Ethiopia and Eritrea - Research Paper Example

? Ethiopia and Eritrea Ethiopia and Eritrea Introduction Ever since Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia, there has been constant opposition by intellectuals along with the opposition to the government’s plan of making Ethiopia a landlocked nation. People have totally rejected the secession (Kahsay, 2007). Others, however, have agreed to the sovereignty as a “fait accompli” and voice alarms over the lack of a way to the sea. Still, others accept the right of secession and self-government of Eritrea but disagree with the discrepancy of the application of the Transitional Charter concerning the Red Sea Afar. Critics also disagree with the Algiers Agreement (Cassese, 1995). This is because the charter denies Ethiopia its legal right of access to the sea. Critics claim that the charter is acting against the paramount national interest of Ethiopia. Access to the sea is an imperative matter in the Ethiopian politics that should be addressed. The issue needs to be dealt with beyond the incumbent governing body. Ethiopia reclaimed the right to the sea, in 1952, through the Resolution of the UN (Harold, 1983). After about four decades of enjoyment of its sovereign right, Ethiopia is once more on the verge of permanently becoming a landlocked country. The present governing body of Ethiopia has approved and signed the Algiers Agreement that might make their nation landlocked (Healy & Plaut, 2007). If the opposition, triumphs in the next election or any election afterward, it might officially condemn the Algiers Agreement and insist on a new arrangement that identifies the right of accessing the sea. It is deemed accessing the sea is one of the burning topics that contributed to the achievement of the opposition and the decreasing support of the government in the last election. In this thesis, this paper will argue that Ethiopia has a legal right of accessing the sea as accepted by the regulations of the UN General Assembly of 1950, which was executed accordingly by merging Eritrea to Ethiopia. This paper recognizes the right of self-government along with the independence of the Eritrean citizens. Even though, it recognizes the independence of Eritrea, it also recognizes the sovereign right of accessing the sea by Ethiopia. The legal system that governs the territorial disagreements between Eritrea and Ethiopia is the treaty between UN and Ethiopia. The treaty was also referred to as the agreement between Ethiopia and the Victorious Four Powers of World War II in line with Eritrea, which was merged to Ethiopia, in 1952. The citizens of Eritrea fought for their fate and have become sovereign. Their desires have been accomplished by the blood that they paid during the fight for their independence (Healy & Plaut, 2007). The treaty of the Four Powers and Ethiopia is about the deliberation of the security of East Africa and the rightful need of Ethiopia to access the sea. In reality, the main purpose and objective of the treaty is the right of Ethiopia to access the sea. However, the people who appear to benefit mainly from the treaty are the Eritreans. The basis of any agreement that is meant to resolve the territorial disagreements between Eritrea and Ethiopia should adapt the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly of 1950, as well as the international law, which gives Ethiopia the right to access the sea. Background The Horn of Africa, which comprises of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, is approximately three-quarters of a million square miles in the northeast of Africa (International Group Crisis, 2003). The region borders hundreds of kilometers of the Arabian Sea. It also lies along the southern border of the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopia stands at the center of the Horn of Africa. The country is bordered by Eritrea 912 km, Djibouti 349 km, Somalia 1600 km and Kenya 861 km, as well as Sudan 1606 km. The country shares diverse cultural groups with its neighbors (International Group Crisis, 2003). There is a wide range of ethnic groups living in Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. The most controversial cultural group is the Somali living in both Ethiopia and Somalia (Malcolm, 1986). In Ethiopia, there are roughly 4.5 million Somalis, whereas, in Somalia, there are approximately 7.7 million Somalis. Directly associated with the wrangle of access to the sea are the Afar cultural group. Of the 2,000,000 Afar people, more than 1,000,000 reside in Ethiopia and the rest live in Eritrea and Djibouti. The Afar group extends from the Gulf of Zula, in Eritrea, to the Gulf of Tadura in Djibouti. The Afar people who dwell in the Asseb region of Eritrea cover 3% of the inhabitants of Eritrea. Asseb alienated from the main populace of Eritrea by over 400 kilometers and established closer economic relationships with Ethiopia than it did with Eritrea during the period of 1938 to 1991. Asseb, hence, symbolizes the matter of Ethiopia’s access to the Arabian Sea, which drove Ethiopia’s long effort to gain and maintain authority over Eritrea. The traditional relationship between the Afar, Red Sea in Eritrea and the vast majority of Afar is so solid that most do not recognize an Eritrean Afar. There are nearly 4,000,000 Tigreans living in Ethiopia whereas almost 2,000,000 are in Eritrea (Kahsay, 2007). This is almost 50 % of the population of Eritrea. Kunama minorities, however, reside on both sides of the border in Eritrea and Ethiopia. All nations bordering Ethiopia have either one or more sea outlets apart from Ethiopia, which is supposedly denied a passage to the sea by the Algiers Agreement. The intention of controlling the Indian Ocean and Red Sea makes the Horn of Africa a strategic region. The endeavor by the Arabs to change the Red Sea to an “Arab sea” and to spread the Moslem fundamentalism forms this political wrangle of the Horn of Africa. Also, the role of Egypt along with its vital interest of managing the Nile River play a key part in the Ethiopia, Eritrea quarrels. The alleged differences in national welfares of the different nations in the Horn obscure the relationship of the neighboring nations, which is abused by other nations outside the region, particularly Arab countries. As early as 1952, the charter of Syria recognized the “Arab home land” as a nationwide home for the Arab people. It comprises of the region that goes past the Taurus Mountain, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Basra, the Ethiopian mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. Also, the Mediterranean Sea completes the region and not even one single, complete area can be alienated (International Group Crisis, 2003). The Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Iraqi Baathists considered the Eritrean conquests as a vital part of the Arab revolution. This was when Eritrea was part of Ethiopia. The late president of Egypt, President Sadat, viewed the Red Sea is an Arab Sea. Arab nations have been impeding in the internal matters of Ethiopia on the excuse that Ethiopian Moslems are being mistreated. Egypt’s interest in controlling the Nile with disregard of the rights of the upper riparian nations is one of the matters that shape the politics of the region. The Modern History of Eritrea and Ethiopia Ethiopia, which comprised of the present-day Eritrea, is one of the earliest nations in the world, however, not in its current shape. An exceptional, African society emerged at the start of the first millennium (International Group Crisis, 2003). This was in the present northern highlands of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Axum, positioned in the Tigray area of northern Ethiopia, prospered for nearly seven centuries and was one of the most authoritative kingdoms of the ancient world. The empire went beyond the Red Sea into Southern Arabia, as well as the west, to Sudan’s Nile valley. Ethiopia likewise is the region where human beings originated as verified by the findings of Lucy or Dinkinesh (Kahsay, 2007). The contemporary history of Eritrea and Ethiopia started with the Italian conquer of Asseb, in 1882, along with controlling the Abyssinian highlands, in 1889. On March 15th 1883, Italy signed a treaty of friendship and peace with Mohammed Hanfire, the ruler of Asseb and head of the Danakil, Afars. Eritrea was the name given to this area occupied by the Italians, in 1890. In March of 1896, Italy raided Ethiopia from Eritrea but was overpowered at the famous conflict of Adwa. Italy and Ethiopia agreed to set the limits of the two regions in treaties of 1900, 1902, as well as 1908. The boundaries were, however, far from clear, and the demand of Ethiopia to differentiate the boarders fell on deaf ears. Italy once more attacked Ethiopia in 1935 and occupied it till 1941. The Europeans had already began separating the East Africa Colony from Eritrea in the north as we as the south into different regions. However, Ethiopian along with the help of British removed the Italians from Ethiopia regained its independence on 1941 (International Group Crisis, 2003). British subjected its rule in Eritrea remained until 1952. The United Nations in its resolution, in 1950, decided that Eritrea should be merged with Ethiopia as a self-directed entity under the rule of Ethiopia. Still in 1952, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia confirmed, the treaties signed with Italy invalid. Haile Selassie abrogated the alliance and made Eritrea the 14th province of Ethiopia. This took place, in 1962. A battle had just started in 1961 in the plains of Eritrea by Eritrean citizens demanding sovereignty (Kahsay, 2007). Emperor Haile Selassie was removed from power in 1974 by a military coup. In 1991, the military government of Ethiopia was expelled by armed opposition fronts, led by Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF). After that, a transitional government was set up. In the same year, Eritrean soldiers went into Asmara and occupied all the areas that they declared were part of Eritrea and the regions that surrounded Eritrea (Shaw, 2003). These Eritrean armed forces formed a de facto governing body. The transitional deed of Ethiopia that was supposed to be the constitution for the transitional period acknowledged the right of nations along with nationalities to self-government including by means of secession. Eritrea was identified as an independent nation after its citizens voted for sovereignty (Shaw, 2003). Ethiopia was influential in getting the respect of Eritrea by other nations through becoming one of the first nations to accept the new state of Eritrea. In the past, the two governing bodies had relations that were accepted by nations as good examples. However, many Ethiopian citizens held resentments over the association alleging that it was to Eritrea’s benefit. Hence, the independence did not last for a long period. In 1996, as well as 1997, Ethiopia put efforts in tightening the unmanaged economic relationships between the two states. Eritrea was aggravated and relations deteriorated among the two nations. In May 1998, the Eritrean army invaded Ethiopia with mechanized forces. They occupied the north-west region of Ethiopia, Badme. Nevertheless, Ethiopia demanded the removal of Eritrean forces from the occupied areas of its land along with the restoration of the ‘status qua ante’. Eritrea discarded this command. In 2000, in what has been anticipated to be the biggest clash on African soil since the exclusion of Nazi forces from Egypt during World War II, took place (Shaw, 2003). Ethiopia, in particular, wiped out the Eritrean armed forces and gained control of all the previously occupied areas. In the Algiers Agreement, Eritrea was required to agree to an embarrassing cease-fire agreement which formed a momentary security zone within its boundaries (Kahsay, 2007). The Algiers Agreement formed two commissions, a reparation commission and a boundary commission. The Boundary Commission was granted the task of demarcating and delimiting the borders in line with the 1900, 1902, as well as 1908 treaties, between Ethiopia and its colonial power, Italy, and according to international law. The terms of reference in the treaties automatically made Ethiopia a landlocked nation. The opposition, as well as many intellectuals, opposed the accord and ineffectively pressed the government along with the House of Representatives to decline the proposal. The opposition and many intellectuals alleged that the Algiers Agreement was a treachery of Ethiopia’s nationwide interest. They also alleged that whatever result might come from that accord, it will be a time bomb that may blow up at any time and affect the steadiness and tranquility of the region. A lot of Ethiopians feel that their necks have been cut by the separation of Eritrea and through being made a landlocked country. In addition, the same individuals think that it is only for some time before justice takes its course (Shaw, 2003). The Red Sea is just 60 kilometers from the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This is a reminder of the plan of dividing Ethiopia so that it would be ready to be ruled by Italy (Shaw, 2003). The security and economic factors are also imperative factors to consider when one examines the right of access to access the sea. However, these aspects alone cannot be sources of sovereign right of access to the sea. Current economic progress needs rapid, efficient, reliable, and cost-effective global trade. The real experience, like the coherent historical evolution, confirms that the lack of access to the sea creates a major barrier for social and economic development (Kahsay, 2007). Poverty or scarcity of resources is the main enemy of Ethiopia. This is also where the main threat of Ethiopia originates. There can be no long lasting stability, security or peace when a nation’s system cannot educate, maintain or feed the great majority of its citizens. Denial of access to the sea is a basis of insecurity since it hampers growth. Ethiopia may use the ports of its neighbors Berbera, Djibouti, Zeila, Massawa, Mombasa and even Port Sudan (Shaw, 2003). However, political suspicions and the sway of other foreign nations have made it extremely difficult to depend on them as Ethiopia is constantly vulnerable to blackmail. In Western Europe, the transit and landlocked nations have been able to devise a network of international rivers, free zones in ports along with special transit rights. This is with an aim of safeguarding the relatively free flow of people and goods between the landlocked countries and the sea. In uneven Africa, where the system of administration has not institutionalized access to the sea, relies upon circumstances. Together with the geo-politics of the region, this puts Ethiopia at high risk as one of the most vulnerable countries in Africa (Kahsay, 2007). Djibouti’s position, Somalia’s irredentism and Arabs discernment of Ethiopia as a Christian nation makes Ethiopia permanently exposed in its security and capability of using alternate outlet to the sea. The arrival of Moslem fundamentalism, the issue of the Nile and the part Egypt played in the Arab world also played their part of determining Eritrea’s access to the sea. Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan, are affiliates of the Arab League. The harbor, in Mombasa, Kenya, is too far for Ethiopia. In addition, the Eritrean governing body is allegedly becoming an instrument of Libya and Egypt (Kahsay, 2007). Even minute Djibouti wanted to black mail Ethiopia after the Ethiopia-Eritrea warfare. Such a similar case took place in capture of the Bolivian port by the powerful Chile government. However, Ethiopia is not Bolivia of South America. Ethiopia, however, had enjoyed an outlet to the sea till lately when Eritrea pulled away from the country. It is (army-wise) one of the toughest on the African continent. However, ironically, it is on the brink of losing its right of access to the sea in spite of having won the battle against Eritrea. The third most populous country in Africa is almost losing one of the vital elements of its continued existence. Therefore, it may turn into the most populous landlocked nation in Africa or even the world (Kahsay, 2007). In order to sustain long-lasting security, stability and peace, Ethiopia needs to eradicate poverty among its citizens. Poverty can be eradicated or minimized if there is instant and sustainable growth or development to the economy. One of the vital elements is global or international trade which demands a cost effective, efficient and competitive market. All barriers to this trade and particularly the transit process needs to be tackled. Outer forces that do not want Ethiopia to develop might make use of Ethiopia’s lack of an outlet to the sea and destabilize the country’s economy. The safety of Ethiopia considerably affects and may be crucial to the security of the Horn of Africa because of its strategic position. A nation deprived of its rights and a people that feel betrayed and injured by the deal must eventually subvert both nations. This refers to a vicious circle. In order to break from this circle, Ethiopia has to recapture its previous recognition. This means the economically and historically based independent rights of access to the sea need to be restored (Kahsay, 2007). The Treaties between Ethiopia and Italy Ras Alula, the well-known Ethiopian Army General, who later was the administrator of the region that is now Eritrea, in declaring Ethiopia’s rights against the Italy stated that he has defeated the Italians once, and always will defeat them. As far as Ras Alula was concerned, Ethiopia’s natural border was the Red Sea and furthermore the Italians would acquire land in Ethiopia only when Alula became Governor of Rome, the capital of Italy. The ports of Asseb and Massawa were switching hands among the Egyptians, Ethiopians and later on the Italians (Oppenheim, 1992). However, as declared by Ras Alula, Ethiopian leaders never deserted their right access to the sea and clashed with Italy and Egypt. Ethiopian fighters conquered a ruthless attack launched from the coastal town of Massawa, in which the Egyptian soldiers were almost entirely shattered. A fourth Egyptian army was determinedly defeated in the south of Massawa, in 1876. In 1889, the Ethiopian leader, Menelik, signed the Treaty of Wichale. This declared Italy as the protectorate of Eritrea. The Italians tried to defraud Menelik by having two diverse versions of the agreement, one in Italian, and the other in Amharic with varied version of the content. The Italian edition confirmed that the Ethiopian ruler has agreed to use the Italian administration for all the dealings he plans to do with all other Governments or Powers (Kahsay, 2007). The Amharic version, on the other hand, stated that the Ethiopian ruler has the alternative to communicate with the aid of the Italian supervision for all affairs that he needs with the rulers of Europe. When Menelik confirmed that he had been swindled he rejected the treaty and stopped all gratuities from the Italians. The Italians attacked Ethiopia and at the renowned Battle of Adwa, Ethiopian forces led defeated the Italians. Humiliatingly defeated, along with a 70% of the Italian forces murdered, captured or wounded, the Italians were enforced to ditch their claim to a territory over all Ethiopia. The Addis Ababa Treaty, signed in October 1896, barred the Treaty of Wichale and restored peace in Ethiopia (Kahsay, 2007). The reason the Emperor stopped the warfare then and sought peace after rather than pursuing the routed Italians and reclaiming the lost regions is an ambiguity. For others, it was only a prudent choice not to take on an impossible military quest with logistical night mare. Also, to some, it was an act of treachery. Critics believe that Menilek knew that he could not afford to provoke the Italians, as well as the risk of meeting them in Eritrea, where they were well-established with heavily equipped positions. The Addis Ababa Treaty was followed by diverse treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908, to demarcate the boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Eritrea. In the 1902 case, the treaty was signed among, Ethiopia, Italian Eritrea and British Sudan to avoid any wrangles between boundaries. The 1900 treaty delimited the North and North West boundaries of Ethiopia with Eritrea. The 1902 treaty was a revision of the 1900 Treaty. It gave more terrain to Italy in the North West of the border of Ethiopia. The 1908 Treaty legally and officially made Ethiopia completely a landlocked state (Oppenheim, 1992). There are other Ethiopians who quarrel that these treaties were void abinitio, saying that they were made under pressure, alleging that France, Britain and Italy were plotting to handover Ethiopia to Italy. They also alleged that Italy was preparing another attack and that the treaties were signed under such coercive demands. However, many treaties were completed through the use of armed force during that time. Use of military force to persuade a nation into signing a treaty was not illegal. Before international law barred the use of force or military power in international relations, regional changes often had come about by virtue of invasion (Oppenheim, 1992). A rule not to identify the validity of territorial possessions brought about by force was assumed after the Kellogg-Briand Pact. For whatever forceful conditions, the Emperor could have had, or calculations that he could have made, the conqueror of the renowned Battle of Adwa that signified the collapse of European rule had to lose at the talks. It is hard to confirm that Ethiopia signed the treaties under pressure. Even though, it was signed under pressure, it was not illegal at that period, and non retroactivity of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits its applications in such conditions. The disagreement that the treaties were void abinitio in both situations cannot hold water. Ethiopia’s Claim to Access to the Sea As soon as Italy renounced its title and rights on its colonial regions, no other nation had better rights than Ethiopia’s in case of temperament of Eritrea. As mention earlier in this paper, the treaties of the 1900 declared that Italy could not move to any other territory that was stated in the treaty. This meant that Italy had to give up the territories to Ethiopia in case it wished to hand out with the regions (Kahsay, 2007). Ethiopia was in a superior position than any state to claim an out late to the sea. This is by considering Ethiopia’s prior right and the historical, ethnic and cultural relationships of both south and south east of Eritrea and the lawful need to have an outlet to the sea. Ethiopia first affirmed its claim to an outlet to the sea prior to the close if the Second World War. In 1940, when Emperor Haile Selassie knew that Britain would support his return to Ethiopia, he started a notion to have Eritrea placed under Addis Ababa’s dominion (Oppenheim, 1992). Great Britain’s view was that this issue can properly be tackled at the peace settlement. On 13th February, 1945, Haile Selassie met the Americna president, President Roosevelt, in Cairo after the Yalta Forum. Haile Selassie outlined Ethiopia’s major concerns. They were substantially detailed in five letters issued to President Roosevelt. Ethiopia learned the significance of a channel to the sea in the hardest manner for there was nothing more imperative for a country to lose than its independence. That is why Ethiopians begun the issue of access to the sea prior to the close of the world war (Kahsay, 2007). The plan of the major powers that influenced Ethiopia, in allowing and recognizing Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia is a prompt to the existing generation of what landlocked might signify when surrounded by hostile nations. In spite of the Algiers Agreement, 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia are neither at peace nor war. In reality, they are forming a proxy war in nearby Somalia. Ethiopia has a rightful concern in Somalia. However, Somalia and Eritrea do not have any boundary relations. A lot of people deem that Eritrea is occupied with Somalia to attack Ethiopia with the alliance of other nations who want to weaken Ethiopia (Hagos, 2011). Eritrea, in its 15 years of existence, have battled out two major wars with its neighbors, Ethiopia and Yemen and is in enduring friction with the other remaining neighboring nations, Djibouti and Sudan. Eritrea is arming, supporting and training ‘liberation fronts’, as well as armed Ethiopian opposition groups, and it is almost official. Hence, the Ethiopian administration claims that Eritrea organized the attempted bombings in the capital of Ethiopia in the last AU Summit. A majority of individuals wonder what the Ethiopian administration is doing in dealing with the Eritrean case (Hagos, 2011). The Prime Minister, however, confirmed that Ethiopia was planning a strategy of containment signifying that Ethiopia was ready to wipe out agents of Eritrea sent to attack Ethiopia and Eritrea recognize that it is unattainable to weaken Ethiopia. Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia during the Cairo Declaration. As far as Ethiopia is concerned, significant colonial agreements could only signify international treaties between Ethiopia and the colonial powers neighboring it and most likely treaties between Italy and other colonizers that are associated with Eritrea. The Algiers Agreement did not bring harmony and stability as projected. The governments that signed the Algiers are the ones who have declined to execute it essentially from the start. The Eritrean governing body has dishonored the Algiers Agreement more or less from the start. The accord was for termination of hostilities, but Eritrea rather started arming and organizing Ethiopian opposing groups. Eritrea dishonored the “Transitional Security Zone” a secure region within Eritrea which was agreed upon. The country has set up barriers and restricted the movements of the UN Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). The Ethiopian governing body initially hesitated about whether to agree to the decision of the Boundary Commission but owing to public pressure it has chosen not implement the agreement (Hagos, 2011). The accord is flawed, and unless it is corrected the disaster will carry on in one way or another. The policy aim of any territorial concord should be to render finality and stability (Hagos, 2011). This can be attained if the agreement is based not only on the receiving of incumbent governments but also the accord of the concerned citizens with less resentment. However, the resentment is growing among the Ethiopia citizens as well as the cadres of the ruling party. An accord that is denied its inherent character of conflict managing cannot bring finality and stability. Stability can be attained only if there is a condition to implement stability (Kahsay, 2007). Implementation pre-supposes actors who have both the willingness and the capacity to make sure that the planned agreement can essentially be put into action. The steadiness of power at both the local and international levels matters a lot. Ethiopia triumphed in the battle field but was defeated at the negotiation table (Hagos, 2011). It should have claimed its lawful rights, particularly the right to access the sea. It is currently paying the price of what it failed to rectify in 2000. Ethiopia is sandwiched between the agreement pressed in Algiers and the accepted will. The victor, Ethiopia, is essentially in a stronger position than the loser, Eritrea. If Ethiopia refuses to execute the unfair accord, then stability cannot be attained. Eritrea cannot execute the agreement unilaterally since the country lacks the resources, both material and human, and is not able to carry this weight. The Security Council and the global community are not willing to press Ethiopia or Eritrea to execute it for reasons that they discern (Oppenheim, 1992). Conclusion In conclusion, Ethiopia has to start a territorial disagreement settlement process by which the claims and rights of both Ethiopia and Eritrea are dealt with so that peace, finality and stability are attained. There are no readymade solutions for the multifaceted legal relationship of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Integrated regulations of law should be utilized so as to achieve a balanced and fair solution. An incorporated use of the explanation of the United Nations Resolution, the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris and the doctrine of freewill with a willingness to make fair cooperation may bring enduring peace and stability. References Brownlie, I. (1979). African boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopedia. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cassese, A. (1995). Self-determination of peoples: A legal reappraisal. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hagos, T. (2011). Ethiopia & Eritrea: Healing past wounds and building strong people-to-people relationships. Retrieved from http://irobmablo.org/Tecola_Hagos.pdf Harold, G. (1983). Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974. Berkeley: University of California Press. Healy, S., & Plaut, M. (2007). Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to persuasion. London: Chatham House. Retrieved from http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpethiopiaeritrea.pdf International Group Crisis. (2003). Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or peace? Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/Ethiopia%20and%20Eritrea%20War%20or%20Peace.pdf Kahsay, A. (2007). Ethiopia's sovereign right of access to the sea under international law. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=stu_llm Malcolm, S. 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