Robert Kagans End of Dreams, Return of History - Article Example

Robert Kagan’s “End of Dreams, Return of History” 2009 In his seminal paper, End of Dreams, Return of History (2007), Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund scathingly criticizes the all-confidant attitude of western democracies after end of the Soviet Union. Like what Francis Fukuyama said in his book, The End of History and the Last Man (“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such… the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.", Fukuyama, first published, 1992), Kagan, in this article, brilliantly contended on how the world maliciously picked up its own ways. The cold war could be over as he says in “End of Dreams, Return of History” But that does not mean, he assertively declares that to consider it as “the end of history” — needs serious reflections (E.Singer, 2007). “The world has become normal again,” Kagan begins his article, a comprehensive essay, this way. Later, he contends manifestly: “Autocracy is making a comeback… the two-centuries-old struggle between political liberalism and autocracy has reemerged as a third defining characteristic of the present era” (as cited in Kagan, 2007). The Cold War, Kagan finds, has made us forget that the more lasting ideological war “has not been between capitalism and communism since the Enlightenment” (cited from Kagan, 2008) but between laissez-faire and autocracy, an war separating the United States from Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a factor breaking Europe itself through the last two centuries. That the end of communism would bring an end to all human disagreements appeared more likely in the last decade of 20th century. It , then appeared that both Russia and China were heading for political and economic changes, unifying all the world super powers for a new era in human progress—mislaid optimism, as both China and Russia, both propped up autocracy ,Kagan regrettably concludes. “Growing national wealth and autocracy have proven compatible, after all”, Kagan notes, and says further, “Autocrats learn and adjust. The autocracies of Russia and China have figured out how to permit open economic activity while suppressing political activity. They have seen that people making money will keep their noses out of politics, especially if they know their noses will be cut off” (cited from E. Singer, 2008). Kagan thinks that 20 years after the end of the Cold War, there is a new split on the world. Majority of the realist theories presume that other powers must certainly unite together poising against the superpower. Some hoped the in the post-Cold War period economic factors find more concerns than politics and thought about a multicultural world would reign with financial lords of Europe, India, Japan, and China in race with the United States. Following the Iraq War and there has been a general belief that American world supremacy is on the wane. The effect of the rise of these two autocratic powers will increase autocracy in some parts of the world, not because Russia and China are stand for autocracy or want to start a worldwide autocratic revolution. It is not the Cold War Brought back. Rather, it is more like the return of the nineteenth century, when the despotic rulers of Russia and Austria supported fellow autocracies — in France, for instance — and used force to suppress liberal movements in Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain. China and Russia may not go to that extreme. But some countries, like Ukraine, has already been a arena between forces aided by the liberal West and that supported by Russia, autocracies obviously providing help to those who are snowed under by the United States and other liberal nations which by its own nature bolstering autocracy in the world as autocrats know they can again find friends and patrons, now (Kagan, 2007). With the help of the three models of diplomacy, political power and economic power, Kagan shows that the faith in political break through economic revival becomes false and the predominance of politics over economy gets lost. He says: “Growing national wealth and autocracy have proven compatible. Autocrats learn and adjust. The Russian and Chinese autocracies have figured out how one can authorize a free market economy and simultaneously suppressing political activity. They have understood that people who make money, stay out of politics, especially when they know that an intervention will let them suffer” (Kagan, as cited in Felix Struening). In the political debate, he worries about a possible end of democracy. Above all, Colin Crouch (2004) explains why democratic society is not any more on the agenda of post-democracy, an idea that sees democracy to be affected by other factors, mainly by the expansion of the principle of profit to non-economic areas. Crouch’s mainly contends is that while modern democracies maintain the facade of democratic principles, “politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the manner characteristic of pre-democratic times” (p. 6). But this theory still considers be is the right form of social system and not to have democracy is a loss (Crouch, 2004). Kagan carefully takes a more open outlook on the question of whether democracy is not only a Eurocentric and U.S. policy model and can be seen from the viewpoint of China and Russia, the Balkans and the Middle East, the superpowers abruptly interfering in the politics of other countries contradicting their own interests. As he says, “This is one of the great schisms in the international system, which divides the democratic world and the autocracies. For three centuries was the law of nations, which regarded any interference in the internal affairs of other nations as inadmissible, but rather on the side of autocracies. Now the democratic world is about to reverse this protection, while autocracies will rush to defend the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty.” He gives the example of the NATO-led toppling of Serbia that Russia tried to stop. On the whole, Kagan touches on a moral inconsistency of the democratic social order, hard to solve. Maintaining democratic value system, sometimes one has to take resort to undemocratic ways, like, the use of armed force, the division between freedom of the citizens and security of the state. In foreign affairs, that every person attribute equal rights in democracy, which may be cut by any state, to impede politically, economically and , sometimes militarily in the inner affairs of other states. But only democracies get these rights, it can be assumed like the European and the Americans value democracy above every other. But in countries like Russia or China, democracy is just another system ,the autocracy still calls the shot. Quite weirdly, these super powers defend and support other autocracies. Whether or is China’s influence in Africa and Asia, or ‘Russian’s support of the Islamic rule in Iran. (Struening, review, Kagan). In the introduction, Kagan explains to the laymen that because of the current geopolitical situation we don’t understand the fallacies and intricacies of democracy. Thus, he indicates, the democratically held elections in the Middle East and North Africa, almost always bolstered Islamic fundamentalists. However, democratic and autocratic regimes have been found simultaneously in the world at many points of time. Typically, one or more governments become the role model for others to follow, whether it be the German empire, the communist Soviet Union regime or the autocracies that now exist in China and Russia. In the 1990s, a number of countries formed democracies following the European model. It was recognized to be to most advanced form of government structure in which political participation and decision making is thought to be most pluralistic. Despite the universal recognition that democratic is superior to autocracy, Kagan maintains that economic growth may come about despite lack of democracy. He says, “The great fallacy of our times is the belief that a liberal international order is based on the triumph of ideas and on the natural unfolding of human progress.” Therefore, even though Russia and China have witnessed faster economic growth than many democratic countries, there is little political freedom in these two countries. If other countries emulate the example of these two countries, there would be a compromise with democratic principles. In such a situation, the multipolar world order would be dismissed. Even in the present times, many of the smaller countries prefer to support the United States, thus leading to a unipolar world, not because there is any ideological adherence but because they feel protected under US shelter against other potential autocracies. Kagan blames George Bush for destroying the multipolar world and creating the unipolar one. According to Kagan, America’s going to war against Iraq was out of character on the part of the large democracy’s history, which has become to be the engine of world growth since the end of World War II and developed military supremacy rather than sharing power with other countries. On the way, the US has advocated liberal democracy as the most superior form of government. Yet, the Iraq War – or the Bush Doctrine that prompted it, was a unilateral act towards regime change in Iraq. Kagan, however, notes, that this is nothing new on the part of the United States, which has attempted regime change in many parts of the world earlier. Hence, America has always believed that it has been working towards the common good of the world. Such belief and act on the part of the US has taken it to take the powerful position in the unipolar world and prevented a multipolar world which seemed possible after the end of the Cold War. Instead, American has taken the center stage of the world economic order and the rest of the world has followed the political principles America showed and suggested. Despite China and Russia attempting to prevent America’s monopoly in the world order militarily and through its oil and gas resources respectively, these countries have so far not been successful. Instead of overthrowing American supremacy, China and Russia remains dependent on American economic might for the purpose of their trade balance. Although it could have been possible for China and Russia to put up a stiff competition to the United States, economically and militarily, if it was joined by other countries in Europe and Asia, these countries have preferred to accept the US as the superpower and has in fact cooperated with the US. Besides, competitiveness among these powers, particularly as most other Asian countries fear being overpowered by China, has turned them towards US protection. Russia’s efforts to increase its influence in the region have created tension with east European countries hence with the European Union. So, there is little likelihood of the remaining powers other than the US joining hands to beat the supremacy of the US in the near future. Hence, it is likely that the world will remain unipolar for quite some time. At the same time, there is growing competition among nations in gaining economic and political strength. As a result, various types of governments, both autocratic and democratic, coexist with shared characteristics of both in each. Therefore, even as China remains politically autocratic, the economy is more democratic. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has managed to maintain its supremacy tenuously because of the growing competition of many other nations. National ambitions of countries from other parts of the world continue threaten its might because of which the US has to adopt various military, political and economic counterstrategies. This is, what Kagan calls, “the return of history”. Works Cited Kagan, Robert, End of Dreams, Returns of History, Policy Review, Aug/Sep2007 Issue 144, p17-44, http://rapidshare.de/files/48501450/Robert_Kagan.pdf Fukuyama, the End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, 2006 E.Singer, David, Democracy, Limited, New York Times, May, 2008 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/books/review/Sanger-t.html Felix Struening, Robert Kagan: The Return of History and the End of Dreams, http://www.germanbookreview.com/robert-kagan-the-return-of-history-and-the-end-of-dreams/ Crouch, Colin, Polity, August 20, 2004 Read More