The Regime Theory - Essay Example

The Regime Theory Regime and its definition The international relations and international regime is a subject that is wide ranging and has no clear boundaries. The aspect of international relations is as old as as trade and the written history. Currently, no point on the globe has been left untouched by overseas countries and markets, or the manipulation of powerful state actors. The relations between nations have been formulated and explained under three theories. These are the realist theory, liberal theory and the constructivist theory. Realist theory on international relations views nations (actors) as rivals and that every nation wants to be powerful. As such, every nation wants to subdue others to retain its power. Liberal theory of international relations views the world system as a system that is governed by laws, rules and order. The constructivist theory regards states as persons who live in a world of their making (Behravesh 2011). Thus, individual states as actors in the international system act and carry out activities in their own way. This discussion looks into international regime, economic and security regimes and their attributes, as well as testing whether GCC has characteristics of a regime. Stephan Krasner explains international regime as a set of standards, rules, norms and decision making events around which actor expectations come together in a given concern area of international relations (Krasner 1983). Krasner drew his analysis from the multinational enterprises and the new economic order of 1974 that set the meaning of rules, principles and decision making events in the real world. Krasner observes that the existing on the values that view foreign direct investment do good to both business persons and the states in which they are invested. As such, national and multinational firms are to be treated equally as customs of the regime. In regulations and choice making dealings, multinational conglomerates are allowed to petition to home-country governments. Volker Rittberger challenges Krasner’s view on regimes, holding “paper regimes” cannot be termed as international regimes. Rittberger notes that clear rules and norms do not necessarily indicate the existence of an international regime. For an international regime to be said to exist, the rules and norms must be operative, so as to specify the impact of international regimes. International regimes are almost similar to global organizations and global treaties (Neumayer, nd). Nevertheless, international regimes are theoretical institutions that are not material occurrences, not like global organizations that have material existence with budgets and personnel staff (Mayer and Rittberger 1997). International regimes have rules that act as international treaties and inherent customs, as well. International regime does not change with the changes in decision making and rules. Rather, the change in decision making criteria signifies a change within an international regime. Nonetheless, a change in the international regime itself happens when principles and norms change (Keohane, n.d.). Differences between economic regime and security regime The regime theory has for a long time addressed on how cooperation can be achieved and sustained in a world that is divided into independent national states. Regime theory has addressed the aspect of cooperation with regards to the environment, economics, security and finance. One of the major contributions of the economic theory of the international regime and cooperation has been an elucidation of what the absence of a central authority in international affairs implies for the scope and depth of cooperation (Keohane and Martin 1995). Cooperation and conflicts are key concepts employed in economic theory and power in the international regime. Keohane defines cooperation as a process that necessitates that the acts of different persons or entities that are not in prevailing agreement be got into compliance with each other through the negotiation process (Keohane, n.d.). Conflict refers to the confrontation and clash over divergent interests. The difference between conflict and cooperation is the lack of harmony between and among nations, with the chief difference being whether the actors are willing to change their behavior to each other. Economic cooperation in economic regime occurs when the strategies in reality pursued by one administration are also adopted by another state with the aim of promoting trade. Economic regime operates under several assumptions. One of the assumptions is that economic regime is utilitarian as it takes that all aspects of decision making may be captured by utility pertinent costs and benefits and that actors maximize a utility function. Secondly, economic regime assumes actors in the international system are rational thinkers, who take into account all available information. The third assumption is that economic regime takes a game theory analysis assuming that there is a unitary actor. Finally, economic regime takes that the unitary actor is faced with a well-specified payoff matrix (Mearsheimer 1995). The four assumptions are somehow restrictive, although they are warranted in order to make a tractable representation that results in testable propositions. Economic theory of international cooperation takes the ideology of cooperation under anarchy seriously and has advanced the notions of self-enforcing and renegotiation proof agreements. Countries are faced with the prisoner’s dilemma in that countries seek to reduce production costs, and all countries are better off with international economic cooperation, but each them has an incentive to free ride on the others’ endeavors and to enjoy the benefits of decreasing without incurring any of the cost. The key to solving this prisoner’s dilemma is for each state to convince others that they have a cooperative concern in incurring temporary sacrifices for the sake of permanent benefits (Herbert 1996). The concept of renegotiation proof is pertinent and significant in international relations. The reason is that assumption of cooperation under anarchism is possible is usually directly or indirectly founded on the game theory. The game theory implies that full cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma may be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if the discount rate is adequately small. Security regime of international relations confronts the concern on how to prevent war, as well as the concern on legitimate war, just ad bellum. Security regime theory begins with the assumption that force will continue regardless of the global politics and that states have to guard against potential aggressors. The threat of war may nevertheless, may be largely diminished by challenging the realists thinking with regards to state behavior, and replacing it with anti-realist norms. States should turn down the use of force in changing the status quo (Wan 2001). Security regime theory also stresses that responsible states should not take action on the foundation of their own thin individual interest in dealing with states that violate the peace norm and threaten or start the war (Oshiba 1994). Instead, responsible states should hold back the inducement to react in any manner would make the most of their individual gains, and directly come together to face the attacker with the danger of overpowering power. The security regime also proposes that states should treat each other to relinquish hostility and to mean that abandonment. States must be confident that other countries will come to their salvage should they become the object of belligerence. The security regime also highlights on war legitimacy that is, justice to go to war, and fairness in the ways and manners of war (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Global regimes and doctrine that surge from legitimate war occupy some ontological ground. The collective security regime is founded on the United Nations Charter that provides inter alia, that non-self distrustful warfare are disallowed, except in circumstances authorized by the United Nations Security Council on collective implementation (Heinze 2012). Collective security regime stresses that self defense rule is actually superlative and a just cause, and further highlights particular exceptions for the collective enforcement. Reasons why economics regime is easier that security regime International dealings are not a steady situation of hostilities, but it is a state of persistent security rivalry, with the probability of war always in the background. The intensity of that competition changes from case to case. Though it may seem counterintuitive, states do often cooperate in this competitive. Nevertheless, cooperation among states has its limits as it is limited by the dominating judgment of security antagonism, which no quantity of cooperation may eradicate. Genuine peace is not likely to result as states are busy competing for power. Economics regime is simpler than security regime since the world system is made up of sovereign states that have no central authority above them (Rittberger, Mayer and Hasenclever, nd). This implies that there is no government over governments as there is no higher ruling body in the international system. Secondly, states intrinsically seize some unpleasant armed capacity that provides them with the means to hurt and, probably, to wipe out each other. The military power of a state is often identified with specific armaments at its disposal. However, even if there were no weapons, the citizens of a state can still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another country. Another explanation why economic regime is easier than security regime is because it is not easy to anticipate the intentions of another state, unlike in economic regime where a state can anticipate the economic decisions of another (European Union 2013). No state may be certain that another will not utilize its destructive military capacity against it. A state may be consistently benevolent, although it is impossible to be certain of such judgment as intents are impossible to define with certainty. Whether GCC has characteristics of a regime The Mediterranean region erupted into a series of war and revolutions in 2011, which sent shock of waves throughout the region from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya to Syria. The Syrian crisis is continuing and has been that way for more that 18 months. Two years into the Arab transitions, differences between the national encounters tend to outweigh the similarities, and the region appears more disjointed that it was at the emergence of the transformation. This fragmentation has led to changing the balance of supremacy at both the nationwide and worldwide levels. The Arab Spring has affected the internal and external conversation, decisions of countries making up the gulf cooperation council (Colombo, et al. 2012). The six GCC states, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and United Arab Emirates, have been confronted with internal and external outbursts of disaffection. The individual countries have responded to the Syrian crisis in a mixed way by embracing support, absolute subjugation and outreach to protestors. The uproar sweeping the Arab world and the current Syria situation is a pertinent test for the GCC. Following the protests against the Syrian government of President Bashar al Assad’s regime, the GCC have taken on a tough stand by condemning and criticizing the actions of the Syrian government of killing its own citizens. Although the gulf emperors censored protests for regime change in their own nations, they have jointly called on Syria president to stop killings and violations of human rights (Pradhan 2012). They have continuously called into question the legitimacy of a government that continues to murder its innocent citizens. GCC member countries have a peculiar reason calling for a regime change in Damascus. Gulf countries have a cold relationship with Syria, and see Syria as a strategic ally of Iran. Iran has the potential to undermine the dominance of the Gulf States in the gulf region. In late November 2012, members of the GCC expressed their support and recognition for the fresh national coalition of the Syrian opposition as the legal representative of the Syrian people. In addition, the six member countries recalled their envoys from Syria and pushed out Syrian ambassadors in their respective states. Initially, GCC countries had requested the Assad’s regime end the civilian killings and embrace sufficient measures to meet the desires of the populace. In addition to the Syrian crisis, the GCC states have utilized all available means to pursue political and economic cooperation with North African states, like Tunisia and Libya. Following the unified decisions of Gulf Cooperation Council, it can be fairly said that GCC states have the characteristics of a regime. Since an international regime is defined as the principles and norms around which actors’ decision-making converge in a certain area of interest, it is no doubt that Gulf Cooperation Council is a regime. Bibliography: Behravesh, M., 2011. Constructivism: an introduction. Accessed on 29 May 29, 2013 from< http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-an-introduction/>. Colombo, S. et al. 2012. The GCC in the Mediterranean in light of the Arab spring. Accessed on 29 May 29, 2013 from< http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2012/12/us%20gcc%20arab%2 0spring%20hamid/mediterranean%20paper%20series%20december%202012.pdf>. European Union, 2013. Joint communication to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions. 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Accessed on 29 May 29, 2013 from< http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/political_science/users/elena.gadjanova/public/The ories%20of%20international%20regimes0001.pdf > Wan, M., 2001. Japan between Asia and the West: economic power and strategic balance. NY: M.E. Sharpe. Read More