This strategy was a part of the nation’s attempt to maintain the targeted exchange rate value of its domestic currency against a basket of major and influential currencies in the world. Despite a few reports about illegal resource transfers across international premises, the Chinese managed to keep a major proportion of their total stock of financial resources with themselves through profound government intervention (Morrison, 2009). The hypothesis testing conducted in the previous section, in connection with the susceptibility of Chinese firms to impacts of the crisis, also found an insignificant effect of the same. In fact, the subtle truth is that, even though the Chinese experienced hardships on account of the financial distress, they were far better off than what the Western economies felt, where recession was declared officially.
As far as statistics are concerned, the Bank of China, the largest nationalised commercial bank in the nation, was responsible for a total of $10.8 billion amount of investment in US owned mortgage-backed securities, nearly 3.5% of its total investment securities portfolio in 2006. Although this figure fell down to 1.4% by the end of 2008, yet, according to Fitch Ratings, this was the highest figure among all other Asian financial institutions (Chim, 2007). The investment into securities was a consequence of excessive stocking of US financial assets, which amounted to a sum of $2.13 trillion as on June 2009, in order to keep its exchange rate floating at the targeted level, compared to that of US dollars. The Chinese government considered it wiser to invest in US securities rather than holding such a huge quantity of money idle (Morrison & Labonte, 2009). The exposure of the Chinese economy to US financial securities however, was not limited to just mortgage backed securities; rather there were huge investments of Chinese renminbi on credit