Shuttle Wagons Project Plan - Essay Example

? “Shuttle Wagons” Project Plan Table of contents Page Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………3 Project background ………………………………………………………………………….3 Identification of project management related issues ..............................................................4 Discussion and analysis ..........................................................................................................5 Conclusion …………………..……………………….………………………………………6 Reference……………………………………………………………………………………..8 “SHUTTLE WAGONS” PROJECT PLAN Introduction The Channel Tunnel project incorporates a three-bore tunnel construction. After completion, the tunnel is meant to join the United Kingdom and France. It will be the longest underwater tunnel in the whole world with a total length of 50 kilometers. The tunnel is inherently a rail transport system, which will enable Eurotunnel, to avail a dive-on shuttle service for the normal road vehicles between the two terminals. Project background Eurotunnel contracted TransManche Link (TML) for the building of the channel tunnel. TML then subcontracted different roll shock manufactures for the buildings of the Shuttle Wagons. The project had a tight timescale and had heavy liquidated damages that were associated with the delays. This paper looks at the design and the manufacture of the transport vehicles called the Shuttle Wagons. The first half of the passenger shuttles comprises a locomotive, twelve single deck wagons for the coaches, the off-loaded wagon, and a loader wagon. The other half is comprised of a similar design but has a two-tier system of wagons for cars. Each single deck is designed to carry a coach while the double deck wagons are designed to carry a maximum of five cars in every deck, which adds up to ten in a single wagon (Harris, 2006 p32). The wagons were designed to enclose the passengers in the vehicles providing a fire resistance for thirty minutes. The reason for this design was that the journey from one terminal to another takes about five minutes. If, by chance, a fire started at the time the shuttle enters the tunnel, the fire would be contained up to the time the shuttle will reach the other end of the tunnel. The policy of keeping the passengers in the shuttle until the wagon reached its destination enables any residual incident to be dealt with in the specially designed emergency siding (Harris, 2006 p67). There was the need to have a drive on and off system that required the unrestricted access to the entire length of the twelve wagon units during the loading and the unloading process. The design concept also required each wagon to be self-contained with a fire resisting enclosure for the whole journey; it was essential to have fire shutters at the end of each wagon. Identification of project management related issues The design parameters became a challenge and had to ensure that there is minimum protrusion into the wagon in practice. The design also had to incorporate pass doors through which passengers were expected to evacuate in case of emergencies like a fire outbreak, it has a minimum of 30 minutes of fire resistance and could withstand the pressure regime of the shuttle passing along the tunnel. The shutters also had to have a minimum leakage rate to maintain the least fire extinguishing concentration of Halon within the Wagon (Harris, 2006 p67). The major aspects of the design operation and construction of the channel tunnel required the approval of the intergovernmental commission. The major focus, at the beginning of the project, was on the safety, security, defense, and the environmental issues. This shows that at first the design parameters were not certain during the designing phase (Harris, 2006 p45). Partly in the middle of the project, it became emerged that the design changes that were required by the IGC were causing delays and work had to proceed before gaining the approval of the commission, this led to subsequent rework and changes when the commission’s reply was not favorable. Some of the changes that caused delays include those that involved the fire doors that separated the rail shuttle wagons, these changes on the doors were to meet the strict safety regulations put forward by the commission (Harris, 2006 p56). Discussion and analysis Many effects were realized after changes were implemented in the design that involved the safety of the vehicles. This includes the addition of the scope of work that was not initially planned. These did not only increase the time spent on the design phase, but also had impacts on other parts of the system. The other effect was the delay experienced during the approval process. The manufactures complained that the TML had been slow when approving the design drawings. This had a negative effect since the contract contained a specific period in which the drawings were to be returned with approval or a comment on them. The approving commission spent 60% of additional time with the design than what was deemed necessary (Harris, 2006 p77). However, these were just the primary effects, which fundamentally led to some secondary effects. The changes were systematic within the product, so a large number of elements in the project had to be changed simultaneously. Other changes within the product resulted in the final product being too complex; the under-car became extremely complex due to the many changes that were made. This complexity increased the cross-relations between parallel activities resulting in the development of cross-related parts of the product. This had an effect in the sense that it increased difficulty in the provision of a system freeze since the changes in one component increasingly cross-impacted other components, and thus created a ripple like effect across the whole system (Harris, 2006 p78). The redesign of the wagons led to the disruption of the initial design schedule. This meant that many of the system elements were being designed without having all the full specifications of the necessary interfaces. This was due to the lack of a system freeze combined with a very tight time constraint, which forced the management to either work on the project elements in which the surrounding system was not yet frozen. Consequently, it meant that the management could be taking a risk of re-work if changes came up in the yet-unfrozen surrounding system. The management could also carry out some design tasks in parallel. The design work would be carried out normally in a series. This made the parallel tasks more complex, as it took much longer than anticipated, and as a result, the cross-impact between the activities increased (Harris, 2006 p88). The safety features that were incorporated in the final design proposal were a combination of Eurotunnel’s original proposal, and some of those that were proposed by the safety authority following the consideration of the results from the full-scale fire tests. These features included a series of several fire detectors that were interfaced with, an AFFF fire spray system found at each deck level and a Halon 1301 fire extinguishing system. There was the inclusion of a central drainage system that was placed at the center of the deck; its purpose was to get rid of any spilled fuel. The hydrocarbon detector system was included, which interlinked with the AFFF spray system, a fire, and an evacuation alarm system that operates automatically once a fire has been detected. The design incorporated an interface with the ventilation system of the wagon, which can either close down in the case of a fire or increases in the case of a fuel spill. There is also an interface with the central control on the shuttle and the shuttle patrol staff (Harris, 2006 p107). Conclusion The design safety logic is derived from the idea that almost all stationary cars, which have their engines switched off, are several times less likely to be involved in fires than when they are being driven. The cars and passengers in the wagon are protected by a sophisticated detection and a suppression system for the short journey of 30 minutes that a risk of a fire outbreak might be witnessed. The safety authority required each of the design assumptions to be checked and approved to their satisfaction (Harris, 2006 p79). The design of the Channel Tunnel Shuttle wagons is one that puts the safety of the passengers at the top of the list. The passengers are then assured of their safety as they cross from one country to the other. The design is one that shows signs of careful planning by the experts. Although, there are some complications that have slowed the actual design process the final product is one that is astounding in nature. References Harris C. S. (2006). Engineering geology of the channel tunnel. London : Telford. Read More