To What Extent Public Opinion Affected Lyndon Johnsons Decision on the Guns vs Butter Dilemma - Research Paper Example

? Vietnam War vs. the Great Society: To What Extent Public Opinion Affected Lyndon Johnson’s Decision on the ‘Guns vs. Butter’ Dilemma Lyndon B. Johnson and the Vietnam War: The Impact of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Introduction Bernstein writes that Lyndon Johnson’s presidency had started with the catastrophe of John Kennedy’s assassination and closed in the mire of the Vietnam War1. This short sentence, however, embraces five painful years of turmoil, racial conflicts and riots, student unrest, and to cap it all, demonstrations by the war opponents. This period is considered a highly trying time to be a president2, especially of the United States in their capacity of a leader of the free world, as well as the standard of democracy and rule of law. On the other hand, President Johnson appeared to be somehow tragically short-changed – according to Bernstein – being inevitably charged with the wrongs, he has never been credited with the rights of the then internal and international situation3. The aforesaid might account for the fact that Lyndon Johnson is ranked relatively low among the American presidents4. Nevertheless, his presidency is believed to have started more or less successfully – having won a landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964, which had given him a comfortable Democratic majority willing to work with him5, Johnson took the responsibility to unite the nation after the Dallas assassination and persuaded the Congress to enact his massive legislative program, which gained popularity as the Great Society program – a term coined by Johnson in a speech at the University of Michigan in 19646. By that time, Lyndon Johnson was beginning to become more and more involved in a conflict, which, in actual fact, had begun nine years earlier, namely in 1955, and which, according to Lunch and Sperlich, was of little concern to two-thirds of the American people7. Thus, the choice between guns and butter, or in other words between investment in public goods and defense - a dilemma which is thought to have emerged at some point in the twentieth century - appears rather characteristic of Lyndon Johnston’s presidency. Moreover, while Johnston was a priori constrained by the Cold War arms race, and the Soviet/Communist aspirations to dominate the system of international relations, he strived to achieve a comfortable domestic economic and social climate, which to cater for the Great Society vision. In order to expand on the existing literature concerning the ‘Guns vs. Butter’ metaphor, this paper will examine how public opinion in the United States influenced the decisions made in Washington during Johnson’s years. The paper also attempts to assess the degree to which Johnson’s decisions to escalate, or seek a negotiated end to, the Vietnam War could be seen as a reaction to American public opinion; as well as the extent to which the lack of public support for the conflict in Southeast Asia overshadowed Johnson’s efforts to build the “Great Society”, and contributed to a deterioration of his public image. In doing so, the paper examines a number of opinion polls conducted by Gallup during the Johnson’s era, as well as articles of The New York Times, which would shed light on the issue of media’s impact upon Johnson. The newspaper articles would also present a clue in the change of public perceptions of failure and success during the Vietnam War, the progress and evolution of the anti-war movement, and the recognition, or lack thereof, in Johnson’s attempts to build the ‘Great Society’. South Vietnam in 1964 – a Limited war for Limited Objectives The number of American military advisors in Vietnam had already been increased to about 16 000 by 1963, and according to Dallek, although President Kennedy appeared willing to commence withdrawal after his reelection8, the American involvement in what the general public considered by then a civil conflict in a faraway country was more or less a fait accompli. In marked contrast to Lyndon Johnson’s contemporaries, many historians recognize that the legacy JFK left behind was rather uneasy – problems and tension abroad, including the ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union and the rampant arms race as a natural concomitant. On the other hand, the probability of losing another country (besides Cuba) to communism had the potential to create a major domestic political problem9; let alone the high popularity of the late President, which inevitably raised the stakes for his successor. Additionally, having believed that “the one thing a bully understands is force and the one thing he fears is courage”10, Johnson unequivocally stated in a TV interview in 1964 that the American government must do everything it can in order to prevent the “loss” of Vietnam and the other countries in the region of Southeast Asia – in accordance with Kennedy’s view of the “falling domino” effect11. The Gulf of Tonkin crisis, which involved the American destroyer U.S.S. Maddox and North Vietnamese torpedo boats, along with the subsequent Gulf of Tonkin resolution of the US Congress, enacted on 7 August 1964, giving the president the authority to take the necessary measures in order to defend the American forces in Southeast Asia12, appeared the “benchmarks” for the further American involvement, being defined by the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as fulfillment of the US’s SEATO commitment13. By that time, the rapidly worsening military situation in the region had made the Administration to realize that “the dimensions and kinds of effort so far invested could not hope to reverse the trend”14; which, in turn, required either a withdrawal, or to embrace the possibility of a considerable increase of American troops, material, and money in the conflict area. In order to avoid the former, i.e. to abandon Saigon to its destiny, admitting defeat and thus inflicting serious damage to the US reputation, as well as suffering the consequences, both home and abroad, Johnson Administration quite understandably chose the second option. In outlining the basic themes of the US policy in Southeast Asia, some two months before the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson clearly declared his resolution to maintain steadfast US position on the conflict, stating that “America keeps her world”15. Given the peculiarities of the then international situation in the context of the Soviet-American rivalry worldwide, along with the possible domestic political implications for the Administration and President Johnson himself - namely accusations of inability to pursue American interests and defend American forces abroad - the retaliatory strikes on targets in North Vietnam, including torpedo boat bases and oil storage facilities, known as operation Pierce Arrow16, along with the enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, came as anything but surprise17. Thus, according to some analysts, the Congress resolution and the US military response, which showed that Johnson was tough enough in protecting American freedom on the high seas, as well as responding in a responsible manner, were timely18. However, in regard to Lyndon Johnson’s relationship with the public opinion, it’s noteworthy that the information concerning the Gulf of Tonkin incidents had been highly exaggerated, thus providing the President with the necessary justification for the unpopular and uneasy decisions that followed; as well as pushing the Congress to issue him the “blank check” – the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution – to wage war against North Vietnam without a formal declaration of war19. Although some analysts define these events as “the escalation genie” being out of the bottle and President’s ability to control the situation as missing ever since, Lyndon Johnson entered the 1964 presidential election pretty much confident in his leadership and bright enough political, diplomatic, and economic prospects20. The Great Society – Vision and Realities On 22 May 1964, Lyndon Johnson delivered a rousing speech at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, proclaiming his vision of a future American society, which “rests on abundance and liberty for all”, as well as “demands an end to poverty and racial injustice”21. The Great Society, in Johnson’s words, was also seen as “a place where every child can find knowledge to enrich his mind and to enlarge his talents”, and “a place where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods”; but not a “safe harbor” or “a finished work”22. Thus, Johnson emphasized the necessity of constant efforts aimed at building the Great Society – in the American cities, in the American countryside, and in the American classrooms23. Behind these moving words, however, could be found a whole new rational legislative program, including federal aid to education, a large-scale fight against poverty, conservation, development of depressed regions and urban renewal, as well as prevention of crime, and removal of right to vote obstacles24. The program had actually become Johnson’s agenda for the Congress in 196525. Johnson’s strong commitment to education, as a Great Society’s top priority, was not only personified by his words before the audience in Ann Arbor, but also with the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, via whose budget, public and private schools received federal money and services, including library funding, etc.; particular emphasis was laid on the districts where large proportions of the students were from poor families26. The war on poverty was another important constituent part of the great Society program and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 appeared the centerpiece of this effort27, along with other economic measures and business stimuli, like the cut in excise tax that was introduced in 196528. Broadly speaking, in 1964, Johnson had both the votes and the revenues to make his Great Society legislative program feasible, and as Wicker writes, “there were exciting worlds to conquer”29. The Vietnam War, 1965 -1968 – the America’s Nightmare In his State of the Union Address on January 4, 1965, Lyndon Johnson once again confirmed his steadfastness to stick to the American commitment to peace in Southeast Asia, but only “when the aggressors leave their neighbors in peace”; thus, stressing not only his Administration’s resolution in opposing a communist aggression wherever it occurs, but also the continuity in American foreign policy30. Having referred to the “pledge” given and supported by his predecessors, most notably JFK, Johnson might have attempted to employ their undoubted popularity and share certain responsibility, to a degree or another, in regard to US policy in the region of Southeast Asia, while longing for the approval of the Eastern establishment; and thus to confront the issue of his own image, “rooted in the picture of the classic Texas gunslinger”, unable to recognize the nuances of the surrounding world, as well as prone to violence31. Whatever the motives behind these declarations might have been, the initiation of airstrikes on targets in Northern Vietnam and the introduction of American combat troops in the region had actually shown that Johnson meant business. On the other hand, the series of attacks launched by Vietcong forces across South Vietnam between January 1st and 7 February 1965, including the seizure of Binh Gia, a village located some forty miles from Saigon, which resulted in five American advisors being killed32, required certain government’s position on the issue. And once again, Johnson reacted in accordance with his image, or one of his images to be precise, associated with his identity, namely “committed to the defense of good against evil”33. Having addressed the audience at John Hopkins University, in Baltimore, Maryland on 7 April 1965, Johnson simply reiterated his earlier arguments – “We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam”, and confirmed – “…I intend to keep that promise”34. As Larry L. King notices, Johnson was obsessed with the communist aggression in Vietnam, making reference to Munich and the lessons of appeasement35. This was not only seen in Johnson’s rhetoric – “The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy”36 – but also, and especially, in both decisions and actions of his administration, namely the Americanization of the Vietnam War. Thus, as of February 1965, Johnson and his advisors undertook drastic steps toward prevention of what was seen as pending severe damage to the American international prestige and influence – the real probability of losing South Vietnam – sending the US air forces in bombing campaign over North Vietnam and the US marines in the South37. Insofar as this kind of stance was more or less expected, what deserves particular attention, however, is the fact that the Americanization of the conflict took place in such a stealthy way that the US general public had been hardly aware of the change.38 In other words, according to the reporter David Halberstam, later cited by L. King, the US Administration crossed Rubicon “without even admitting it, and the task of their press secretaries was to misinform the public”; which misinformation is thought to have included almost everything from costs and casualties to victories and build-ups39. With over 75 000 American troops in Vietnam by June 1965, and much more pouring in during the years to come, the escalation is deemed to have reeled out of the US Administration’s control; to reach the staggering figures of more than 500 000 American soldiers fighting in the region in 1968, and over 58 000 American casualties by the end of the war. The Great Society – Guns vs. Butter In 1966, according to Wicker, Lyndon Johnson had much less major items to present in regard to the Great Society program; at least nothing of the scale of the secondary education bill40. The past year of “resentments and frustrations” is thought to have lessened the Congress’s support for the President; while the situation was getting even worse with the uncertainties over Vietnam, the racial unrest at home, the state of the economy, and, of course, the oncoming election in November41. The growing costs of the Vietnam War were expected to force Johnson to raise the income tax – yet another blow to the Great Society program – while attempting to make “sufficiently good start” on some of its constituent parts42. Thus, Johnson’s objectives in the new Congress session were seen as rather modest, mainly reduced to the following – to secure necessary support for his policy in Southeast Asia, to avoid stimulating inflation and too much discontent among taxpayers, and finally, to secure enough “attractive record of legislative accomplishment” for the Democratic Party in order to successfully run the oncoming election campaign43. In regard to the Great Society area, there was a bill to raise the minimum wage and extend its coverage, which was pending in the House; as well as expectations for either comprehensive transportation bill or measures to improve railroad service and urban mass transit44. Additionally, measures in health and new programs in higher education were expected, along with a new civil rights bill “attempting to prevent some of the injustices of all-white Southern juries”45. At the same time, a supplemental appropriation bill for the war in Vietnam was estimated to total 12 to 14 billion dollars, which, when added to the military spending budget for 1967, was expected to contribute to the staggering military expenditures’ figure of 60 billion dollars46. Not surprisingly therefore, Robert Kennedy called on Johnson to seek Congressional approval before undertaking further increase in troop number in Vietnam, although the President had no such constitutional duty47. The Public Opinion It was not before the spring of 1966 - in fact 11 years after the first American military personnel entered Vietnam - when an academic study team reported that most Americans appeared willing to follow the presidential decisions in this area – whether toward escalation of the war or toward some form of negotiated end48. This, to a degree or another, came to confirm what Seymour Martin Lipset wrote in the same year - “President makes opinion, he doesn’t follow it”4950. The popular uneasiness about Vietnam, however, is thought to have begun between the mid-1966 and 1967, when an increasing number of people started telling the pollsters that the United States’ involvement in the Vietnamese war was more or less a “mistake”51. Nevertheless, most people favored escalation of the war in 1967, which was not that surprising in regard to administration policy of slow escalation of the American involvement52 and limited, if not distorted, information on issues, like costs and casualties. There were two types of questions in regard to Vietnam opinion polls – the so-called “mistake” question and “policy alternative” question; the “mistake” question was formulated by the Gallup organization as follows: “In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?”53 The Gallup organization asked the “mistake” question using the aforementioned wording from 1965 to 1971, thus making possible comparisons over time54. Although being generally considered an advantage, the particular formulation of this question is also thought to have created a “problem of inference’55. For example, respondents who might consider the American involvement in Vietnamese war to be a mistake, could still support the presidential policy, even if the policy called for escalation of that involvement56. Thus, the percentage of “yes” responses had been taken for opposition of the war; while the equation appeared rather more complicated57. The difference is demonstrated by a study conducted in 1969 by Harris polling organization, in which 80 percent of the respondents indicated that the US involvement in Vietnam was a “mistake”, but only 36 percent favored withdrawal as the correct policy to be followed58. In regard to the “mistake” question asked, the support for the war was as follows: as of August 1965, sixty-one percent said no, while during 1966, the percentage widely varied – 59 percent in March, 49 percent in May, 48 percent in September and 51 percent in September respectively59. The percentage of those who regarded the US involvement in Vietnamese war as correct might have followed the news of the battlefield, or at least the information that appeared in the mass media, while the American involvement in the conflict continued to grow. Nevertheless, after the initial period of “rally-round-the-flag”60, as described by Lunch and Sperlich, the Americans began gradually to move away from unquestioned acceptance of presidential policy61. The slightly improved support for the escalation policy from November 1966 to February1967 was followed by considerable deterioration in support percentage, since the large proportion of the general public which favored that course steadily began to drop off62. From that time on, escalation continued to lose support until May 1971, when the pollsters stopped asking the question63. According to Gallup, by the end of the direct American involvement most Americans regarded the prospect of renewed military effort in Vietnam as unacceptable; which is demonstrated by 79 percent opposition to the re-intervention of American troops in Vietnam, at the time of Paris peace accords in 1973, even “if North Vietnam were to try to take over South Vietnam”64. The figures regarding the withdrawal issue, however, appeared to have told quite different story, indicating that for the period between late 1964 and late 1968, the support for this option had never went beyond 20 percent65. Additionally, in 1967, the support for withdrawal dropped off to 6 percent and although having begun to increase, it broke through the 20 percent level as early as after the 1968 election66. From that point on, the preference for withdrawal policy steadily increased until it had become the preferred policy among the Americans67. Lyndon Johnson vs. Public Opinion From the very beginning of his presidency, after the landslide victory in 1964 election, Johnson was faced with the necessity to make tough decisions. These include the retaliation strikes after the Gulf of Tonkin “incidents” and the subsequent Congressional resolution in 1964, and most notably Operation Rolling Thunder, which finally resulted in Americanization of the Vietnamese conflict68. As the American troops had taken the brunt of the fighting in Vietnam, the American military casualties mounted dramatically over time, which in turn brought to the rise of a noisy and mobilized antiwar movement.69 The American nation became greatly divided on the war issue, but the opinion polls, as seen from the previous section, were rather ambiguous in regard to the public support for Johnson’s policy in the region of Southeast Asia. Johnson’s domestic initiatives, which appeared constituent parts of his Great Society program, were more or less hampered by the enormous cost of the Vietnam War. However, the introduction of legislation stage that is considered to have completed the US social transformation, having begun with Roosevelt’s New Deal, paints a bit rosier picture of the then situation70. According to Bator, the biggest concern of Lyndon Johnson in July 1965 had been the implementation of his Great Society vision; with the forty extra Congressional seats in 1964, Johnson believed he had two-year of opportunity71. The conflict in Vietnam, however, faced him with the guns vs. butter dilemma, insofar as he appeared keen not only to fulfill his domestic promises, but also to keep the promises in the international arena72. Being also confronted with the probability to provoke a coalition between conservative Republicans and Deep South senators, who appeared determined to block the civil rights legislation, Johnson preferred to sign off on Gen. Westmoreland minimum numbers73. Thus, according to Bator, he entered the war with minimum fuss - there were neither prime-time speeches, nor call-up of reserves, drumming up of support, tax increase, etc.74. This move appears especially demonstrative of Lyndon Johnson’s way of following his policy objectives. On the other hand, Lyndon Johnson, like other Democratic politicians of his generation, appeared traumatized by Truman’s presidency “failures” - as denounced by Dwight Eisenhower – regarding China, Korea, and Communism as a whole75. The probable question “who lost Vietnam” had been hanging over Johnson’s head like a sword of Damocles, with the enormous potential to destroy not only his presidency, but also the Great Society program with it76. Therefore, according to Johnson’s contemporaries, the President stuck to Eisenhower & Kennedy’s commitment to help South Vietnam, fearing the opposite would force him to share Truman’s destiny77. Ironically, despite Johnson’s efforts and steadfastness in regard to the Vietnam War, that was exactly what happened. After the TET offensive, in January 1968, Johnson announced his retirement from politics78. Conclusion Given accounts of Johnson’s personality, as well as the way he conducted his domestic and foreign policies, it’s highly unlikely that his decisions and actions, especially concerning the conflict in Vietnam, were provoked or influenced by the American public opinion. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that Johnson even used several methods to counter negative polls, publicizing opposite results, attacking the interpretations and the very methods of the polls.79 Thus, he persistently attempted to sidestep and influence the public opinion, while balancing between the Vietnam War and the Great Society program. Bibliography Americans on the War: Divided, Glum, Unwilling to Quit,” Time magazine (October 31, 1969): 13-14 Andrew L. Johns, “Doves Among Hawks: Republican Opposition to the Vietnam War, 1964-1968.” Peace & Change, 31, No 4 (October 2006): 585- 628. Peace History Society and Peace and Justice Studies Association. Battlefield: Vietnam, Timeline 1965-1966.” Biographile. Accessed 30 March 2012, http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/index1.html Bruce E. Altschuler, “Lyndon Johnson and the Public Polls,” Public Opinion Quarterly 50/3 (Autumn 1986), 285-299 G. David Garson, “Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.” http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/751/769950/Documents_Library/eoa1964.htm George H. Gallup, ed. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971. Vol.3, 1959-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972) George Gallup, "Gallup Poll on Peace Settlement." San Francisco Chronicle, home edition, (January 31, 1973), p. 12. Cited in William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam.” The Western Political Quarterly, 32, No1 (March 1979): 21-44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/447561 Francis M. Bator, No Good Choices: LBJ and the Vietnam/Great Society Connection, (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007) Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) Larry L. King, “Trapped: Lyndon Johnson and the Nightmare of Vietnam” in Outlaws, Con Men, Whores, Politicians and Other Artists (Viking Press, 1980) Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan (May 22, 1964) Miller Center, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3383 Mitchell Lerner, “Four Years and a World of Difference: The Evolution of Lyndon Johnson and American Foreign Policy.” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 107, No1 (Jul., 2003): 68-95. p.69. Accessed 30 March 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30239425 Pentagon Papers, Part V.A – Vol. II: Justification of the War - Public Statements, D. Johnson Administration. TV Interview with President Johnson, 15 March 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents, Johnson, 1963-1964, p.370. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3, by NWD: 2011. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/205536/pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.pdf Pentagon Papers, Part V.A – Vol. II: Justification of the War - Public Statements, D. Johnson Administration. “United States Policy in Vietnam,” by Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 26 March 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 13 April 1964, p.562. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3, by NWD: 2011. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/205536/pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.pdf Pentagon Papers, Part V.A – Vol. II: Justification of the War - Public Statements, D. Johnson Administration. “Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia”, Address by President Johnson at John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland on April 7, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, p.607. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3, by NWD: 2011, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/205536/pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.pdf Richard Reitano, “LBJ Goes to War.” OAH Magazine of History, 18, No5 (October 2004): 27-31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25163719 Robert K. Murray and Tim Blessing, Greatness of the White House (University Park: the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1944) Seymour Martin Lipset, "The President, the Polls, and Vietnam, "Trans-Action3 (September/October1966): 20-22. Tom Wicker, “Big Issue for Congress – Great Society vs. Vietnam War.” The New York Times, January 9, 1966 William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam.” The Western Political Quarterly, 32, No1 (March 1979): 21-44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/447561 Read More