A History of Hesbulla - Essay Example

Page A History of Hesbulla Table of Contents Page i Table of Contents ii Introduction Origins of Hesbulla 1 Hesbulla Ideologies 3 Organization, Growth and Maturity (1982-2005) 4 Over-all Organization and Activities 4 Tactical Capabilities 6 Estimated Strength 7 Participation in Lebanon's Government 7 External Aid 8 Social services 9 Current Assessment of Hesbulla 10 Reference List 12 Appendices 15 Introduction This paper is an analysis of the origins, historical development, and the ideologies of Hesbulla, a resistance movement organization established in Lebanon that has evolved over the last 25 years into one of Lebanon's major political parties and a controversial group that some countries, specifically the United States, view as a radical terrorist organization (Qassem, 2005). The Americanized name of the organization, Hesbulla, comes from the Arabic words Hizb'allah, or "Party of God". It is also referred to as Hizballah, Hizbollah, Hizbullah, or Hezbollah, but for simplicity, Hesbulla would be used throughout this paper. Several sources were used as references to analyze facts and events with the highest level of objectivity, and not without difficulty, in order to increase the writer's understanding of international terrorism in general and as it is carried out by Hesbulla in particular. The paper has four parts. Part one is about the origins of Hesbulla. Part two outlines and explains the ideologies that led to the creation, development, and current state of Hesbulla. Part three reports on its major developments since foundation to the present. Part four is an assessment of how to situate the organization and its plans in current international and domestic affairs. Origins of Hesbulla Trouble in the Middle East has been going on for centuries as Arabs and Jews fought over land that both claimed to be theirs. During the time of the Roman Empire some two thousand years ago, the countries that are now known as Israel, Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have been a battleground among conquering and conquered peoples and nations. These conflicts reached a major flash point after the Second World War when the State of Israel was created in 1948 (Owen, 1992). Recounting this brief historical background is important to realize that the Middle East conflict is not rooted in Islamic ideology, but something that is perhaps deeper and that goes farther back in time. Even before Islam's history began in the 8th century with the prophet Muhammad, the people of the region have already been doing battle against each other as ancient Palestinian, Jewish, Assyrian, Egyptian, etc. tribes (Owen, 1992). However, Islam was a strong factor that provided a cultural and religious bond for differing Middle Eastern Arabic tribes to unite against a common enemy, the Jews, although Islam was not a guarantee of peace in itself as it too was racked by different streams of thought: Shi'a, Sunni, Salafi, Kurds, etc. For centuries and even before Israel was created in 1948, these Arabic tribes fought each other as vehemently as they now fight against Israel (Tarrow, 1994; Owen, 1992). Lebanon, which shares a southern border with the northern tip of Israel, received Palestinian refugees who were driven out by the newly created Israeli state in 1948. When these refugees, who were understandable in thinking that their lands were "stolen" from them by the newly erected Jewish state, attempted to regain those lands by committing acts of aggression and violence as a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Israeli armed forces retaliated by attacking the PLO and expelling them from Jordan. The PLO settled in the southern part of Lebanon, where their guerillas were trained and from where they continued to mount attacks against Israel (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Shapira, 1988). In 1982, Israel began to attack PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon, where it remained until 1985. It was during this three-year period that Hesbulla was born as a resistance movement against Israeli occupation. Inspired and supported by Ayatollah Ruhollah Kohmeini, who was then ruling Iran as a Shi'ite Islamic Republic after successfully ousting the Shah, Hesbulla consisted of Lebanese who belonged to the Shi'a sect of Islam. Hesbulla worked with the other Shi'ite resistance movement, Amal, to achieve the same objective of expelling Israel from the country. They were the first to use suicide bombings, assassinations, and capturing Israeli soldiers before torturing and executing them as a tactic of humiliation against the enemy. However, its victories only fuelled the retaliation by Israel against Lebanese targets (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Shapira, 1988). Although Hesbulla denied it at the time, the group and not the PLO as was widely believed is credited with the 1982 assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese Christian political leader Bashir Gemayel who had just been elected President, the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, and the kidnapping and detention of US and other Western hostages in Lebanon. However, in 2004, Hesbulla Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah publicly admitted after the death of a senior Hesbulla terrorist that the group had been working with the PLO for some time. Hesbulla also gets support from Syria (Alagha, 2007). Hesbulla Ideologies Inspired by Iran's Khomeini, it is but natural that Hesbulla's ideology follows similar patterns: they view Israel as occupied Palestinian territory, the liberation of Jerusalem, establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon, and removal of all non-Islamic influences from the region. It is strongly anti-Western and refers to America as the Great Satan: arrogant, hypocritical, materialistic, and oppressive. This line of thinking consolidated new concepts in the field of Islamic thought that were inspired by Willayat al-Faqih, a radical Islamic thinker from Iran (Qassem, 2005; Mackey, 1996). Using the 1982 Israeli occupation of Lebanon as an immediate evil that had to be addressed, Hesbulla was able to gather worldwide support from those who sympathized with their cause. Iran, having just driven out the U.S. and the Shah, was eager to widen its influence in the region and sent 1,500 Revolutionary Guards with weapons and funds to drive the resistance. Since then, Hesbulla has used four operational strategies to fight Israel (Qassem, 2005; Harik, 1996; Shapira, 1988): 1. Bring terrorists and collaborators through border crossings using foreign documents, 2. Set up a terrorist organization inside Israel and in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, 3. Cross-border operations, e.g., smuggling weapons and terrorists, and 4. Financial support for Palestinian organizations and groups. Lastly, unique among Islamic resistance groups, Hesbulla is adamant that its key objective of establishing a Shi'ite Islamic Republic in a multicultural nation such as Lebanon must come about peacefully and with popular support. And to achieve its objectives, it establishes regular networks with 'rival' parties as well as groups from other denominations (Qassem, 2005; Sidahmed et al., 1996; Asad, 1991). Figure 1 shows Hesbulla's flag that indicates its ideology of armed resistance. Organization, Growth and Maturity (1982-2005) Over-all Organization and Activities The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group's highest governing body and has been led by Secretary General Nasrallah since 1992 with eleven senior Islamic clerics responsible for tactical decisions and supervision for all the group's activities in Lebanon. A Majlis al-Shura al-Karar (Deciding Assembly) led by Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah with eleven other clerics is responsible for strategic issues. The Consultative Council has seven specialized committees: ideology, finances, military, politics, judiciary, information, and social affairs. This 7-committee structure is duplicated in each of Hesbulla's three main operational areas: Al Biqa' (Bekaa) Valley, Beirut and its southern suburbs, and southern Lebanon (see Figure 2). Hesbulla claims that it is a movement, more flexible and loose in hierarchy and order, and not an organization with card-carrying members (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Tarrow, 1994). Hesbulla started as a militia, an armed resistance group that fought Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon and that waged attacks against Israeli forces across the border. From 2000 to 2006, Hesbulla mounted its attacks against Israel in its main areas of operations through its network of cells. It has established cells in Europe, Africa, and in North and South America. It has training bases in the Biqa' Valley and has its headquarters and offices in southern Beirut and in Ba'albek. Since 2003, it has increased its cooperation with other Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and the Popular Front. This is particularly evident between Hesbulla and the Tanzim (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Ranstorp, 1997/1994). Hesbulla's methods of controlling terrorist organizations in the territories are similar to those characteristic of the involvement of the command centers of Palestinian terrorist organizations abroad (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) in the actions of their organizations inside the country. Striking in this framework are the instructions to carry out mass murder attacks within Israeli territory, mediation between terrorists at the different centers of action, the large-scale transfer of money, and finally, coordination of the effort to upgrade the terrorist capabilities of allied organizations. The Lebanese government considers Hesbulla not as a Lebanese militia, but as a national resistance group that defends Lebanon from Israel and that aims to expel Israeli forces from the Shab'a farms that Lebanon claims to be part of its territory and not Syria. This is the reason why the Lebanese government refused to abide by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 in September 2004 that called on Lebanon to disband all militias and to prevent the flow of armaments and other military equipment to militias, including Hesbulla, from Syria, Iran, and other countries. Due to this refusal, Israel and Hesbulla engaged in heavy retaliatory rocket attacks in late 2005. The U.N. once again called on Syria and Iran to stop supporting Hesbulla in early 2006, but this did not stop Hesbulla and Israel to engage each other in July 2006, with a few Israeli soldiers and some civilians captured or killed. In retaliation, Israel bombed roads, bridges, and power plants inside Lebanon, and al-Manar, the Hesbulla television station (Alagha, 2007; Norton, 2007). Tactical Capabilities Hesbulla has developed an effective system of gathering operational intelligence. One unit gathers intelligence against Israeli targets by recruiting and running agents to provide information about Israeli military bases. It has also penetrated the communications network of the Israeli army. Another unit helps Palestinians in their operations by providing funds, weapons, and bomb-building instructions (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005). Hesbulla claims that it has not carried out any suicide bomb attacks since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. After 9/11, Hesbulla condemned the Sunni-inspired group Al-Qaeda for attacking civilian targets and denounced terrorist massacres in Algeria and Egypt and the killing by Islamic extremists of western journalists. The group declared that American civilians have nothing to do with the war and targeting them is forbidden (Norton, 2007; Wright, 2006). This claim, however, is contradicted by Hesbulla authorities who find it alright to target Israeli civilians because they are considered occupiers and usurpers of the land, and therefore there is no difference between an Israeli soldier and an Israeli civilian (Shatz, 2004). Hesbulla's Al-Manar television station shows programs that inspire suicide attacks in Gaza, the West Bank, and Iraq. Estimated Strength Estimates of Hesbulla's strength vary depending on the source. Its own sources claim it has up to 10,000 fighters. Others report that the Hesbulla militia consists of a core of 400 fighters that could be increased to 3,000 within several hours if needed. The estimated number of those in combat at any one time is less than 1,000 mostly from strongholds in its operating areas in the south. It has many activists and moral supporters, and an estimated reserve force of a few thousands, but these lack experience and training. After the latest Israeli troop withdrawals, Hesbulla was thought to have cut down its active troops to about 500 (Norton, 2007; Alagha, 2007; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). The militia is a light force equipped with small arms, automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and Russian-made rockets that can reach targets in northern Israel. It also has surface-to-air missiles and China-made anti-tank weapons that it has used in recent battles. Televised military parades in Beirut where Hesbulla has participated showed tanks and armored personnel carriers that may have been captured from the Lebanese army or bought from Palestinian guerillas and other sources. Some Hesbulla officials have claimed that it is better equipped and more experienced than the Lebanese armed forces (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002; Ranstorp, 1997). Participation in Lebanon's Government When municipal elections were held in 2004, Hezbollah won control of 21% of the municipalities. In the 2005 elections, Hesbulla won 10.9% of parliamentary seats. The Resistance and Development Bloc of which Hesbulla is a member won all 23 seats in Southern Lebanon, and a total of 35 seats or 27.3% of parliamentary seats nationwide. Although Hesbulla joined the new government in 2005, it remained strongly opposed to the majority Christian Phalange government party. In November 2006, Hesbulla, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Amal Movement demanded the formation of a national unity government which called for early elections and one-third of Cabinet seats, giving the coalition effective veto power. Negotiations with the ruling coalition failed, and five Cabinet members from Hesbulla and Amal resigned. This led to the start in December 2006 of a series of protests and sit-ins to oppose the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora whom they accused of being too close to Israel and the U.S. (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007). External Aid Hesbulla gets most of its material support from Iran and Syria in the form of financial, logistical, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid. This has been so since the beginning, and estimates of the actual value of such aid are in the range of $25-50 million annually. Although inspired by Iran and Syria, Hesbulla often acts on its own, even without Iran's tacit approval. While it does not share the Syrian government's secular orientation, Hesbulla supports Syria's political objectives in the region (Alagha, 2007; Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Shapira, 1988). Aside from these traditional sources, Hesbulla has a worldwide fund-raising network, notably in Latin America because of the large Lebanese refugee population there. In 2001, the capture of a Hesbulla operative in Paraguay revealed that some $50 million in funds had been channeled to Hesbulla since 1995. It also makes use of charity funds from extremist Islamic groups not connected with Hesbulla but which support its cause (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Mackey, 1996). Supporters include not only Shi'a Lebanese Moslems but even Sunnis and Christian Lebanese who oppose Israel's activities in their home country. Most of the Lebanese blame Israel for causing the 15-year civil war that damaged their country until 1990. The funds raised also allow Hesbulla not only to buy weapons and train its fighters, but to provide economic support to their families and to the martyrs who have died for their cause. These funds have also allowed Hesbulla to organize large street protests in support of its government and its causes, such as to call for the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005 and, for some time, to protest against the foreign policy moves of the U.S. in the region. However, Hesbulla is also known for its social services, which accounts for its popular support in Lebanon even among non-Moslems (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007). Social services Hesbulla organizes social development programs, running schools, hospitals and providing news services that are estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars annually. These social services play an important role in legitimizing Hesbulla as a political party. It has established some institutions like the Emdad committee for Islamic Charity, the Hesbulla Central Press Office, the Al Jarha Association, and the Jihad al-Binna Developmental Association. Its Reconstruction Campaign (Jihad al-Binna) carries out several economic and infrastructure development projects in Lebanon. It also has a Martyr's Institute (Al-Shahid Social Association) which provides for the living and education expenses for the families of fighters who die in battle (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005). In March 2006, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted that Hesbulla not only has armed and political wings, but also has an extensive social development program: four hospitals, 12 clinics, 12 schools and two agricultural centers that provide farmers with technical assistance and training. It has an environmental department and an extensive social assistance program. Medical care is also cheaper at its clinics than in most of the country's private hospitals and is given free for Hesbulla members. Its social service agencies provide health care and schooling for poor farmers (Norton, 2007). Even its critics admit that Hesbulla does some things better than the government, from collecting garbage to running hospitals and repairing schools. Hesbulla's supply chain network can deliver supplies effectively within the city. People see Hesbulla more as a social service provider as much as it is a militia, especially in poor and dispossessed Shi'ite communities. After the war, it competed with the Lebanese government for reconstruction projects. Thus, according to analysts, Hesbulla through Jihad al-Binna has won the initial battle of hearts and minds in large part because they are the most experienced in the reconstruction field in Lebanon (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007). Current Assessment of Hesbulla Hesbulla is not a simple organization to understand. It openly acknowledges its inspiration from Shi'ite Iran but is supported by Sunni Moslems and Christians. It is branded as a terrorist organization but has been democratically elected as the biggest opposition bloc in Lebanon's parliament. Its critics, including the U.N., calls it a militia, but it acts as a political party that effectively carries out social projects that a U.N. office has deemed effective in addressing the needs of the Lebanese people. It claims to work for peace but is ever ready to wage war at huge costs to lives and property (Norton, 2007; Alagha, 2007). In everything that it does, whether in war or peace, Hesbulla's innovations have served as models for similar resistance movements: suicide bombings, roadside bombs, Iran-backed militia, and social services that win hearts and minds. All these were part of Hesbulla's strategies and tactics that are now being used in Iraq by Moqtada al-Sadr, a relative of one of Hesbulla's founders. By standing up to Israel, Hesbulla has served as an inspiration to other Islamic groups; perhaps even to Al-Qaeda which is now doing to American and European targets what Hesbulla has been doing to Israel for the last quarter of a century (Norton, 2007). After its latest protest moves in December 2006, several senior Hesbulla officials including Nasrallah and Qassem were interviewed by Saad-Ghorayeb (2007), a Middle East expert on the organization. The interviews showed that Hesbulla's officials acted based on what they perceived to be the will of the people. Using opinion polls, a Western invention, Hesbulla realized that it and not the elected government enjoyed greater popular support. This led them to make demands on the government that it be given a greater role in decision-making. The government refused, so Hesbulla officials resigned their positions and began to call on the people to join them in their protest. This experience of democracy through mass action and popularity is one that it thinks it can win. They also resented President Bush's support for the government of Siniora and America's classification of Hesbulla as a radical Islamic terrorist group and militia. They see these actions as a confirmation of foreign (basically U.S. and Israel) meddling in Lebanese affairs. Hesbulla also distrusts the United Nations, which they see as an instrument established by their enemies. However, Hesbulla justifies meddling by Iran using equally pragmatic and ideological perspectives based on shared Arabic and Islamic cultures. They think that recent calls for disarmament of all Lebanese militias are part of a strategy to make resistance toothless for Israel and the U.S. to push their vision for domination. On the other hand, Israel and the U.S. see Hesbulla's protests as part of a grand strategy for Iran to impose its model on Lebanon, contrary to the will of majority of the Lebanese and posing a long-term threat to the security of the Israeli state. This is how affairs stand as the world enters the last quarter of 2007, and how Hesbulla continues to justify its raison d'etre: it sees Israel as a continuing threat to the security and stability of Lebanon and the region for as long as Israel and America see Hesbulla as a threat because of its links to the vehemently anti-American and anti-Israeli ideologies of Iran. Neither side would be willing to back down because each sees the other in the same light, and with the historical baggage of thousands of years of tribal and cultural conflicts, it is difficult for each to trust the other. What the region needs is a foreign policy breakthrough leading to a permanent solution that the world has never seen in the last two thousand years. Such a policy must swing popular opinion so that each side's government, armies, and militia can agree to live in peace with each other. After all, it is the people that allow their governments and Hesbulla to do as they please. The short period of calm in Lebanon after the long civil war showed everyone the benefits of peace. Winning the people's hearts and minds, as always, would be the key to long-term success and peace, and each must realize that if they stand by and do nothing, what they would get would be what they deserved. Reference List Alagha, J. (2007). The shifts in Hizbullah's ideology: Religious ideology, political ideology, and political program. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Asad, A.K. (1991). Hizbullah in Lebanon: Islamisation of Leninist organizational principles. Middle Eastern Studies, 27(3), 390-403. Harik, J. (1996). Between Islam and the system: Sources and implications of popular support for Lebanon's Hizballah. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40 (1), 41-67. Mackey, S. (1996). The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. Harmondsworth: Plume. Norton, A.R. (2007). Hezbollah: A short history (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Olmert, J. (1987). The Shi'is and the Lebanese State." In Martin Kramer (ed), Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Owen, R. (1992). State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East. London: Routledge. Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbullah: The story from within. Beirut: Saqi Books. Ranstorp, M. (1994). Hizbollah's command leadership: Its structure, decision-making and relationship with Iranian clergy and institutions. Terrorism and Political Violence, 6(3), 303-339. Ranstorp, M. (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The politics of the Western hostage crisis. New York: St. Martin's Press. Saad-Ghorayeb, A. (2002). Hizbu'llah: Politics and religion (Critical Studies on Islam Series). London: Pluto Press. Saad-Ghorayeb, A. (2007). In their own words: Hizbollah's strategy in the current confrontation. (Democracy & Rule of Law Program). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Shapira, S. (1988). The origins of Hizballah. The Jerusalem Quarterly, 46 (Spring), 115-30. Shatz, A. (2004). "In search of Hezbollah." New York Times Review of Books, 51 (7), April 29, 2004. Sidahmed, A.S. & Ehteshami, A. (Eds) (1996). Islamic fundamentalism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective actions and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wright, R. (2006). "Inside the Mind of Hezbollah." The Washington Post, July 16, 2006, p. B01. Appendices Figure 1: Flag of Hesbulla [Source: Norton, 2007] Figure 2: Hesbulla's Area of Operations [Source: Qassem, 2005] Read More