The Effects of the Cold War on the Middle East - Essay Example

?The Effects of the Cold War on the Middle East Introduction If the Cold War is deemed as the communism’s conflict with the capitalist west under theheadship of the United States, communism decidedly becomes defeated. The Soviet leadership’s expansionist desire to force communism upon the rest of the earth panicked the wealthy capitalist west whose reaction to the communist expansionism eventually kindled the war. The condition for the communism’ triumph was to bring the whole world under communist rule, whereas the West’s target was to thwart the threat of communism. Eventually with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the West had been able to destroy the main drive of expansionist communism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the remnants of communism were no more threat to the capitalist world. Thus the US-led west proved itself to be the true claimant of communism. Yet the United States’ success to eliminate the threat of communism through the dissolution of the Soviet Union perpetuates the debate on whether the United States as a superpower can, decidedly, declare its authority unchallenged. From a different perspective the Cold War can be viewed as the superpowers’ conflicts of interests. In plain eye, on the Soviet Union’s part, the war was a fight of idealism and on the United States’ part, it was a moral defense against expansionist communism. But beneath both these moralist and idealist apparels lies the superpowers’ contest for a superior position in international politics. Through the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1989, the threat from the communist front simply changed its platform from the communist block to the Islamic block and the Cold War turns into “War on Terror”. Indeed the threat from the extremist Islamists was one of the direct derivatives of the Cold War. Since even after the Cold War, the United States had to face additional Islamic threat, once watered by the Reagan Administration, one can deem that the US did not really win the War; rather the communist just lost it. A Brief Overview of the Cold War The Cold War can be defined as the conflicts of interests between the two superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, in the post Second World War period. It existed from 1947 to 1991. After the Second World War, the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not need the Soviet support any more to win over Japan after testing the atomic bomb, ensuing the 50 years long Cold War. Thus, the Yalta Conference in the Crimea, Soviet Union, in February 1945 between the “Big Three” allies of the Second World War was one such event that structured the start of the Cold War (“The Cold War” 1). Though during the Cold War, ideological, political, economic and military tensions existed at an extreme level, the superpowers did not become involved in any direct war. Rather their military involvements were confined to proxy wars in various geographical regions of interests. Nuclear arm race between the two main parties of the war, the USA and the Soviet Union, began as a response to the superpowers’ desire to overpower each other. During the period, the world experienced a worldwide regrouping of the countries into the US block and the Soviet block. This regrouping in the Soviet block was mainly based on the Marxist political ideology of Communism, whereas capitalism and democratic interests dominated the countries in the US block. This regroupings in both of the blocks often turned into expansionism and counter-expansionism. (Schweizer, 1994, pp. 69-74) Reagan’s Policy to Win the Cold War Reagan’s policy towards the Soviet Union can significantly be marked as a dual approach in the sense that on one hand Reagan’s administration chose to provide both overt and covert support to anti-communist communities and guerrilla movements in order to “roll back” “Soviet-backed communist governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America” (D'Souza, 2003) and on the other hand, it put effort on growing an intimate, but cautious, relationship with the Soviet Authority. In reality, the “Reagan Doctrine meant above all a new American activism in Latin America” (Profiles of US Presidents, n.d.). In October 1983, the Government sent troops into Grenada, a Caribbean island, to exorcise an anti-US communist regime that revealed signs of forging a relationship with the Soviet Union. While the doctrine was intended to diminish the Soviet influence in the Soviet supported countries by opening the door of democracy and capitalism for those nations, its endeavor to grow the United States’ intimacy with Gorbachev’s administration necessarily pushed the pro-reform portion of the Soviet authority to move one step forward towards bringing changes within the country’s political system that eventually brought the abrupt collapse of the regime. A deep analysis of Reagan’s policy will show that the Reagan was aware of the self-devouring nature of the Soviet economy which was then sagging under the expenditure of an unusually large USSR army. During the last several years of the Cold War it became evident that with an unusually large and economically unproductive army that consumed as much as “25 percent of the Soviet Union's gross national product at the expense of consumer goods and investment in civilian sectors” (Lagon, 1994. P. 89) the Soviet authority would be forced to introduce whatever economic reforms needed. Referring to Reagan’s attitude towards the Soviet economy, D'Souza, (2003) says, Reagan did not need a Ph.D. in economics to recognize that any economy based upon centralized planners dictating how much factories should produce, how much people should consume and how social rewards should be distributed was doomed to disastrous failure. For Reagan the Soviet Union was a'sick bear,' and the question was not whether it would collapse, but when. (D'Souza, 2003) Reagan made proper use of this weakness of the Soviet economy; using this opportunity he not only brought the ever-expanding muscular, but hungry, soviet bear back at round table discussion, but also made the Soviet authority more aware of their own crisis by removing the eye-patch of idealistic enthusiasm. Meanwhile Reagan’s resoluteness to build up a sturdy military force and the “scale and pace of the Reagan military buildup” rather worked as a discouraging factor for the expansionist Soviet authority, as D'Souza (2003) says in this regard, “Through the Reagan Doctrine, the United States had completely halted Soviet advances in the Third World — since Reagan assumed office, no more territory had fallen into Moscow's hands” (D'Souza, 2003). Reagan’s Doctrine: The United States’ Visible Victory and Communism collapse under its own Weight Reagan’s military strategy was an essential part of his “rein the demon and wait to see it collapse under its own weight” policy. But other approaches were indeed to hasten the collapse of the “evil empire” under America’s control. Along with Reagan’s resolute rearmament Reagan’s SDI program served a two-fold purpose for Reagan’s policy towards the Soviet Union. First, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiatives was a defensive strategy on America’s at the risk of inviting another arms race. Leaving the traditional track of arms race of producing killer machines, Reagan made it clear to the Soviet authority about the United States’ defensive stance against the offensive communist expansionism. Secondly, the SDI program was a non-offensive armored challenge from the Reagan Administration to the economically self-devouring Soviet Army that then, if wanted, could intercept, but obviously they could not win. Thus Reagan made the country’s economic fragility obvious to the Soviet leadership. Reagan’s stance regarding the arm race and his policy to make the Soviet economic fragility more obvious are evident in one of his speeches: “We won't stand by and let you maintain weapon superiority over us. We can agree to reduce arms, or we can continue the arms race, which I think you know you can't win.” (Lagon, 1994, p. 67) Indeed Reagan's SDI program provoked the Soviet leaderships into another kind of arms race that they could hardly afford. Eventually Reagan’s policy worked and after 1985, the Soviet leaderships decided to try something different that was vividly evident in Gorbachev’s reformative approach (Nigel, 2006, p. 44-9). In this regard D’Souza (2003) says, It was Reagan, in other words, who seems to have been largely responsible for inducing a loss of nerve that caused Moscow to seek a new approach. Gorbachev's assignment was not merely to find a new way to deal with the country's economic problems but also to figure out how to cope with the empire's reversals abroad. (D’Souza, 2003) In fact what motive worked behind this policy of Reagan was to keep the economically fragile Soviet Union under control and let it collapse. By growing the fear of a rapid military build-up through events such as direct military invasion on Grenada, and by forcing the Soviets to wallow amid heavy damages and losses in Afghanistan, Reagan Doctrine successfully kept the regime away from further invasions. The Soviets did not dare to take any more risk of involving themselves in situations like Afghanistan. The possibility of accumulation resources that the soviet economy needed was annihilated. Reagan’s strategy was to enhance the regime’s economic appetite and let it be weaker, and thus to push the soviet leaders to bring a change on their own. Referring to Reagan’s policy, Ilya Zaslavsky, “who served in the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, said later that the true originator of perestroika and glasnost was not Mikhail Gorbachev but Ronald Reagan” (D’Souza, 2003). Communism Collapse: The United States Still in Cold-war-induced Threats It is right that the communist Soviet Union collapsed. Yet the United States could not claim its victory, since the country was still under the cold-war-induced threat, that is, Islamic Extremism, proliferated internationally after the war, while greatly inspired by the success of the Afghan Muzhids during the Cold War. The effects of the Cold War on the socio-political affairs in the Middle East were very diverse and discursive in nature due to a number of economic, historical, political and religious causes such the Arab-Israel antagonism, the overt anti-religious nature of Communism, the vast reserve of furnace oil in the Middle Eastern countries, the non-democratic and most likely monarchic political systems in those countries during the Cold War and Islam as the religion of the majority of the people in the Middle East. Since most of the political governments of the Middle East were non-democratic and, to a great extent, monarchic after the Second World War up to 2000, the then rulers were forced to take shelter either in the US block or the Soviet in order to survive in the countries’ power with the support of any of the two superpowers. Also due to the vast reserve of oil, the Middle Eastern countries were strategically important for both of the superpowers (Garthoff, 1994, pp. 48-56). Therefore, the rulers of these countries needed backings of any of these two superpowers against the expansionist invasions of the others. Before the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the Arab countries were more or less neutral, though because of being geographically close to the Soviet Union and the overt US support for Israel in this region, the countries were more influenced by the Soviet Leaders. Because of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the countries were alarmed; they began to feel the threat from the Soviet Union’s aggressive nature. Meanwhile, the Islamists’ victory in the Iranian Revolution gave rise to the Islamic wave in the region. These Islamic uprisings were threatening to both the monarchies and the anti-religious communist influence in the region. Almost concurrently the Arabs’ defeat in the Arab-Israel War of 1967 due to the Soviet Union’s callous support gave birth to an anti-Soviet sentiment among the Arabs. As a result, the Soviet influence began to be swayed and the US influence on the Middle Easter countries began to increase. (Norman, p. 4) Mujahidin’s Success during the Cold War: Inspiration of the Islamist to pose challenge against the US The presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was being viewed by the common Muslims as an aggression to a Muslim country, and therefore, as a threat to the Muslim world. Consequently anti-Soviet sentiment swept over the Middle East, giving the Islamists, especially the Iranian Islamic revolutionists, an opportunity to be morally and popularly strong. Afghanistan became the battleground of the Cold War when the Soviet troops landed on its soil in December 1979 in support of the Afghanistan’s Marxist government led by its ex-Prime-minister, Nur Muhammad Taraki. The US had been providing support to the Mujahidin insurgency against the Soviet-supported Marxist government even before the arrival of Russian forces there (Garthoff, 1994, pp. 34-8). This fact was revealed in an interview by the French weekly newsmagazine Le Nouvel Observateur by the US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Cold War between the then Superpowers was an extension of their desire to become world leader by waging a proxy war into which the US wanted to confirm that the Soviet would not be able establish its control on the Arabian Sea that is several hundred miles from Afghanistan’s southern border. The secret American support to the Mujahidin was a trap for the Russians so that America could back out from SALT II treaty from the Senate (War in Afghanistan, pp. 1-4). The Iranian Revolution itself was a direct consequence of the Cold War and it further impacted the political affairs as well as the Soviet influence in the Middle Eastern countries. Since Iran was the largest Oil enriched country that shared a long border with the Soviet Union, the country was strategically and economically important for both America and the Soviet Union. The USA and the UK jointly planned the overthrow of the elected government of Mossadeh and enthroned the Shah Government. But the US-backed Shah Government fueled the anti-American sentiment both in the country and the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Islamists were emergent all over the Middle East due to the growing insurgence against the US role in Arab-Israel conflicts. Instead of being sympathetic to the revolution against Shah’s despotism the US officials continually assured that America would give the regime military support. The US role in the pre-Revolutionary plot fueled the cause of the Islamists to stage the Revolution, thus losing influence on the country. But this indirect defeat of the US in Iran through the Islamic Revolution determined the future roles of the Superpowers in the Middle East in the 1980s. In the same year of the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Union began to deploy its troops in Afghanistan. Historians argue that the Soviet Invasion was inspired by the mutilated US influence in Iran. Conclusion The Cold War ended through the collapse of the Communist Soviet Union. Still the United States did not win the war, since the country is fighting the Cold War-induced threats around the world. According to Mamdani, the 9/11 is not the result of the clash of civilizations but the outcome of the latest history of the Late Cold War. The period of the Cold War actually starts at the end of the Second World War to the downfall of Soviet Union in 1989, ensuing a period of proxy war till the latest war in Iraq. The proxy war represented two distinct features that of America pursuing a foreign policy of Reagan’s presidency. One finds similar traits in the policies of Reagan and Bush, throwing light on their “War on Terror” framework after 9/11. The Reagan administration saw the Islamic revolution in Iran and other revolutions as the starting of a new trend of anti-American governments after Vietnam. Consequently, America was getting ready for a war against the Soviet Union on the European battleground. According to Mamdani, militant nationalists were presented by the Reagan administration as if they were Soviet proxies. Thus, a changeover in American approach and planning for low-level conflicts emerged (M. Mamdani 12). America shifted in its approach from “containment” to “rollback” through all means of waging proxy wars against “evil empires”, starting immorally useful talk with the apartheid rule in South Africa. Political terror was employed to underscore the nationalist governments in Africa, shifting the proxy war battlegrounds to rest of the world including the Middle East in the late seventies (Cordesman 2). It brought a change in its political terror approach by befriending al-Qaeda later and Taliban in Afghanistan. Actually, they were American allies in the cold war. America wanted to win “by all means necessary”, matching by a phrase “by hook or crook”.9/11 needs to be taken as an aftermath of sour relations because of incomplete American aims of the Cold War (M. Mamdani 13). References “Cold War.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 28 February 2011. 28 February 2011 . Cordesman, Anthony H. “Lessons of Post-Cold War Conflict: Middle Eastern Lessons and Perspectives”. 27 May 2004. 11 March 2011 Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. Amazon.com. 2005. 5 March 2011 Norman, L. Robin. “The Cold War and the Middle East From 1945 to 2001”, 14 July 2002. 30 February 2011. Available at “Soviet War in Afghanistan.” Answers.com. 2011. 28 February 2011 “The Cold War,” Disney: ABC News Classroom Edition. 28 February 2003. 30 February 2011 . D'Souza, D. (October, 2003). “President Ronald Reagan: Winning the Cold War”, American History. Retrieved October 18, 2011 from http://www.historynet.com/president-ronald-reagan-winning-the-cold-war.htm Garthoff, R. L. (1994). The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War, Brookings Institution. Lagon, P. M. (1994). 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