A Consideration of Prison Ethics: Punishment vs. Rehabilitation - Coursework Example

A Consideration of Prison Ethics: Punishment vs. Rehabilitation The swing in Corrections ideology often moves between the idea of punishment (where one or society has been wronged against and should be able to get some form of retribution for his/their troubles) and rehabilitation – where an individual is not evil or wrong, but has acted in a manner that was the result of a string of consequences that were out of his control and therefore simply needs to be shown how to act as a decent human being. Although this is an extremely simplistic way of looking at the problem of punishment the fact is that over the centuries no-one has found an effective balance between the two ideals and that could be one of the reasons for our ever growing prison populations. Punishment At present the ideology in terms of punishment in American society at least, is retributive. This stemmed from a mid 20th century debate between the merits of rehabilitation and a form of fixed sentences that was uniform (and therefore fair) and applied to everybody. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and subsequent political acts took care of that and has been adhered through to present day. The philosophy behind this legislation is that rehabilitation is not effective for all individuals and therefore society needs to be protected from individuals who do wrong (against others or property) with the best way of doing that perceived as being incarceration or incapacitation (Zimring). One of the main issues in determining ethical ways of dealing with wrongdoers is that there needs to be an established set of roles and definitions that work within society to provide a system that all potential criminals are subject to. Rawls for example noted that defining punishment was not the same as justifying punishment; Justifying the use of prisons should be separate from any act of punishment (committing a person to such place); and that the practice of punishment must be justified through either forward thinking (consequentiality), or backward thinking (deontological). Based on his (and others) ideas it is generally agreed now that while the act of punishment might be the cause of some debate in terms of harshness and appropriateness, the justification for punishment is assumed. Secondly, that the justification for punishment comes from both consequential and deontological considerations. There are a number of reasons why punishment needs to be justified. Firstly punishment is a man-made action – it is not a natural fact and does not exist outside of the human experience. Therefore the rules that govern such action (human on human) are ones that should be considered ideal within society. Punishment as such is something that we as a human society decide to have and maintain within our society – it is a choice and as such could be done without. Although this is not likely to happen it has been proposed by the likes of Skinner in 1948 and Davis in 2003. One of the problems about punishment is the determination of whether or not the acts or depravations inflicted on the perceived wrongdoer are completed by an authoritative body, or by a sadist. The potential for an abuse of the power to inflict harm on another with impunity – indeed one that is actually sanctioned by society at the time cannot be ignored (Bedau). By their very nature punishments are severe, and one of the key issues still being debated today is what constitutes a cruel or inhumane act – where does the authoritative body draw the line especially for when the person being punished has committed acts that society find so distressing. Rehabilitation When it comes to rehabilitation most theories consider three basic ideas: 1. that the intervention is intentional and necessary; 2. that the method of rehabilitation relates directly to what is perceived to be the causal element of the offence in the offender and 3. that the proposed intervention will make it less likely for an individual to reoffend (Cullen and Gendreau). Unfortunately these ideas provide too broad of a consensus as to what might be effective or not. Research shows that very few rehabilitation programs actually have the desired effect in reducing crime (Martinson, Cullen) and they are very expensive to implement. But why are these programs considered so ineffective? Is it because of the premise they are based on as outlined above? This author believes that the single biggest problem with rehabilitation ideology is that an assumption is made on the causal element in an individual’s offending and then this element is addressed when in fact it might not be the reason that the individual committed a wrongdoing in the first place. This author believes that it is the concept of free will and choice that should be addressed in rehabilitative discussions, not a random assignation of cause. That idea dismisses the impact of free will and our ability to choose our actions. Descartes for example claimed that freedom of choice was the same as free will; that this nature allowed anybody to do anything, and that this is not something that can be constrained. Hume talks about acting or not acting dependent on will. These two viewpoints might be a bit too radical to work in today’s society and indeed these ideas have been refuted by subsequent philosophers, but the discussion about free will is relevant here. Hume’s idea above is all about choice based on personal needs and desires. An individual has a need or a desire for something and goes about getting it based entirely on their own thought patterns as opposed to considering the needs of others. A more practical solution might be instead to make a choice based on a choice that is weighed against personal values or morals. This rationale comes from the classical philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and Aquinas. The idea here is that the concept of free choice is tempered by the need to do good or the understanding that to follow through with any action resulting from the choice would in fact not do good (Aquinas) and therefore should not be followed through with. Two lines of thought have stemmed from Aquinas’s and others ideas on choice. One is that our free will could be compromised by an addiction or similar mental affliction and that it is possible to strongly desire something, and not know it is wrong (psychopathic behavior or mental illness). Secondly there is also the issue of what happens when a person’s right to free choice in his actions harms others – what is more important? The individual’s right to free choice or society’s right to live without pain or depravation. Neither of these issues has been addressed fully although many philosophers have tried. Wallace and Mele have tried to do this in separate articles where they have espoused the idea that if a person has a mental illness for example then they are not actually expressing free will in their actions because the deliberative process is impaired. The same could be said for addictions although whether a choice is considered a choice when the desire for the addictive element is so strong is another topic to be debated elsewhere. Harry Frankfurt felt that free will was in fact a choice between wanting something, and “wanting not to want” something. He also believes that free will and free actions are two different things – that it is possible to act without free will; and to have a choice about something and not do it. An important distinction about his ideas was the idea that the moral responsibility for an action only relates to a situation where the individual acted freely; not that the action itself was free will. Discussion When considering the ethics behind our current system of punishment as opposed to rehabilitation as a means of dealing with people who commit offences against people or property, perhaps the most important question that needs to be answered is what purpose is the punishment or rehabilitation system supposed to fulfill? If we consider the question from a correctional authority standpoint then the answers could be to protect society from further crimes by specific individuals. Society’s view may be to serve some form of justice for actions perpetrated by individuals that result in harm or deprivation. The criminal might see the prison system as either a deterrent towards future offending; or a period of tuition on how to get better at his form of criminal offending so he doesn’t get caught next time. The fact is that the mere fact that there are so many viewpoints to the one question makes it really hard to come up with an ideal that will actually work and satisfy the rights of all of the interested stakeholders. If we consider that society has the right to live free from harm or deprivation then any person caught harming or depriving another person in society should be held accountable and put in a position where they won’t commit similar acts in the future – this is the ethical model that our current correction legislation is based on. Wrongdoers, whether they commit their actions by choice or not, are kept locked up away from other law abiding citizens until such time as they have been “punished enough” in accordance with society laws, or punished in another way that causes them harm or deprivation. If we consider every individual human being as a person entitled to the same rights as another, then depriving anyone of their freedom, or property would be wrong – simply because this action is carried out by an authoritative body does not on its own make this right nor does the fact that this same individual might have deprived someone else of their rights. From a simplistic standpoint, especially if we believe Descartes, no-one should be allowed to deprive another simply because they exercise their own free will; so punishment should not be allowable in any situation. The reality is of course that we do have laws and we do have prisons and both of those aspects in life appear to be growth areas. This would suggest that the punitive system, as it stands does not work because it is not acting as a deterrent to either further offending or new offenders committing similar crimes. If crime numbers are to drop then the causal element of those actions needs to be addressed more fully for a rehabilitative system to be implemented. The current punishment based system might not work in its entirety, but the crime figures are unlikely to drop if all of the prisons were emptied overnight. But at present there are simply too many variables to be considered for an effective rehabilitative system to work either – human nature and the ideas of free will being what they are today. Works Cited Bedau, Hugo. “Feinbergs Liberal Theory of Punishment,” Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 2001,5: 103–44. Web. 22 Aug 2011. Cullen, Francis. “Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs.” in J. Q. Wilson and J. Petersilia (eds.), Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control. San Francisco: ICS Press. 2002: 606-614. Web. 22 Aug 2011. Cullen, Francis and P. Gendreau. “Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects” in J. Horney (ed.), Criminal Justice 2000, Volume 3: Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. 2000: 109-175 Print. Davis, Angela Y. Are Prisons Obsolete?, New York: Seven Stories Press. 2003. Print. Descartes, René. “Meditations on First Philosophy [1641] and Passions of the Soul [1649]”, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I-III, translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. Print. Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in Gary Watson ed. Free Will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003, 81–95. Print. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. 1977. Web. 22 Aug 2011. Martinson, Robert. "What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform.” The Public Interest 35 (Spring, 1974):22-54. Mele, Alfred. Free Will and Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. Print. Rawls, John. “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review, 64: 1955. 3–32. Web. 22 Aug 2011. Skinner, Burrhus. Walden Two. New York: Macmillan. 1948. Web. 22 Aug 2011. Wallace, R. Jay. “Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections,” in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003: 424–452. Print. Zimring, Frank E. “Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumers Guide to Sentencing Reform,” Occasional Papers, No. 12, Chicago: University of Chicago Law School. 1977. Web. 22 Aug 2011. Read More