs of decay. The barriers created by the above-ground highway had been eliminated and now replaced with a green space which in turn revived the inner-city parts of Boston by significantly improving vehicular traffic and human or pedestrian traffic by vastly simplifying traffic circulation with positive impacts on public transit as well. However, the total project costs exceeded original estimates by five times due to poor planning; underground drilling was undertaken while the project had already started such that actual sub-surface conditions were not known earlier, resulting in unpleasant surprises. Discussion (from the viewpoint of various perspectives) A really big or ambitious project like the “Big Dig” deserved more thorough engineering studies prior to starting the work but for some reasons (most likely urgency due to the congestion at Boston City), an initial environmental impact study (EIS) began in 1982 was quickly followed by an earmarked funding in 1987 by Congress with the amount of $755 million allocated for the said project to start in 1991 but by the time it was finished in 2005, actual costs exceeded initial cost estimates and reached $15 billion with another $7 billion to be paid for the additional bond payments by the city. In other words, this project was started with very little planning and done almost in an ad-hoc basis or what is termed as muddling through, hoping it will turn out right. Ethics Perspective – public officials pushing for the Big Dig Project should have taken into account the ethical consequences of an ill-conceived project of this magnitude. In other words, they should have first considered the ethical implications of spending huge amounts of taxpayers' money which in retrospect, diverted precious funding from other equally important public works. The cost overruns and the continuing payments for the increased debt load of the city of Boston cannot adequately compensate for the enormous fiscal burden incurred by the Big Dig Project on the city's inhabitants including all future generations of the citizens of Boston. It does not speak well of their fiscal responsibility to safeguard city funds for any worthy projects. Obviously, only some sectors of the city were favored over other less vocal sectors. But on the other hand, there were also other competing considerations and obligations in this case. City officials are also mandated to look after the welfare of city residents and one of its primary concerns was the growing traffic congestion in a high-density population urban area like Boston. Something has to be done now before the problem gets any worse when it will become more difficult to solve. The ethical obligations of city officials were to find a logical solution but at the least cost to the city treasury while minimizing any potential disruptions and aggravations. Public officials thought of urbanism as a creative political act on their part and so found an outlet for this creativity through a botched massive engineering project (Inam, 2013, p. 235). Accountability Perspective – there seems to be no one who was found to be primarily or mainly liable for the huge cost overruns of the project and there seems to be no public outcry on the way the city spend its funds. Once the project had started, it was already difficult to stop it or even pause or defer it until such time all detailed engineering plans and studies were completed. The money just kept pouring in and getting spent on the big project (Greiman, 2013, p. 146). In the Big Dig, the public officials and others involved in the project were accountable for the overall budget (to ensure it will stay within budget), project financing (where to source the funds for the project), and adherence to project criteria such as safety, reliability and also the project completion (that there will be no delays that will unduly hinder the project's timetable).It failed on most of the criteria listed above, such as safety due to numerous accidents and the large excess costs of the project from its original cost estimates. A lesson from this case is the need for a governance board that will oversee all these various concerns (ibid.) and see to it all competing interests like political, project, social, and corporate structures are all aligned to one aim. Prevention Perspective – the best prevention method to avoid problems in any really big project is to appoint or require a centralized governing board of directors which well try to bring together multiple governance structures to avoid any probable conflicts of interest that may arise. This governance board will have ultimate responsibility for the strategic plan of the project and in addition, also develop a framework for it by making a list of the key success factors (KSF) by which to measure actual performance of project contractors including all sub-contractors. This board will also grant the levels of authority for each project proponent and easily allow it also to pinpoint accountability and responsibility in case something goes wrong (Wald, 2006, p. A17). Political Perspective – before the Big Dig Project was even conceived by two engineers named Bill Reynolds and Frederick P. Salvucci, the prevailing sentiment of city residents was a cross between anger and resignation to their fate of growing and worsening traffic congestion; it was predicted if nothing was done about the chronic congestion due to bad design of the original expressway (Interstate 93 or I-93), then traffic jams of up to sixteen hours would become normal. City executives, local businesses, and residents were all agreed something drastic has to be done. There were also pockets of public opposition to the project coming from those sectors of society who will most likely suffer adverse consequences. In a particular example, some areas or neighborhoods subjected to exercise of the state power of eminent domain will have to sell and vacate their residential properties to give way to the project at a time when property values were quite high in a highly-urbanized center like the city of Boston. Other residents hoped something will correct the grievous error that was I-93; what convinced most Boston residents to go along with the project was the belief Big Dig will be a triumph of engineering (Williams,2006, p. 707) together with sensible and logical urban planning that will somehow save downtown Boston. Bureaucratic Perspective – any big city will have its fair share of fierce advocates and on the other side, equally vociferous opponents for any project because each side will find a strong justification for their respective positions. While the state governor and city executives had both approved the project concept, business leaders wanted a different project that will provide faster access to Logan Airport and furthermore, while appropriations were passed by the Congress, it was later disapproved by Pres. Reagan as too expensive but the U.S. Congress overrode his veto. To circumvent expected bureaucratic delays (red tape), the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) was created that later on took joint-venture partners but caused problems with regards to the role and responsibility of the MTA to supposedly independently monitor project partners. Conclusion (lessons learned from the Big Dig) Any big project offers unique challenges and demands so no two projects can be the same but creation of a governing board is always a necessity. Both the public and private sectors must cooperate to ensure project success. Project administrators and contractors must abide by a code of ethics through ethical conduct consonant with professional morals (Cooper, 2012, p. 71). Reference List Cooper, T. L. (2012). The responsible administrator: An approach to ethics for the administrative role (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. Greiman, V. A. (2013). Megaproject management: Lessons on risk and project management from the Big Dig. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. Inam, A. (2013). Designing urban transformation. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. Wald, M. J. (2006, November 2). Late design change is cited in collapse of tunnel ceiling. The New York Times, A17. Williams, R. H. (2006, July). The Big Dig. Technology and Culture, 47(3), 707-711. Read More