Hostage Incident Prevention and Mitigation - Research Paper Example

THE MOREY UNIT HOSTAGE INCIDENT: A Prevention and Mitigation Analysis An Overview of the Incident The 15-day Morey Unit Hostage Situation was the longest prison hostage standoff in the history of the United States. Though human life was spared with the eventual surrender of the hostage takers, the incident brought into surface the need for a thorough reevaluation of procedures, training, budget allocation of correctional institutions and inmate management. Overall, the incident was a hard lesson on the perils of complacency in a correctional environment that sadly could have been avoided with precise measures. This analysis will review the pre-existing circumstances that led to the escape attempt, the response of the authorities during the crisis and then based on these, will focus on recommendations that will curb similar scenarios from arising. An Account of the Hostage-Taking The hostage episode began on the early morning of January 18 when two inmates, Ricky K. Wassenaar and Steven J. Coy took control of the kitchen of the Morey unit (a facility that is part of the Lewis Prison Complex in Buckeye, Arizona) by subduing Correctional Officer Kenneth Martin, the lone officer then in charge of a total of 19 inmates assigned to work in the area (“Preliminary Repport….”, 2004). The two inmates managed to subjugate the officer by wielding “shanks” or home-made weapons shaped like a knife. After securing Martin with handcuffs, Wassenaar, dressed in the correctional officer’s uniform, managed to access the 20-foot tower situated in the middle of the facility by deceiving the assigned prison guards, Jason N. Auch and Lois Fraley into thinking he is also a correctional officer. Wassenaar quickly hit Auch in the head with a “three-foot metal pole”, as related by Fraley to Anderson Cooper, host of 360° in a later interview (“Transcript of Police….”, 2005). Wassenaar then cuffed Fraley’s hands behind her. He then forced his two hostages to show him where the weapons are stored. Around this time, Coy remained in the kitchen and sexually assaulted a female kitchen worker. Afterwards, another correctional officer, Robert D. Cornett arrived at the area to relieve Martin. He too was overpowered by Coy. A short while later, Correctional Officers Coy C. Kelley and Elizabeth M. DeBaugh arrived at the dining area to escort two inmates. Cornett alerted his two colleagues and Kelley tried to wrench the homemade weapon from Coy’s hand but was unsuccessful. Kelley and DeBaugh pursued Coy, alerting several other officers near the tower area. The responding officers then ordered Coy to release his weapon and lie on the ground. Coy resisted, refused to release his weapon and threatened the correctional officers by swinging the shank. Several corrections officers tried to restrain the inmate by spraying pepper spray but to no avail (“Preliminary Report….” 2004, p. 4). . Before Coy could be checked, Wassenaar, who was situated in the tower, fired several rounds at the responding corrections officers, leaving Coy free to seek protection in the tower. Reunited, the two inmates were able to control the tower, as well as two hostages. Coy thereafter sexually abused Correctional Officer Fraley (“Preliminary Report”, 2004, p. 4). Initial Response and Negotiations Prison Officer Captain Michael Forbeck was concurrently “conducting perimeter checks” when Wassenaar fired at the responding prison officers. After a briefing about the hostage situation, he took steps to secure the perimeter of the Administration area and ordered a lockdown of the facility. He then sought assistance of the Tactical Support Unit (TSU), the local police department, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and local fire department. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) Division Director Jeff Hood and Lewis Complex Warden William Gaspar were also notified of the disturbance (“Preliminary Report….”, 2004, p. 4). The office of the Governor through Chief of Staff Dennis Burke was advised of the incident around 6:30 a.m. Burke in turn reported the situation to the Governor and other key staff members. A Command Center was established right away at the DOC headquarters in Phoenix. During this time, DOC Director Dora Schriro was out of the state but was able to return to Arizona by 11:30 a.m. (“Preliminary Report….”, 2004, p. 4). The DOC has an Inmate Management System (IMS) policy. This policy was designed to launch and provide specific course of action for serious and critical events. It also outlines a command structure that has control on specific areas of responsibility. On the local front, the incident is to be managed by an assigned Incident Commander (IC). Based on the severity of the situation, the IC may have authority from the Central Office. During the hostage situation at Morey, three command centers were set-up to oversee the situation: two on-site command centers (one to manage the events occurring in the tower and another to manage the day-to-day complex operation, complex perimeter security, and coordinate tactical maneuvers occurring at the Lewis Complex Rast Unit), in addition to the agency command center (“Preliminary Report…, 2004, p. 4). Once IMS was established, the next course of action was to initiate contact with the inmates. By 7 a.m., negotiators, SWAT teams and TSU snipers were deployed in the Morey facility. By this time, Wassenaar made contact with Morey Unit Chief of Security, Barbara Savage to advise her that Auch needed medical attention because of head injuries sustained when he took over the tower. Wassenaar then demanded to trade Auch with another officer, a request that was firmly refused. Wassenaar then demanded transport and food. He also warned that any attempt to harm him or Coy will lead to the death of the hostages. For the next fourteen days, Wassenaar emerged as the leader between the two. He was the one who negotiated and gave demands with the authorities. During the first few days, he issued a continued demand for a transport helicopter for himself and his associate but was continually refused by the hostage negotiators. However, his other demands were granted like media coverage, hygiene supplies, water, cigarettes, medicines, food, etc. – in exchange for continual reassurance of the hostages’ safety. Health and welfare checks were conducted everyday. The Governor was also briefed on the developments of the standoff on a daily basis. Wassenaar frequently reiterated his warning that any attempt to harm him or Coy will result in the demise of the hostages. Hostage negotiators and other members of the response team have studied scenarios in the hope of ending the situation. First, they implemented steps in restricting the inmates’ freedom to gauge the response of the hostage takers, but the two grew anxious and edgy of any advancement made by the authorities, reacting violently and threatening the hostages. In one outburst, the hostage takers threatened to cut off a hostage’s finger. Due to medical attention, Auch was released in exchange for food and other supplies. During the final days of the hostage situation, the authorities used family members to influence the inmates to surrender. Wassenaar’s sister spoke with the inmate and persuaded him to give up the hostage. Coy, on the other hand, also heard a tape of his ex-wife’s voice, persuading him too to end the hostage crisis. The strategy worked, as there was a softening in the inmates’ countenance and demeanor. By this time, the inmates were declaring a different reason for the escape attempt. They continued that the attempt was their only means of carrying out their desire to be transferred into prison facilities that are near their home states, enabling their families to visit them. In response to the inmates’ subtle communication, the negotiators initiated contact to with the hostage takers, pushing for a cessation of the situation and to discuss particulars of an imminent surrender. Coy and Wassenaar informed the authorities to call back. Authorities were under the impression that the two needed time to confer the details of a possible surrender. Wassenaar then initiated a discussion for the surrender. Once reassured that the conditions are met, Wassenaar gave indication and opportunity for the tactical team to takeover control of the tower. The inmates complied to be restrained by the responding team. The two were processed by the DOC and BOP officers and placed in an isolation area of the Morey Unit. The hostage was secured - treated and reunited by members of the family (“Preliminary Report…”, 2004, p. 6). Nine days after the hostage situation concluded, Governor Napolitano initiated an investigation of the said standoff and an Administrative Review Panel or Blue Ribbon Committee comprised of experts and practitioners in the field of law, police and corrections management. The group was tasked with the reconstruction of the events that led to the situation, the identification of factors that fuelled or may lead to similar incidents and to generate recommendations that could be applied to ensure the continuous improvements of the corrections system in terms of security and the well-being of its professionals. Analysis The Morey Unit standoff was an instance that could have been averted have there been measures undertaken to ensure that inmates were continuously placed in a position wherein they will have no means to predict or examine the procedures and functions of the corrections system. Predictability and complacency are two main factors that exposed the corrections system and its officers to perilous circumstances. In the aftermath of the situation, the Blue Ribbon Committee was able to come up findings and recommendations classified into ten categories, namely: inmate security, yard security, kitchen security and procedures, tower security, defensive tactics, individual/unit response, communications, inter-agency response, hostage resolution and administrative/policy budget issues (“Preliminary Report…”, 2004, p. 6). The first seven categories mentioned in the final committee report discussed in detail the findings that referred to the entirety of the Morey Unit. In reference to the inmate security, there were gaps and inadequacies on the search procedures in the especially in transferring inmates from one area to another. The inattention gave Wassenaar and Coy opportunity to conceal deadly weapons that was not detected when they reported for kitchen duty. It was also found out that yard area could be used for the concealment of weapons. The report also concluded that inmates are too familiar with everyday schedules and practice of its officers. The kitchen also was undermanned and kitchen duty was made available even for aggressive inmates. The seizure of the tower, as mentioned in the findings was brought about by the deficiency in procedures relating to identification of corrections officers. Lack of defense training and tactical errors also contributed in foiling Coy from reaching the tower area. Communication breakdown also led to a slow dissemination of information among the officers. There was also alack of “situational awareness” that delayed initial response. Officers were not trained to respond cohesively as a group. To address the gaps mentioned above, the committee recommended stricter measures in security. Presently, all of the recommendations enumerated in these categories are now being employed and implemented (“Blue Ribbon Panel Recommendations”, 2005). Inmates were thoroughly searched from one area to the next. Visitors and other staff were also subjected to searches and scanning - punitive action will be undertaken should a weapon was detected. Inmates were also placed on rotational work assignments and violent ones are not allowed to perform kitchen duties. Additional personnel were also posted in the area. In the tower area, visual devices were increased and entry points were limited. No access was given without securing approval from duty officers. Correctional officers were also required to undergo defensive and tactics training. Communication and distress signals were incorporated in the training of the correction officers and additional alarm systems were integrated. During the period of the hostage taking, the interaction and relations between the different institution and agencies were well-established. From day one of the crisis, a central or a command center was immediately established to be on top of the situation. Such immediate response was commendable and contributed to the eventual resolution of the event. Further recommendations by the committee, such as the initiation of an annual convention between the agencies are also being implemented. The budget and administrative issues existing before the hostage taking were also evaluated and examined by the committee. The committee’s findings concluded that the inmate classification system was outdated and needs to be revised. The assignment of correctional officers to high-risk areas/positions, according to the report, should be based on experience and training. The report mentioned that compensation of correctional officers were not up to standard, thus contributing to the high attrition rate (Skinner, 2005). As per DOC, these recommendations are now being reviewed and under “phase one- funding” by the DOC’s Support Services (“Blue Ribon Panel Recommendations”, 2005). Conclusion The incident is an unfortunate episode that illustrated the breach in security, procedures and practices that was not only applicable in the Morey Unit but also in other correctional facilities in the country. In its aftermath, the move to create an evaluating and investigative body was laudable. The evaluation, assessment and recommendation by the committee allowed various agencies, especially the Bureau of Corrections to bridge the gaps, implement institutional changes and look at avenues for future improvement. It was commendable that the BOC was able to implement almost all of the recommendations outlined in the final report. Such awareness and conscious effort in improving the correctional system will ascertain that an episode like the Morey Unit situation will never recur in the history of the United States. References “Blue Ribbon Panel Recommendations”. n.d. Arizona Bureau of Corrections. Retrieved August 7, 2006, from http://www.azcorrections.gov/news/2005/blue-ribbon.html Garrett, Michael. (June 17, 2004). In Need of Correction: Arizonas Prison System Is Overloaded And Its Staff Is Overwhelmed. Retrieved August 7, 2006, from http://www.tucsonweekly.com/ gbase/currents/Content?oid=oid:57551 Skinner Ed. (February 4, 2005). AZCOPS Speaks: Low Pay, Poor Training, Large Turnover Major Causes of DOC Hostage Situation. Retrieved August 7, 2006, from http://www.ncpso-cwa.org/news/doc-hostage.html “Preliminary Report of Findings and Recommendations Relating to the January 18 - February 1 Hostage Incident at the Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex”. (March 4, 2004). Blue Ribbon Panel. Retrieved August 7, 2006, from http://www.nicic.org/Library/019617 “Transcript of Police Identify Murder Victim; Police Chases in California; Hostage Situation in a Prison”. (May 5, 2006). CNN. Retrieved August 7, 2006, from http://transcripts.cnn.com/ TRANSCRIPTS/0505/05/acd.01.html Read More