The Close Connection Between Identity and Security in US Foreign Policy - Essay Example

Some critics have claimed that the periods of the Cold War and detente were underpinned by the close connection between identity and security in US foreign policy. Do you accept this claim? Introduction During the Cold War era, US identity was characterized as individualism, voluntarism and democratic. US identity was also shaped by a belief in God. Taken together, US identity was constructed around a general belief that the US way of life and thinking was not only different but persuasive and the rest of the world would eventually adapt the American way (Jervis, 2010). Historically, the U.S. identity has always been a benchmark by which threats to security are perceived. As Campbell (1998) informs, U.S. foreign policy has demonstrated that where the existence of alternative identities challenges the belief that the U.S. identity could be the ideal identity, this is often construed as a threat to security. In other words, security risks are interpreted as a means of establishing the U.S. identity (Campbell, 1998). Campbell’s conceptualization of the close relationship between U.S. identity and security is consistent with the constructivist account of international relations. For example, Wendt (1999) argues that state actors establish identities within an international social structure. How the state views its identity and how other states view the state’s identity shape and direct international politics and relations (Wendt, 1992). Using the constructivist account of international relations, this paper will argue and demonstrate the close connection between identity and security in U.S. foreign policy during the period of the Cold War is clearly established. However, during the detente phase of the Cold War, it appears as though U.S. security is less connected to identity but rather more closely connected to materialism. This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part of this paper provides an overview of the theory of constructivism in international relations. The second part of this paper will analyse the close connection between identity and security in U.S. foreign policy during the period of the Cold War and the fragility of that connection during the period of detente. The Theory of Constructivism in International Relations Constructivists, like neoliberal and neorealist theorists attempt to understand the drivers of state behaviour. However, constructivists are distinguished from neorealism and neoliberalism in that constructivists do not “ignore” the “content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics” (Checkel, 1998, p. 324). Essentially, neoliberalism, neorealism and realism are juxtaposed against constructivism in a paradigm articulated as materialism vs idealism (Barkim, 2003). In this regard, constructivists reject the realist/traditional view that state behaviour is driven and explained by material power (Barkim, 2003). For the constructivists, state behaviour and international politics are both socially constructed (Alder, 1997). State behaviour is explained by a number of underlying factors that subjectively form the basis of ideas that steer state behaviour through the acquisition of state identities and interests (Copeland, 2000). Where states share the same ideas and interests, this can constrain and modify the behaviour of a state. Thus in interacting with one another, states may reconstruct their identities and interests through what is referred to as a “socialising process” (Copeland, 2000, p. 190). It is via the socialising process that states identify, defend and protect their identities which in turn inform their objectives and roles within the international political order (Copeland, 2000). Constructivism offers a novel and expansive method for understanding how states perceive security dilemmas as it offers tools for conceptualizing “human consciousness, national identity” and state interests (Tsai, 2009, p. 19). When constructivism is used to understand how states interpret security dilemmas, it offers explanations for situations in which a military threat cannot possibly explain a state’s protectionism behaviour toward some states and not toward other states with the same military threats. For example, the U.S. perceives Cuba’s possession of nuclear weapons as a military threat and the U.K.’s possession of nuclear weapons quite differently (Wendt, 1992). Therefore anarchy and materialism is not an adequate explanation for how states behave and define security dilemmas. Constructivism allows analysts to take account of the conditions that influence and shape state identities and state interests. Conditions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civic society, corporate citizens and other non-state actors are also taken into account. Thus concerns about economic prosperity, the protection of human rights, environmental issues, poverty and other non-military factors that influence and shape a state’s identity determine how states identify security threats and how they relate to other states and to their own citizens (Payne & Sambat, 2012). Constructivism therefore provides a broader construction of security and allows for an understanding of how and why critics claim that there is a close connection between security and identity in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and detente. The close connection between identity and security is manifested by the clash of ideologies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era and detente, particularly since it was their ideological differences that drove security decisions in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and in the amalgamation of allies. In the next section of this paper, the U.S.’s expression of its identity and how this expression gave way to security decisions in foreign policies during the Cold War and detente is demonstrated. The Close Connection Between Security and Identity in U.S. Foreign Policy During the Cold War and Detente Lock (2008) argues that there are two important aspects of U.S. identity that can be tied to security and how the U.S. defines security dilemmas in its foreign policies. In one aspect, U.S. identity is intricately tied to a number of values articulated in what is referred to as the “American Creed” (Lock, 2008, p. 70). In the other aspect of U.S. identity is the emphasis on U.S. state sovereignty and its status as a “territorially bounded nation-state” (Lock, 2008, p. 70). Taken together or separately, both aspects of U.S. identity have “important implications” for gaining insight into U.S. security (Lock, 2008). The territorially bounded state is tied to nationalism and the perception that it is Washington’s responsibility to protect Americans and to preserve the integrity of what it means to be American (Lock, 2008). The territorially bounded state is only important during the Cold War and detente period in which the U.S. felt that it was necessary to protect the U.S. from the proliferation of Communism. In this regard, early on in the Cold War, the U.S. went to great lengths to promote nationalism and to warn of the ills of communism. In the initial “concept to of containment” the U.S. actively “enlisted the forces of nationalism” as a means of containing the “expanding power of the Soviet Union” (Gaddis, 2005, p. 180). The American Creed reflects standards and principles upon which the U.S. was founded. These standards and principles are expressed in a number of instruments including the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence and encapsulate, “democratic liberalism, republicanism and the rule of law” (Lock, 2008, p. 70). These are the standards and principles that the U.S. uses to define itself. It may be what the U.S. aspires to be, but it can certainly be argued that this is the identity that the U.S. wishes to assume within the international arena. Jervis (2010) argues that identities are not merely internal. Identities are used to establish boundaries and to distinguish the “Self from Others” as well as to “exclude” and to “include” (p. 27). On the other hand, tensions will typically result in one side perceiving the rival in a way that exaggerates differences between them. For instance, during the Cold War, the U.S. formed a myopic view of the Soviet Union’s communism despite its legitimacy. In turn, the Soviet Union reciprocated with equal disdain for the U.S.’s political ideology and its underlying values (Jervis, 2010). The Cold War was thus shaped by a psychological battle of political identities. The U.S. and the Soviet Union attempted to stockpile allies in proving that their respective ideologies were superior to the other. One way of proving its superiority during the Cold War was with economic prosperity. The close connection between U.S. identity and security is illustrated by the U.S.’s emphasis on economic superiority. The U.S. has always attempted to establish an identity of economic prosperity and uses this identity to exact cooperation from other states on the grounds that in cooperating with the U.S. other states will share in this economic prosperity. Therefore the U.S. identity as a state with economic prosperity is important to its security. If another state threatens the U.S.’s economic prosperity or if the U.S. is not perceived as an economically prosperous state it might lose its influence and leverage in international politics and could find itself without allies (Allin & Jones, 2012). Economic prosperity gave validity and legitimacy to the U.S.’s identity as a superior social and economic system during the Cold War. As Jervis (2010) explains, the Cold War was a “class of social systems” (p. 33). According to Jervis (2010): What was at stake was nothing less than each side’s view of the rightness of its cause, the universalism of its values, and the answer to the question of whose side history was on (p. 33). Thus the close connection between security and identity was displayed in the U.S. foreign policy toward the third world during the Cold War era. The third world was not communist and the U.S. was determined to ensure that it remained that way. Obviously, the U.S. felt that it would be better for national and international security, if the third world would adopt U.S. principles of democracy and its values. However, the U.S.’s determination to contain communism was more important and therefore it forged relationships with tyrants whenever it was found to be necessary (Jervis, 2010). Stokes (2003) argues however, that the U.S. was particularly concerned with implementing its containment policy in the third world. From the U.S. perspective, the third world was particularly vulnerable to Soviet influence because of social, economic and political instability. Stokes (2003) further argues that the U.S. ran a series of “counter-insurgency military campaigns” in the third world and explained these campaigns in a way that links U.S. identity with security using a constructivist perspective (p. 572). According to Stokes (2003), if the U.S. failed to influence the third world and the Soviet succeeded, the U.S. would be perceived as weak by its allies. In addition, the U.S.’s “resolve to resist Soviet aggression would be questioned” (Stokes, 2003, p. 572). Therefore the U.S. identity as modelling an ideal political ideology was intricately tied to security decisions during the Cold War era. From a constructivist perspective, the U.S. security interests were informed by its identity, the identity it wanted to project to the rest of the world and the identity is wanted to establish and maintain. In this regard, the U.S. wanted to be identified as a strong and successful democracy after which other states should be modelled. In the process, the U.S. wanted to establish itself as the leader of this strand of democracy. The Cold War was not always marked by “heightened tensions” between the world’s two super powers. There were times in which those tensions were relaxed and those periods are referred to as detente (Garthoff, 1994, p. 3). The detente period, although a part of the Cold War persisted during the 1970s and is perceived by most scholars as a failed foreign policy. Detente began with President Richard M. Nixon who called for a cessation of confrontational relations with the U.S.S.R. and instead to embrace a new “era of negotiation” with a view to obtaining peace (Garthoff, 1994, p. 3). This new era of cooperation never dispensed with the rivalry and competition between the two superpowers (Garthoff, 1994). Schulzinger (2010) described the period of detente as a “fragile” period of cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (p. 373). Nixon, who had previously played a significant role as a member of the U.S. Congress and as Vice-President in shaping anti-Communist policies, stated in his inaugural address in January 1969 that the U.S. would be entering a “period of negotiation” with the Soviet Union (Schulzinger, 2010, p. 373). The reasons for this turn around in the U.S. foreign policy toward Soviet Union are very loosely tied to the close connection between U.S. identity and its conceptualization of security issues. The loose link arises as a result of the fact that the U.S. had reached a point in which, the authenticity of its rivalry and confrontations with the Soviet Union became questionable. As Schulzinger (2010) argues, Europe was growing weary of the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and in the meantime there was a growing movement toward the protection of human rights worldwide. European states wanted improved economic relations and this would require the removal of political tensions between the superpowers (Schulzinger, 2010). Obviously, based on the constructivists’ emphasis on state identity informing state interests, since the U.S. wanted to be identified as the leader of the free world and the model democracy after which other states should follow, it was in the U.S.’s best interest to lead by example. Therefore, the detente foreign policy was borne out of this identity. At the same time, it was much clearer that materialism played a significant role in the U.S.’s decision to implement the period of detente foreign policy. By the 1970s, it was clear that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessed the material military capacities to destroy each other. As Schulzinger (2010) explains: The growing nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had altered traditional ideas about the relationship between the use of or the threat of military force to achieve political ends. In the past, the greater a nation’s military power, the greater its ability to influence others (p. 374). With both the Soviet Union and the U.S. possessing equal military capabilities, the threat that they posed to one another was removed. At the same time, other states were less intimidated by either state’s military power since the superpowers cancelled each other out. Instead, the U.S. had to deal with a collective fear of the threat of nuclear war with no state or citizen assured that either the U.S. or the Soviet Union could provide security from the threat of a nuclear war (Schulzinger, 2010). While it can be argued that the U.S. initiated the period of detente as a means of protecting and promoting its identity as enshrined in the American Creed, it is more likely that the U.S. responded to the material realities of the day. The material realities of the day dictated that since both superpowers had the military capacity to destroy each other, tensions increased the risk of a nuclear war. Therefore the U.S. turned to the Soviet Union as a means of addressing this reality and the fears and demands of its allies. As a result, the U.S. and the Soviet Union managed to negotiate agreements for the control of arms, fostered commercial relations and cooperated politically during the period of detente (Schulzinger, 2010). According to Wallensteen (1985) the period of detente began following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Following the crisis the U.S. and the Soviet Union began negotiating on a number of agreements dealing with the testing of nuclear weapons, trade and communications during times of crises. By 1968, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had led the way for the signing of the non-proliferation treaty. After Nixon took office, other agreements would follow (Wallensteen, 1985). In this regard, material factors, more especially, military power was the driving force behind U.S. foreign policy during the period of detente. The U.S. saw security in terms of military power. With the Soviet Union just as dangerous to the U.S. as the U.S. was to the Soviet Union, and with the rise of nuclear states, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were fearful that they would lose their status as the leading nuclear states. Thus material considerations rather than identity were the main factors informing the U.S. of its security dilemma and therefore shaped its security decisions: detente with the Soviet Union. Detente would not last however, as U.S. identity would win out and provide the primary basis for U.S. concepts of security and therefore how U.S. foreign policy should devolve. Before detente ended, U.S. identity would play a significant role in the strengthening of detente. With Nixon’s Watergate scandal and his resignation in disgrace, the Vietnam War fiasco, the U.S. as leader of the free world was not only questionable abroad, but also at home. Therefore when Jimmy Carter assumed the office of the Presidency, he was determined to strengthen detente with a view to proving that the U.S. was the rightful leader of the free world. Carter promised to accomplished this by influencing the Soviet Union to adopt U.S. ideology and identity as the preferred political and economic constructs for state success (Westad, 1997). Regardless of Carter’s plans and efforts, the period of detente ended when Soviet union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Detente no longer appeared to be the right response to the security threat posed by superpower with equal military strength to that of the U.S. Carter was even more resolved about the need to end the period of detente with the crisis that developed over Poland and the fact that nuclear weapons were deployed throughout Europe. Tensions and conflicts between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R only “intensified” (Wallensteen, 1985, p.1). In his campaigns for U.S Presidency, Reagan articulated his anti-detente beliefs in a way that clearly aligned U.S. identity with security and foreshadowed his concept of security and foreign relations. According to Reagan, detente had crippled American pride and its identity as a super power. Reagan stated that as a result of detente, the U.S. had become “the Number Two military power in a world where it is dangerous – if not – fatal to be second best” (cited in Hayward, 2001, p. 465). Reagan went further to state: All I can see is what other nations the world over see; collapse of the American will and the retreat of American power. There is little doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union will not stop taking advantage of detente until it sees that the American people have elected a new President and appointed a new Secretary of State (pp. 465-466). It was obvious that Reagan placed significant emphasis on U.S. identity and placed it at the centre of U.S. security. Detente weakened the U.S. as a leader among states and presented it as subordinate to the Soviet Union particularly since the Soviet Union did as it wanted regardless of how opposed the U.S. was to its actions. Detente therefore left other states with the impression that the U.S. was intimidated by the Soviet Union. This would give the Soviet Union the upper-hand within the international community. When Reagan was elected to his first term in 1980 it was precisely because U.S. identity was closely connected to security and security and identity had become a significant issue as a result of the failed detente. Voters obviously felt that Reagan could address the issue of the U.S.’s seemingly decline in power and the Soviet Union’s increasing aggression (Podhoretz, 1984). Indeed Reagan delivered on his promise as he restored American pride and re-established its identity as a leader of the free world (Hayward, 2001). Although detente was initiated by Nixon as a response to materialistic realities, it evolved into an issue for American identity and its close connection to security. Thus detente necessitated a shift in foreign policy that re-established U.S. identity and therefore the U.S. concept of security. Conclusion U.S. foreign policies during the periods of the Cold War and detente demonstrate that the U.S. security is closely connected to its identity. However, the period of detente itself was borne out of materialism and can be explained by reference to the traditional international theory of realism. However, detente failed as a foreign policy because it challenged U.S. identity and as such invoked concerns about U.S. security. Therefore the failure of detente and the Cold War era, were periods in which the U.S. clearly demonstrated that its identity and its security are intricately tied. A constructivist explanation informs that the U.S. was determined to establish an identity in which the U.S. was perceived as the superior state to which other states pledged their loyalties. In this regard, the U.S. would achieve its goal of peace and security. Bibliography Alder, E. (September 1997). “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3(3): 319-363. Allin, D. H. and Jones, E. (2012). Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity. 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