Civil War History - Essay Example

? Civil War History Q1 However, only few of these factors played a significant role in bringing about defeat to the Confederacy in the American Civil War. Firstly, the North had superiority in terms of manpower and resources. The Union had a population of around 22 million people at the start of the Civil War, compared to the Confederacy’s population of 9 million. Therefore, the North had a greater pool from which to draw troops. In addition, the South dared not arm the 3.5 million troops within its boundaries for fear that they would turn against them and fight for the Union, which was advocating for their rights (Farmer, 2013). Secondly, the Union had a massive advantage in terms of resources. The South’s industrial output could not match that of New York alone, let alone the entire Industrial output of the North. Most of the heavy industries were concentrated in the North, including coal, iron, and woolen production, machine shops, and shipyards. In addition, the Union had far better infrastructure with several times the mileage of well-surfaced roads and canals, and twice the density of railroads. Shipping was a monopoly of Union vessels, and the South had only a handful of shipyards (Beringer, 1988). The third major factor was poor economic management. The Confederacy failed to export its stockpile of cotton at the start of the war before the Union blockade came into full effect. The revenues from exporting this cotton would have provided a sound financial base for undertaking a more effective war effort. Instead, the cotton was stockpiled or burnt. Moreover, the Confederate government chose to print money instead of levying high taxes on its citizens. This resulted in rampant inflation: prices increased 100-fold during the course of the war, devastating the economy and wiping out the savings of southerners. In contrast, the Union financed the war from bonds and taxation, maintaining a sound economy conducive for an effective war effort (Farmer, 2013). Q2 Reconstruction after the American Civil War entailed three major issues: the Social Problem, the Political Problem, and the Constitutional Problem. The policies and strategies adopted by President Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republicans after him were only partly successful. Johnson took up a soft stance towards Reconstruction. He solved the Political Problem and the Constitutional Problem, leaving the Social Problem to persist. Johnson unveiled his Reconstruction Plan in which each Southern state would be allowed back into the Union and has its war debts cancelled, if it withdraws its right of secession and swears allegiance to the Union. He supported the rights of states at the expense of a strong federal government, resolving the Constitutional Problem. As a result, this ‘forgiveness’ policy was successful at incorporating the South back into the Union. Johnson failed to solve the Social Problem regarding slaves by failing to address their issues regarding land acquisition and voting rights. He denied former slaves the right to vote because he believed the South should be managed by white men only (Peacock, 2003). The Radical Republicans solved all the three problems for a short period following the election of Ulysses S. Grant to the presidency in 1868. They introduced the 15th Amendment, which granted African Americans the right to vote as well as protection under the law. They passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867 which granted African Americans all rights of citizenship enabling them access to education, land, public office and equal opportunities, leading to rise in their socio-economic status. The Enforcement Act gave the Grant government power to enforce the Reconstruction Act. As a result, the Southern states lost the right to oversee Reconstruction, which the Federal government took over. However, most of these gains were lost since Reconstruction governments in the South created bitter opposition among Southerners with their harsh measures. Northerners were also growing tired of Reconstruction due to the divisions it was creating and an economic depression which diverted their attention from Reconstruction. As a result, the gains achieved were rapidly reversed from 1873. Therefore, the Reconstruction policies of Johnson and the Radical Republicans were mostly failures (Benedict, 1978). Q3 The extent of American federalism underwent fundamental changes with the introduction of the Reconstruction amendments. These amendments significantly changed the separation of powers in two areas: Firstly, between the three arms of government (judicial, legislative, and executive); secondly, between the federal government and state governments. Power repeatedly shifted between the executive, the judiciary, and the legislative. The 14th Amendment gave considerable power to the judiciary by giving all American citizens equal protection under the state laws. However, the Reconstruction Act of 1867 shifted power from the judiciary to the legislature by replacing civilian courts with tribunal courts set up by Congress (Peacock, 2003). The 15th Amendment ensured Black Suffrage by stating that no one can be prevented from voting due to race or previous condition of servitude. This amendment limited the powers of state executive governments from limiting the rights of former slaves, and empowered the federal government to enforce this law. The 14th amendment considerably limited the power of the states and gave the federal government supremacy over them. Congress acquired supremacy over state legislative organs, with policies enacted by Congress having superseding those of the states on all levels. Similarly, the federal government acquired considerable power over the states to execute new policies, backed by the judiciary which safeguarded enacted laws and policies (McPherson & Hogue, 2010). Q4 The preceding years to the American Civil War were characterized by prosperity of small industry. Most businesses were owned by a single family, entrepreneur, or a small group of stakeholders. The most significant economic impact of the Civil War is that it accelerated industrial growth of the United States. The war effort required massive increase of industrial output so as to satisfy the requirements for troops such as arms and material and still maintain the economic requirements of the population. After the war, the new industries that had come up shifted from the production of wartime material to the production of peacetime products. In addition, the policies of reconstruction implemented after the war increased the industrial growth of the south (Higgs, 1971). Apart from the economic boost provided by wartime production, increased Northern control of the federal government during the war and for several decades later led to increased industrial growth. This is because the Southern states held a strong position in the senate in the decades before the war and the south strongly opposed Northern economic policy, which advocated for tariff expansion and increased industrial production at the expense of agrarian output. Therefore, the North had no choice but to compromise a number of its economic policy objectives. When the southern states seceded, and southern legislators vacated their Congressional seats, the Northern legislators finally acquired the opportunity to enact their delayed economic agenda while at the same time executing the war. Subsequent victory in the war ensured that the North maintained a monopoly of the federal government, introducing and implementing several policies of industrial expansion (Henry, 2008). Q5 General Ulysses S. Grant was the only general of the Union who could equal General Robert E. Lee of the Confederacy. Grant’s victories early in the war threw him into the public eye, and his aggressiveness in the battle field, a trait lacking in many Northern generals, enabled him to retain his post after the disaster at Shiloh. He was a general of immense capability who possessed a high strategic sense and an understanding of the crucial relation between strategy and policy. Grant was Lee’s equal as an operational commander. The Vicksburg campaign serves as testament to Grant’s excellence as an operational commander, whereby his mastery of operational art gifted the Union forces victory. This operational excellence manifested itself again in the way he conducted operations at Forts Donelson and Henry, and at the Chattanooga operation as an army group officer (Fuller, 2007). Grant’s excellence as a general was further demonstrated by how he was able to salvage his only operational setback when he was surprised at Shiloh, but eventually routed the Confederates. Grant was an army commander whose concern rested with the operational level of war. He was at ease with the dynamics of the geographic extensiveness of the western theatre, which favored his preferred maneuver-focused operational approach. Grant’s generalship was crucial in brining victory to the Union. He utilized the Union’s superior manpower and resources in combination with his operational strategies to defeat the Confederate forces whose resources had begun to give out (Bonekemper, 2004). References Benedict, M. L. (1978). Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, Supreme Court Review, 34: 39–79. Beringer, R. (1988). The elements of confederate defeat: nationalism, war aims and religion. Georgia: University of Georgia Press. Bonekemper, E. H. (2004). Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher: The Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc. Farmer, A. (2013, March 3). Why Was the Confederacy Defeated? History Today, 56, 15 – 19. Fuller, J. F. (2007). The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Lightning Source Incorporated. Henry, C.K. (2008). Long-term Effects of the Civil War. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. Higgs, R. (1971). The Transformation of the American Economy, 1865–1914. New York: Oxford University Press. McPherson, J. M. & Hogue, J. (2010). Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 4th Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Education. Peacock, J. (2003). Reconstruction: rebuilding after the civil war. Mankato: Capstone Press. Vatter, H. C. (1975). The Drive to Industrial Maturity: The U.S. Economy, 1860-1914. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.   Read More