Crime Control And Safe Street Act Of 1968 - Research Paper Example

Crime Control And Safe Street Act Of 1968 This case involves reconciling the prosecution of a defendant with the limits provided and must be observed under the Federal Constitution (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Miranda v. Arizona delves on the issue of whether statements that were taken from an individual under “custodial police interrogation” are still admissible (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), taking into consideration the Fifth Amendment in the Constitution which provides that “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself” (Amend V, US Constitution). In this case, Miranda after being arrested and held custody by police officers for allegedly raping a girl, the police were able obtain a confession as to the robbery and attempted rape by interrogation (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Aside from this, Miranda was made to sign a written confession stating therein that it was made voluntarily, without coercion and that he was fully aware of his legal rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). However, he was not advised by the said police officers that he had the right to a counsel (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Despite this circumstance, said confession was presented and admitted as evidence during the trial, and hence “was found guilty of kidnapping and rape” and “sentenced from 20 to 30 years of imprisonment for each count” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). On appeal, the said decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona stating that there was no violation of the Constitutional provision as the accused did not state his request to have a counsel (State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721). The Court explained that there was no objection made as to the voluntariness of the statement nor a request for an examination of such voluntariness of confession made (State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721). Following the procedure in the case of State v. Owen, the judge is to determine whether the admissions were involuntary or not. If it is voluntary then such statement may be admitted (96 Ariz. At 277, 394 P.2d at 208). Furthermore, the Court held that no request for counsel was made and was not denied the assistance of a counsel (State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721). Hence, it affirmed the decision of the trial court (State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721). The US Supreme Court reversed this explaining that the prosecution shouldn’t have used such statements made especially if there is no effective procedural safeguard against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 444 (1966)). Interrogation was said to be “inherently intimidating” and thus violates the right to self-incrimination (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 445 (1966)). The Supreme Court further explained that any person in custody should be “clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him, before beginning the interrogation (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 467 (1966)). If this procedure is not followed and the accused has no counsel during the interrogation, the Government must then prove and show that “defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 475 (1966)). Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 (18 USC § 3501) This was the procedure used for the decision made by the Supreme Court of Arizona when it affirmed the decision of the trial court. This provision provides that a confession, in any criminal prosecution “shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given” (18 USC Code 3501). The trial judge shall make a determination as to the voluntariness of a confession before such may be admitted as evidence, in which case, if it is determined to be voluntary then it shall be admitted, and allow the jury to hear evidence as to such an issue (18 USC § 3501). Among those which the judge must take into consideration in determining the voluntariness of the confession is the lapse of time between “arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of offense charged against him, if defendant was counseled or had knowledge that he was not obliged to make such statement, if he was advised of his right to counsel before the questioning and finally if during such questioning or confession he was without a counsel to assist him or her (18 USC § 3501). Furthermore, under the Act, a confession by a defendant is still admissible even if there was a delay in bringing the person charged before the judge if such confession is voluntary (18 USC § 3501). This Act sought to overturn the decision made in Miranda v. Arizona as to the inadmissibility of evidence if confession was obtained without informing the defendant of his rights, and instead allowed the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the voluntariness of a confession (Hilbink, 1). Cases in relation to Miranda Doctrine In the case of Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the Supreme Court sought for the admission of the confession made by a person who was mentally incapacitated to waive his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination (Colorado v. Connelly (479 U.S. 157 (1986)). Using the decision made in Miranda v. Arizona, the confession was voluntary in that there was no “coercive police activity” and hence no violation of the due process clause (Colorado v. Connelly (479 U.S. 163 (1986)). It reasoned that the defendant’s mental condition alone should not be the determining factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession especially if made without a violent interrogation by the police officers or the government (Colorado v. Connelly (479 U.S. 163 (1986)). Hence, in this case, the suppression of evidence was reversed and remanded (Colorado v. Connelly (479 U.S. 163 (1986)). The case of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) involves the accused who made conflicting statements, one made before the Miranda warning which conflicted against the statement made during the trial of the case (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Hence, the issue in this case was whether the use of such initial statement may be used in order to impeach the defendant’s credibility without violating the Miranda doctrine (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). The Court in this case answered in the affirmative as it does not mean that every evidence found to be inadmissible should already be “barred for all purposes” (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). This may be used provided that legal standards will still be followed as to the trustworthiness of the evidence presented (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). It may therefore be utilized in order to attack the defendant’s credibility especially as to the testimony made (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). The Court stressed that there is no justification for the defendant to make a perjurious testimony mainly because the statement rendered previously was without counsel (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). Although a criminal has every right to testify for his own defense, the Miranda doctrine cannot be used as a shield to commit perjury (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980) case involves an accused who was arrested by police officers after identification by the victim and was constantly informed by the police officers of his Miranda rights (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). He however requested for a counsel of his own (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 297 (1980). While defendant was in the car along with the police officers discussing that the gun should not be found by any children in the area which is very unsafe, the accused interrupted and volunteered to show where the gun was (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). Despite being advised of his Miranda rights, he stated that he understood his rights and still showed the location of the gun because of the several kids in the area who might be harmed (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). The respondent moved for the suppression of the evidence regarding the statement he made and the discovery of the gun (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). The issue in this case is whether or not the accused was interrogated by police officers in violation of his Miranda rights (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). There was no interrogation made as the accused interrupted a conversation made by the police officers and the police officers did not intentionally appeal to his conscience for the safety of the children (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). Furthermore the police actions that “they should have known” that such would constitute as an incriminating evidence against the accused was not established (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980). Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) case involves the accused’s motion to suppress the statement which he made at the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as he claimed that during the interrogation, he was deprived of the Miranda warnings (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The district court granted the motion but was however reversed in the Court of Appeals on the ground that the statements made were voluntary under 18 USC §3501 and thus admissible (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Hence, the issue is whether or not the Congress through a law may overturn the Miranda v. Arizona doctrine as to the warnings and admissibility of confession given in a custodial interrogation (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The Court held that such constitutional requirement cannot be superseded by a legislative act (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). This jurisprudence, the Court stressed, has never been abandoned as this sought to protect individuals from “compelling pressures” in custodial interrogation made in violation of the Constitution (530 U.S. 428 (2000). Being embedded in the practice of law enforcement, it cannot then be overturned by mere legislative enactment of Congress (530 U.S. 428 (2000). In Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the issue was whether the first statement made before a Miranda warning was given, the next and succeeding statements given in a continuous manner, which were given Miranda warnings prior to the said statements being made but stated on the basis of the first statement, is still admissible in evidence (2004). The Court held that since the succeeding statements were made as a product of the first statement in violation of the Miranda doctrine, then it is inadmissible in evidence (Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Statements made before the Miranda warnings, related to those statements which had given proper Miranda warnings, “must be excluded unless curative measures are taken. Hence, the statements must be suppressed (Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Works Cited Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 (18 USC § 3501). Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Hilbink, T. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Enotes.com site. Retrieved on 23 April 2009 from http://www.enotes.com/major-acts-congress/omnibus-crime-control-safe-streets-act Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291(1980) State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Read More