Berkeley on the Existence of Objects - Article Example

I. Berkeley on the Existence of Objects George Berkeley argues that the existence of material substance, such as mountains and rivers, come into being only through sense-perception. However, what one perceives is but one’s own ideas or sensations—ideas that exist only in one’s own mind. Berkeley further explains that ideas are not mere thoughts of the mind. Rather, they are the objects that the mind uses in thinking. And these objects can only be utilized in the thought process if they are perceived through the senses. Thus, all these things and objects, which are considered ideas that only has the possibility to come into being through perception, cannot exist unperceived. As Berkeley stated: “For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?” Berkeley also refutes the notion of a “natural or real” existence of tangible objects, which is separately regarded from perception. He explains that this is erroneous in that ideas (Berkeley uses this term as synonymous with objects), in actuality, are just products of the impressions of the senses and the various operations of the mind. Thus, objects cannot exist on their own. They do not have a natural or real existence because their being depends on perception and the subsequent understanding of what the mind has perceived. However, many critics have surfaced with problems regarding Berkeley’s argument concerning the existence of objects. The most obvious one being the question, “Do objects go out of existence when one stops perceiving them?” Berkeley actually answers this question by stating that God, who is all knowing and is capable of universal attention, perceives everything at all times. Therefore, all objects and things remain in existence even if we people do not perceive them. There is always an entity other than and higher than humans who perceive these objects and consequently, keep them into being—and this is in the form of God. Nonetheless, some philosophers still have arguments regarding Berkeley’s response. In particular, Philonous had some reservations regarding God as the divine being who, through His constant perception, keeps objects into being. Philonous’ main argument against Berkeley’s response is that God has a different way of perceiving objects in that He does not make use of the senses as we humans do. This is because when we humans perceive through the use of the senses, ideas naturally enter our minds—whether we like it or not. We are also limited by sensory perception in that our senses are imperfect tools for perceiving. The ability to feel, for instance, to be scared, may hinder and limit what one sees when confronted with a vision of a lion or a snake. On the other hand, God, who is omniscient, can only be characterized by perfection. He knows all things and He does not do this in the way that we perceive things, which is through the senses. How then can Berkeley say that God keeps objects into being through His perception when God does not perceive as we humans do? This can be answered through the fact that Berkeley’s discussion of God’s perception did not limit divine perception. Berkeley merely stated the that God does not perceive through the use of the senses. Divine perception, then, is still a viable explanation as to how God perceives things. As Berkeley further elucidated, God maintains the existence of material substance just by thinking about them in His own divine and perfect way. One can only suppose and give the term divine perception as God only knows the exact manner in which He perceives and thinks. With the explanation of Berkeley’s response to the main argument and his subsequent answer to the criticism presented against the said response, I believe that Berkeley has satisfactorily addressed the question in that the main arguments against his theory on the existence of material substance can be answered logically. II. Kants Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative Kant’s Categorical Imperative is a set of absolute moral laws applicable to all rational beings, which states that for an act to be considered morally right, it has to be unconditionally necessary. It is treated separately from the personal desires and motives that pervade humanity as individuals. In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant maintains that the source of every rational and moral act is good will (that is, good will without limitations in that it is good in isolation and devoid of all contexts) and that all rational acts must have ends. Most ends can be characterized as personal, and therefore, highly subjective. However, this is not the categorical imperative that Kant is pertaining to for the very nature of subjectivity generally opposes the concept of good will as the only source of moral action. For instance, there are many ways to go about achieving happiness as an end result. If the value of a good will then depends on the end, then it is treated as merely a means to an end. As long as the end is satisfied, the means by which the result was produced is insignificant. Thus, there is no such thing as rational and moral acts as the value of the source—good will—has been negated. Therefore, an objective end is what makes a categorical imperative in that for an act to be considered as having an objective end, it must be unconditionally necessary to pursue, free of contexts. Therefore, Kant presents his second categorical imperative with the statement that human beings are ends in themselves and to treat one as merely a means to an end is highly erroneous and morally wrong. “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” Using this categorical imperative, it is then only logical to conclude that lying to a friend in order to attain the end of having a car to use for a bank robbery is morally wrong in all aspects—within and devoid of context. As Kant would state, the friend was used merely as a means to an end. The end of which can be considered bad without limitations in that it is not good in isolation or even in context. Moreover, the false promise is not a moral and rational act for its value lies in its subjective end. It then contradicts the objective nature of good will and the ends for which all moral acts must be geared towards. III. The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative In the second formulation of The Categorical Imperative, Kant explains the nature of good will. He differentiates between the idea of good will and “holy will.” While the latter can only be attributed to God in that it is seen in good acts that do not need the repression or the obstruction of natural preferences, the former is the opposite and can be attributed to human beings. In this light, Kant then supposes that a will that is done for the sake of duty is good will “under human conditions”—as duty, by its very nature, is the will to restrain one’s natural inclinations. An act can be moral only if it is done with a sense of duty in mind. The morality of duty lies in that a particular duty can be made a universal law. “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Kant states that there are two types of duty: perfect and imperfect duty. We as human beings have a perfect duty to not take actions on duties that result in logical contradictions when universalized. For instance, the notion that it is acceptable to steal assumes the existence property in that there must a concept of property in order for thievery to take place. However, to make it a universal law negates the very existence of property in that if it is okay to steal, then the idea of owning something cannot exist. Thus, the acceptability of stealing presents a logical contradiction. Thus, human beings have the perfect duty to respect property by not stealing. Imperfect duty, on the other hand, is subjective in nature. It is the duty to act only on those that we, as individual human beings, would want to be universalized. For example, the principle that one should only help other people when something can be gained from it can only be morally true if the concept that one will only accept help if he or she is able to give something back in return is universally true. But since it is obvious that this is not so, this will result in a “contradiction of the will.” Therefore, Kant concludes that one has an imperfect duty to help others when one is capable to do so. On the nature of duty as perfect and imperfect, the lying with the use of a false promise is morally wrong as we have a perfect duty not to lie. This is because it logically contradicts the value of language in that the act of stating that lying is right denotes the significance of language and to universalize this statement would result to the negation of the very value of language. Kant can also say that the act of lending the car to a friend can be considered a moral action as we have an imperfect duty to help others if we are capable to do so. Since the friend has the capability to lend the car, he or she is performing a moral act based on imperfect duty. Read More

This can be answered through the fact that Berkeley’s discussion of God’s perception did not limit divine perception. Berkeley merely stated the that God does not perceive through the use of the senses. Divine perception, then, is still a viable explanation as to how God perceives things. As Berkeley further elucidated, God maintains the existence of material substance just by thinking about them in His own divine and perfect way. One can only suppose and give the term divine perception as God only knows the exact manner in which He perceives and thinks.

With the explanation of Berkeley’s response to the main argument and his subsequent answer to the criticism presented against the said response, I believe that Berkeley has satisfactorily addressed the question in that the main arguments against his theory on the existence of material substance can be answered logically. II. Kants Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative Kant’s Categorical Imperative is a set of absolute moral laws applicable to all rational beings, which states that for an act to be considered morally right, it has to be unconditionally necessary.

It is treated separately from the personal desires and motives that pervade humanity as individuals. In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant maintains that the source of every rational and moral act is good will (that is, good will without limitations in that it is good in isolation and devoid of all contexts) and that all rational acts must have ends. Most ends can be characterized as personal, and therefore, highly subjective. However, this is not the categorical imperative that Kant is pertaining to for the very nature of subjectivity generally opposes the concept of good will as the only source of moral action.

For instance, there are many ways to go about achieving happiness as an end result. If the value of a good will then depends on the end, then it is treated as merely a means to an end. As long as the end is satisfied, the means by which the result was produced is insignificant. Thus, there is no such thing as rational and moral acts as the value of the source—good will—has been negated. Therefore, an objective end is what makes a categorical imperative in that for an act to be considered as having an objective end, it must be unconditionally necessary to pursue, free of contexts.

Therefore, Kant presents his second categorical imperative with the statement that human beings are ends in themselves and to treat one as merely a means to an end is highly erroneous and morally wrong. “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” Using this categorical imperative, it is then only logical to conclude that lying to a friend in order to attain the end of having a car to use for a bank robbery is morally wrong in all aspects—within and devoid of context.

As Kant would state, the friend was used merely as a means to an end. The end of which can be considered bad without limitations in that it is not good in isolation or even in context. Moreover, the false promise is not a moral and rational act for its value lies in its subjective end. It then contradicts the objective nature of good will and the ends for which all moral acts must be geared towards. III. The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative In the second formulation of The Categorical Imperative, Kant explains the nature of good will.

He differentiates between the idea of good will and “holy will.” While the latter can only be attributed to God in that it is seen in good acts that do not need the repression or the obstruction of natural preferences, the former is the opposite and can be attributed to human beings. In this light, Kant then supposes that a will that is done for the sake of duty is good will “under human conditions”—as duty, by its very nature, is the will to restrain one’s natural inclinations.

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